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Abstract 
Lord Neuberger describes open justice as a procedural principle requiring 
that "what goes on in court and what a court decides is open to 
scrutiny".1  The prime rationale typically given for this principle is that it 
is a safety check on the right to a fair trial, and so instrumental to the 
fulfilment of the justice purposes of criminal and civil justice processes.  
The thesis argues that such a conception of open justice only applies on a 
relatively superficial level to inquests into use-of-force deaths at the hands 
of the state.   Rather it is clear that openness in these inquests is intrinsic 
to the purposes of the inquests themselves, and that this is also true of 
other types of investigation in these circumstances.  The thesis examines 
the practice of, and rationales behind, opening up deaths at the hands of 
the police, or in police or prison custody to scrutiny in order to frame a 
context-specific conception of open justice in the aftermath of such deaths.  
The focus of the thesis is police and PPO investigations into deaths in 
prisons, IPCC investigations into deaths involving the police, and inquests 
and inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 (where the latter replace and 
fulfil the role of an inquest).  The thesis introduces recognition theory both 
as a way of understanding the potential harms that may be associated 
with a lack of openness regarding deaths in these circumstances, and to 
provide a normative link between openness and justice in these 
circumstances—a link that is implicit in the term Ǯopen justiceǯ but rarely 
explored in these non-retributive, non-compensatory justice processes. 
                                                 
1 Neuberger, Lord, ǮOpen Justice Unbound?ǯ (JSB Annual Lecture, London, 16 March 2011) 
<http://tinyurl.com/6e7tw5f> accessed 16 January 2012. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
  
 2 
1.1 Background to the study Whenever the state may bear responsibility for an individualǯs death, there will be an 
inquiry.  This will ordinarily be by way of an inquest and will be carried out in public, 
consistent with principles of open justice and public accountability.  While there have been 
advocacy pieces, practitioner guides and court cases which discuss the openness of 
inquests to the public and the media, the concept of open justice has never been framed in 
the context of this particular justice system.  This constitutes a significant gap in (open) 
justice theory. Lord Neuberger describes open justice as ǲa common law principle that stretches back into common lawǯs earliest periodǳ whose ideal is that ǲwhat goes on in court and what the courts decide is open to [public] scrutiny.ǳ1  It is typically thought of as a procedural 
principle, its rationales both directly and indirectly instrumental to the ends of justice.2  In 
particular, the prime rationale for open justice is generally considered to be that it is a 
safety check for the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.3  Most famously, in Scott v Scott 
Lord Shaw quoted Bentham and Hallam in arguing the importance of the principle and the 
rationales behind it: )t moves Bentham over and over again. ǲ)n the darkness of secrecy, sinister 
interest and evil in every shape have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity 
has place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.ǳ ǲPublicity is the very soul of justice. )t is 
the keenest spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying under trial.ǳ4 
The principle, then, is subsidiary to the ends of justice, and thus departure from the ideal may be justified ǲto the extent and to no more than the extent that the court reasonably believes it to be necessary in order to serve the ends of justice.ǳ5 
                                                 
1 Neuberger, Lord, ǮOpen Justice Unbound?ǯ (JSB Annual Lecture, London, 16 March 2011) 
<http://tinyurl.com/6e7tw5f> accessed 16 January 2012. 
2 AG v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 (HL), 450. 
3 ibid, 449–550; Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 (HL). 
4 Scott (ibid), 477. 
5 Leveller Magazine (n 2), 450. 
 3 
The nexus between open justice and the free speech rationales of participatory 
democracy and an informed citizenry, have begun to be recognised in the context of our 
civil and criminal justice systems. Sharon Rodrick points out that: [… R]ecently, there has been a tendency to regard open justice […] as a stand-
alone exercise of freedom of expression. Treating open justice as an adjunct of 
free speech has a number of consequences. First, unlike the traditional approach 
to open justice, it does not demand a link between open justice and the 
administration of justice.6 
However, free speech rationales are still described as peripheral concerns, subsidiary to 
the role of open justice in ensuring a fair trial.7 
When it comes to investigations into deaths at the hands of the state there has been a 
greater tendency towards public participation and openness for reasons more explicitly 
concerned with accountability in terms of the subject matter of the investigation rather 
than its fair and/or proficient conduct.8  The role of open justice in securing public 
accountability for such fatalities has been advanced significantly by both European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and domestic jurisprudence addressing Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).9  Here the development of a procedural obligation 
under Article 2, for the state to initiate an independent, effective and public investigation 
into deaths at the hands of the state, has been justified on the basis of a need for public 
accountability.  In Jordan v UK, the ECtHR stated that such investigations required ǲa sufficient element of public scrutinyǳ in order ǲto ensure accountability in practice as well as in theory.ǳ10  And in Amin, Lord Bingham famously defined the purposes of Article 2-
related investigations as including the need: ǲto ensure so far as possible that the full facts 
are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to 
                                                 
6 Sharon Rodrick, ǮOpen Justice, the Media and Avenues of Access to Documents on the Court Recordǯ 
(2006) 29 Un SWLJ 90, 94–95. 
7 Joseph Jaconelli, Open Justice : A Critique of the Public Trial (OUP 2002) 2; see also the discussion on 
Binyam Mohamed at 9.3.1 below. 
8 Although openness as a check on the fairness and proficiency of the investigation obviously remains a 
feature. 
9 See ch 2 and 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 below. 
10 (2003) 37 EHRR 2, 109 (emphasis added).  See 2.8 below. 
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public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing ȋif unjustifiedȌ is allayed.ǳ11  These 
examples help illustrate that open justice has a more significant role to play in such 
investigations than the traditional characterisation of open justice as a procedural principle 
concerned with ensuring fairness would admit. 
If the rationales behind open justice in investigations into deaths at the hands of the 
state are distinct from those in our criminal and civil justice systems, it is also likely that 
the most appropriate procedural manifestation of open justice will also be different to meet 
these distinct rationales.  This thesis explores the extent to which it can be argued that the publicǯs role in open justice is not just confined to observing, reading or hearing about 
proceedings, but involves an element of active engagement in processes.  This is reflected 
in the role of juries at inquests.12  The involvement of the deceasedǯs next-of-kin in 
investigations may also be seen as another element of open justice.13  While this primarily 
enables them ǲto safeguard [their] legitimate interestsǳ,14 they can also play an important 
role in representing wider public interests at inquests.15 
There is an open justice literature that defines and delimits the procedural principle of 
open justice as it applies to criminal and civil justice processes.16  Academics, practitioners 
and the courts have defined the principle as it relates to these processes in terms of its 
origins, contents and rationales.17  This is not a completely uncontroversial area, but there 
is broad agreement as to what the principleǯs core content and rationales are in the context 
of these judicial systems. 
                                                 
11 R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 51, 31 (emphasis added).  See 
5.1.2.1 below. 
12 See 5.1.3.2 and 9.2.1.9 below. 
13 See 5.1.3.2, 5.1.4, 5.1.5 and 9.2.1.9 below. 
14 Jordan (n 10), 109. 
15 See 5.1.3.2, 5.1.4, 5.1.5 and 9.2.1.9 below and R (Main) v Minister for Legal Aid [2007] EWHC (Admin) 
742. 
16 See, for example, Jaconelli (n 7); Ian Cram, A Virtue Less Cloistered: Courts, Speech and Constitutions 
(Hart Publishing 2002); Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 312–352; Geoffrey Robertson 
and Andrew G.L. Nicol, Media Law (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) 410–519; H.M. Fenwick and G Phillipson, 
Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 167-382; Garth Nettheim, ǮOpen Justice versus Justiceǯ ȋͳͻͺ͵Ȍ ͻ Adel L Rev Ͷͺ͹; Colleen Davis, ǮThe )njustice of Open Justiceǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ͺ JCULR ͻʹ; JJ 
Spigelman, The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective (Lawlink NSW 2005). 
17 For cases on open justice see, for example: Scott (n 3); Leveller Magazine (n 2); Re S (FC) [2004] UKHL 
47; Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB); DL v SL [2015] EWHC 2621 (Fam). 
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Openness is plainly important in inquests and other investigatory processes engaged in 
these circumstances, and there is a literature that discusses this openness to the public and 
the media.18  But while there has been some recognition of the distinctive procedural 
manifestation of open justice in the context of investigations into deaths at the hands of the 
state,19 there has been no systematic analysis of the place and characterisation of open 
justice, nor its normative function.  In so far as the principle of open justice relates to the 
transference of information from judicial processes to members of the public, one might 
presume that it is as relevant to one judicial system as to another.  But even if we confine 
our analysis to judicial processes (i.e. here, the inquest), the relevance, role and content of 
open justice must depend on the type of justice that these processes are directed at 
achieving.  Normally, when open justice is considered in the context of inquests, there is a 
failure to contextualise what is effectively a principle whose core content has been critically 
defined by the very different contexts of criminal and civil justice.  Perhaps most 
significantly, any link between openness and justice—implicit in the term Ǯopen justiceǯ, 
and relatively well-explored in the criminal and civil justice contexts—is rarely considered 
in inquests. 
 
1.2 Aim 
The aim of the thesis is to frame a context-specific conception of open justice in the 
aftermath of deaths at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody, with a focus 
on non-retributive and non-compensatory justice related processes. 
This conception of open justice will be comprised of four elements.  Three of these are 
derived from the interpretive account of practice in England and Wales in Part 1 of the 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Greg Martin and Rebecca Scott Bray, ǮDiscolouring Democracy? Policing, Sensitive Evidence, and Contentious Deaths in the UKǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ JL Soc ͸ʹͶ; Rebecca Scott Bray and Greg Martin, ǮFO): Closing Down Open Justice in the UKǯ ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ͵͹ Alt LJ ͳʹ͸; Rebecca Scott Bray, ǮParadoxical Justice: The Case of )an Tomlinsonǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ ʹ JLM ͶͶ͹; and practitioner guides such as Leslie Thomas QC, Adam Shaw, Daniel 
Machover and Danny Friedman QC, Inquests: A Practitionerǯs Guide (3rd edn, LAG 2014) especially 279-287; 
Christopher Dorries, Coronersǯ Courts: A Guide to Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2014) especially 195-206. 
19 See, for example, Robertson & Nicol (n 16) 492-496; Thomas et al (n 18); John Beggs and Hugh Davies, 
Police Misconduct, Complaints, and Public Regulation (OUP 2009) 541-559; Jack Waterford, ǮThe Media and )nquestsǯ in (ugh Selby ȋedȌ, The Inquest Handbook (Federation Press 1998); Michael (ogan ǮLet Sleeping Watchdogs Lieǯ in Michael Hogan, David Bentley Brown and Russell Hogg (eds), Death in the Hands of the 
State (Redfern Legal Centre Publishing 1988) 161. 
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thesis: the procedural manifestation of openness; the rationales that are given for 
openness; and a general procedural principle of open justice that can be derived from this 
practice.  The fourth element is a normative account of the link between openness and 
justice—a link that is implicit in the term Ǯopen justiceǯ. 
It is argued that, rather than open justice being primarily a check on the fairness of 
processes in these circumstances, it is something akin to a form of justice—an end in itself, 
if not the end—to which the processes concerned are geared.  Theories of procedural 
justice, legitimacy and justice as recognition are used to provide a moral basis for the 
prioritisation of openness in these circumstances.  Such a project is important because an 
understanding of the normative value and purposes of openness will assist in the 
prioritisation and implementation of appropriate corresponding procedures. 
 
1.3 Scope 
1.3.1 The types of death which form the focus of the study 
The thesis focuses on investigations into deaths at the hands of the police, or in police 
or prison custody, in England and Wales.20  These are at times referred to collectively 
below as ǲuse-of-force deaths at the hands of the stateǳ. Their particular significance was 
encapsulated by the ECtHR in Ramsahai v Netherlands, when it stated ǲWhat is at stake here is nothing less than public confidence in the stateǯs monopoly on the use of force.ǳ21 Cases 
that involve deaths in other circumstances at times form part of the discussion where they 
set (or may set) precedents, or are otherwise instructive.22  The focus, however, is on 
instances where a person has died in circumstances in which the state, or state actors, 
exercised, or were exercising coercive force over the deceased in the policing or criminal 
justice contexts.  This includes deaths in prison resulting from self-inflicted injuries. 
The use of force within the criminal justice system is at times unavoidable.  Public 
confidence is often based on a perception that it is governed by an intricate and nuanced 
                                                 
20 A detailed consideration of the Saville Inquiry therefore falls outside of the scope of the thesis. 
21 Ramsahai v Netherlands (2008) 46 EHRR 43, 325. 
22 See, for example, R (Humberstone) v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWCA Civ 1479, a healthcare-
related case which potentially has implications for public funding of the deceasedǯs next-of-kin in all Article 2-
related inquests (see 2.5 below). 
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system of laws, rules, procedures and safeguards regarding its exercise.  But it is only at the 
most sanitised and controlled stage of the criminal justice system, the criminal trial, that 
there is a clear window into the system for the interested public.  An investigation into a 
death occurring within the criminal justice system is a rare opportunity to open up 
normally unseen processes where the state exercises its monopoly on the coercive use of 
force over its citizens. 
 
1.3.2 The types of investigation which form the focus of the study 
The thesis analyses processes that pursue non-retributive/punitive justice and non-
compensatory justice forms.  The primary focus is on coronersǯ inquests, and inquiries 
under the Inquiries Act 2005 (IA 2005) where these perform a function analogous to coronersǯ inquests.  The secondary focus is Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC), Prison and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) and (in the case of deaths in prison 
custody) police investigations.  While IPCC and police investigations are also associated 
with broader criminal and disciplinary investigative processes, they play crucial roles in 
identifying lines of inquiry, and collecting evidence in preparation for inquests.  A 
discussion which treats inquests and inquiries in isolation from these preliminary 
investigations would be incomplete. 
 
1.3.3 Justice theory 
Theories of procedural justice, restorative justice, justice as recognition, and 
transitional justice inform a discussion on the nature and place of open justice in 
investigations into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state.  However, the critical 
analysis of these theories are necessarily limited due to issues of length.  In particular, the 
consideration of restorative justice is confined to its invocation in some literature on justice 
during transitions.  A critical analysis based on recognition theory is preferred as means of 
explaining, amongst other things, many of the benefits often associated with restorative 
justice approaches. 
 8 
The discussion of recognition theories is also necessarily limited, and based primarily on Axel (onnethǯs seminal theory of recognition in The Struggle for Recognition: the Moral 
Grammar of Social Conflicts.23  Honneth acknowledges that there remains dispute about 
what the content of a unifying theory of recognition should be.24  But a detailed analysis of 
the philosophical polemics surrounding recognition as a normative model for social and 
political theory is not possible in this thesis.25 
Similarly, while Chapters 7 and 8 discuss aspects of theories of procedural justice and 
justice during transitions respectively, it has not been possible to cover all competing 
theories in these areas.  Rather these chapters concentrate on those issues and arguments 
considered most relevant for an understanding of any link between openness and justice in 
the circumstances that are the focus of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
The investigation involves a traditional doctrinal legal analysis of domestic and ECtHR 
jurisprudence, primary and secondary legislation, guidance, policy documents and 
literature on the investigatory processes engaged following use-of-force deaths at the 
hands of the state. The thesis also discusses relevant literature on justice theory and 
research in the areas of procedural justice, restorative justice, justice as recognition and 
transitional justice. 
Use has been made of data including: consultation submissions and evidence; 
parliamentary debates; inquest and inquiry transcripts; and interviews (including with 
families and practitioners) and reports published by the media, the government, 
organisations such as the IPCC, the PPO and the organisation INQUEST.  Research also 
                                                 
23 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition (MIT Press 1996). 
24 Axel (onneth, ǮRecognition as )deologyǯ, in Bert van den Brink and D. Owen ȋEdsȌ Recognition and 
Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory (CUP 2007) 328. 
25 For more on the nature of some of these polemics see, for example, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth  
Redistribution Or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (Verso 2003); Jonathan Allen, ǮDecency and the Struggle for Recognitionǯ ȋͳͻͻͺȌ ʹͶ Soc TP ͶͶͻ; Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition ȋER)C ͳͻͻͶȌ; Mattias )ser, ǮRecognitionǯ, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall edn, 2013) 
<http://tinyurl.com/ofrqfye> accessed Ͷ October ʹͲͳ͵; Nancy Fraser, ǮRethinking Recognitionǯ ȋʹͲͲͲȌ New 
Left Rev 207. 
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involved attendance during most of the Ian Tomlinson inquest (2011), the Azelle Rodney 
Inquiry (2012) and the Mark Duggan inquest (2013-14). This helped to achieve a better 
understanding of how the relevant law, rules and guidance are put into practice, and how 
things may have changed, when compared to accounts of earlier inquests. 
In Chapter 6 there is a discussion of the predictable harms that may arise in the 
aftermath of deaths at the hands of the state and inadequate institutional responses to 
those deaths.  The thesis could not include an empirical analysis of how individuals from 
three categories of interested persons (family, community and general public) tend to 
interpret and relate to state action or inaction in the aftermath of a death at its hands—
whether or not such an analysis is even possible and could produce empirically useful 
material.  The description of harms is, therefore, largely intuitive, but has been informed by the candidateǯs personal experience of practicing law in this area, and public statements 
where individuals have given expression to similar senses of injustice to those described, 
or to a sense of justice that has come with reliable official explanations about the 
circumstances of deaths.  As well as the fact that these experiences are highly subjective, 
their public expression is relatively rare.  The examples given in the chapter are, therefore, 
purely illustrative, and the conclusions drawn from the discussion in this chapter are done 
so guardedly. 
 
1.5 Chapter outline 
Part 1 of the thesis is primarily explicatory and looks at the practice of opening up the 
circumstances of deaths at the hands of the police, and in police and prison custody, to 
scrutiny.  Critical analysis is limited and mainly left to Part 3.  Chapter 2 describes the 
historical development of the investigative obligation under Article 2 ECHR in ECtHR jurisprudence whilst focusing on the obligationǯs open justice requirements. Chapter ͵ 
examines domestic law, jurisprudence, rules and guidance governing police and PPO 
investigations into deaths in prison, and IPCC investigations into deaths at the hands of the 
police or otherwise in police custody.  Chapter 4 assesses the history of the inquest in 
England and Wales from its origins in the twelfth century until the late twentieth century.  
Finally Chapter 5 examines current practice in inquests and inquiries under the IA 2005 
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into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state.  All four chapters focus on the openness of 
processes to public participation and scrutiny. 
Part 2 begins by taking something akin to a negative morality approach in Chapter 6, by 
outlining the types of harm that might predictably arise when there are inadequate state 
responses to use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state.  These harms may impact upon 
one or more of three categories of people: those personally close to the deceased; any 
community or group that identifies with the deceased; and members of the wider general 
public.  It is argued that these harms are analogous to the types of harm that are often the 
focus of certain theories of procedural justice and justice as recognition. 
Chapter 7 considers aspects of ongoing debates in procedural justice theory concerning 
the intrinsic justice value of procedures for those engaged in judicial and other decision-
making processes.  This includes a consideration of the notion of legitimacy. Rawlsǯs 
account of political legitimacy provides an analogy to illustrate the general normative 
importance of participatory rights within decision-making and narrative formation 
processes.  It also provides a direct explanation of why open and effective investigations 
into use-of-force deaths may contribute to the legitimacy of the stateǯs monopoly on the use 
of force, by making the state accountable for the social and individual exercise of that 
monopoly.  The second part of Chapter 7 introduces recognition theory and outlines its 
core elements. 
In Part 3, Chapter 8 begins the synthesis of the practice described in Part 1 with the 
theory described in Part 2, by looking at ǯtransitional justiceǯ and truth commissions.  The 
chapter draws from existing debates in the one area of law where there has been some 
analysis and discussion of the relative normative value of (non-retributive justice-related) 
truth discovery and narrative formation processes concerning (amongst other things) 
deaths at the hands of the state.  In particular, discussions about the normative function of 
truth commissions provides some insight into the potential justice value of truth discovery 
and narrative formation processes in non-transitional contexts. 
Finally, Chapter 9 outlines the elements of a context-specific conception of open justice.  
It begins by summarising the main aspects of the practice described in Part 1 in terms of 
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both the form that openness takes in the aftermath of use-of-force deaths at the hands of 
the state in England and Wales, and the rationales provided for openness.  The chapter then 
discusses the most appropriate form for a general procedural principle of open justice in 
this context that is consistent with the practice.  Finally, the chapter concludes by 
describing the normative value of openness in these circumstances in relation to the elements of (onnethǯs theory of recognition.  This illustrates the real and important link 
between openness and justice as recognition in these circumstances. 
In addressing the thesis aim described above, and reaching conclusions, Chapter 9 
summarises the main points made in Parts 1 and 2 of the thesis.  As such, Chapter 10, which 
concludes the thesis, is relatively brief in order to avoid repetition, and is mainly confined 
to some tentative suggestions as to the practical implications of the analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
ECtHR Jurisprudence on Article ʹǯs Procedural 
Obligation  
  
 16 
2.1 Introduction 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) was drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War by the then 
members of the Council of Europe.  It came into force on 3 September 1953.  The 
Convention and six of its 14 Protocols set out basic rights and freedoms that state parties 
undertake to secure to all persons within their jurisdiction.1  The UK ratified the 
Convention on ͺ March ͳͻͷͳ.  Under the UKǯs dualist approach to international law, the 
Convention does not have direct application in domestic law.  Since 1966, the UK has 
recognised the right of individuals to petition the ECtHR and until 2001 this was the only 
way individuals could seek redress for alleged breaches of their Article rights by the state. 
In October 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) came into force and made it 
unlawful for public authorities to act incompatibly with Convention rights, unless 
prevented from doing otherwise by primary legislation.2  Section 6(3) states that public 
authorities include courts and tribunals.  Under the Act individuals can also challenge 
alleged breaches of Article rights by public authorities in domestic courts.3  All UK courts 
and tribunals must, so far as possible, read and give effect to all primary and secondary 
legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights,4 taking into account ECtHR 
jurisprudence.5  Where this is not possible certain courts may make a Declaration of 
Incompatibility under s 4.6  This does not affect the continued validity of the legislation 
concerned, but is intended to prompt the legislature to remedy the incompatibility—if 
necessary with fast-track procedures.7 
Convention jurisprudence now permeates the current domestic framework of 
legislation, case-law, rules, regulations, protocols, policy documents and memoranda of 
                                                 
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
2 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), s 6. 
3 ibid, s 7. 
4 ibid, s 3. 
5 ibid, s 2(1)(a). 
6 ibid, s Ͷ. For this section Ǯcourtsǯ includes the Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, the Court Martial Appeal Court, the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Protection in any 
matter being dealt with by the President of the Family Division, the Vice-Chancellor or a puisne judge of the 
High Court. (s. 4(5)) 
7 HRA 1998, s 4(6)(a), 10 and sch 2. 
 17 
understanding etc. that set out essential and best practice for investigations into deaths at 
the hands of the state in England and Wales.  This chapter analyses the ECt(Rǯs 
development of a procedural obligation under Article 2 for there to be an official and public 
investigation into deaths at the hands of the state. It is worthwhile considering this 
obligation separately, before looking at its influence on domestic practice. 
It will be seen in Chapter 4 that for centuries domestic law has required that the types 
of death with which this thesis is concerned are publicly investigated in inquests, and that 
families of the deceased can participate in them.  The origins of this requirement are not 
rights-based, however, and the rationales that have sustained the requirement have 
evolved considerably.  In contrast, while ECtHR jurisprudence alludes to various purposes 
behind the procedural obligation that it has developed, its obligation is, first and foremost, 
derived from the requirement under Article 2 to provide practical protection for the 
substantive right to life.  One aim of this thesis is to understand the normative function of 
openness in the aftermath of a death at the hands of the state, and to understand any 
connection between openness and justice in inquests and related processes—a connection 
which is implicit in the term Ǯopen justiceǯ.  By looking at the evolution of the Article 2 
obligation separately we should get a clearer picture of its discrete character. 
 Article ʹ has been described by the (igh Court as ǲthe most fundamental of all human rights.ǳ8  It requires states to have laws in place which protect everyoneǯs right to life, and 
prohibits states from deliberately taking anyoneǯs life, except in certain limited 
circumstances.9  
This chapter describes the beginnings of the procedural obligation on states to 
investigate certain deaths, and how ECtHR case-law has refined the principles and 
minimum requirements which make up the obligation.  The focus is on two questions: 
When is the obligation engaged? And, what are its constituent elements?  Particular 
                                                 
8 R v DPP, ex p Manning [2001] QB 330 (QB) 33. 
9 Where it is the result of no more force than absolutely necessary in defence from unlawful violence, 
during a lawful arrest, preventing the escape of someone lawfully detained, or to quell a riot or insurrection 
(ECHR, art 2). 
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attention is given to the open justice and participatory aspects of the obligation.  The 
chapter is explicatory; analysis is mostly left to later chapters. 
 
2.2 McCann v UK – The beginnings of a procedural obligation under Article 2 ECHR 
McCann v UK10 (1995) was brought by the parents of three Provisional IRA members 
shot dead by members of the Special Air Service (SAS) in Gibraltar in March 1988.  The 
deceased had been under surveillance and were in Gibraltar to carry out a terrorist attack.  
The soldiers who carried out the shootings stated they believed the deceased intended to 
detonate a bomb using a remote detonating device and were likely to be armed.  In fact, 
none were armed or carrying detonating devices when killed.  A bomb was later found in a car hired by one of the deceased.  The inquest jury returned a ǲlawful killingǳ verdict by a 
nine – two majority.11  The parents of the deceased complained that the killings violated 
Article 2, and that the investigation and inquest into the shootings were defective. On whether there had been a breach of Article ʹǯs substantive negative obligation, the 
Court ruled that it must examine ǲall the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination.ǳ12  As Ní Aoláin points out, this ǲwidened the mantle of state protection, preventing the moment of death alone becoming defining of liability.ǳ13  This had important implications for the procedural 
obligation the Court also developed. 
On the substantive obligation, the Court accepted the soldiersǯ assertions, but 
nevertheless held that there had been a breach of Article 2 because state actors missed 
opportunities to arrest the suspects prior to lethal force being ǲrendered inevitableǳ.14   
The Court then developed the procedural obligation that is the focus of this chapter.  It 
held: 
                                                 
10 (1996) 21 EHRR 97. 
11 ibid, 121. 
12 ibid, 150. 
13 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ǮThe Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Convention Concerning the Right to Lifeǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ͳͻ NQ(R ʹͳ, ʹͻ. 
14 McCann (n 10) 201. 
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[… A] general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State 
would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the 
lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities. The obligation to 
protect the right to life under this provision, read in conjunction with the State's 
general duty under Article ͳ of the Convention to ǲsecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Conventionǳ, requires 
by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation 
when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alia, 
agents of the State.15 
The Court concluded that there had been no breach of this requirement.16   It pointed 
out that a public inquest had taken place, lasting 19 days and involving 79 witnesses with a ǲdetailed review of the eventsǳ surrounding the killings, and that lawyers for the families of 
the deceased had had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and make submissions.17 
The Court was reluctant to specify what form an investigation should take, but noted 
that the inquest had been held in public, provided a degree of participation for the families, 
and took in the wider circumstances of the killings.18  In subsequent ECtHR case-law, all 
three of these characteristics developed into explicit minimum requirements. 
It is important to point out that the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR), 
had similarly indicated the need for a procedural obligation to investigate use-of-force 
deaths at the hands of the state in its Report on McCann.  The Commission held that the 
purpose of such an obligation was to ensure that ǲthe circumstances of a deprivation of a life by agents of the state may receive public and independent scrutiny.ǳ19  It gave two 
rationales behind this need: first, the need to have ǲregard to […] the necessity of ensuring the effective protection of the rights guaranteed under the Conventionǳ, and, in particular, that ǲeveryoneǯs right to life […] be ǲprotected by the lawǳǳ;20 and second, that it was ǲessential both for the relatives and for public confidence in the administration of justice 
                                                 
15 ibid, 161. 
16 ibid, 163. 
17 ibid, 162–164. 
18 ibid, 162. 
19 McCann v UK App no 18984/91 (Commission Report, 1994) 193. 
20 Ibid. 
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and in the stateǯs adherence to the principle of the rule of law that a killing by the state is subject to some form of open and objective oversight.ǳ21  As seen above, the Court only 
adopted the first of these rationales, sharpening it with reference to Article 1, and the Commissionǯs second rationale is notable in its absence from the Courtǯs reasoning. 
This was the first case in which the procedural obligation had been read into Article 2.  
The Court must have been aware that it would be accused of judicial activism by creating a 
procedural obligation which had no textual basis in Article 2.  By adopting only the former 
rationale, and sharpening it with reference to Article 1, the Court makes a strong argument 
that a natural reading of the two Articles must imply some independent and effective 
investigation into killings by state actors.  How can a state give effective protection to the 
substantive right without investigating alleged breaches? 
It is argued in later chapters that public confidence in the administration of justice and the stateǯs adherence to the rule of law are obviously important, and can be threatened 
where use-of-force deaths occur at the hands of state actors.  There is an argument that 
such confidence is necessary for effectively protecting the substantive requirements of the 
right to life, although it is a relatively nuanced one—particularly if used as a basis for a 
relatively onerous positive obligation.  It is understandable then, that the Court preferred 
to limit its reasoning for the obligation to what falls within the spirit of a plain reading of 
Articles 1 and 2—even if there are other, equally good reasons (including those associated 
with democratic accountability) for states publicly investigating certain deaths.  As the 
investigative obligation has become more established, the rationale of accountability being 
intrinsically valuable has also entered the Courtǯs reasoning in judgments on Article ʹ. 
 
2.3 Kaya v Turkey – The need for independence and public scrutiny 
The next significant case was Kaya v Turkey in 1998.22  Here, the applicant alleged that 
members of the Turkish security forces had unlawfully killed his brother.  The deceased 
                                                 
21 ibid, 192. 
22 (1999) 28 EHRR 1. 
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had been apprehended by Turkish forces, and it was alleged that when he attempted to 
flee, he was shot by the security forces who planted a gun next to his body. 
The Court reiterated the investigative requirement established in McCann; that there be an ǲeffective official investigationǳ into deaths at the hands of the state.23  It added that this 
required ǲsome form of independent and public scrutiny capable of leading to a 
determination on whether the force used was or was not justified in a particular set of circumstancesǳ24—thus confirming the requirements of independence and openness 
alluded to in McCann.  According to the Court, the procedural obligation ǲsecures the accountability of agents of the state for their use of lethal force.ǳ25  This could be 
interpreted as a rationale that is important in its own right, or something instrumental to 
securing for everyone the substantive right to life. 
Kaya blurred the line between the procedural obligation under Article 2 and the right to 
an effective remedy under Article 13, only distinguishing between them by saying that Article ͳ͵ǯs requirements were ǲbroaderǳ.26  According to the Court, Article 13: […] entails, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a 
thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the relatives 
to the investigatory procedure.27 
It is unclear exactly how this requirement is broader than McCannǯs procedural 
requirement.  The difference for the Court at the time may have been that Article 13 
required an investigation to be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible for a death.  If this was the case, it was a distinction that did not last.28 
                                                 
23 ibid, 86. 
24 ibid, 87 and 91 (emphasis added). 
25 ibid, 87. 
26 ibid, 107.  The reasoning in Kaya, stemmed from the Article 3-related cases of Aksoy v Turkey [1996] 
ECHR 68; Aydin v Turkey [1997] ECHR 75. 
27 ibid. 
28 The Court concluded in Kaya that there had been a breach of Article ʹǯs procedural obligation and that 
there has been a denial of an effective remedy under Article 13; ibid 108. 
 Yasa v Turkey ((1999) 28 EHRR 408) referred to the two obligations without distinguishing between 
them (74). Assenov v Bulgaria ((1999) 28 EHRR 652) referred to the need for an investigation to be capable of 
leading to the identification and punishment of wrongdoers under Article 2 (102). 
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2.4 Ergi v Turkey – The burden to initiate an investigation falls on the state 
Ergi v Turkey (1998) concerned the death of a two-year-old girl during a security 
operation by Turkish forces in South-East Turkey.29  The deceasedǯs brother alleged that state forces opened fire on the deceasedǯs village with an indiscriminate bombardment of 
houses, killing his sister.  The Turkish government claimed that the operation was directed 
at members of the PKK, and that a PKK bullet had killed the deceased. 
As in Kaya, the Court found that it was unable to determine whether the victim had 
been killed unlawfully by state actors.30  But it rejected the Turkish governmentǯs argument 
that the investigative obligation should only arise where it was beyond reasonable doubt 
that state officials caused a death.31  The Court also held that it was irrelevant whether or 
not the family of the deceased had lodged a formal complaint with authorities.  Instead, ǲthe mere knowledge of the killing on the part of the authorities gave rise ipso factoǳ to the 
procedural obligation.32  Therefore, along with the now explicit requirements for 
effectiveness, openness to the public, and independence, states had to undertake 
investigations on their own initiative. 
 
2.5 Powell v UK and Tarariyeva v Russia – Article 2 and failures on the part of 
healthcare workers 
The early ECtHR case-law quickly established that the procedural obligation under 
Article 2 required independent, public, and effective investigations into violent deaths 
involving state actors, and these had to be initiated by the state, involve the family of the 
deceased and be capable of leading to the identification of persons responsible. 
Most early cases focused on the effectiveness of investigations.  It was noted that in 
McCann the Court was impressed by what it saw as the inquestǯs thoroughness.33  In 
                                                 
29 (2001) 32 EHRR 18. 
30 ibid, 78. 
31 ibid, 82. 
32 ibid, 82. 
33 McCann (n 10) 162. 
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contrast, the Court found a breach of Article ʹǯs investigative obligation in Kaya because of 
the lack of a thorough investigation by the public prosecutor.  The Court criticised several 
elements of the investigation, including the fact that the prosecutor: appeared to assume 
that the deceased was a terrorist who died in a clash with security forces;34 did not scrutinise the soldiersǯ accounts or take statements from those present;35 made ǲno attempts […] to confirm whether there were spent cartridges over the area consistent with an intense gun battleǳ;36 did not test the deceased for gunpowder residue, or dust the 
weapon he was alleged to have used for fingerprints;37 and relied on a deeply flawed 
autopsy report that did not even indicate how many bullets had struck the deceased.38  In 
Ergi, the Court was likewise critical of the public prosecutorǯs investigation: he had relied 
almost entirely on an incident report prepared by a gendarme commander who was not 
present during the alleged clash between the security forces and the PKK.39 
The subject matter of Powell v UK does not strictly fall within the scope of this study, but 
it may have an effect on prison-related deaths in light of the later case of Tarariyeva v 
Russia.40  Powell was a decision on admissibility. It concerned the death of a 10-year-old boy from Addisonǯs disease.  The applicants alleged that their son would not have died had 
it not been for the negligence of healthcare staff, and that hospital records had been 
falsified in order to cover-up staff failures. 
The Court began by stating that Article 2 requires states not only to refrain from 
unlawfully taking lives, but also to take appropriate steps to protect life.41  As such, acts or 
omissions by healthcare authorities may, in certain circumstances, engage a stateǯs 
responsibility under Article 2.  However: […W]here a Contracting State has made adequate provision for securing high 
professional standards among health professionals and the protection of the 
                                                 
34 Kaya (n 22) 89. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid, 86–92. 
39 Ergi ȋn ʹͻȌ ͳ͵ͳ. No statements were taken from the victimǯs family, other villagers or any of the 
military personnel present (83). 
40 (Admissibility) (2000) 30 EHRR CD362; [2006] ECtHR 4353/03.  
41 ibid, 12. 
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lives of patients, [the Court] cannot accept that matters such as error of 
judgment on the part of a health professional or negligent co-ordination among 
health professionals in the treatment of a particular patient are sufficient of 
themselves to call a Contracting State to account from the standpoint of its 
positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life.42 
Thus individual negligence by healthcare staff resulting in death does not alone 
constitute a breach of the obligation to protect life under Article 2. 
The Court then considered whether a death in these circumstances triggered the investigative obligation under Article ʹ.  )t ǲattached particular weightǳ to the procedural 
obligation, which was not confined to cases involving the use of force by the state,43 and 
held that the obligation could arise in cases involving healthcare workers.  However, the 
Court left room for confusion: 
The Court considers that the procedural obligation as described cannot be 
confined to circumstances in which an individual has lost his life as a result of an 
act of violence. In its opinion, and with reference to the facts of the instant case, 
the obligation at issue extends to the need for an effective independent system 
for establishing the cause of death of an individual under the care and 
responsibility of health professionals and any liability on the part of the latter.44 The problem here is that the Court refers to both ǲthe procedural obligation as describedǳ ȋi.e. that which involves an effective, public investigation initiated by the state), and what has been interpreted as a different procedural requirement for ǲan effective independent system for establishing the cause of death of an individualǳ.  Reading this 
paragraph in isolation, it is easy to dismiss these as simply different words to describe the 
same thing.  However, this interpretation is problematic in light of subsequent comments 
by the Court that do not correspond to what have elsewhere been accepted as the full investigative obligationǯs minimum requirements.  In particular, the Court noted that the 
applicants had abandoned an appeal against a Medical Services Committee investigation, 
                                                 
42 ibid, 12. 
43 ibid, 13. 
44 ibid. 
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the implication being that the applicants bore responsibility for ensuring there was an 
effective investigation.  This was compounded by the Courtǯs observation that by settling their civil claim, the family ǲhad closed another and crucially important avenue for shedding light on the extent of the doctorǯs responsibility for their sonǯs death.ǳ45  This was 
ultimately behind the Courtǯs decision that the case was inadmissible because the 
applicants were no longer ǲvictimsǳ under Article 34.46 
Subsequent ECtHR case-law seems to confirm that there is a hierarchy of investigative 
obligations under Article 2 in healthcare-related cases.47  This approach was also endorsed 
domestically in Goodson v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire and Luton, Moss v HM Coroner for 
the North and South Districts of Durham and Darlington, and Humberstone.48  However, 
other case-law (albeit case-law that does not refer to Powell) has at least held that the full 
procedural obligation under Article 2 cannot be bypassed through payment of 
compensation.49 
That Powell may have concerning implications for prison deaths appears more likely 
following the 2006 judgment in Tarariyeva v Russia.50  Here, the deceased was a prisoner 
who died because of poor medical treatment whilst in custody in both civilian and prison 
health institutions.51  His mother alleged breaches of Articles 2 and 13 for failing to carry 
out a comprehensive or adequate investigation; that her civil action attached to the 
criminal proceedings had been refused; and that she had no prospects of obtaining redress 
in bringing separate civil proceedings.52  These matters were considered exclusively under 
Article 2 by the Court.  Under the heading ǲAdequacy of the investigationǳ, it opened its 
discussion, saying: 
                                                 
45 ibid,13–14. 
46 See also Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy [2002] ECHR 51–55. 
47 ibid. 
48 [2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin); [2008] EWHC 2940 (Admin); Humberstone (ch 1, n 22). 
49 See the discussion of Kelly below (2.8.3). However, Happold and Chevalier-Watts argue that Akman v 
Turkey (App. No. 37453/97, 26 June 2001) indicates the Court may still turn a blind eye to the procedural 
obligation where compensation for a death has been paid (Matthew (appold, ǮLetting States Get Away with Murderǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ͳͷͳ NLJ ͳ͵ʹ͵; Juliet Chevalier-Watts, ǮEffective )nvestigations under Article ʹ of the European Convention on (uman Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous Burden on a State?ǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ 
21 EJIL 701, 718). 
50 Tarariyeva (n 40). 
51 In the civilian hospital he was handcuffed to the hospital bed. 
52 Tarariyeva (n 40) 72. 
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The Court also has to examine whether the respondent Government discharged their obligation under Article ʹ to put at the applicantǯs disposal an effective 
judicial system, enabling liability for the loss of life to be established and any 
appropriate redress to be obtained.53 
While the Court referred to Keenan v UK,54 and the fact that it was ǲincumbent on the State to account for any injuries suffered in custodyǳ, it made no reference to the full 
investigative obligation under Article 2 to initiate an independent, effective and public 
investigation into deaths in custody.55  Instead it dealt with the matter under a duty to 
provide an ǲeffective judicial systemǳ.56  The Court complained that there were delays in 
the criminal investigation, that it was not comprehensive, and that the applicantǯs right to 
participate was not secured.57  The rest of the discussion centred on the collapse of the trial 
against one doctor, the failure to bring to trial cases against other staff,58 and the applicantǯs inability to bring civil proceedings.  )n its conclusion, the Court used another 
form of wording for a procedural obligation under Article 2: 
In these circumstances, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article ʹ of the Convention on account of the Russian authoritiesǯ failure to discharge 
their positive obligation to determine, in an adequate and comprehensive 
manner, the cause of death of Mr Tarariyeva and bring those responsible to 
account.  The Court considers that no separate examination of the same issue 
from the standpoint of Article 13 of the Convention is necessary.59 Much of the Courtǯs analysis of the facts would have been equally germane to both a full 
investigative obligation—as expressed in McCann et al—or a more limited obligation as 
described in Powell.  However, it failed to consider the need for the investigation to be 
public, or the need for any investigation to have been initiated by, and pursued by, the 
state. 
                                                 
53 ibid, 90 (emphasis added). 
54 (2001) 33 EHRR 38. See below at 2.7. 
55 Tarariyeva (n 40) 74. 
56 ibid, 75. 
57 ibid, 91–93. 
58 ǲ[D]espite the medical expertsǯ unanimous finding that there had been a causal link between their failings and Mr Tarariyevaǯs deathǳ ȋibid, 95). 
59 ibid, 103 (emphasis added). 
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It is difficult to gauge the significance of Tarariyeva.  The Court found in favour of the 
applicants so overwhelmingly that the minimum requirements of the obligation, including 
that it be public, were never really tested.  But the implication is that there is a lesser 
obligation in some healthcare-related cases (as Powell and some subsequent cases 
indicate60) even where the death occurs in custody. 
The issue could arguably be dealt with more cleanly if, where appropriate, the full 
investigative obligation is addressed by the Court under Article 2, and any lesser 
investigative obligation in basic negligence cases, under Article 13—especially as the issue of an ǲeffective judicial systemǳ is invariably connected by the Court to questions 
concerning the availability of potential criminal or civil remedies.  At the moment, the 
danger is that one obligation can be lost behind the other, and this is what appears to have 
happened in Tarariyeva.  The Court made no mention of the importance of investigations 
into prison deaths being public: an obligation that can often only be guaranteed if the duty 
to initiate (and sustain) an investigation is borne by the state.  If pure healthcare-related 
cases do not engage the full investigative obligation when only individual negligence is 
alleged, that must be accepted.  But this case involved a death in custody, where the 
deceased was being confined involuntarily, and was subject to the coercive use of force 
(including allegedly having his medication taken away from him by the prison, being handcuffed to the bed in the civilian hospitalǯs resuscitation unit, and being transferred back to the prison despite being ǲunfit for transportationǳȌ.61 
 
2.6 Salman v Turkey – The burden on the state to explain deaths in custody 
Salman v Turkey involved a death in police custody.62  The case is significant because it 
imported into such cases an important development in Article 3-related cases: where 
someone has been injured in custody, the onus falls on the state to explain the injuries:63 
                                                 
60 Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 12, 89; Calvelli (n 46) 51–55. 
61 Tarariyeva (n 40) 44. 
62 (2002) 34 EHRR 17. 
63 See Tomasi v France (1993) 15 EHRR 1; Selmouni v France (2009) 29 EHRR 403. 
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[…] Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are 
under a duty to protect them.  Consequently, where an individual is taken into 
police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is 
incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries 
were caused.  The obligation on the authorities to account for treatment of an 
individual in custody is particularly stringent where that individual dies. […] Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive 
knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in 
custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death 
occurring during that detention.  Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded 
as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing 
explanation.64 
The implication, therefore, is that failure to investigate and provide a plausible explanation for a death in custody may not only breach Article ʹǯs procedural obligation, 
but may lead the Court to conclude by default that there has also been a breach of the 
substantive negative obligation. 
 
2.7 Keenan v UK – Responsibility for self-inflicted deaths in prison 
Keenan v UK (2001) concerned an alleged breach of Article 2 in circumstances which 
correspond to an unfortunate number of deaths in custody.65  The applicantǯs mentally ill 
son, Mark Kennan, took his own life in HM Prison Exeter.  He was serving a 28-day 
punishment which had been added to his sentence for assaulting two prison wardens.  Markǯs mother alleged breaches of Articles ʹ, ͵ and ͳ͵ by the state for failing to protect her sonǯs right to life and subjecting him to cruel and inhuman and/or degrading punishment 
before his death. 
Powell indicated that it cannot be taken for granted that just because a death occurs in a 
state institution, or that state actors contributed to a death, the full investigative obligation 
under Article 2 will be engaged.  The Court first has to be satisfied that a death is prima 
                                                 
64 Salman (n 62) 99–100. 
65 Keenan (n 54). 
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facie of a type capable of engaging the substantive obligation under Article 2.  Keenan 
answered this question in relation to self-inflicted deaths in custody.66 
The Court began by reiterating the duty upon states to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.  This, it said, includes a duty to have in 
place a criminal justice system to deter offences against the person,67 and extends, in appropriate circumstances, ǲto a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventative 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.ǳ68  This extended duty arises where authorities know, or ought to 
know, of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual.69  They must then take reasonable steps to avoid the risk to the individualǯs life.70  The question for the Court was whether this duty arose ǲwhere the risk to a person derives from self-harm.ǳ71 
In Osman v UK, the Court indicated a relatively high threshold for when a state may be 
responsible for a death at the hands of a non-state actor.72  However, in Keenan the Court 
noted that prisoners were in a particularly vulnerable position and therefore authorities 
had a general duty to protect them from harm73 and account for injuries which occurred in 
prison.74  The duty to protect had to be balanced against potentially competing rights—e.g. 
Articles 5 (Liberty and Security of Person) and 8 (Private and Family Life).  However, the Court stated that ǲ[t]here are general measures and precautions which will be available to 
diminish the opportunities of self-harm, without infringing personal autonomy, […w]hether any more stringent measures are necessary […] and whether it is reasonable to 
apply them will depend on the circumstances of the case.ǳ75 
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Mark Keenan was acknowledged by all concerned to be mentally ill.  While the 
immediacy of the risk he presented to himself varied, the Court was satisfied that the 
prison authorities knew that he posed a risk to his own life.76  The test was whether the authorities had done all that was reasonably expected of them, ǲhaving regard to the nature of the risk posed.ǳ77  The Court found that they had. 
 
2.8 Jordan et al v UK – The essential elements of the procedural obligation are 
confirmed 
Jordan v UK,78 Kelly v UK,79 McKerr v UK80 and Shanaghan v UK81 involved deaths connected to ǮThe Troublesǯ in Northern )reland and were dealt with by the Court 
simultaneously. 
 
2.8.1 The facts in brief 
2.8.1.1 Jordan v UK 
The applicantǯs ʹʹ-year-old son was shot three times in the back by a Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) officer on 25 November 1992.  The circumstances of the shooting were 
disputed, but an official statement by the RUC, acknowledged that: 
[…] an RUC unit had pursued a car on the Falls Road and brought it to a halt.  On 
stopping the car, the officers had fired several shots at the driver, fatally 
wounding him a short distance from where his car had been abandoned.  No 
guns, ammunition, explosives, masks or gloves had been found in the car and 
the driver, Pearse Jordan, had been unarmed.82 
On 29 November 1993, the coroner was informed that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) had decided not to prosecute anyone for the death.  No reasons were 
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given. This decision was reviewed and upheld by the DPP shortly after the inquest began, 
again with no reasons given.  Before the inquest, the Secretary of State for Defence issued two Public )nterest )mmunity ȋP))Ȍ certificates which ǲidentified information whose 
disclosure at the inquest he believed would be contrary to the public interest on grounds of national securityǳ.83  He also applied for the identify of certain military witnesses not to be 
made public at the inquest.  The family brought judicial review proceedings against the 
coroner, primarily in order to challenge the non-disclosure of witness statements.  Delays 
and litigation about the conduct of the inquest meant that when the case came before the 
ECtHR, the inquest was still on-going.  Civil proceedings were also still pending when the 
ECtHR gave judgment in 2001. 
 
2.8.1.2 Kelly v UK 
In Kelly, 24 soldiers and three RUC officers ambushed a Provisional IRA attack on an 
RUC station.  During a fire-fight, eight IRA members and a passing civilian were killed—all 
by bullets fired by the security forces.  Relatives of the deceased alleged inter alia that the 
deceased were killed by the use of excessive force and the security operation was not 
conducted in compliance with Article ʹǯs substantive negative obligation.  They also alleged 
a breach of the obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the deaths due to the 
scope of the inquest being too limited, a lack of legal aid for relatives, a lack of advanced 
disclosure of witness statements, the extensive use of PII certificates, and the inability of 
the coroner to compel police officers to attend the inquest. 
 
2.8.1.3 McKerr v UK 
On 11 November 1982, Gervaise McKerr and two passengers were shot and killed 
whilst driving a car in East Lurgan.  None were armed.  At least 109 rounds were fired into 
the car by RUC officers.  Three officers were initially prosecuted for their involvement.  At the close of the prosecutionǯs case, Gibson LJ ruled that there was no case to answer, and all 
three were acquitted. 
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A combined inquiry was set up into the McKerr killings and three other killings and a 
serious injury of unarmed individuals by the RUC in Armagh.  The course of the so-called 
Stalker/Sampson Inquiry was controversial. The original inquiry leader, Assistant Chief 
Constable John Stalker (Greater Manchester Police), was suspended before its conclusion, 
apparently shortly after writing to the RUCǯs Chief Constable stating that evidence 
suggested RUC officers had been involved in unlawful killings.84  The inquiryǯs final report 
was completed by Sir Colin Sampson of West Yorkshire Police and submitted to the DPP, 
who concluded that it ǲwould not be proper to institute any criminal proceedingsǳ on the 
basis of the inquiry and its report.85 
An inquest into the deaths was also opened, but the coronerǯs requests for documents 
collected as part of the Stalker/Sampson inquiry were refused, and 11 years after the deaths the coroner concluded that the aims of the inquest were ǲno longer achievableǳ.86 
 
2.8.1.4 Shanaghan v UK 
In Shanaghan, the applicant was the mother of the deceased, Patrick Shanaghan, a 
member of Sinn Féin.  He had been arrested on suspicion of being an IRA member and 
involved in terrorism, but was never charged.  In April 1989, the RUC informed him that 
security force materials, including personal information, had accidentally fallen out of an 
army vehicle and may have fallen into the hands of loyalist terrorists.  In August 1991, he 
was shot and killed by a masked gunman.  The Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) claimed 
responsibility for the murder.  Patrickǯs mother alleged collusion between the RUC and/or 
other members of the security forces and the UFF. 
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2.8.2 The law 
In all four cases the applicants alleged inter alia breaches of both the substantive 
negative obligation under Article 2, and the procedural obligation to conduct an effective 
investigation into the deaths.  They also alleged breaches of Article 13. 
As in Salman, the Court began by stressing the importance of Article 2, stating that the right to life ǲ…ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention [which 
together with Article 3] enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.ǳ87  It repeated the principle that, together, Articles 1 and 
2 require states to conduct an official investigation where an individual has been killed in 
circumstances involving the use of force by the state.  It underlined that investigations 
must consider, not just the individual actions of state actors, but also the surrounding 
circumstances.88  According to the Court the ultimate purpose of such investigations was ǲto secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life 
and, in those cases involving state actors or bodies to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility.ǳ89  While the Court reiterated that the form of an 
investigation will vary in different circumstances,90 it set out the minimum requirements. 91 The first of these is the stateǯs duty to initiate an investigation once a matter has come 
to its attention.92  The Court held that the state ǲcannot leave it to the initiative of the next-
of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative proceduresǳ.93  This goes further than Ergi by emphasising that, not only is 
there no burden on the applicant to lodge a complaint, but she is also not responsible for 
driving the investigation forward.  This contradicts a possible interpretation of Powell—at 
least as far as the ǲfullǳ investigative obligation is concerned—that an applicantǯs failure to 
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appeal the conclusions of an inadequate investigation absolves the state of responsibility 
for ensuring an investigation is, in the end, effective.94 
The Court then turned to the need for independence, holding that ǲthe persons 
responsible for and carrying out the investigation [must be] independent from those implicated in eventsǳ.95  This entailed ǲnot only a lack of hierarchical or institutional 
connection but also a practical independence.ǳ96 
Regarding an investigationǯs effectiveness, the Court held that it should be ǲcapable of 
leading to a determination of whether the force used in such cases was or was not justified 
in the circumstances, and to the identification and punishment of those responsible.ǳ97  
This was an obligation of means and not result.98  The court listed a number of technical 
requirements which should ordinarily be fulfilled: 
The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps […] to secure the evidence 
concerning the incident, including […] eye witness testimony, forensic evidence 
and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate 
record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause 
of death.  Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to 
establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk 
falling foul of this standard.99 The next requirement was for ǲpromptness and reasonable expeditionǳ.100  The Court 
pointed out that ǲa prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force 
may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence 
to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.ǳ101 
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Finally, the Court referred to the need for openness and, in particular, for the deceasedǯs 
family to be involved in the investigation: 
There must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its 
results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory.  The degree of 
public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case.  In all cases, however, 
the next-of-kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent 
necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.102 
 
2.8.3 Application to the cases 
In all four cases, the Court did not consider it appropriate to try to determine whether 
there had been a breach of the substantive negative obligation under Article 2.103  It 
anyway held that those applicants who had not pursued civil actions domestically would not have standing before the ECt(R in terms of the alleged breaches of Article ʹǯs 
substantive obligation, because they had not exhausted domestic remedies.104  In Kelly, the 
wife of the passer-by killed had accepted a settlement in her civil claim and so was also no 
longer considered a victim in respect of the alleged breach of that obligation.105 
However, contra the decision in Powell, the Court held that all applicants had standing 
regarding their complaints that the state had failed to fulfil the investigative obligation.  
The Court categorically rejected the link between potential civil proceedings and the  investigative obligation under Article ʹ, pointing out that ǲthe obligations of the state under Art.ʹ cannot be satisfied merely by awarding damages.ǳ106  In particular, civil proceedings involve ǲa procedure undertaken on the initiative of the applicant, not the authorities, and 
it does not involve the identification or punishment of any alleged perpetrator.ǳ  They can not, therefore, ǲbe taken into account in the assessment of the stateǯs compliance with its 
procedural obligations under Article 2.ǳ107 
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2.8.3.1 The police investigations – Effectiveness 
In Jordan and Kelly, the Court found no evidence to suggest significant shortcomings in 
the original police investigations.108  In Shanaghan, the Court was concerned that it was ǲnot apparent to what extent, if any, the initial police investigation included possible 
collusion by the security forces in the targeting of Patrick Shanaghan by a loyalist paramilitary group.ǳ109  In McKerr, the Court was troubled by the fact that some officers 
under investigation had, at the behest of a senior officer, concealed information from the 
investigating officers, and this raised ǲlegitimate doubts as to the overall integrity of the 
investigative process.110 
 
2.8.3.2 The police investigations – Openness and independence 
In terms of the openness of the police investigations to public scrutiny, the Court made 
the same point in each case, stating: 
The Court considers that disclosure or publication of police reports and 
investigative materials may involve sensitive issues with possible prejudicial 
effects to private individuals or other investigations and, therefore, cannot be 
regarded as an automatic requirement under Article 2.  The requisite access of the public or the victimǯs relatives may be provided for in other stages of the 
available procedures.111 
However, the Court was concerned about the lack of independence of all the police 
investigations.  In Jordan and McKerr, despite the RUC investigations being ǲsupervisedǳ by 
the Independent Commission for Police Complaints (ICPC – ǲan independent monitoring bodyǳȌ, the Court found that there was ǲa hierarchical link between the officers in the 
investigation and the officers subject to investigation, both of whom were under the responsibility of the RUC Chief Constable.ǳ112  In Shanaghan, the ICPC played a lesser role 
than in McKerr and Jordan and the Court held there were insufficient safeguards given the 
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connection between the investigating officers and those who could fall under 
investigation.113  In Kelly, those investigated were soldiers rather than RUC police officers.  
Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that ǲ[w]hile the investigating [RUC] officers did not 
appear to be connected structurally or factually with the soldiers under investigation, the 
operation at Loughgall was nonetheless conducted jointly with local police officers, some of 
whom were injured, and with the co-operation and knowledge of the RUC in that area.ǳ114  
Again, the Court found that the involvement of the ICPC was insufficient to ensure the 
requisite independence. 
 
2.8.3.3 The role of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
The Court did not doubt the DPPǯs independence.  Nevertheless, in all but one of the 
cases (McKerr, where three of the officers were prosecuted) the Court criticised the fact 
that reasons were not given for decisions not to prosecute: ǲ[w]here no reasons are given 
in a controversial incident involving the use of lethal force, this may in itself not be conducive to public confidence.ǳ115  It also argued that this ǲdenies the family of the victim 
access to information about a matter of crucial importance to them and prevents any legal 
challenge of the decision.ǳ116  The Court found that the circumstances of many of the deaths 
made the lack of reasons all the more concerning.117 
 
2.8.3.4 McKerr and The Stalker/Sampson Inquiry 
As seen above, the UK government set up an inquiry to look into the alleged cover-up of misconduct by police and the security services and an alleged policy of Ǯshoot to killǯ by the 
British Army and the RUC.  Despite some concerns about the RUC Chief Constableǯs role in 
the Stalker/Sampson Inquiry, the Court held it was sufficiently independent.118  However, 
the Court found that there were unnecessary and unacceptable delays in its conduct.  It also 
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took issue with the fact that the inquiryǯs findings were not published.  The resultant lack of transparency ǲadded to rather than dispelled the concerns that existedǳ.119 
 
2.8.3.5 The inquests – Effectiveness 
In Jordan, Kelly and Shanaghan, the Court began by discussing inquest procedure in positive terms, pointing out that they had ǲstrong safeguards as to the lawfulness and 
propriety of the proceedingsǳ120, and noting its earlier approval of the McCann inquest.121  
However, it felt that there were several differences between the inquest in McCann and 
those in the cases before it.  Inquests in Northern Ireland follow different procedures to 
those in England and Wales.  Most notably, r 9(2) of the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) 
Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963 provided that a person suspected of causing a death could not be compelled to give evidence. This detracted ǲfrom the inquestǯs capacity to establish 
the facts immediately relevant to the death, [and] in particular the lawfulness of the use of force and thereby to achieve one of the purposes required by Art.ʹ.ǳ122 
The Court also pointed out that in England, Wales and Gibraltar, juries could reach 
verdicts including ǲunlawful killingǳ.  Juries in Northern Ireland were confined to stating 
the identity of the deceased and the date, place and cause of death.123  Where there was an ǲunlawful killingǳ verdict in England and Wales, the DPP was required to ǲreconsider any 
decision not to prosecute and give reasons which are amenable to challenge in the courts.ǳ124  No such obligation existed in Northern Ireland.  The Court conceded that this 
did not necessarily mean that the scope of inquests would be too narrow for Article 2ǯs 
purposes.125  In particular, it did not prevent the inquest in McCann from examining ǳthose 
aspects of the planning and conduct of the operation relevant to the killing of the three IRA suspects.ǳ126  In Kelly, the Court felt that the inquestǯs inability to address issues relating to 
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the planning, control and execution of the operation, resulted less from formal restrictions to the inquestǯs scope, and more from non-attendance of the soldiers concerned.127 And in 
Jordan, it felt that the inquest was able to ǲplay no effective role in the identification or 
prosecution of any criminal offences which may have occurred and, in that respect, falls short of the requirements of Art.ʹ.ǳ128  It had similar concerns in McKerr, but additionally, 
while noting that a ǲdetailed investigation into policy issues or alleged conspiracies may not be justifiable or necessaryǳ, here there were legitimate concerns that required public 
investigation.129  PII meant that the inquest had been prevented from doing this.130  Finally, 
in Shanaghan, the Court criticised the inquestǯs failure to address alleged collusion between 
security personnel and paramilitaries.  The result was that ǲ[s]erious and legitimate 
concerns of the family and the public were therefore not addressed by the inquest proceedings.ǳ131 
 
2.8.3.6 The inquests – The public nature of proceedings and access for next-of-kin 
The Court did not dispute the general public nature of the inquest proceedings.  Many 
applicants complained that they were prejudiced by a lack of public funding for legal 
representation, but while the Court sympathised with this, it noted that the applicants had, 
nevertheless, been represented by lawyers throughout.132 )n all cases, the inquestsǯ inability to access certain documents formed an important 
part of the Courtǯs judgments.  It distinguished the inquests in the cases before it from that 
in McCann,133 while additionally noting that, since McCann, the Court had increasingly 
emphasised the importance of involving the next-of-kin in investigations and giving them 
access to information.134  It was particularly concerned that the applicants were generally 
not provided with advanced disclosure.  This put them at a considerable disadvantage 
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compared to other interested persons, and affected their ability to prepare lines of 
questioning.  The Court commended the change in policy following the Stephen Lawrence 
inquiry and the MacPherson Report.  This had recommended families receive witness 
statements at least 28 days before an inquest.  The Court held that this was ǲa positive contribution to the openness and fairness of the inquest procedures.ǳ135  Prior to this, however, the Court was ǲnot persuaded that the applicantsǯ interests as next-of-kin were fairly or adequately protectedǳ.136 
In terms of the use of PII certificates, in Jordan and Kelly, the Court found that (as in 
McCann) PII had not in itself significantly hampered the effectiveness of the inquests.137  
However, it ruled the same could not be said of McKerr: where non-disclosure of the 
Stalker/Sampson Report, and associated documents, meant that the inquest was ǲunable to fulfil any useful function.ǳ138 
 
2.8.3.7 The inquests – Delay 
Finally, the Court considered the lengthy delays in the inquests and, in the case of 
McKerr, the inquiry.  While it acknowledged that the applicants themselves had sought 
adjournments, and that this had contributed to delays, the court found that ultimately, 
responsibility rested with the state.139  The Court held this was incompatible with the stateǯs obligation to ensure investigations were carried out promptly.140 
 
2.9 Edwards v UK141 – Openness and the public interest in cases 
Christopher Edwards was beaten to death by his cell-mate in HM Prison Chelmsford in 
2002.  Christopher was a 30-year-old with mild mental health problems being held on 
remand for a breach of the peace.142  His attacker, Richard Linford, was a paranoid 
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schizophrenic with a long history of violence who was acutely mentally ill.143  There was no 
public examination of the circumstances of the death during the criminal trial because 
Linford pleaded guilty to manslaughter.  There was also no inquest.  An inquiry was set up 
to examine the circumstances surrounding the death.  This was held in private, although its 
report was made public.144 
The ECtHR concluded that there had been a breach of the substantive obligation under 
Article 2 as the relevant authorities failed to pass information about Richard Linford to the 
prison, and the prisonǯs inadequate screening process led to Christopher and Richard being 
placed together.145 
Regarding the investigative obligation, the Court provided guidance on the requirement 
of openness.  It found that the inquiry into Christopher Edwardsǯ death was generally 
rigorous and thorough, involving many witnesses and a detailed review of how the two 
men were treated by the relevant agencies.146  But the Court criticised the inability of the 
inquiry to compel witnesses to give evidence, and noted that this had detracted from its 
effectiveness.147  But most of all, the Court was highly critical of the lack of public scrutiny 
of the inquiry. 
The Court acknowledged that public scrutiny of the investigation or the results may 
satisfy the requirements of Article 2.  But in this case it held: 
[W]here the deceased was a vulnerable individual who lost his life in a 
horrendous manner due to a series of failures by public bodies and servants 
who bore responsibility to safeguard his welfare, the Court considers that the 
public interest attaching to the issues thrown up by the case was such as to call 
for the widest exposure possible.ǳ148 
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The UK government had given no reason why the inquiry was private, and the Court 
noted that considerations of medical privacy had not prevented the publication of either partyǯs medical histories.149  The Court also noted that the applicants were unable to attend 
the inquiry other than to give evidence, and had had no opportunity to question 
witnesses.150  The Court held that ǲgiven their close and personal concern with the subject 
matter of the Inquiry, the Court finds that they cannot be regarded as having been involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their interests.ǳ151 
 
2.10 Nachova v Bulgaria – The test for whether force is lawful 
In Nachova v Bulgaria (2004) the Court found breaches of all of the constitutive 
obligations under Article 2.152  The case concerned the killing of two 21-year-old Bulgarian 
nationals of Roma origin.  Both men were conscripts in a division of the army dealing with 
civilian projects, but they absconded and hid in a village.  When police caught up with them 
they tried to escape and the police shot and killed them.  Relying on Articles 2, 13 and 14, 
the applicants argued that: domestic law permitting lethal force when not absolutely 
necessity was deficient; prejudice and hostility towards Roma people had played a role in 
the shootings; and no meaningful investigation had taken place. 
The Court held that ǲthe circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified must […] be strictly construedǳ and, in particular ǲany use of force must be no more than ǲabsolutely necessaryǳ for the achievement of one or more of the purposes set out in sub-
paras (a) to (c) [of Article 2].153  It concluded that: 
[The] respondent State is responsible for deprivation of life in violation of Art. 2 
of the Convention, as firearms were used to arrest persons who were suspected 
of non-violent offences, were not armed and did not pose any threat to the 
arresting officers or others.  The violation of Art.2 is further aggravated by the 
fact that excessive fire-power was used.  The respondent State is also 
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responsible for the failure to plan and control the operation for the arrest of Mr 
Angelov and Mr Petkov in a manner compatible with Art.2 of the Convention.154 
Regarding the effectiveness of the investigation the Court held that ǲwith respect to the right to life, the authoritiesǯ duty to secure its effective protection will not be discharged 
unless the investigation in cases of death implicating agents of the State applies standards 
comparable to those required by Art.2 of the Convention.ǳ155  The domestic authorities had 
not charged the officers concerned because they deemed that the force used complied with 
the relevant domestic regulations.  The Court stated that this finding was, in itself, 
questionable.  However, even if this was accepted, the investigation ǲdid not apply a standard comparable to the ǲno more than absolutely necessaryǳ standard required by Art.ʹȋʹȌ.ǳ156  The Court also doubted ǲthe objectivity and impartiality of the investigators and prosecutors involvedǳ157 and found that the investigation and its conclusions were ǲcharacterised by serious unexplained omissions and inconsistencies.ǳ158  Finally, the Court 
found a breach of the positive obligation to protect life by law because ǲthe ǲabsolutely necessaryǳ standard […] was not applied.ǳ159 
 
2.11 Oneryildiz v Turkey – Some clarity on Article ͳ͵ and an ǲeffective judicial 
systemǳ 
The circumstances behind the deaths in Oneryildiz v Turkey fall outside the scope of this 
study, but the Court provided a useful explanation of the link between Article ʹǯs 
procedural obligation and Article 13.  It also threw some light on the relationship between the duty to set up an ǲeffective judicial systemǳ and the obligation to initiate an 
independent, effective and public investigation into a death. 
The applicant was a relative of 8 of 39 people who died when an explosion on a refuse 
tip caused a landslide in a slum quarter of Istanbul.  The Court explained the various 
                                                 
154 ibid, 115. 
155 ibid, 121. 
156 ibid, 128. 
157 ibid, 139. 
158 ibid, 140. 
159 ibid, 143. 
 44 
positive obligations under Article 2 in a circular way.  First, states have a primary duty to 
create a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide an effective 
deterrence against risks or threats to the right to life.160  Secondly, states must ensure an 
adequate response to deaths—judicial or otherwise—so that the former legislative and 
administrative framework is properly implemented and breaches of the right to life are 
punished.161  The obligation to institute an effective investigation with certain minimum 
requirements is an essential part of the obligation to maintain an ǲeffective judicial systemǳ.  The ability of a judicial system to effectively engage with a potential breach of 
Article 2, inevitably depends on such an investigation.  Criminal proceedings will only be 
effective if they are preceded by an effective criminal investigation, and because ǲthe true 
circumstances of [a] death are, or may be, largely confined within the knowledge of state 
officials or authoritiesǳ, families are also unlikely to appreciate the potential, or otherwise, 
for civil proceedings in the absence of an effective public investigation. 162 
The Court noted that previous case-law on Articles 2 and 13 largely concerned use-of-
force deaths involving Turkish security forces in the 1990s.  These were characterised by 
the lack of an effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment 
of those responsible.  This in turn led to the lack of an effective remedy for the applicants as 
they were denied the possibility of establishing liability for the incidents and seeking 
appropriate relief.163 
When considering a potential breach of Article 13, therefore, the Court must consider ǲthe impact which the stateǯs failure to comply with its procedural obligation under Article ʹ had on the deceasedǯs familyǯs access to other available and effective remedies for 
establishing liability on the part of state officials or bodies for acts of omissions entailing the breach of rights under Article ʹ and, as appropriate, obtaining compensation.ǳ164  The ECt(Rǯs task therefore often consisted of determining ǲwhether the applicantǯs exercise of 
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an effective remedy was frustrated on account of the manner in which the authorities discharged their procedural obligation under Article ʹ.ǳ165 
 
2.12 Ramsahai v Netherlands – There can be a breach of Article 2 even where a killing 
is lawful 
In Ramsahai (2007) the Court found a breach of Article ʹǯs positive investigative 
obligation despite finding that there had been no breach of the substantive negative 
obligation.166  In previous cases, the Court had only found breaches of the procedural 
obligation where it had also found a breach of the substantive obligation or found itself 
unable to make a determination one way or the other.   The decision was controversial.167 
The applicants were the grandparents and father of 18-year-old Moravia Ramsahai, 
who was shot and killed by police officers after stealing a motor scooter at gunpoint.  In its 
judgment, the Court made an observation that goes to the heart of one of the main concerns 
addressed in Parts 2 and 3 of the thesis: ǲ[w]hat is at stake here is nothing less than public confidence in the stateǯs monopoly on the use of force.ǳ168  The importance of the stakes at 
play means that: […] the obligation to carry out a prompt and effective investigation when 
individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force, and to bring, or 
enable, such proceedings as may be appropriate to the case, is not dependent on 
whether the said use of force itself is ultimately found to constitute a violation of 
art 2 of the Convention.169 
Despite relying on the conclusions of the investigation (that the shooting of Moravia 
had been lawful), the Court found that it was impaired both technically and because the 
officers conducting it belonged to the same force as those involved in the shooting.170  The 
Court criticised failures to test the two officers for gunshot residue, examine their weapons 
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and ammunition, stage a reconstruction, or record the trauma caused to the deceasedǯs 
body.171  It also took issue with the fact that the two officers were not kept separate 
following the incident and were not questioned until nearly three days after the shooting.  
While there was no evidence to suggest collusion, the court found that this was ǲa 
significant shortcoming.ǳ172 
Following the investigation, the public prosecutor concluded that officers had acted in 
self-defence and would not be prosecuted.  The applicants applied to challenge this 
decision in Amsterdamǯs Court of Appeal, and for it to hear the challenge in public.  The 
Court declined to hear the application in public but allowed the applicantsǯ lawyer to make 
written submissions to the judge on the alleged inconsistencies in the original 
investigation.  The complaint was eventually dismissed. 
The ECtHR held that the applicants had sufficient access to participate in the 
proceedings challenging the decision not to prosecute.  It emphasised that Article 2 does not require investigating authorities ǲto satisfy every request for a particular investigative 
measure made by a relative in the course of the investigation.ǳ173  It also held that ǲArticle ʹ 
does not […] require all proceedings following an inquiry into a violent death to be 
publicǳ174 and, ǲthe degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case.ǳ175  
In this case, the applicants had access to the investigation file, participated in the Court of Appealǯs hearing, and were provided with a reasoned decision.  The applicants were able to 
make the decision public themselves, and generally ǲpublicity was […] sufficient to obviate 
the danger of any improper cover-up by the Netherlands authorities.ǳ176 
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2.13 Al-Skeini v UK – The procedural obligation where investigators are hindered by 
circumstance 
Al-Skeini v UK, concerned alleged breaches of the substantive and procedural 
obligations regarding the killing of 6 individuals in separate instances in 2003, by, or 
allegedly by, British soldiers in Iraq.177  The main issue before the Court—the Conventionǯs 
territorial application—falls outside the scope of this thesis, but, the judgment also 
considered the degree to which the Court will take into account difficult security situations 
when assessing whether an investigations is Article 2 compliant. 
The Court was careful to acknowledge the endemic nature of crime and violence in Iraq 
at the time, and that the coalition forces were targeted in over a thousand violent attacks in 
13 months.178  Nevertheless, it held: the Courtǯs approach must be guided by the knowledge that the object and 
purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual 
human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to 
make its safeguards practical and effective.179 
The Court pointed out that the conflicts and difficult security conditions characterising 
previous cases concerning Turkey and Chechnya did not absolve those states of the 
investigative obligation.180  In five of the six cases, the Court held that the UK had breached 
its procedural obligations.181  While acknowledging that there may exist ǲconcrete 
constraints [which] may compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayedǳ,182 the Court held that ǲall reasonable steps must be 
taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into alleged 
breaches of the right to life.ǳ183  This meant applying Article ʹ ǲrealistically, to take account 
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of the specific problems faced by investigators.ǳ184  The Court stressed that it had taken as its starting point ǲthe practical problems caused to the investigatory authorities by the fact 
that the UK was an occupying power in a foreign and hostile region in the aftermath of invasion and war.ǳ185  It noted the shortage of pathologists, the scope for linguistic and 
cultural misunderstandings between the occupiers and the local population, and the 
inherent danger that existed in Iraq at the time.  However, the Court held that in the five cases ǲall reasonable stepsǳ had not been taken for an effective investigation. 
 
2.14 Conclusions 
The ECt(Rǯs development of Article ʹǯs procedural obligation to initiate an 
independent, effective and public investigation into a death, has not always been a smooth 
or unambiguous process.  The Court only gradually set certain fixed minimum 
requirements as each case raised its own particular issues concerning the circumstances of 
the death, or the particular alleged short-comings of an investigation. 
In summary, the obligation requires: 
1. an official investigation.186 
2. that must be initiated by the State.187 
3. that must be carried out promptly and with reasonable expedition.188 
4. that must be effective: i.e. in cases involving the use-of-force ǲcapable of leading to a 
determination of whether the force used in such cases was or was not justified in the circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible.ǳ189  
This is an obligation of means and not result.190 
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5. that the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation be ǲindependent from those implicated in events.ǳ191   This entails ǲnot only a lack of hierarchical or 
institutional connection but also a practical independence.ǳ192 
6. that there must be ǲa sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory.ǳ193 
7. that the victimǯs next-of-kin ǲmust be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests.ǳ194 
Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that the impact of the procedural obligation on death 
investigations in England and Wales has been considerable.  Perhaps the biggest has been 
in terms of the scope of investigations.  The procedural obligation also had both personal 
and significant political ramifications in the context of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.  
Bell and Keenan, for example, argue that: 
This story [of the procedural obligation under Article 2] is integral not just to 
future state accountability, but to communal attempts to move to a shared 
understanding of the conflict that could enable the peace process to move 
forward.195 
But as well as high profile cases such as Jordan, cases such as Keenan have provided 
families with a crucial weapon for ensuring that deaths in prison, self-inflicted or 
otherwise, are investigated seriously, and not simply dismissed as lost causes.   
It is important to be cautious about the rationales given for the procedural obligation 
under Article 2.  It is not really a single obligation at all, but contains overlapping duties 
with overlapping rationales.  The duty to open up the circumstances of a death to public 
scrutiny is clearly an end in itself.  But it also serves the purpose of leading to potential 
criminal and/or civil liability.  Therefore, when the ECtHR underlines the importance of 
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opening up the circumstances of deaths to scrutiny, and the need for accountability for 
deaths, it is difficult to judge the relative intrinsic importance the Court attributes to 
accountability through an effective and public truth discovery process, versus the 
importance of wrongdoers being held to account through criminal or civil remedies. 
The ECtHR has given various overlapping rationales behind the procedural obligation.  
It was observed that in McCann, the Commission and the Court differed slightly in the 
purposes they attributed to it, with the Court preferring to present the obligation as simply 
a practical necessity given that Article 2 has to be read with Article 1.196  While the Court 
repeats this primary rationale in subsequent cases, it also variously describes the obligationǯs purposes as being: to ǲsecure[] the accountability of agents of the state for their 
use of lethal forceǳ;197 ǲto allay rumours and suspicions of how a death came aboutǳ;198 ǲto secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to lifeǳ;199 and ǲin those cases involving state actors or bodies to ensure their accountability for 
deaths occurring under their responsibility.ǳ200  In Jordan, the Court also underlined that it is vital that accountability be secured ǲin practice as well as in theory.ǳ201 The Courtǯs approach and reasoning is (at least in theory) restricted by what is 
necessary to fulfil the explicit requirements of Articles 1 and 2.  Chevalier-Watts argues 
that ǲthe duty to carry out an effective investigation is only an implied provision, and is not an unambiguous requirement […].ǳ202  This likely contributes to the fact that the Court has 
generally highlighted a rationale that is tied to a reading of Article 2 in the light of Article 1, 
i.e. a need to effectively secure for individuals the substantive right to life.203  But the need 
to allay (unfounded) rumours or suspicion, referred to in Jordan, and the Courtǯs concern for public confidence in the stateǯs monopoly of the use of force in Ramsahai, suggests that 
the Court also shares the concerns expressed by the Commission in McCann.204  This is 
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consistent with the Courtǯs emphasis on investigations being public and involving the deceasedǯs family.  There is a valid argument that the instrumental effectiveness of 
investigations—as a means for helping to ensure that the right to life is protected in 
practice—is aided by investigations being open and involving the family of the deceased.  
But it is hard to believe that this is the only motivating factor behind these requirements. 
Rather, it seems reasonable to assume—if only on the basis of the judgment in Ramsahai—
that these requirements are also motivated by the intrinsic value of democratic 
accountability, and the intrinsic justice in recognising the special interest of the family of 
the deceased in an investigation.  Ferguson argues: 
The burden of the ECtHR decisions can, however, be reduced to one broad issue.  
The object of an investigation, if it is to be effective and adequate, is to allay the general public ȋand the familyǯsȌ fears and suspicions over deaths at the hands 
of the state by a public canvassing of the circumstances of the death which is 
capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was justified 
and, if it was not, to the identification and punishment of those responsible.  
This object is therefore the vindication of the rule of law, which the ECtHR has consistently stated lies at the heart of the Convention.  )t is […] for the state, as it were, to ǲcome cleanǳ and account for the deaths.205 
There remain several ambiguities regarding the procedural obligation: not least the 
future course of case-law on deaths in prison involving healthcare issues.206  The extent of 
the requirement for openness and the involvement of the next-of-kin also remains 
uncertain.  On the one hand, the requirement for openness has been expressed with regard 
to the investigation or its results.  But in Edwards it was noted that the publication of the 
conclusions of an inquiry held in private, will sometimes be insufficient.  There has also 
been movement regarding the requirement to involve the next-of-kin in an investigation on 
account of the Courtǯs characterisation of the Convention as a living instrument.207  Finally, 
there is uncertainty concerning the extent to which the state can withhold evidence from 
an investigation because it claims it is sensitive.  Indeed, there is little clear guidance on the 
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priority to be given to openness when it comes up against such conflicting interests. Given 
the Court has aligned the investigative obligation to a need for public accountability, there 
is arguably scope for it to give more active scrutiny to the governmentǯs use of P)) 
certificates.208 
Chevalier-Watts suggests that the lack of clearer guidance in these areas may be a result 
of various factors: 
First, the duty to carry out an effective investigation is only an implied 
provision, and is not an unambiguous requirement of the Convention; therefore, 
it may be subject to a wider margin of appreciation than that which would be 
awarded to states in areas of common ground between the High Contracting 
Parties.  Secondly, the concept of an effective investigation is a novel one, as 
McCann was the first case to set out such a requirement; therefore, to expect 
dramatic or draconian measures would be unrealistic.  Thirdly, the Court must 
have a mind to respect the rights and obligations of a member state, in this case 
its obligation to maintain law and order, and protect its public servants.  To 
maintain a flexible and pragmatic approach is more likely to achieve an effective balance of the differing interests […].209 
It may also be that further particularising the obligationǯs minimum requirements is 
impractical due to the considerable differences in the investigative mechanisms used by 
different states. 
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Preliminary Investigations 
  
 54 
3.1 Introduction 
Domestically, there is more to investigations into deaths at the hands of the police, or in 
police or prison custody, than just the inquest or inquiry.  Lines of investigation first need 
to be pursued and evidence collected.  Those investigatory processes that precede inquests 
or inquiries are referred to here as Ǯpreliminary investigationsǯ.  There may be several such 
investigations, by different investigating bodies.  Each body will differ in terms of its 
investigatory powers and its primary focus.  However, there will always be some overlap 
and a need for some interaction, coordination and cooperation. 
The following briefly describes the main types of preliminary investigations into deaths 
in prisons, and at the hands of the police or in police custody, and the nature and declared 
role of openness within such investigations.  As well as their openness to the family of the 
deceased and the public, it is important to look at the degree to which these bodies 
exchange information and evidence with each other.  The police, for example, may not 
generally disclose witness statements to families or the public, but they do share them with 
the coroner and the PPO, who, in turn, are more proactive in sharing information with 
families and the public. 
 
3.2 Deaths in prison 
After a death in prison, there will be a police investigation, a PPO investigation, and a Clinical Review by the prisonǯs primary healthcare provider.1  The prison may also carry 
out its own investigation.2 
 
3.2.1 Police investigations into prison deaths 
Deaths in prison are initially investigated by the police.  The Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), the Prison Service, the Immigration and National Directorate, the Youth 
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Justice Board, and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) are all parties to the 2012 ACPO 
Protocol for Police Investigations into Prison, Probation and Immigration Related Deaths 
(ACPO Protocol).3  This immediately refers to human rights considerations to be noted by 
the police when investigating deaths in prison—whether in relation to the rights of the 
deceased, any suspects, members of the deceasedǯs family, prison staff or members of the 
public.4  It lists for special consideration Articles 2, 3, 6 and 8 ECHR,5 but refers to the need to pay particular attention to the stateǯs investigatory obligation under Article ʹ.6 
Deaths in prison are initially treated as potential homicides.7  The Protocol observes that ǲeven deaths due to Ǯnatural causesǯ may warrant substantial investigation beyond just the clinical treatment givenǳ.8  )t states that ǲ[i]ssues can arise about the quality of care 
received by the deceased, whether there has been compliance with standard procedures or 
the suitability of those procedures, and investigations may even reveal the sophisticated staging of a crime scene.ǳ9  It stresses that: 
[…] persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and there is a particular 
obligation on public authorities to account for the treatment of an individual in 
custody, where that individual dies.  It is a matter not only of concern to the deceased personǯs family but also the wider community.10 
This echoes the ECt(Rǯs sentiment in Salman and the requirement that states ǲprovide 
a satisfactory and convincing explanationǳ for deaths in custody.11  It also acknowledges 
that deaths in a prison can be of concern to members of the public beyond the family of the 
deceased. 
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The police investigation has primacy over other investigations unless and until either 
the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) decides a full criminal investigation is not required, or 
the CPS decides no criminal charges will be brought.12 This ensures that the criminal justice 
process is not prejudiced.  Nevertheless, the Protocol acknowledges the importance of PPO investigations in fulfilling the stateǯs duties under Article ʹ, and notes that ultimately it is 
for the PPO to decide if its investigation should exceptionally take place in parallel with the 
police investigation.13  The 2009 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ACPO 
and the PPO, also emphasises the importance of the PPO investigation in contributing to the fulfilment of Article ʹǯs procedural obligation.14 
If and when the criminal investigation ends, the police may continue to investigate on 
behalf of the coroner, in order to establish more generally the circumstances of the death.15  
There is a subtle difference between this and the role of the PPO, which acknowledges a 
duty to assist the coroner to fulfil her investigative duty under Article 2, but maintains that 
it does not conduct investigations on behalf of the coroner.16 
 
3.2.1.1 Openness and liaison with family, community and public )mportantly, the Protocol states that ǲ[a]n attitude of openness and accountability is fundamentalǳ and places ǲcommunication with the deceasedǯs familyǳ and ǲcommunication with the communityǳ at the top of the considerations behind such an attitude.17 
The benefits derived from such an approach are listed as including: 
 Improved and effective dialogue with families and communities 
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 57 
 Better understanding of issues raised by families and communities  Long term confidence of witnesses, jurors and community advocates  Improved confidence in the investigative process  Better community intelligence  Enhanced investigative opportunities  Improved inter-agency co-operation.18 
Openness is therefore partly motivated by the perceived instrumental benefits for 
policing that come with good relations between the police, communities and the public.  
But, the list also acknowledges some intrinsic value to openness for the family of the 
deceased and the community.19 
The Protocol also warns of the potential for a death and investigation to have negative 
public or prison-order implications and raises the possibility of designating a death as a Ǯcritical incidentǯ in order to ǲprevent the situation from escalating.ǳ20  Critical instances are 
defined as ǲincidents where the effectiveness of the National Offender Management Service 
[(NOMS)], HM Prison Service, National Probation Service, UKBA, Youth Justice Board or 
police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family or the communityǳ.21  Unfortunately, the practical consequences of a situation being 
so defined are not explained. 
Part 8 of the Protocol deals with the relationship between the police investigation and 
the family of the deceased.  It refers to Article ʹ and ǲthe principle that the family are 
entitled to be involved in the investigative process, to the extent necessary to protect their legitimate interests.ǳ22  If reference to the principle is intended as a statement of intention, 
it is undermined somewhat by a lack of commitment to the role of police Family Liaison 
Officers.  The Protocol highlights the limits of the Family Liaison role and suggests the 
                                                 
18 ibid, para 2.10. 
19 (ampshire Constabulary, for example, links the need for openness with a concern that ǲ[s]udden 
deaths, particularly within establishments such as prisons, can generate suspicion and concern amongst relatives as to the true circumstances surrounding the death.ǳ (ampshire Constabulary, ǮͲͳͷͲʹ Procedure – Deaths in Prison Custody Management of Police Responseǯ <http://tinyurl.com/nf͸fͻͻd> accessed ͳ͹ 
November 2014. 
20 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ ʹ.ͳͳ. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid, para 8.1. 
 58 
family may be better supported by other agencies—singling out the charitable organisation 
INQUEST for particular mention.23  
The family of the deceased may need significant pastoral and technical support 
throughout the preliminary investigation and the inquest.  Attempts to do this by the 
police, the prison service and (to a lesser extent) the PPO, may be hindered by their 
association with institutions which may be viewed with suspicion by the family.  The MoU 
between ACPO and the PPO envisages family liaison being co-ordinated between both 
bodies, but hints that it may be appropriate for one body to take over the role.24  This is 
probably a sensible approach, and the PPO is arguably better placed to engage with the 
family given its independence from the criminal justice system. 
Generally, while the Protocol exhibits an understanding of Article 2 requirements—
particularly in terms of family and community engagement—it avoids anything more than 
vague commitments to positive action.25  The only exception to this is paragraph 8.9, which 
requires that families be notified of the time and location of the post-mortem and their 
right to have someone attend on their behalf.26 This right comes from Regulation 13(1) of 
the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, (SI 2013/1629) (C(I)Regs 2013).  In the 
past, the coroner was under no duty to inform the family of the existence of this right 
unless the family has expressed an interest in being represented at the post-mortem.27  If 
there is a delay in first contact and/or the right is not communicated immediately, the 
family will often miss this opportunity.  A second post-mortem can only be held with the coronerǯs permission.  While coroners rarely refuse this, it will be necessary to secure extra 
funding for it to be carried out.28  The compulsory tone of this provision in the Protocol is 
therefore to be welcomed. 
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If criminal proceedings are brought or contemplated, liaison with the family is given a 
higher priority—although the relevant provisions in the Protocol are still not couched in 
mandatory terms: 
The police should appropriately consider the concerns of the family and pay due 
regard to any further lines of inquiry they may suggest.  For instance, the family 
may have important information concerning health problems of the deceased, 
and be concerned as to whether the care the deceased received in relation to 
such problems was appropriate.  This may suggest further lines of inquiry, 
where the latter is relevant to the circumstances of the death.29 
A meeting between the family and the SIO is advised, during which the family should be 
provided with information and the likely timetable towards trial.30  This increase in 
interaction with the family may be motivated by two factors.  It may promote good 
relations with the family where their co-operation may aid a prosecution.  But also, if a 
prosecution is successful, there may not be an inquest.31  There would then be no other 
opportunity to fulfil the requirement that the family be involved in the investigatory 
process. Finally, Part ͻ deals with ǲmedia managementǳ.32  This seems more concerned with 
controlling information than facilitating openness. It warns that deaths in custody may attract a lot of media attention and public interest, and places an emphasis on ǲprotectingǳ the investigation and minimising ǲthe causing of inappropriate and unnecessary alarm to 
the family, general public and prison community.ǳ33  While protecting the criminal justice 
process may receive understandable prioritisation, it is questionable whether a legitimate 
public interest in the circumstances of a death should be subjugated to highly subjective opinions on what might constitute ǲunnecessaryǳ alarm.34 
 
                                                 
29 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ ͺ.ͳʹ. 
30 ibid, 8.13. 
31 If important issues are not considered at the criminal trial, an inquest or inquiry will still be necessary 
(Amin (ch 1, n 11)). 
32 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ Part ͻ. 
33 ibid, 9.1. 
34 ibid, 9.2–9.3. 
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3.2.1.2 Disclosure to other investigating bodies Part ͸ addresses ǲAccess to Relevant Material and Exchange of )nformationǳ.35  While 
re-iterating the primacy of the police investigation, it emphasises the need to agree with 
other bodies how the exchange of information and material will be managed.  The first 
point of principle is that, wherever possible, the coroner should have unimpeded access to 
all relevant material.36    However, the Protocol raises an important caveat in paragraph 
6.4:  the sharing of certain types of information and evidence may be restricted by statute.  
As examples, it references the Data Protection Act 1998, the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, as well as associated 
Codes of Practice.  Interestingly it does not mention the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 (RIPA 2000).37 
The Protocol also refers to the ǲduty of confidentiality attaching to information 
provided to police during the course of investigationsǳ and the need to balance the public 
interest in keeping information confidential and the public interest in sharing 
information.38  This should not affect the exchange of material between the police and the 
coroner which is presumptive.  Officers should warn witnesses that their statements may 
be shared with the PPO, although consent is not required.39  The MoU between the police and the PPO states that, ǲAs soon as possible, without prejudicing any criminal proceedings, 
the police will share with the PPO all evidence obtained in the course of the investigationǳ.40  It warns that the consequence of this will be eventual disclosure to the 
bereaved family, the prison and the coroner.41  This is a slightly over-simplistic summary of 
PPO disclosure policy, but it does reflect the reality that the police lose control over further 
disclosure unless ad hoc agreements are in place.42  Where the police continue an 
                                                 
35 ibid, Part 6. 
36 ibid, 6.3.  The Protocol warns of potential difficulties in disclosing information to other bodies while the 
investigation remains a criminal one, advising that police should consult the CPS beforehand (ibid, para 6.5). 
37 Discussed below at 5.2. 
38 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ ͸.Ͷ. 
39 ibid, ͸.ͻ and repeated in the Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ para ͳͻ. 
40 Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ para ͳͺ. 
41 ibid, 20. 
42 PPO, ǮPrison and Probation Ombudsman Disclosure Policyǯ ȋʹͲͲͻȌ <http://tinyurl.com/j͵Ͷp͹͸l> 
accessed 28 January 2016 (Disclosure Policy). 
 61 
investigation on behalf of the coroner, the Protocol envisages that it will be more 
appropriate to share evidence with other investigating bodies.43 
 
3.2.2 PPO investigations into prison deaths 
The PPO is sponsored by the Ministry of Justice, and reports to the Secretary of State.  
Nevertheless, it is a non-statutory body which claims to have complete operational 
independence.44  It conducts investigations into all deaths in prisons, and acknowledges 
that it plays a part in fulfilling Article ʹǯs procedural obligation.45   PPO investigations can 
include scrutiny of services provided outside of the public sector.46  Each investigation ends 
with a report, and the coroner will usually wait for this before proceeding with an 
inquest.47 The PPOǯs Terms of Reference set out the following aims behind their investigations 
into deaths: 
1. establish the circumstances and events surrounding the death, especially 
regarding the management of the individual by the relevant authority or 
authorities within remit, but including relevant outside factors; 
2. examine whether any change in operational methods, policy, practice or 
management arrangements would help prevent a recurrence; 
3. in conjunction with the NHS where appropriate, examine relevant health 
issues and assess clinical care; 
4. provide explanations and insight for the bereaved relatives; 
5. assist the Coronerǯs inquest to fulfil the investigative obligation arising under Article ʹ of the European Convention on (uman Rights ȋǮthe right to lifeǯȌ, by ensuring as far as possible that the full facts are brought to light 
                                                 
43 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ (n 3) 6.6. 
44 It is hard to see how the PPO can claim to be entirely operationally independent from the Ministry of Justice if it also ǲreports to the Secretary of Stateǳ ȋPPO ǮǮTerms of Referenceǯǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ ʹȌ. 
45 ibid, 29. 
46 ibid, 30. 
47 Leslie Thomas, Adam Straw and Danny Friedman, Inquests: A Practitionerǯs Guide (2nd edn, LAG 2008) 
432-3. 
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and any relevant failing is exposed, any commendable action or practice is 
identified, and any lessons from the death are learned.48 
As noted above, this final point does not mean that the PPO investigates on behalf of the 
coroner.49 
The scope of PPO investigations can be relatively broad.  Its website states that investigators ǲwill find out as much as possible about what was happening to the person before their death.ǳ50  The Terms of Reference also state that investigations may include a 
consideration of other deaths where there appear to be common factors.51  This opens up 
the possibility of more probative investigations into prison life and culture, where there are 
suggestions of institutional or systemic concerns that may have escaped scrutiny in 
previous death investigations. 
As a non-statutory body, the PPO has no power to seize documents or compel 
individuals to submit to interview, and is therefore reliant on the prison service and other 
bodies requiring their staff to cooperate with their investigations.52 
 
3.2.2.1 Openness to family, public and other investigatory bodies 
There is a range of guidance on the exchange of information and material between the 
PPO, other investigating bodies, individuals or institutions with an interest in the death, 
and the public.53  The most important is the PPOǯs Disclosure Policy.54  Its introduction 
states: 
                                                 
48 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ ͵ͳ. 
49 Newcomen and Rebello, ǮMoU PPO and CSEWǯ ȋn ͳ͸Ȍ para ͹. 
50 PPO, Ǯ(ow We )nvestigate Fatal )ncidentsǯ ȋundatedȌ <http://tinyurl.com/l77bmbb> (accessed 13 October ʹͲͳͶȌ ȋǮ(ow We )nvestigateǯȌ. 
51 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ ͵ʹ. 
52 PPO and NOMS, ǮProtocol on Death )nvestigation by the PPOǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ para ͳ.ʹ. For example, the MoU 
between ACPO and the PPO requires police officers to co-operate fully with PPO investigators (Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ para ͳͺȌ. 
53 Newcomen and Rebello, ǮMoU PPO and CSEWǯ ȋn ͳ͸Ȍ; PPO and NOMS ǮProtocol on Death )nvestigation by the PPOǯ ȋn ͷʹȌ; PS) ʹ͹ͳͲ ȋn Ͷ͹Ȍ; Ministry of Justice ǮPS) ͷͺ/ʹͲͳͲ The Prison and Probation Ombudsmanǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ; PPO ǮDisclosure Policyǯ ȋn ͶʹȌ; PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ; Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ; PPO, Ǯ(ow We )nvestigateǯ ȋn ͷͲȌ. 
54 PPO ǮDisclosure Policyǯ ȋn ͶʹȌ. 
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ͳ. At the heart of the Prison and Probation Ombudsmanǯs work on fatal 
incidents is a commitment to full, fair, open and transparent investigations.  This commitment is essential if the Ombudsmanǯs investigation is to meet the 
aims set out in his terms of reference.  Of particular relevance is the aim of assisting the inquest to meet the Stateǯs obligations under Article ʹ of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  This includes enabling the family to 
participate fully in the inquest, and ensuring that the full facts are brought to light.  One of the Ombudsmanǯs aims is also to provide explanations and insight 
for bereaved relatives. 
2. When dealing with disclosure under this policy, the question of what 
information should be disclosed to whom, and when, has to be set against the 
background of these aims. 
The Ombudsmanǯs policy is that disclosure should occur as fully and as 
early as his terms of reference, and the law allows.55 
The Policy, therefore, recognises both the PPOǯs Article ʹ duties vis-à-vis the family of 
the deceased, and its duties vis-à-vis the wider general public ȋin terms of ǲensuring that the full facts are brought to lightǳȌ.  )t also indicates a presumption in favour of public 
disclosure, ǲunless it is clearly not in the public interest to do so.ǳ56 
Despite the above, openness to the public appears in practice to be confined to the 
publication of investigation reports after the inquest.  While it is unlikely that members of 
the public will seek disclosure from the PPO, journalists might.  However, the section of the Policy entitled ǲTo whom should information be disclosedǳ, makes no mention of the public 
or press. 
In terms of disclosure, there will be sub judice issues, because—quite apart from any 
prosecution contemplated—the inquest will be held with a jury.57  This should not 
necessarily mean that information is withheld from the press, as they are responsible for 
ensuring that their publications do not prejudice court proceedings.  Paragraphs 10 to 13 
                                                 
55 ibid, paras 1–2 (original emphasis). 
56 ibid. 
57 Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ para ʹͶ. 
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address disclosure to designated properly interested persons, specialist advisors and other 
investigatory bodies.  The Policy emphasises that the Ombudsman alone decides to whom information should be disclosed ǲin order to meet the aims of his investigation.ǳ58  A two-
stage test is applied: 
1. The investigator should first consider whether the document is relevant to 
the investigation. 
2. The investigator should then consider whether there are any restrictions on 
disclosure or exemptions, for example, because of information on third 
parties or sensitive information which it is in the public interest not to 
disclose.59 
The Disclosure Policy states that in making decisions on disclosure, PPO investigators 
should consult other bodies such as prison security, the police, the CPS and the coroner.60 
When assisting the coroner, the Disclosure Policy states that ǲ[i]t is the responsibility of 
the Ombudsman to make pre-inquest disclosure in order to satisfy the Article 2 
investigation obligationǳ and it is ǲparticularly important in the pre-inquest phase to 
disclose information to the family of the deceased [and] their personal representatives […] so that they can prepare for it.ǳ61  Early disclosure to the family also helps ensure they can 
have an informed input into the PPO investigation.62 
Draft and final investigation reports remain confidential until after the inquest.  This is 
interpreted in practice as referring only to publication to the wider public, rather than the 
family of the deceased.63  Drafts are also provided to those subject to criticism.  Despite the PPOǯs insistence that they alone are responsible for decisions on disclosure, in practice 
investigators usually defer to the coroner.64  Until recently, this included decisions on 
                                                 
58 PPO ǮDisclosure Policyǯ ȋn ͶʹȌ paras ͳͲ and ͳʹ. 
59 ibid, paras 14–15. 
60 Unredacted documents are supplied to the coroner upon request (ibid, para 15). 
61 ibid, paras 9-10. 
62 The issue of pre-inquest disclosure to the family of the deceased is dealt with more fully in sub-chapter 
5.1.4. 
63 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 492. 
64 See also ibid, paras 29-30 where letters and papers written by the deceased should only be disclosed with the coronerǯs agreement (ibid, 29–30). 
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whether or not to disclose draft investigation reports to the family.  However, since July 
2012 the new MoU between the PPO and CSEW indicates that they should be disclosed.65  This is in keeping with the PPOǯs Terms of Reference which, since ʹͲͲͻ, have directed that 
draft reports be sent, with relevant documents, to bereaved families and other interested 
persons, and that they be allowed an agreed period to respond.66 The familyǯs input after the first draft of the report can be crucial.  This is the first time 
they can consider the investigation as a whole and the conclusions being considered.  If 
they are dissatisfied with the draft report, it is not too late for them to ask the PPO to 
investigate issues further. Thomas et al point out that familiesǯ lawyers can often 
correspond constructively with the PPO at this stage with the PPO ǲbeing willing to discuss alterations.ǳ67 
An anonymised version of the final report is published on the PPOǯs website after the 
inquest.68  The significance of the report, and the investigation that produces it, cannot be 
overstated in terms of the active role it can afford the family of the deceased in the 
investigatory process.  The PPO is far from perfect.  It suffers (as many such bodies do) 
from insufficient resources to always fulfil its role effectively.  But while all PPO 
investigators are different, the tendency for them to be genuinely open to the meaningful 
input of families, has, at times, been in contrast to IPCC investigations and even inquests, 
(despite inquests providing a more formal role for families). 69  The difference appears to 
be mainly attitudinal, and in this respect the Terms of Reference and various policy 
documents set a positive tone regarding openness, which investigators seem to take to 
heart. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Newcomen and Rebello, ǮMoU PPO and CSEWǯ ȋn ͳ͸Ȍ para ʹ͹. 
66 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ. 
67 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) para 19.39. 
68 PPO, Ǯ(ow We )nvestigateǯ ȋn ͷͲȌ. 
69 See ͷ.ͳ.͵ below and: Tony Murphy, ǮPolicing the Policeǯ The Guardian (26 February 2008) <http://tinyurl.com/mjbbscj> accessed ͳ͸ July ʹͲͳͶ; and )NQUEST, Ǯ(ow the )nquest System Fails Bereaved People: )NQUESTǯs Response to the Fundamental Review of the Coroner Servicesǯ ȋ)NQUEST ʹͲͲʹȌ. 
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3.3 IPCC investigations into deaths involving police 
The Independent Police Complaints Commission was set up by the Police Reform Act 
2002 (PRA 2002), and took over from its predecessor, the Police Complaints Authority, on 
1 April 2004.  It is a non-departmental public body, funded by the Home Office but legally 
independent of the police and any interest groups.  Its general functions include ǲthe 
recording of matters from which it appears that a person has died or suffered serious 
injury during, or following, contact with a person serving with the policeǳ;70 and making effective arrangements regarding ǲthe manner in which [they] are investigated or otherwise handled and dealt with.ǳ71  The purpose of the )PCC is described as being ǲto 
increase public confidence by demonstrating the independence, accountability and 
integrity of the complaints system and so contribute to the effectiveness of the police service as a whole.ǳ72 
Since July 2005, any qualifying Death or Serious Injury (DSI) involving the police must 
be referred to the IPCC, even in the absence of a complaint or any evidence of a conduct 
matter.73  This reflects the Article 2 requirement that states initiate investigations of their 
own motion.74  Under section 12(2A) PRA 2002 a qualifying DSI involves any 
circumstances where a person has died or sustained serious injury during arrest or 
detention by the police, or where there was contact with the police at or before the death 
or injury, which may have directly or indirectly caused or contributed to it. 
Investigations by the IPCC can take various forms.75  However, the IPCC will initially investigate all DS)s independently.  The investigationǯs form may be reviewed, but 
investigations into deaths at the hands of the police should only be downgraded in 
                                                 
70 Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA 2002) s 10(2)(ba). 
71 This includes ensuring the investigation is sufficiently independent (PRA 2002, s 10(2)(3)). 
72 PRA 2002, s 10(1)(d)–(e); Allyson MacVean and Peter Neyroud, Police Ethics and Values (SAGE 2012) ͳ͵͹; CPS, ǮAllegations of Criminal Offences against the Police: Legal Guidanceǯ <http://tinyurl.com/ntkoyur> accessed ʹ͵ July ʹͲͳͶ; )PCC and CSEW, ǮA Memorandum of Understanding Between the Coroners Society for England and Wales and the )ndependent Police Complaints Commissionǯ ȋʹͲͲ͹ – On Nov 2015 in process of 
being revised and no longer current). 
73 PRA 2002, sch 3. 
74 See above 2.4 and Ergi (ch 2, n 29). 
75 Categorised as local, supervised, managed or independent. 
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exceptional circumstances.76   Independent investigations carried out by the IPCC, must be led by one of the Commissionǯs own staff.77  Staff that carry out independent IPCC 
investigations have the powers of police constables for the purposes of the investigation.78 
The statutory guidance describes the aims of DSI investigations as: […] to establish facts, the sequence of events and their consequences.  )ts role is 
to investigate how and to what extent, if any, the person who has died or been 
seriously injured had contact with the police, and the degree to which this 
caused or contributed to the death or injury.79 
While a DSI investigation is ǲnot an inquiry into any criminal, conduct or complaint allegation against any person servicing with the policeǳ, the )PCC must determine whether 
there are indications of a crime having been committed or behaviour that justifies 
disciplinary proceedings.  If there is, the IPCC must notify the relevant authority.  Other 
than lesson-learning, none of the various policy documents or guidance seem to indicate 
any particular qualitative purposes behind IPCC investigations into deaths.  One assumes 
they coincide with the wider purposes behind the IPCC described at PRA 2002, s 10(1)(d) 
(see above).  The fact that Article ʹ ǲshapes the wayǳ the )PCC carries out its investigations, could also be interpreted as importing those purposes implicit in Article ʹǯs procedural 
obligation.80 
 An investigation will aim to establish the facts and reach conclusions: including 
whether there is a case to answer for misconduct, gross misconduct or unsatisfactory 
performance.81  According to the statutory guidance, ǲit is also an opportunity to ascertain 
whether there is any learning for the force arising from the incident itself or the way it was handled.ǳ82  An investigationǯs scope should be broad, given that it should be proportionate 
                                                 
76 )PCC, ǮReview of the )PCCǯs Work in )nvestigating Deaths: Final Reportǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ȋReview Report) 
<http://tinyurl.com/gmenjtq> accessed 28 January 2016; A decision on the form of an investigation must 
consider the seriousness of the case and the public interest (PRA 2002, sch 3, Part 3, 15(C)). 
77 PRA 2002, sch 3 para 19. 
78 ibid, sch 3 para 19(4)(b). 
79 )PCC, Ǯ)PCC Statutory Guidance to the Police Service on the (andling of Complaintsǯ ȋʹͲͳͷȌ ȋStatutory 
Guidance) <http://tinyurl.com/zjgmqe2> accessed 27 January 2016, para 11.49. 
80 See below at ͵.͵.ʹ; )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͳ͸. 
81 )PCC, ǮStatutory Guidanceǯ ȋn ͹ͻȌ. 
82 ibid, para 9.2. 
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to the seriousness of the matter investigated, the public interest, and the prospects of 
producing learning.83  Its conduct should additionally take into account the need to 
establish all the facts, and the fact that Article 2 is engaged.84 
 ͵.͵.ͳ The review of the )PCCǯs work in investigating deaths The )PCCǯs relatively short history has been controversial.  )ts remit is not just to 
investigate DSI cases, but to oversee the entire police complaints system.  The amount of 
IPCC oversight of individual complaints ranges from rare cases where the IPCC investigates 
independently, to the vast majority where the police investigate themselves with limited 
IPCC oversight. 
Expectations were high when the Commission took over from the largely discredited 
Police Complaints Authority.  However, lawyers representing complainants became 
increasingly frustrated at what they saw as: a lack of effective oversight of the majority of 
cases investigated by the police; a perceived bias amongst IPCC investigators in favour of 
police; the rejection of complaints out of hand despite supporting evidence; badly managed 
investigations overseen by caseworkers with few relevant qualifications, experience or 
training; and an unacceptable number of case decisions being overturned by the 
Commission only after threats of court action.85  Things reached a head in February 2008, 
when more than 100 lawyers—members of the Police Action Lawyers Group, who had 
played an advisory role in the setting up of the IPCC—resigned en masse from its Advisory 
Board.86  The relationship between the IPCC, complainants, their lawyers, and even the 
police, continued to deteriorate, with public confidence seemingly reaching an all-time low 
in 2011, when the IPCC wrongly told the press that Mark Duggan had shot at police before 
they shot and killed him. 
                                                 
83 ibid, para 9.14. 
84 ibid, para 9.15. 
85 Nick Davies, ǮCrisis at Police Watchdog as Lawyers Resignǯ The Guardian (London, 25 February 2008) < 
http://tinyurl.com/zqjajqv> accessed 1 December 2014. 
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In February 2012, Dame Anne Owers took over as Chair of the IPCC.  She brought with 
her a degree of respect amongst civil and human rights lawyers following her nine years as 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons.  She seems to have brought with her a more proactive 
attitude towards winning and maintaining public confidence.  This can be seen in the 
independent review she commissioned into the IPCC investigation into the death of Sean 
Rigg. 
Sean died in 2008 in Brixton Police Station following restraint by police officers.  The 
original )PCC investigation concluded that there were no significant concerns about Seanǯs 
treatment by police officers.87  However, an inquest jury reached starkly different 
conclusions, producing a narrative verdict that was highly critical of the police.88  The 
review reflected a concern to see why there was such a discrepancy, and what lessons 
might be learnt.  It concluded with a report (the Casale Report), which seemed to confirm, 
at least in Sean Riggǯs case, some of the accusations made by PALG lawyers in 2008.89 
Shortly after the independent review, the IPCC conducted its own, wider-ranging 
review of its investigations into deaths, including consultations with stakeholders.  In the 
foreword to the resulting report, Anne Owers acknowledged that: 
Those who have lost relatives or friends have little reason to trust either us or 
the system, particularly in communities where such trust is already low.  We can 
only earn that trust by engaging with them, and enabling them to participate in 
the investigation process.90 
 
3.3.2 The scope of IPCC investigations The Review Report acknowledges that ǲArticle ʹ investigations should be inquisitorial 
and broad in scope, establishing what happened and why, who (if anyone) is responsible 
                                                 
87 )PCC Ǯ)PCC )ndependent )nvestigation into the Death of Sean Rigg Whilst in the Custody of Brixton Policeǯ ȋʹͲͳʹȌ <http://tinyurl.com/jpuz͸͸d> accessed ʹͺ January ʹͲͳ͸. 
88 Vikram Dodd, ǮSean Rigg Death in Custody: Police Used Unnecessary Force, Jury Findsǯ The Guardian 
(London, 1 August 2012) <http://tinyurl.com/jbmhksw> accessed 1 December 2014. 
89 Silvia Casale, ǮReport of the )ndependent External Review of the )PCC )nvestigation into the Death of Sean Riggǯ ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ, in particular ͻͷ–98. 
90 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͹. 
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[…] drawing conclusions beyond misconduct and criminal behaviour such as systemic problems or poor practiceǳ, and investigating ǲhow a death could be prevented in the futureǳ.91  The narrow scope of IPCC investigations was a source of contention for many 
stakeholders during the review and the report acknowledges that many, including the police and the )PCCǯs own staff, were frustrated at their narrow scope.92 
It is hard to measure how much of a practical effect Article 2 has on IPCC investigations 
per se, because they are normally followed by inquests—the primary means by which the 
state fulfils the obligation.  This arrangement can let the IPCC off the hook in terms of any 
legal challenges for breaches of Article 2, because it is effectively for the coroner to ensure 
that any inadequacies in the IPCC investigation are corrected by the inquest.  The IPCC 
itself underlines that: 
Our work is an important part of the way the state meets [the procedural] 
obligation, alongside the work of the coroners and the Crown Prosecution 
Service.  The obligations arising from Article 2 shape the way that we investigate 
deaths involving the police.93 
Coroners often rely on IPCC investigations for the gathering of evidence and the 
identification of relevant issues, and they therefore play an important practical role in 
helping ensure that the process as a whole is Article 2 compliant.  When the IPCC fails to 
adequately fulfil this role, it can lead to significant additional expense and delays, with 
coroners or inquiry chairmen having to instruct their own officers to gather evidence and 
interview witnesses.94 
 
͹.͹.͸.ͷ The IPCCǯs powers, remit and competence 
While the government recently renewed its commitment to providing the IPCC with 
sufficient resources to perform its functions effectively, its budget is still obviously 
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93 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͳ͸ ȋemphasis addedȌ. 
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limited.95  It is understandable, therefore, that it may at times seek to limit the scope of its 
investigations.  It often relies on three factors in order to do so: its understanding of what 
its remit is; its limited powers; and its limited expertise.  These are important 
considerations where police contact is just one feature of the broader circumstances of a 
death. 
The )PCCǯs ability to investigate bodies other than the police is becoming more of an 
issue as police services are contracted out to private firms: e.g. the use of contracted Ǯdetention officersǯ and Ǯcustody assistants.ǯ  But it is also a problem that extends to where 
health care providers may also have been involved in a death.  The Reviewǯs report 
acknowledges that: 
Police forces are also increasingly outsourcing some of their functions 
(particularly in relation to staffing custody suites) to non-police private 
providers.  We currently only have limited powers over staff employed by 
private contractors.  Only people who have been specifically designated as a 
detention or escort officer by the chief constable of the force they work for fall 
directly within our remit.96 
After pressure from the IPCC and stakeholders, a provision was included in the Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, to allow the Secretary of State to extend the 
IPCCǯs powers over contractors, sub-contractors and their employees.97  Regarding what 
the IPCC considers its remit to be, the Casale Review specifically recommended that it not 
only look at police involvement in a death, but also other issues, including the acts of other 
agencies.98  However, in the Review Report, the IPCC still argues that ǲ[t]he focus of an IPCC 
investigation will always be the actions of the police and we will not always be best placed 
to consider the actions of non-police agencies.ǳ99 
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(Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 135); See also ibid, 29. 
98 Casale (n 89) 92. 
99 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ʹͺ. Regarding this claim of limited expertise, the police, for example, 
usually manage by consulting experts. 
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Effectively, the IPCC interprets its role as not being to investigate the circumstances of a 
death, but rather any police involvement in a death.100  Article 2 investigations need to 
consider the broad circumstances of a death, including the role played by all relevant 
individuals or institutions.  Problems can arise if there is a patchwork of mutually exclusive 
investigations bearing no relationship to the interconnectedness of circumstances and 
experiences.  If an inquest is left to piece together different preliminary investigations 
which examine different aspects of a death, lines of inquiry might fall between the gaps.  
Where other lines of investigation are left to the police, this can also give rise to concerns 
that the combined investigative process may lack independence.101 
 
3.3.3 Family liaison and openness 
The Review Report acknowledges that the effective engagement of bereaved families is 
a fundamental part of the )PCCǯs responsibilities under Article ʹ at all stages of the 
investigation.102 
It is essential that families are as involved as they can be, or want to be as our 
work progresses.  The investigation should seek to answer the questions they 
have about how and why the person close to them died.  That is why family 
involvement is a specific requirement in any investigation into a possible breach of Article ʹ[…] [W]e will contact the family as soon as possible, and offer 
meetings with the commissioner and lead investigator to explain our role and 
what we will be doing.  We will also provide information about their right to 
legal representation and where to go for independent advice and support.  In 
some cases, we will appoint a family liaison manager to act as a link between the 
investigation and the family.103 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 ibid, 27. 
101 See R (Reynolds) v IPCC [2008] EWCA Civ 1160, 24. 
102 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͷ͹. 
103 ibid, 58. 
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3.3.3.1 Openness to the family 
Under PRA 2002, the IPCC must keep families informed about the progress of 
investigations, including provisional findings and when an investigation report has been 
completed.104  Additionally, the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 
(P(CM)R 2012), require the family to be updated at least every four weeks.105  The )PCCǯs 
statutory guidance states that ǲcommunication with complainants and interested persons should be based on a presumption of opennessǳ, and that ǲ[m]aking the investigation 
report available to the complainant and/or interested person is the most transparent way 
of showing what the investigation has found.ǳ106  As such, the report ǲshould usually be 
provided to the complainant and an interested person, subject to the harm test and any necessary redactions.ǳ107  The )PCCǯs disclosure policy states that ǲWe will be as open as 
reasonably practicable in discharging our duties to provide information during the course 
of, and following the completion of a [PRA ʹͲͲʹ] investigation.ǳ108  Finally, the Review Report states that ǲA key part of maintaining open and meaningful engagement with 
families is the timely disclosure of evidence throughout the investigationǳ:109 
Openness is one of our core values and disclosure of information is one of the 
ways we ensure transparency in our work.  This disclosure of evidence to families 
in an investigation into a death is also vital if they are to be effectively involved 
with the investigation.110 
Regulation 13 P(CM)R 2012 requires a ǲharm testǳ to be applied to all disclosure 
decisions.111  Information may be withheld for the purposes of: 
                                                 
104 PRA 2002, s 20. 
105 Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1204 (P(CM)R 2012), reg 12. 
106 )PCC, ǮStatutory Guidanceǯ ȋn 79) para 12.5. 
107 ibid, para 12.5. 
108 )PCC, ǮMaking )nformation Availableǯ ȋundatedȌ para ʹ.͵ <http://tinyurl.com/ptpͷ͹cj> ȋaccessed ʹʹ 
June 2014). 
109 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͸Ͷ. 
110 ibid, 66 (emphasis added). 
111 P(CM)R 2012. 
 74 
a)  preventing the premature or inappropriate disclosure of information that is 
relevant to, or may be used in, any actual or prospective criminal 
proceedings; 
b)  preventing the disclosure of information in any circumstances in which its 
non-disclosure— 
 (i) is in the interests of national security; 
 (ii) is for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime, or the 
apprehension or prosecution of offenders; 
 (iii) is required on proportionality grounds; or 
 (iv) is otherwise necessary in the public interest.112 
Information should only be withheld where the risk is real and the potential adverse 
consequences significant.113 Strangely, neither the Regulations nor the Disclosure Policy 
reference statutory impediments to the disclosure of information, including RIPA 2005, 
which caused so many problems in the Azelle Rodney case, and led to the inquest being 
abandoned.114  The Review Report, however, does mention RIPA 2005: 
In some circumstances our hands are tied by the law.  One such provision is 
Section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  The impact of 
this is not only that some information cannot be disclosed, but also that we 
cannot even explain why this is, as this itself would be a breach of the law.115 
It goes on to express the view that the law should be changed in this regard.116 
On the Ǯharm testǯ, the Review Report acknowledges the prevalence of the opinion that it has sometimes been applied ǲtoo rigidly or restrictively because of a risk averse stance 
on [the part of the IPCC], because disclosure is time-consuming, or because of a resistance 
                                                 
112 ibid, reg 13. 
113 ibid, reg 13(2). 
114 Andrew Walker ȋAssistant Deputy CoronerȌ, ǮPre-Inquest Ruling Touching Upon the Death of Azelle Rodneyǯ ȋʹ August ʹͲͲ͹Ȍ; discussed at ͷ.ʹ below. 
115 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͸͸. 
116 ibid. 
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to providing information to families.ǳ117  This causes distress and confusion and, when not 
adequately explained, ǲcreates general mistrust of the )PCC.ǳ118 
The charity INQUEST agreed with this analysis, observing: 
For a bereaved family trying to engage in an IPCC investigation the organisationǯs reluctance to provide early and full disclosure ȋor to clearly 
explain why they cannot provide this at early stages of investigations and when 
they expect to do so) fosters mistrust.  It is alienating and unhelpful.119 
In response, the Review Report renewed a commitment that ǲIPCC investigators will 
begin from the position that families of a deceased person will be given access to information gathered during the investigationǳ and that they will ǲexplain to families if we cannot release information to them at this stage, and tell them why.ǳ120 
 
3.3.3.2 Liaison with the general public 
Sub-section 6.3 of the Review Report deals with ǲEngaging with communities and the public through the media.ǳ121  Significantly, it recognises that ǲit is not only the families of those who have died but also communities who are affected by a death.ǳ122  The reviewǯs research showed ǲa significantǳ lack of trust in the )PCC amongst certain communities.123  It 
heard arguments from various sources, including police organisations, that it should be ǲmore robust in carrying out community engagementǳ, particularly with ǲmarginalised 
groups in local communities, including young people, members of black and minority 
ethnic communities, and people with mental health problems.ǳ124 
                                                 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid. 
119 ibid. 
120 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ȋoriginal emphasis) 
121 ibid, 67. 
122 ibid, 75. 
123 ibid. 
124 ibid, ͹Ͷ. Greater Manchester Police argued that ǲ[w]ork within the communities by the )PCC needs […] 
to be built on a real concept and understanding of the specific community, their needs and the challenges facing them.ǳ ȋibid). 
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Deaths at the hands of the police often have to be viewed in the broader context of a communityǯs experience of, and relationship with the police.  )t is important that 
investigators understand the objective realities of community membersǯ day-to-day 
experience of interaction with the police, and the historical context of community relations.  
The report seems to half grasp this.  But its emphasis is on ǲcommunity engagementǳ as a means of ǲpromoting our profile and helping to build trust in local communities.ǳ125  While 
building trust within communities is vital, community engagement should arguably be 
treated as an end in itself.  Recognising this can be the difference between genuine, 
meaningful engagement with communities, and superficial engagement which risks 
unfulfillable assurances being made, and can be counterproductive in the long term. 
The review received various suggestions on how the IPCC could engage more effectively 
with communities, including public meetings and community briefings on the progress of 
investigations; a more visible presence where a death may trigger public disorder; and 
working more closely with local police forces to address community tensions.126  There 
may be problems with the IPCC directly aligning itself with police attempts to improve community relations.  Arguably, the )PCCǯs purpose of increasing trust and confidence in 
the police should be pursued indirectly by demonstrating that they are accountable to 
independent oversight.  Anything more could risk compromising public confidence in the )PCCǯs independence.127 The Review Report gives a statement of intention that ǲwhere an )PCC investigation into 
a death raises significant community concerns, the lead investigator will consider how to 
engage with the community, recognising the importance of community confidence and trust in ourselves and the police.ǳ128   It also makes welcome reference to the potential for representatives of communities to be Ǯinvolvedǯ in investigations: 
                                                 
125 ibid; See also ibid, 72. 
126 ibid, 74. 
127 A concern not helped by recent revelations that police exploited community liaison for intelligence gathering purposes.  Jason N Parkinson and Rob Evans, ǮSussex Police Criticised for (arassment during Protester Liaisonǯ The Guardian (4 September 2012) <http://tinyurl.com/ok8ogz4> (accessed 24 July 2014); Press Association, ǮSecret Met Police Unit (eld )nformation on ͳ͹ Campaigns for Justiceǯ The Guardian (24 
July 2014) <http://tinyurl.com/pzpfn5b> accessed 24 July 2014. 
128 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͹͵. 
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[We w]ill seek to develop better links with people and organisations who work 
in the community, including groups that have low levels of trust in the police 
and the complaints system.  We will use these links to help identify appropriate 
representatives for involvement in individual investigations (e.g. through 
community reference groups).129 
In terms of engaging the public through the media, the IPCC often struggles to strike the 
right balance.  The Review Report begins by acknowledging the importance of media 
engagement to inform communities and the wider public about the investigation.130  The 
IPCC faces issues about how much information it makes public, especially in the immediate 
aftermath of a death.  The balance to be struck is a fine one.  As noted above, too little 
information can instil suspicion about the investigation and give a sense that things are 
being covered up.  But premature statements of fact that turn out to be wrong can also be 
very damaging.  The Review Report undertakes that ǲStatements issued at the start of an 
investigation (when few details have been confirmed or tested) will be brief and limited to facts verified by the )PCC investigator.ǳ131  The brevity of information released can frustrate 
families and communities, but this may outweigh the damage caused by erroneous 
information being released.  This is more likely if the IPCC keeps to its commitment to 
engage with communities and communicate why there are limits to information being 
released, and gives a timetable for the investigation.132 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
The above shows that the police, the PPO and the IPCC are all keen to exhibit a 
principled commitment to openness in their investigations: both to public scrutiny and the 
active involvement of the family of the deceased in investigations.  As institutions, they are conscious of Article ʹǯs basic procedural requirements.  But the extent to which they back 
up their general commitments to openness with specific practical action varies significantly 
between organisations, and can depend on the approach of individual investigators. 
                                                 
129 ibid. 
130 ibid, 75. 
131 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͹ͷ. 
132 ibid, 76.  The Review Report also undertakes to share advance copies of all press releases with the family and ǲthe force in remitǳ to ensure that they are factually accurate. 
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The primary focus of police investigations into prison deaths is to determine whether 
criminal offences have been committed.133  The policy and practice guidance show an awareness of Article ʹǯs procedural requirements, but they tend to see these as more of a 
concern for the PPO and for coroners.134 The guidance generally asserts the primacy of 
police investigations.135 However, at times the police show a certain deference to the PPOǯs 
role in fulfilling the procedural requirement under Article 2.136  This is arguably misplaced.  
Criminal prosecutions, where appropriate, are also a crucial part of Article ʹǯs procedural 
obligation, and given that they are more easily prejudiced, they should arguably be 
prioritised more unambiguously.   
It was noted that the police appear to recognise the importance of communicating with 
the family of the deceased and communities during investigations,137 and the intrinsic and 
instrumental operational value of this.138  However, the possibility of some situations being designated as ǲcritical incidencesǳ could give cause for concern.  So-called ǲpublic order concernsǳ can be used as a pretext for preventing the dissemination of information that 
might lead to criticism of the authorities. 
  In terms of any practical guidance on how family and community engagement should 
be implemented, it seems that unless charges are brought, this is typically left to the PPO 
and the coroner.139  With PPO investigations and inquests being more firmly geared 
towards public scrutiny and accountability (these being their explicit purposes), this is 
again probably understandable.  Evidence gathered by the police usually reaches the family 
of the deceased in pre-inquest disclosure if not before, and enters the public domain 
through the inquest and the PPO report.  The main caveat to this is where there are 
statutory restrictions on what the police (and the IPCC) are allowed to share. 
                                                 
133 See ͵.ʹ.ͳ above and, for example Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ ʹ.Ͷ. 
134 See, for example, ibid, paras 2.7, 8.2-ͺ.͵; Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ paras ͹ and ͻ. 
135 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ ͵.ͳ-3.2; Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ para ͹. 
136 Shaw and Stoddart, ǮMoU ACPO and PPOǯ ȋn ͳ͵Ȍ para ͹. 
137 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋn ͵Ȍ ʹ.ͳͲ. 
138 ibid. 
139 See 3.2.1.1 
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PPO investigations are explicitly geared towards providing answers for families, 
learning lessons, and helping fulfil Article ʹǯs procedural requirements.140  The relevant 
guidance shows that the latter role is at the forefront of the PPOs formal approach.141  Their 
investigations tend to be more open to the family of the deceased, providing them with 
information and disclosure during an investigation, and providing them with opportunities 
to raise concerns and engage with the investigation.142  While the PPO also sets out a 
general commitment to openness vis-à-vis the public, there are few specific concrete 
commitments other than the publishing of its report after the inquest.143 
As for the IPCC, it appears to be going through significant attitudinal changes in the way 
it views its role, how it conducts DSI investigations, and how it engages with families and 
the public after a death.144  Of the three investigating bodies looked at, the IPCC appears the 
least in touch with the intrinsic normative value of investigations, instead focusing on 
instrumental benefits such as learning lessons and improving trust in the police.  The )PCCǯs statutory guidance makes no mention of accountability in the context of death 
investigation, and learning lessons (the one qualitative purpose it does refer to), while 
admirable, is a police-centred objective.  While there has been recent progress, in the past 
engaging with families and the public appears to have been treated as a chore, separate 
from its main investigative function.145  It is hoped that the acknowledgment that Article 2 
should ǲshapeǳ )PCC investigations, will see its public accountability requirements given 
more of a priority in the )PCCǯs approach.146  Indeed, the IPCC seems to be going through a 
watershed moment, in terms of reassessing how it operates, and addressing a lack of 
confidence amongst complainants and the wider public.  This extends to the way it carries 
out DSI investigations.  At least in the Review Report, Anne Owers acknowledges that: 
One of the most important functions of the [IPCC] is the investigation of deaths 
following contact with the police. It is important, for the families of those who 
                                                 
140 See ͵.ʹ.ʹ above and, for example PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ ͵ͳ. 
141 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋn ͳʹȌ ͵ͳ. 
142 See 3.2.2.1 above. 
143 PPO, Ǯ(ow We )nvestigateǯ ȋn ͷͲȌ. 
144 See 3.3.1 above 
145 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ; Casale ȋn ͺͻȌ. 
146 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͳ͸. See ͵.͵ and ͵.͵.ʹ. 
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have died, that they know and understand what happened and why.  It is equally 
important, for the police themselves and for public confidence in policing, that 
these events are seen to be fully and independently investigated, that there is 
proper accountability for actions or failures to act, and that lessons are learnt.147 
Crucially she also points out that this is ǲan essential part of the democratic 
accountability of the police.148 
Involving the family in the investigation is generally confined by the guidance to providing them with information about the )PCC and the investigationǯs progress.  There is 
little indication that it might include a two-way conversation, with the IPCC taking on board 
family and community concerns.  A renewed commitment to community engagement is 
seen as a means to improve public trust in the IPCC and it is a shame that in this regard 
even the Review Report fails to reflect on its intrinsic value for communities. 
                                                 
147 Foreword to )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋn ͹͸Ȍ ͷ. 
148 ibid, 6. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Evolving Nature and Purposes of Inquests 
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4.1 Introduction 
It is important to consider the history of the inquest and its evolution into the natural 
domestic forum for fulfilling the procedural obligation under Article 2 ECHR.  The ECtHR 
found in favour of the UK when creating the investigative obligation in McCann, and it is 
likely that the requirement was inspired at least in part by the inquest.1  Indeed it could be 
argued that for literally hundreds of years there has been a procedural requirement in 
England and Wales, largely equivalent to the procedural obligation under Article 2.  This 
claim may appear paradoxical given that many of the lead ECtHR cases were brought 
against the UK, and practice was often found to be lacking.  But the inquestǯs history reveals 
the development of a permanent independent forum that, amongst other things, holds 
public investigations into deaths in prisons and at the hands of the police or in police 
custody, in which the family of the deceased can participate. 
The motivations behind the holding of inquests has changed over time.  At certain 
points in history, amongst certain groups, a particular constitutional purpose was attached 
to inquests into deaths in custody or otherwise at the hands of the state.  But it would be 
wrong to assume that there was ever a tidy consensus as to what their qualitative purposes 
were, or how different aims or purposes should be prioritised.  So while in theory there 
may for centuries have been a similar, if not equivalent, domestic procedural obligation to 
that imposed by Article 2, in reality, the wide discretions exercised by coroners, the periodic confusion over the inquestǯs purposes, and its troubled relationship with other 
judicial forums, meant that the practice in inquests was not always consistent, and its social 
function not always clear.2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 McCann (ch 2, n 10). Of course the Court found against the UK on the substantive obligation. 
2 Even when that social function has been relatively clear, it has not necessarily been consistently 
pursued. 
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4.2 The early history of the inquest 
The office of coroner is one of the oldest in England and Wales.3 It is unclear exactly 
when it was established, but it is referred to in the Articles of Eyre in 1194.4  James Upshaw 
Downs recounts that: 
In order for the knight to be elected coroner, he had to be a freeman of sufficient 
means to resist potential corruption.  Towards that end, the office was unpaid.  
The specific concern was the general level of financial misconduct rampant at 
the time in the office of the Sheriff.5 
The main role of the local nobles elected as coroners was to look after the Crownǯs 
revenue interests.6  )n this regard, the death of one of the Crownǯs subjects could raise 
certain issues.  Brennan observes: Although the medieval coronerǯs duties were many […], first and foremost, the 
coroner was an administrator who was responsible for record keeping of 
complex codes regarding fines and penalties having to do with deceased bodies, 
including homicides and suicides.7 
  If a death appeared unnatural or suspicious, it would be necessary to establish 
whether anyone should be held responsible for any resultant loss of Crown revenue.  This 
meant there had to be an investigation.  Medieval inquests often took place outdoors and 
could be held with more than 50 jurors.  The inquisition would view the body of the 
deceased and hear from witnesses with any knowledge about the circumstances of the 
death.8  The jury would then reach a verdict on the cause of death.  Where appropriate, the 
                                                 
3 Phil Scraton and Kathryn Chadwick, In the Arms of the Law : Coronerǯs Inquests and Deaths in Custody 
(Pluto, 1987) 22. 
4 However, according to James Upshaw Downs, the existence of the office can be traced to the 10th 
century.  Its reinvention was necessitated by the depletion of the treasury in ransoming King Richard from Vienna ȋǮCoroner/Medical Examinerǯ in Michael John Brennan ȋedȌ, The A–Z of Death and Dying: Social, 
Medical, and Cultural Aspects (ABC-CLIO 2014) 107). 
5 Upshaw Downs (n 4) 107. 
6 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 13–14. 
7 Upshaw Downs (n 4) 107. 
8 In the middle ages witnesses would also often sit on the jury. 
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jury would also identify who they believed was responsible for the death.  If unable to 
account for a violent or unnatural death, a community could be fined.9  If a suspect was not 
already detained, a warrant would be issued for her apprehension and she would be held in 
custody to await criminal trial.  The coroner would also ǯattachǯ witnesses, who would be 
obliged, sometimes through payment of a surety, to give evidence at trial.10 A crucial part of a coronerǯs and juryǯs role was to assess the value of the deceasedǯs goods, and, where the 
verdict was murder, the goods of any accused.  If the accused was found guilty, the family of 
the deceased might be compensated by being given some of her property, with the 
remainder being forfeited to the Crown.  Where an inquest jury reached a verdict of suicide, 
(or felo de se – self-murderȌ, the deceasedǯs property would go to the Crown.11 Another of the coronerǯs roles was to make a record of any crimes committed within the 
jurisdiction and present it to the Eyre, a travelling court that stopped at villages and towns 
at fixed times of the year to try criminal and civil cases.12  So, originally at least, there was a 
strong connection between the role of the coroner and a developing criminal justice 
system.  Gradually, however, the judicial and administrative duties of coroners diminished: 
particularly in the late middle ages, with the rise of escheators and Justices of the Peace.13  According to Knapman, by the sixteenth century, ǲalmost the sole remaining function performed by the coroner was the holding of inquests into violent death.ǳ14 
For almost three hundred years there was little significant change in the office of the 
coroner, other than how it was financed.  In the eighteenth century local Justices of the 
Peace were responsible for their payment according to the number of inquests ǲduly heldǳ.  
This led to disputes as to what types of death required investigation.  Some coroners, and 
many magistrates, considered it only appropriate to hold inquests into obviously violent 
deaths.  Others felt they had a duty to investigate all deaths in custody (not just prison), and 
                                                 
9 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 13. 
10 ibid, 14. 
11 Scraton and Chadwick (n 3) 22–28. 
12 ibid, 24. 
13 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 15. 
14 Paul Knapman, ǮThe Crownerǯs Questǯ ȋͳͻͻ͵Ȍ ͺ͸ JR Soc Med ͹ͳ͸, ͹ͳͻ. 
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all sudden or ǲunnaturalǳ deaths.15  This fuelled bitter disputes between some coroners and 
magistrates. 
 
4.3 Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century inquests 
Originally, then, the inquest was less about justice for the deceased or their family, and 
more about establishing whether the Crown had been denied a source of revenue.16  Over 
the centuries the demographic and political landscape of the country changed and with it 
the popular motivational sentiment behind investigations into unexplained, unnatural or 
violent deaths.  The nineteenth century marked a watershed in this regard.  This did not 
manifest itself in significant changes to the inquestǯs fundamental procedural 
characteristics (although important changes did take place), rather it was exhibited in debates about the inquestǯs purpose and perceived constitutional significance. 
As the inquest evolved, its relationship with the criminal justice system began to throw 
up important legal and conceptual problems, especially in terms of their often preliminary 
(some would argue ex parte), inquisitorial and public nature.  Perhaps the most important 
period in the evolution of the inquest occurred during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  During that time the office barely survived being squeezed out of existence by 
hostile justices of the peace, and a rapidly evolving criminal justice system.  The inquest 
was becoming increasingly unpopular amongst powerful vested interests and there was 
growing disquiet about the reputational impact that it could have.  This was exacerbated by 
a developing modern press, and the relative lack of procedural protections for those who 
might face criticism at inquests.  Despite these pressures (or perhaps because of them), this 
was also a period in which inquests acquired renewed constitutional significance for many; 
particularly when investigating deaths in prisons, workhouses, or otherwise at the hands of 
state actors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 ibid, 719. 
16 Or otherwise an opportunity for the Crown to secure additional revenue. 
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4.3.1 Inquests into deaths in prison 
While inquests were usually confined to violent or unnatural deaths, they have always 
been held into deaths in prison, regardless of the circumstances.17  This peculiar historical 
pre-occupation with discovering the cause of prison deaths should not be misinterpreted 
as driven by humanist concerns.  Writing about the medieval inquest, Burney observes that ǲPrison inquests as tokens of the transhistorical tenderness of English common law were 
artefacts of a much later political reconfigurationǳ:18 
Sovereign dignity and profit, at stake in every inquest, was implicated in the particular instance of prison death by virtue of the Crownǯs prerogatives in 
imprisonment and the infliction of bodily punishment.  As a general principle, 
since prisons were coextensive with the person of the king, any wrongdoing on 
the part of the franchise holder constituted an affront to his dominion.  Prison 
deaths, furthermore, represented a breach of sovereign interest with a unique 
set of consequences.  As John Langbein observed in his work on torture, 
medieval incarceration served a well-recognised coercive function, ǲdesigned to 
compel someone to take some other procedural step, characteristically the 
payment of a crown debt or a civil judgment debt.ǳ  )n this sense prison deaths 
attributable to abuse or mismanagement could be counted as direct losses to 
the fiscal well-being of the Crown, requiring compensation of some sort…19 
However, inquests rarely led to verdicts critical of either the prisons as institutions, or 
individual gaolers.20  Hunnisett and Overstone describe how in the middle ages, verdicts of ǮNatural Deathǯ or ǮVisitation by Godǯ took on very wide meanings: ǲDeaths from disease, 
cold, hunger and thirst and from peine forte et dure were common to all gaols, but were regarded as Ǯnatural deathsǯ.ǳ21  Incredibly, for example, despite concluding that a 
                                                 
17 Joe Sim and Tony Ward, ǮThe Magistrates of the Poor? Coroners and Deaths in Custody in Nineteenth-Century Englandǯ in Michael Clark and Catherine Crawford ȋedsȌ, Legal Medicine in History (CUP 1994) 246. 
18 Ian A Burney, Bodies of Evidence: Medicine and the Politics of the English Inquest, 1830-1926 (JHU Press 
2000) 25. 
19 ibid. 
20 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 13–15; Sim and Ward (n 17). 
21 RF Hunnisett and Samuel JL Overstone, The Medieval Coroner (CUP 2008) 37. 
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prisonerǯs death at Canterbury Gaol in ͳ͵ͳ͵ had been caused by flogging, a City of London 
jury still returned a verdict of ǲNatural Deathǳ.22 
This was still a problem by the nineteenth century.  Between 1795 and 1829, 376 
prisoners died in Coldbath Fields prison.  T. R. Forbes concluded that the inquests revealed: […] an apparent lack of official interest in determining why prisoners died.  
Indeed one wonders whether the vagueness of the record represents an effort 
to conceal actual causes of death—a state of affairs which would not be 
surprising in a prison in utter disrepute.  No cause was recorded for almost one 
third of the deaths.  Almost one fifth were piously ascribed to a ǮVisitation of Godǯ, a whitewashing phrase that also was frequently used by coronersǯ juries of 
the time for deaths in prison; it was as nonspecific as it was unassailable […].23 
Similarly, in the ͹ years between ͳͺʹͷ and ͳͺ͵ʹ, there were ͳͷͺ deaths in the Kingǯs Bench debtorsǯ prison.24  The inquests reached verdicts of Visitation of God or Natural 
Death in 150, and in only six cases of cholera was an actual cause of death given.25  The 
statistician, Dr William Fair, who compiled the Register Generalǯs reports, noted in ͳͺ͵͹ 
that: […] the inquest in gaols is at present very much a matter of form […] The causes 
of death registered as the result of a solemn, juridical, investigation are the most 
unintelligible in the register.26 
Until 1823, juries could include a significant proportion of prisoners from the 
institution being investigated, leading to concerns that jurors were under the influence of 
prison governors.27 
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 88 
 
4.4 The evolving constitutional significance of inquests 
There is evidence of people increasingly challenging the tendencies described above.  
Ignatieff points to a 1798 example where a vagrant died in Coldbath prison.28  At the 
inquest, the jury returned a verdict of Visitation by God.  Members of the London 
Corresponding Society, who were serving sentences in the same prison for treason, queried 
the verdict in a letter asking: 
Were the Jury informed, Sir, that this man was barely clothed?  Did they inquire 
into the quantity of food given him, did they know that he was put into a cold 
damp cell during a very severe frost without the use of a fire or anything to keep 
him from perishing?  Did they hear that he complained 36 hours before his 
death that his legs would mortify if he was left in that state?  Did they inquire 
what medical assistance he received after his complaints were known?  Were 
any inquiries made of the prisoners near him of the circumstances of his death, 
and did the jury know that he was not a criminal? […] When our humane statutes made provision for passing the poor to their 
parishes they never intended that their lives should be sported with like the 
worthless felon who is speculated upon to calculate what degree of hunger he 
can sustain!  What degree of cold he can bear.29 
Another example can be seen in a letter from a Colonel Blennerbasset Fairmen to the 
Lancet complaining that: ǮDied by the visitation of Godǯ is the return nine times out of ten when the verdict ought to be Ǯof a broken heart through persecution of the most relentless and unjust kindǯ – Ǯof disease brought on by the removal from a bed of sickness to a place of incarcerationǯ – Ǯof abstinence and starvation through the absolute 
                                                                                                                                                             
regarding deaths in mines (Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, Volume 1, translated 
by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Wandsworth Editions Ltd, 2013) fns. 378, 379, 380). 
28 Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 
(Penguin 1989) 131–132. 
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want of the necessitates of lifeǯ – or perhaps Ǯfrom excessive drinking brought 
on by anxiety and dejection of mind, through a long confinementǯ.30 
During this period the office of coroner was under constant attack from two different 
sides.  The first was reactionary and tended to believe magistrates were better placed and 
qualified to investigate deaths.  They targeted, in particular, the independence and the wide 
discretions that attended the office, as well as inquest juries.  They complained that 
coroners carried out too many inquests, at too much cost, into deaths which were either 
from natural causes, or—with deaths in prisons and workhouses—ultimately the consequences of the deceasedǯs own life-long excesses and poverty of spirit. 
As for attacks on jurors, Sim and Ward point out they ǲwere easy targets; since there 
was, uniquely, no property qualification for this form of jury service, the jurors were often poor, and sometimes illiterate.ǳ31  The magistrates of Middlesex, for example, set up a Committee to investigate the conduct of inquests in the area. )ts report derided juriesǯ ǲmisplaced interference and irrelevant questionsǳ32 and recommended abolishing them 
and transferring control of death investigation to the magistrates.33 
The other source of criticism came from radicals and reformers.  They generally 
recognised the potential value of the office, but advocated urgent reform.  They were 
particularly concerned about coronersǯ lack of medical training.  The Lancet, for example, railed against ǲthe imbecility and ignorance of coronersǳ.34  In 1841, the surgeon, Jonathan 
Toogood, argued in a letter to The Times: 
Men are often elected to the office of coroner who are so totally unfit for its 
duties, as to be quite unequal to conduct an inquiry themselves, or direct a jury […].  In this part of the country the evidence of a medical man is generally 
dispensed with, and a post-mortem examination is a matter of very rare 
occurrence; so that unless the cause of death be obvious and visible, it is 
                                                 
30 Wakley (n 27) 144. 
31 Sim and Ward (n 17) 254. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 Sim and Ward (n 17). 
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scarcely ever ascertained, and the coroner directs the jury to find a verdict of Ǯdeath by visitation of Godǯ, which they return accordingly.35 
Coroners were rarely medically trained and, until the Remuneration of Medical 
Witnesses Act of 1836, could not pay for qualified doctors to conduct post-mortems.  Critics 
were also appalled by the tendency for the office to, at best, be filled by those lacking the 
rigour necessary to fearlessly investigate deaths; and, at worst, by those who were simply 
corrupt.  Between these two extremes there were many coroners who exhibited a natural 
bias towards institutions implicated in deaths.  In one example, Parliament heard how an inquest jury was ǲswayed by the coronerǯs Ǯimproperǯ summing upǳ, and told there was no middle ground between a verdict of ǮMurderǯ and ǮDied by the visitation of Godǯ.36  This: […] induced the jurors to bringing in the latter verdict, though three of them 
afterwards said, they thought it would have been more proper to declare, that 
the prisoner died through the negligence of the gaoler or his servant.37 
Such examples were common.38  Another can be seen in the context of the battle between prison reformers, and those who believed that prison should be ǲas lonely and as 
inconvenient and irksome as the human mind could bearǳ, such as the Tory MP, C. C. 
Western.39  The regime at Millbank prison was singled out for particular derision by hardliners, with the chairman of the Millbank Committee accused of overseeing a ǲfattening houseǳ.40  Ignatieff observes that bread riots at the prison in 1818 had the ironic effect of 
encouraging the myth that the administration was weak and indulgent.41  After criticism in 
Parliament and the press, the prison diet was reduced to disastrous levels.  Ignatieff describes the new regime as an ǲexperimentation with the outer limits of terrorǳ—
although noting that this was not unique to Millbank.42 
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[C]ounty and borough magistrates introduced bread and water diets and 
banned the supply of outside food.  By the early 1840s, the paring away of 
institutional diets had reached the point that the Home Secretary felt it was 
necessary to warn [Justices of the Peace] against using diets as ǲan instrument of punishmentǳ.43 
  In the winter of 1823-24, starving and freezing prisoners succumbed en masse to 
typhus, dysentery and scurvy.  Thirty-five died and around four hundred were 
incapacitated in just one winter.  The Times observed that at the inquest into the death of one prisoner, ǲthe body ȋwhich was quite skeletonȌ presented the same deplorable 
appearance to which so many unfortunate convicts have been reduced within the last nine months.ǳ44 
The coverage of the inquest illustrates the active role played by juries in questioning 
witnesses.45  The coroner is constantly interrupted by questions and exclamations from 
jurors, who at times express incredulity at claims that the death had nothing to do with the prisonerǯs diet.  At one point the coroner pleads: 
You are not to insult a gentleman examined here.  Put your question through 
me.  A professional gentleman must know better than we do.  You are bound to 
believe him; but do put your question civilly.46 
The Times reports that the jury was split with six wishing to record a verdict of ǲNatural Death, occasioned by the former bad dietary.ǳ47  But, ǲthe coroner impressed strenuously upon the minds of [these] jurymen […], the discontent such a verdict would occasion out of doors, and ultimately succeeded in getting the whole to sign a verdict of ǲNatural Death, 
occasioned by diarrhoea.ǳǳ48 
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It is important to note, however, that The Times did not ǲbow to the coronerǯs suasionǳ49 
publishing details of the evidence, the juryǯs original opinion, the coronerǯs interference, and the juryǯs U-turn.50 
 
4.5 Thomas Wakley and the inquest as radical theatre 
So despite a bleak picture of the beginnings of the modern inquest and any association 
it might have with holding state actors to account for deaths at their hands, things were 
being challenged by a determined coalition of radicals and reformers, commentators, 
journalists, newspaper and periodical editors, doctors and parliamentarians.  In particular, 
because inquests were held in public and the press reported on them, reformers were well-
informed and able to comment upon the realities of the system. 
Much of the literature that describes inquests during this period focuses on their 
perceived ineffectiveness due to the inconsequential verdicts often reached.  But this 
arguably misses the significance of the proceedings as a whole.   It is true that a verdict of 
Natural Causes or Visitation by God meant there would be little chance of a criminal 
prosecution51, but evidence heard at inquests was widely disseminated by a developing 
modern press, successfully and widely exposing cruelties suffered in e.g. workhouses,52 
prisons,53 orphanages,54 and at the hands of Yeomanry Cavalry.55  Inquests had a significant 
impact on national conversations surrounding state institutions, informing debates on 
policing, prison and poor law reform, and other social issues.  These appear in 
Parliamentary debates, newspaper editorials, and letters to newspapers and journals of the 
time, with evidence from specific inquests being referred to. 
Furthermore, not all coroners or inquests in the nineteenth century merited all of the 
criticisms outlined above.  Sim and Ward argue that: 
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[…] the coroners court was a forum where some of the most marginalised 
groups in Victorian society, such as prisoners, paupers and their relatives, could 
challenge the practices of disciplinary institutions and the medical profession.  It 
was also the only court in which working-class people could participate as 
jurors.  While there were many inquests in which juries tamely recorded Ǯvisitation of Godǯ verdicts as instructed by the coroner, there were others in which their verdicts reflected a form of popular justice.  The coronersǯ claim to be the Ǯmagistrates of the poorǯ was not entirely unfounded.56 
With coroners normally elected by local freeholders, and inquests including local jurors, 
they point out that inquests could have ǲa distinctly popular flavourǳ and provide ǲa forum in which the poor could challenge the powerful.ǳ57  Specifically, coronersǯ courts ǲplayed an 
important part in raising popular discontent about the disciplinary orientation of the prisonsǳ,—and this also extended to other institutions.58 
 
4.5.1 Thomas Wakley 
Some coroners fulfilled their role with a considerable sense of duty.  Probably the most famous of these was the Victorian coroner and ǲradical surgeonǳ, Thomas Wakley.59  In 
1835, Wakley was elected as an MP, and in a move that alleviated one of the most repeated 
criticisms levelled against coroners—their lack of medical knowledge—he guided the 
Remuneration of Medical Witnesses Bill through Parliament.60  This allowed coroners to 
pay doctors to conduct post-mortems and give evidence at the inquest.61 
In 1839, Wakley was elected coroner to Western Middlesex, and instructed that all 
deaths in custody (including prisons, workshops, asylums and police stations) be referred 
to him.  With magistrates being both the ex officio guardians of poor law workhouses in 
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rural areas, and controlling the payment of coroners, there ensued an almost inevitable 
battle between the two groups of office holders in Middlesex;62 a battle so fierce that a 
Parliamentary Committee was tasked with looking into it.63 Wakley argued before it that 
the office of coroner was the only thing that stood ǲbetween all persons in authority and the peopleǳ:64 
The justices of the peace are the controlling authorities in gaols and in lunatic 
asylums; they are sometimes concerned in cases where life is lost in conflicts 
between the people and the civil power; the magistrates are the persons to 
whom the poor apply in cases of urgent necessity, when the requisite aid is 
refused to them by the parochial officers; in the whole of these cases the 
coroners may be brought into conflicts with the magistrates in the discharge of 
the most solemn and important portions of their public duties.  If coroners be 
subject to the control of persons who are thus engaged, seeing the tyranny that 
might be exercised over them in relation to their accounts, they might shrink 
from the performance of their duty at a time when their most powerful energies 
should be called into action in the public service.65 
Wakley oversaw several inquests where juries returned damning verdicts on 
institutions.66  Two inquests into deaths at Hendon Workhouse pitted Wakley against the 
local vicar, magistrate, and chairman of the workhouseǯs board of guardians, the Rev. 
Theodore Williams.  In the first, a jury found that a pauperǯs death from scalding was 
contributed to by the workhouse failing to erect a safety railing.  The second, was into the 
death of James Lisney, whose daughter claimed had died due to an illness caused by him 
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being locked in a cold and damp room as a punishment.67  Wakleyǯs opening statement to 
the inquest provides an interesting illustration of his attitude regarding its purpose: 
Now the allegation of the daughter was of a very serious import; and it is quite 
clear that, if allegations of this kind get forth without inquiries being instituted, 
and investigations too, somewhat of a searching nature, the poor would very 
soon believe […] that the inquest afforded them no protection whatever […].  I 
am the more particular in alluding to the protection which the inquest is 
capable of affording, and ought to afford, to poor persons in workhouses […].68 
Wakley obviously believed it was important for the inquest to take seriously the concerns of the deceasedǯs family.  )t was on the basis of the daughterǯs allegations alone 
that he ordered a post-mortem.69  The quote also reflects his belief that one of the inquestǯs 
tasks was to reassure the public that wrongdoing would be exposed, or an exonerating 
verdict would only be reached after a thorough investigation.  These fit the purposes that 
Lord Bingham gave Article 2 compliant investigations in Amin over 150 years later.70  
Finally, Wakley obviously believed that if governors were held to account, real protection 
would be afforded to the poor by deterring future excesses by those in authority.  This 
corresponds with the ECt(Rǯs view, a century and a half later, that for Article 2 to provide 
meaningful protection, it must be read in combination with Article 1.71 Wakley also 
impressed on the jury what he saw as the particular importance of inquests into deaths in 
prisons and workhouses.72 
The report of the inquest illustrates how much juries were involved in the investigative 
function of inquests.  Wakley repeatedly asks the jurors for their opinions on the inquestǯs 
course, including whether they agree there should be a post-mortem, and whether they can 
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suggest a reliable surgeon, commending their suggestion that one be requested from 
London with no connection to the case.73 
Another feature of interest is Wakleyǯs use of what we would call today Ǯspecial 
measuresǯ.  Whenever a pauper from the workhouse gave evidence, Wakley emptied the 
courtroom, save for the jurors.  Their evidence was heard and depositions prepared, which 
were then read out in open court.  In terms of open justice, this was a worrying practice.  It 
was obviously thought prudent by Wakley to protect witnesses from intimidation—real or 
imagined—by workhouse staff.  But it also raised real questions of fairness and propriety, and was justifiably seized upon by the Rev. Williams as unfair.  Wakleyǯs response to the Reverendǯs complaints may have been canny (pointing out his hypocrisy), but failed to address a valid point ȋeven if the origins of that point lay in Williamsǯs prejudicesȌ: 
The Rev. T Williams.]  […] ) submit to you that the paupers you may be about to 
examine are not belonging to the most intellectual class of persons, and 
therefore a great deal depends upon the way the questions may be put to them.  
This being the case, I have to request, that although you may exclude the 
guardians, you will at least allow the reporters of the public press to be present. 
Coroner.]  It is singularly curious that so much anxiety is manifested about the 
presence of reporters, when I find that by a resolution of the Board of guardians themselves in October ͳͺ͵͹, it is resolved ǲThat no reporters or members of the public press be permitted to be present at any of the meetings of this Board.ǳ74 
The jury concluded that Lisneyǯs death was ǲcaused by an imprisonment in the gaol-
room of the Hendon Union Workhouseǳ, and expressed its view that it ǲwas not humane to 
imprison, without fire and on low diet, […someone] in an infirm state of health, in 
consequence of […] diabetes.ǳ75 
Wakleyǯs peculiar concern amongst his profession for justice can be seen in the 
aftermath of 180 deaths in Tooting Child Farm in 1848-9.  Surrey coroners failed to carry 
out a single inquest, but one of the sick children happened to die in Wakleyǯs jurisdiction. 
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But for this happenstance, Charles Dickens wrote in the Examiner, ǲthe conditions at the 
Farm might never have come to lightǳ.76 
 Wakley called an inspector of the Board of Health to produce a report on the conditions 
at the Farm.  It was damning, describing how they: [exceeded] in offensiveness anything yet witnessed […] in hospitals or elsewhere, occupied by the sick […]. Drouet [the manager], despite warnings, 
had overcrowded his accommodation and had put four cholera patients in one bed.  They lay, of course, covered with each otherǯs diarrhoea, which the inspector described as Ǯevery offensive, indecent and barbarous circumstances that can aggravate the horrors of their condition […]ǯ77 
The jury brought in a verdict of manslaughter against the manager.78 
 
4.5.2 The inquest into the death of John Lees 
The Oldham/Manchester inquest into the death of John Lees had a singular impact on 
debates about the role of inquests and their openness to the public.  Lees was fatally wounded on ʹ͸ August ͳͺͳͻ at Saint Peterǯs Fields in Manchester ȋthe Peterloo MassacreȌ.  
According to Burney: )n the course of the inquest, discussion centred on ǲconstitutionalǳ issues; most notable were the status of the inquest as an ǲopenǳ court to which ǲthe publicǳ 
had a fundamental right of access and the role of the press in transmitting its 
proceedings onto a national stage.  These connected with broad jurisprudential 
debates that, in the context of the political repression of the revolutionary era, 
had been consistently before the courts in previous years.  Equally, abstracted from the specific institutional location of the coronerǯs inquest, principles of 
open justice were matters of major concern for a radical politics founded on the 
defence of ancient liberties.  The Oldham hearings definitively placed the 
inquest and open justice in the same frame: the coroner and his supporters 
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argued that, in the climate of intense agitation surrounding it, the inquest was 
best kept out of the public eye; radicals saw in the full public hearing a chance to 
expose government repression to public opinion in a clear forum.79 
Paradoxically, the inquest and its outcome illustrated both the forumǯs importance, and 
its vulnerability to abuse and corruption.  The formal outcome of the inquest was a travesty 
of any notion of justice. However, the proceedings themselves led to the wide 
dissemination of eye-witnesses evidence, testifying to the carnage inflicted upon the peaceful gathering at Saint Peterǯs fields.  Every day the courtroom was packed, with The 
Times describing how: 
The interest excited by the proceedings before the Coroner is most intense.  The 
pressure of the crowd into the room obliged the Coroner repeatedly to interfere 
for fear the floor should give way.  A considerable multitude continued assembled at the doors and windows of the house during the whole time […]80 
Despite the very real local anger at the events at Peterloo, the reporter observed that: 
Up to this moment the utmost order has been observed, and I have no reason 
whatever to apprehend that any disturbance will arise.  There is a deep and 
settled melancholy on every countenance; and the immense assemblage now 
before the house are waiting patiently for the result of the inquiry.81 
Inside the Tavern where the inquest was originally being held, its chaotic and bad-
tempered opening on 8 September 1819 set the tone for the next few weeks of angry 
exchanges on points of legal and constitutional principle, and the on/off hearing of evidence.  The inquest was opened by the coronerǯs clerk who, after becoming aware that 
the family had legal representation and were prepared with witnesses, adjourned 
proceedings until the return of the coroner.  First, he insisted that the coroner would not 
allow the press to report on proceedings or others to attend.  At this the familyǯs barrister, 
Mr Harmer, observed: 
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[T]his is an open Court; any man is at liberty to publish anything which takes 
place here […The coroner] could not legally exclude us; for as this is a public Court of Justice […] if all the people of England could be so compressed, they are 
entitled to be present in this room [… T]o exclude us would be contrary to the 
law of the land: for not merely professional agents, but any passing strangers, 
are at liberty to enter this public Court.82 
In fact, when the inquest reconvened, the coroner, Mr Ferrand, did open the court to the 
public and the press, and allowed them to take notes.  However, he insisted that the press 
not publish anything until all related proceedings had finished.83  He could rely on R v Fleet 
as authority for this order.84  )n that case, the Kingǯs Bench ruled that a court could grant a criminal information for ǲpublishing, in a newspaper, a statement of the evidence given before a coronerǯs jury, accompanied with comments, although the statement be correct, 
and the party has no malicious motive in the publication.ǳ85   That case concerned the 
publication of an account of an inquest also into the death of a man at the hands of soldiers 
during a civil disturbance.  The jury brought in a verdict of ǲwilful murderǳ against the high 
constable and two others.  During the proceedings, The Brighton Herald published minutes 
of the evidence and a comment suggesting the military had been unnecessarily called out, and the high constableǯs conduct was, ǲto say the least, […] imprudent.ǳ86 
In R v Fleet all four judges held that the publication was unlawful with two singling out 
the comment for particular criticism.87 Bayley J. went a step further than the other judges, 
arguing that the inquest was: […] wholly ex parte, and where there is no opportunity for cross-examination.  A 
jury who are afterwards to sit upon the trial ought not to have ex parte accounts 
previously laid before them.  They ought to decide solely upon the evidence 
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which they hear on the trial.  It is therefore, highly criminal to publish, before 
such a trial, an account of what has passed on the inquest before the coroner.88 Back at the Lees inquest, the coronerǯs order—that any notes taken should not be 
published—was ignored by The Times and other newspapers. The Times gave a verbatim account of the second dayǯs proceedings including the evidence given by witnesses.  Despite stating that the coronerǯs conduct was ǲas wise as it was honestǳ, The Times 
questioned ǲthe propriety of suppressing the evidenceǳ, and insisted it would follow the 
practice in London and publish all that transpired.89 
The coroner—who during the following days very quickly lost the sympathy of The 
Times90—was furious.  On the third day, he stated he would institute criminal prosecutions 
against all who violated his order.  Again, Mr Harmer weighed in, arguing that ǲThis Mr 
Coroner, is an open court as much as any kind of courtǳ, and pointing out that inquests of 
old were even held in the open air.91  The coroner then banned anyone from taking notes, 
at which Mr Harmer observed that ǲsurely the fair and correct reports given by those who 
took notes in that Court, were far better grounds of opinion than the vague recollections 
and inaccurate statements of mere spectators.92 
The Times continued to publish accounts of proceedings, seemingly from a mixture of 
memory and surreptitiously made notes.  Things reached a head on the eighth day of 
proceedings, with the coroner squabbling with members of the public and press on the 
legality of his prohibition on note-taking. 
The CORONER here asked the gentleman […] whether he was taking notes […] 
The gentleman declined to answer.  Then you must leave the Court […] The 
gentleman remarked, that in taking notes in that Court he was exercising as 
undisputed a right as in walking the highway or breathing the common air.  The 
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giving of evidence in that Court was a publication.  Whatever is aired in a public 
Court is already published, and how can a journal be restrained from publishing 
what has been already published?93 
At this point another member of the public argued that ǲthe publication of the evidence 
might be punished if it was illegal; but that it was contrary to law [… and] the practice of our Courts, to forbid using oneǯs hand in noting what took place.94 At this, the coroner 
finally lost patience and had the reporter forcibly removed.95 
Unfortunately, the Lees inquest was halted when the coroner ordered a lengthy 
adjournment.  This was challenged in the High Court, which ruled that because the jury had 
viewed the body in the absence of the coroner, the inquest was ǲutterly illegalǳ.96  The 
adjourned inquest was therefore never resumed, but neither was a new one ordered.97 
The suspension of the inquest helped ensure that no one was ever prosecuted in 
connection with Peterloo, but it was too late to cover up what had happened.98  The 
evidence of numerous witnesses was widely circulated—most of whom swore to the 
peacefulness of the gathering and the unprovoked nature of the attack by the cavalrymen—
and so too was the alleged bias of the coroner, his alleged collusion with the Manchester 
magistrates,99 and the denial of justice by the High Court.  Burney describes how in 
Parliament, Henry Brougham did not let the injustice of the (igh Courtǯs judgment pass 
without comment, arguing that legal principle had been sacrificed to ǲbase political 
expediencyǳ, making ǲa mockery of the people of England.ǳ100 
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Despite the above, Burney argues that the Lees inquest had the paradoxical affect of re-
invigorating the ancient institution with a renewed constitutional significance, and that this 
was quickly picked up on by the press: 
For the opposition press, the Lees inquest struck critics as part of a broad-scale 
assault on the foundations of English liberties, of which Peterloo was itself the 
most obvious and flagrant instance.  Opponents of despotism, an Examiner 
correspondent declared, were facing a constitutional crisis of epic proportions: ǲAs if the atrocious sabring of an unarmed inoffensive population were not 
sufficient of itself to make the triumph of arbitrary principles, supported by 
military power, over the constitutional rights of the people, we are doomed to 
witness the scandalous perversion of judicial proceedings in support of that 
system of state policy which will either destroy this country, or it must be destroyed by the spirit of the British nation.ǳ  The resort to legal machination 
thus provided a means to invest in the popular inquest the emotions attached to 
the most traumatic martyrdom in the annals of radical politics.  The inquest, at 
least in principle, emerged from Peterloo as a constitutionally sanctioned 
answer to the problem of reconciling the tension between appeals to public 
opinion and the spectre of public disorder. Small wonder, then, that the 
opposition press took the opportunity over the next several years to realise 
other cases of inquests that equally promised to expose abuse.101 
 
4.6 Ongoing tensions about the openness of nineteenth-century inquests 
The controversy surrounding public access to inquests and the publication of 
proceedings continued for two decades.  In an 1827 case brought against the same Mr 
Ferrand, the High Court considered whether an action for trespass could be brought 
against a coroner for forcibly removing a member of the public from the courtroom.102  Two questions were considered.  Was the coronerǯs court an open court; and, if so, did the 
coroner still have the power to remove individuals as he deemed fit.  The coronerǯs 
barristers stressed the fact that the plaintiff was not in any way connected to the inquest 
                                                 
101 ibid, 28–30. 
102 Garnett v Ferrand (1827) 108 ER 576 (KB). It has not been possible to ascertain whether this related 
to the Lees inquest. 
 103 
proceedings: ǲhe was not summoned, nor accused, nor suspected, nor a relation of the deceased, nor even an inhabitant of the vill where the body was found.ǳ103  As such, they argued, he had no right to be present because the inquest was a ǲpreliminary investigation only, and, therefore, not open to the public.ǳ104 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that both statute and old authorities defining inquests 
and the publicǯs obligations towards them necessitated that they be open.  Certain 
members of the public had certain rights at inquests, which could only be exercised if they 
were present.  They pointed out that ǲif a person has not a right to be present, he cannot tell 
when evidence tending to criminate him is given, so as to be able to adduce evidence in answer.ǳ105  Further, unlike grand juries, inquests were required to hear both evidence for 
and against anyone implicated in a death.  An inquest would also not necessarily lead to an accusation against any individual, and the fact that it sometimes would was ǲnot sufficient ground for saying the inquiry should be secret.ǳ106  In particular, the notion of a closed 
inquest flew in the face of the tendency in the past to have enormous juries, and the 
ongoing practice of impanelling juries publicly and then viewing the body ǲin the street, in 
an open place, and in coronâ populi.ǳ107  They observed that the 1207 Statute of Marlbridge 
had required all persons over twelve years old to be present at inquests.108  Also, in 
contrast to grand juries, inquests could conclude with decisions which would not be ǲtraversableǳ—the issuing of fines upon villagers, for example, or a verdict of felo de se. Despite these arguments, the court ruled in Ferrandǯs favour.  The judges expressed their view that the inquest was, indeed, only a ǲpreliminary enquiryǳ and that ǲsuch an 
enquiry ought, for the purposes of justice, in some cases to be conducted in secrecy.ǳ […S]ecrecy and exclusion may be proper and necessary when charge and 
accusation begin, it is obvious, that this may begin as soon as the evidence 
begins.  Cases also may offer, in which privacy may be requisite for the sake of 
decency; others, in which it may be due to the family of the deceased.  Many 
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things must be disclosed to those who are to decide, the publication whereof, to 
the world at large, may be productive to mischief without any possibility of 
good.109 
The ratio of the case, however is limited to the finding that the coronerǯs court is a Court 
of Record, of which the coroner is the Judge, and that no action will lie against a Judge of 
Record for any matter done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions.110 
In 1832, the issue of inquestsǯ openness to the public was debated in the House of 
Commons.111  Mr Warburton MP rose to advocate inserting into the Coroners Bill a clause ǲdeclaring that all inquests should be public.ǳ112  In debate, the Lees inquest was referred to 
explicitly: What security was there that the Coronerǯs inquiry would lead to a full and fair 
investigation, if the inquest could be held in secret?  In all such cases, the only 
protection which the people could have was by the free admission of the reporters of the public Press.  [Mr OǯConnell] looked upon the case of those who 
were concerned in the celebrated murders at Manchester to have been secured by the imperfection of the law respecting the Coronerǯs Court.  The highest 
Courts of Law were open, although in them there was some guarantee of justice, 
in the education, experience, previous character, and responsibility of the Judge; 
whereas, neither experience, nor education, nor any qualification whatever was 
required in the Coroner, who had the power of deciding absolutely and in 
secret.113 
It was pointed out that in inquests suspects could adduce evidence in their own favour 
and that a public verdict of murder at an inquest was as likely to prejudice a criminal jury 
as the evidence on which that verdict was founded.  Referring to the Lees inquest, Henry 
Hunt observed that ǲ[t]he right of excluding the public from Coronerǯs )nquests was first 
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assumed, twelve years ago, at Manchester […] )n fact, a Coronerǯs )nquest, as the law now 
stood, was little better than the Star Chamber or the Inquisition.ǳ114 
 The clause was agreed to by a significant majority, whereupon it went to the House of 
Lords for consideration. The Lords struck out the clause, saying it was unnecessary.  The 
Attorney General and Solicitor General both stated that ǲthe present state of the law was, that the Coronerǯs Court was an open Court.ǳ115  Lord Chief Justice Denman (the principal Coroner of EnglandȌ and the Lord Chancellor also confirmed that ǲthere could be no doubt 
but [the coronerǯs court] was an open Court.ǳ116  When the amended Bill returned to the 
Commons, they rejected it, pointing out that the actions of Mr Ferrand and other coroners 
proved the need for statutory clarity.117  A conference was arranged to attempt to persuade 
the Lords to reinsert the clause.  Unfortunately, the issue does not seem to have been 
pursued any further, and the Bill itself was never passed.118 Despite the Law Lordsǯ assurances that coronersǯ courts were open to the public, Sewellǯs A Treatise on the Law of Coroner: With Copious Precedents of Inquisitions, published 
in 1843, still cited Garnett v Ferrand as authority for them being closed, unless at the 
discretion of the coroner.119 
 
4.7 Separating inquests from the criminal and civil justice systems 
Along with the Remuneration of Medical Witnesses Act 1836, two other important 
pieces of legislation came into force towards the end of the nineteenth century.  The 
Coroners Act 1887 made it clear that inquests should be held into all violent, unnatural and 
(where the cause of death was unknown) sudden deaths, as well as deaths in prison.120  It 
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also made it a statutory requirement that: juries be summoned for all inquests; inquest into 
deaths in prison should not include prisoners on the jury; and juries number no less than 
12 and no more than 23.  The Local Government Act 1888, finally released coroners from 
the power of magistrates, and the office was made a salaried one.121 
The renewed constitutional significance attributed to inquests in the nineteenth 
century, in terms of their potential to secure public accountability for deaths at the hands of 
state institutions or actors, receded into the background during the early to mid-twentieth 
century.  Nevertheless, it arguably played a part in ensuring the inquestǯs survival in the 
face of interest groups who were losing patience with the forum.  These could also call 
upon a cause with constitutional significance: the need for natural and procedural justice 
protections for those accused of criminal or civil wrongdoing. 
In 1909, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Coroners was set up to look into 
possible reform.122  Its proposals eventually contributed to some significant changes to the 
law governing inquests.  Possibly the most important was that the police, not coroners, 
should investigate murders, and that inquests be adjourned while they did so.123  This was 
given effect in the Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926.124  Despite this, Scraton and Chadwick 
point out that tensions between inquests and criminal proceedings remained.125  This led 
to another significant review by a departmental committee chaired by Lord Wright (set up 
in 1935 and reporting in 1936).  This was greeted by a The Times editorial that reflected 
the waning association of inquests with popular justice.126  In stark contrast to the paperǯs 
attitude a century before—it criticised the wide press coverage of inquests as serving only ǲthe public demand for sensation.ǳ127  It condemned inquests as superfluous and liable to 
abuse, and accused coroners of ǲdragging into the glare of publicity private and doubtfully 
relevant correspondence [and] parading to a receptive Press their unessential views on 
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modern society.ǳ128  It concluded by stating that the age when inquests were necessary was now ǲmercifully as dead as the age of chivalry.ǳ129 
Thomas et al, point out that whereas the ͳͻͳͲ report ǲhad been concerned with enhancing the utility of investigationsǳ, the Wright Report ǲwas more personal in its concernsǳ, focusing on what it saw as the need to limit coronersǯ powers.130  The Report 
mirrored the Timesǯs editorial cited above: criticising coroners for going ǲbeyond the mere 
investigation of the facts of an unnatural death and to deal with questions of civil and criminal liability for the consideration of which the coronerǯs court was ill equipped.ǳ131  This was ǲall the more problematic because the coroners lacked the necessary forensic and judicial skills to justify their influence.ǳ132  The Report recommended further measures to isolate coronersǯ courts from criminal and civil justice processes, including that inquests 
should no longer proffer indictments for murder against named persons, and that a 
declaratory provision should be enacted in legislation to the effect that coronerǯs courts 
were not concerned with questions of civil liability.133 
The Coroners Rules 1953 (CR 1953) were significantly influenced by the Wright 
Report.134 But r 14 at least stated unequivocally that: 
Every inquest shall be held in public: Provided that the coroner may direct that 
the public be excluded from an inquest or any part of an inquest if he considers 
that it would be in the interest of national security so to do.135 
The Rules also gave the police formal responsibility for investigating murders, and 
repeated the now statutory requirement that inquests be adjourned in the event of a 
criminal prosecution.136  Finally, they gave rather clumsy effect to Wrightǯs 
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recommendation for a declaratory provision, by prohibiting inquests from Ǯappearingǯ to 
determine questions of civil liability.137 
On the impact of Wright, Thomas et al conclude: 
The 1953 Rules (so heavily reliant on Wright) were consolidated by the 
Coroners Rules 1984.  Up until the coming into force of the [Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009] regime, those rules were critical in determining the scope and 
limitations in the inquest system.  Their origins can be traced back to the pre-
welfare state concerns of the Wright Committee, in which Edwardian ideals of a gentlemanǯs reputation and good governance outweighed the broader priority 
of rendering the conduct of public authorities in the modern world more 
accountable.  On a structural level, coroners moved from being magistrates of 
the poor to administrators of the embryonic welfare state.138 
The Coroners Rules 1953 failed to resolve the problematic relationship between 
inquests and criminal and civil justice processes.  Partly as a response to this, another 
commission was set up to look into inquests in 1965, led by Judge Norman Brodrick QC.  It 
took six years to produce its report.139  This recommended abolishing juriesǯ power to attribute individual criminal responsibility for a death, and the coronerǯs power to proffer 
individuals for criminal trial.140  However, it also unequivocally declared that "the existing coronerǯs service, subject to [the] modification[s] we propose […], is worthy of retentionǳ,141 and included 114 recommendations for improving its effectiveness.142  Some 
were particularly relevant for inquests into deaths at the hands of the state: 
1. All interested persons should be publicly funded to pay for legal representation;143 
2. Juries should be selected as in other courts;144 
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3. All deaths in custody (including in police stations and under the Mental Health Act 
1959) should be reported to the coroner;145 
4. Inquests should be held into all deaths in custody;146 
5. Coronersǯ officers should be civilians (not policemen);147 
6. The decision on whether to summon a jury should be entirely for the coroner.148 
It was to take many years before some of the Reportǯs recommendations were given 
effect.149 The preoccupation with the inquestǯs relationship with the criminal justice system was 
one-sided, focusing on the perceived problems posed to the criminal justice process by the 
inquest.  The Brodrick Report, while recommending procedural changes to protect the 
criminal justice system, nevertheless recognised that a solution to this troubled relationship also required a restatement of the inquestǯs own purposes.  These needed to 
be defined on their own terms, rather than simply negatively vis-à-vis the purposes of 
other judicial processes. 
The Committee suggested certain ǲgrounds of public interestǳ which the inquest should 
serve, including: determining the cause of death; allaying rumours or suspicion; drawing attention to circumstances which ǲif unremedied, might lead to further deathsǳ; advancing 
medical knowledge; and preserving the interests of the deceasedǯs family or other 
interested persons.150 Regarding deaths in custody, the Report argued that: 
Most people, we think, want to have assurances that prisoners (and other 
persons set apart from society as a whole) did not die from maltreatment. We 
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accept that it is perfectly proper for a coronerǯs court to be used for this purpose 
and that, to be fully effective, the procedure must apply to all deaths in such 
circumstances.151 
 
4.8 A changing society 
In the nineteenth century, coroners at times struggled to keep control of juries in the 
face of interruptions and heckling.152  The ǲjustifiable homicideǳ verdict in the ͳͺ͵͵ inquest 
into the death of PC Robert Culley during a riot, illustrates how wary many of the public 
were of state authority and the nascent police force in particular.153  Gradually deference to 
those in positions of authority, including the police and coroners, seems to have increased.  
But in the 1970s and 80s, Thomas et al (drawing upon Mick Ryanǯs account of the origins of 
the NGO, INQUEST) argue that such attitudes began to shift again as the post-war 
consensus in politics came to an end: 
 […D]uring this time that the police and the Prison Service lost much of their 
uncritical support among the general public as people became aware of major 
instances of malpractice and manslaughter.  One thinks of the alleged perjury 
surrounding the convictions of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four or Stefan 
Kisko; the apparent culture of organised police violence that led to the death of 
Blair Peach and others; the spate of high-profile deaths of black people in 
custody in the 1990s, some giving rise to disturbances; and the institutional and 
individual racism that was so apparent in the failure to bring Stephen Lawrenceǯs murderers to justice.154 
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Thomas et al observe that these changing attitudes could also be observed in inquests, 
which ǲbecame more focused and critical.ǳ155  But these shifts were not one directional.  
Political polarisation was just that.  Those who were increasingly vocal in their demands 
for social justice were met by a reactionary lurch to the right by other sections of the 
population.  Amongst other things, this was reflected in sections of the popular press, 
which was undergoing its own revolution and, some would argue, becoming increasingly 
dominated by a pro-authority and pro-Thatcherite right.156 
 
4.9 Failing inquests: Blair Peach, the New Cross fire and Jamieson 
The 1970s and 1980s saw a number of controversial deaths and inquests in which state 
actors and institutions were implicated in some form or another.157  Time and again the 
inquests revealed shortcomings in a process that had seemingly lost its way.  For example:  Roman Musial died in ͳͻ͹Ͷ after being restrained by police in St Jamesǯs Park in 
London. The inquest failed to even acknowledge written statements from civilian 
witnesses and failed to call any of them to give evidence.158  Liddle Towers died in 1976, three weeks after allegedly being given a ǲsevere beatingǳ by police.  Seven officers refused to answer questions during the inquest.  The jury returned a verdict of Ǯjustifiable homicideǯ, which was quashed, and a second inquest returned a verdict of Ǯdeath by misadventureǯ.  The conduct of both was 
widely criticised.159  In particular, the family was denied advanced disclosure and 
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many of their questions were disallowed by the coroner ǲon the grounds that no one 
was on trial.ǳ160  Jimmy Kelly died in 1979 in police custody, again after allegedly being severely 
beaten by police.161  The inquest was again the subject of criticism.  For example, 
Michael Meacher MP pointed out that important pieces of evidence were withheld 
from the jury; and while police were given access to their original statements, civilian 
witnesses were not.162  Richard Campbell was a diagnosed schizophrenic who died, according to the 
examining doctor, as a result of dehydration due to schizophrenia at Ashford Remand 
Centre in 1980.  Scraton and Chadwick recount how the jury was pressured to return 
a verdict of Ǯdeath by self-neglectǯ.163  The jury foreman asked if it was possible to return a verdict of ǲnegligence by the authoritiesǳ, to be told ǲthere is no such verdict as the one you are suggesting.ǳ164  An unofficial inquiry chaired by Alf Dubs MP 
criticised the fact that Richardǯs Rastafarianism was taken as an indication of a mental condition, and concluded that ǲRichard did not die of Ǯself-neglectǯ, rather he was a 
helpless victim of a series of crucial failures by the authorities.ǳ165  James Davey died in 1983 after being restrained by police officers.  The juryǯs original 
verdict was ǲaccidental death but an unreasonable amount of force was usedǳ.166  The 
coroner instructed that this was contradictory and told them to reconsider, 
whereupon they returned a verdict of accidental death.167  Helen Smith was found dead at the bottom of a block of flats in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 
in 1979.168 Relationships between the UK and Saudi Arabia were sensitive at the time, 
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and some felt that this impacted on how the case was dealt with in the UK.169  
Initially, two coroners refused to hold an inquest despite one post-mortem suggesting 
she may have been attacked and raped prior to death.170  Eventually, the Court of 
Appeal ruled an inquest must be held.171  Amongst other criticisms, it became 
apparent that one pathologist removed reference to evidence of a possible rape on 
the instruction of the coroner.  Despite the second coroner summing up heavily in 
favour of accidental death, the jury returned a majority open verdict. 
 
Just as the aborted John Lees inquest in 1819 helped define nineteenth-century debates 
on inquests, the Blair Peach and New Cross Fire inquests had a similar impact on debates in 
the 1980s and 90s.  Once again, hopes that the inquests might be a source of accountability 
were largely disappointed. 
 
4.9.1 Blair Peach 
Blair Peach was killed by a police officer at an anti-fascist demonstration in London on 
23 April 1979.   Thomas et al describe the inquest as being a ǲlandmark event both politically and legally.ǳ172  Two pathologists agreed that Blairǯs skull had been crushed by 
what may have been an unauthorised police weapon such as a lead-weighted cosh or a 
police radio.  An investigation was carried out by Commander John Cass from the 
Metropolitan Police.  He submitted a report to the DPP who decided that there was 
insufficient evidence to charge any officers over the death.  Cassǯs investigation team was 
composed of thirty-one officers, and conducted interviews with civilian witnesses and 
police officers known to have been in the area of the assault on Blair.  In 2010, after years of campaigning by Blairǯs friends and family, this report was made public—albeit with 
redactions and anonymisation.173  It recounts that fourteen of the witnesses interviewed 
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173 Commander Cass, Ǯ)nvestigation Report into the Death of Blair Peach: )nvestigation into Complaint Against the Police C.O. OGͳ/͹ͻ/ʹʹ͵Ͷǯ ȋFirst Report—Blair Peach) (Metropolitan Police 1979); and 
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said they saw a police officer striking Blair, and concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that he received his injuries in any other way.  The report stated that Blairǯs killer 
had almost certainly been one of six identified police officers from the Special Patrol Group 
Unit, and there was one main suspect.  The report also recommended that three officers be 
prosecuted for obstructing the investigation.174 
The inquest was carried out by Dr John Burton.  He refused to summon a jury or disclose the Cass Report to Blairǯs family or their legal representatives (although he had a 
copy of the report, as did counsel for the police).175  Both decisions were unsuccessfully challenged by Blairǯs family at the (igh Court.176  They appealed the failure to summon a 
jury.177  At the time, the law on when a jury had to be summoned was governed by s 13 of 
the Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926, as amended by s 56 of the Criminal Law Act 1977.  
Inquests into deaths in prison had to have a jury, but there was no requirement then that 
juries be called in cases involving the police.  However, the Court of Appeal held that 
because there was evidence that police may have used unauthorised weapons the death fell 
within s 13(2)(e) of the Act: i.e. the death may have occurred in circumstances the 
continuance or possible recurrence of which was prejudicial to the health or safety of the 
public.178  A jury was therefore required. When the inquest reconvened it was moved to (ammersmith, where there was ǲlittle or no accommodation for the public.ǳ179  Dr Burton refused to call important witnesses like 
Commander Cass, or Commander Helm (responsible for the police operation that day).  
Knowing what the coroner was aware of from the Cass Report, and what was kept from the 
family and the jury, it is difficult to avoid concluding that the juryǯs statutory role as finders of fact was denied.  For example, Dr Burton allowed the Metropolitan Policeǯs barrister to 
refer to some of the more neutral findings of the Cass investigation, while omitting to 
                                                                                                                                                             Commander Cass, ǮSecond Report–Death of Blair Peachǯ OGͳ/͹ͻ/ʹʹ͵Ͷ ȋSecond Report—Blair Peach) 
(Metropolitan Police 1979). 
174 ibid. 
175 ǮPeach case papers withheldǯ The Times (Issue 60608, London, 23 April 1980) 2. 
176 ǮBlair Peach inquest to continue without a juryǯ The Times (Issue 60476, London 16 November 1979) 
14. 
177 R v HM Coroner at Hammersmith, ex p Peach [1980] QB 211 (CA). 
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179 Scraton and Chadwick (n 3) 75. 
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mention the Reportǯs more damning conclusions, giving the jury the impression that it had 
exonerated the police.180  He also repeatedly pushed his view of the evidence, and overtly 
expressed contempt for what he saw as an anti-establishment conspiracy being pushed by Blairǯs family and their supporters.  Scraton and Chadwick observe that: )t was his submission that there were two ǲextreme theoriesǳ about the death of 
Blair Peach.  The first theory was that an Anti-Nazi League demonstrator had killed Blair Peach in order to give ǲthe causeǳ a martyr […The second] was that 
the police had murdered Blair Peach with an unauthorised weapon.  The 
evidence of civilian eye-witnesses and the pathologists was consistent with a 
police attack, yet this theory was given the same status and treatment as the 
martyrdom theory which had absolutely no grounding in the evidence.181 
The jury returned a verdict of death by misadventure. 
 
4.9.2 New Cross/Deptford fire 
The inquest into the deaths of 13 black teenagers killed in a fire at a house party in 
1981 technically falls outside the scope of the thesis.  However it deserves brief attention 
because it informed debates on inquests, including those into deaths at the hands of the 
state.  The New Cross fire and the stateǯs response to it ȋi.e. the police investigation and the 
inquest) contributed to rising tensions between the black community in London and the 
police.  Some suspected the fire had been started by a petrol bomb thrown through a 
window in a racist attack.  By the time the inquest opened, many in the local black 
community accused the police of carrying out their investigation in an oppressive way, and 
putting pressure on witnesses to corroborate a narrative that the fire started during or 
shortly after a fight between party-goers. 
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The conduct of the inquest—which reached an open verdict—was criticised by the 
black community, the press, and MPs in the House of Commons.182   Lawyers for the 
families of the deceased repeatedly clashed with the coroner, Dr Arthur Gordon Davies, 
who had refused to grant them pre-inquest disclosure.  On the third day, lawyers noticed he 
was not taking notes of the evidence, as required by CR 1953, r 30.  They also objected to Dr Daviesǯs indications from the start that he had already reached conclusions broadly 
reflecting the police narrative.  His summing up to the jury largely consisted of him reading 
out police statements, while glossing over other important evidence.183 
The legality of the inquest was challenged twice in the High Court: once, shortly before 
its conclusion; and again, after the jury reached an Ǯopen verdictǯ.  )n the former case, Mr Justice Comyn acknowledged that ǲserious irregularities had occurred in the coronerǯs conduct of the caseǳ.184  )n the latter, the courtǯs criticism was limited to Dr Daviesǯs failure 
to take notes.  Nevertheless, in both cases, the High Court refused to intervene.185  In Parliament, Christopher Price MP summed up that the inquest had done ǲenormous damageǳ to ǲthe processes of justice and to race relations.ǳ186 
Both the Blair Peach and the New Cross Fire inquests, raised serious concerns amongst 
the public about the conduct of inquests.  To an extent it was understandable that these 
focused on the Ǯcompetenceǯ of the coroners.  But this was, perhaps, to the detriment of 
more systemic issues.  It was mainly in response to these inquests that amendments were 
tabled to the Administration of Justice Bill in 1982 relating to inquests.  These included 
provisions requiring that: High Court judges take over inquests into controversial deaths, 
including those occurring in police or prison custody;187 legal aid be made available for all 
interested persons;188 police reports on investigations be disclosed to all interested 
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persons;189 and that all deaths in police custody or at police hands trigger inquests 
automatically.190 
The debate mainly focused on the perceived need for more qualified coroners for 
complicated or controversial inquests, with the Blair Peach and the New Cross Fire 
inquests being cited as illustrative of this need.191  Christopher Price MP, who attended the 
New Cross Fire inquest, was horrified at the way it was conducted and argued that 
Parliament had a responsibility ǲto ensure that if similar tragedy takes place, never again shall we see such a spectacle.ǳ192  John Tiley MP also made reference to the New Cross fire 
and stressed the importance of inquests for the public: […)]t was not merely a private tragedy for the families involved, but something 
that led to a reaction of considerable and important public significance in the 
response of the black community […]. 
These people were angry at the inadequate response, as they saw it, of the rest 
of society, and particularly the judicial process, to the loss of the lives of those 
young black people. […T]hey were upset with the courts and particularly with 
the inquest, which was clearly inadequate to meet the needs of the case. […] If 
the people concerned with the Deptford fire are saying, and saying strongly, to 
British society and the British establishment that they are unhappy—the slogan that summed it up was ǲͳ͵ dead—nothing saidǳ—we should in Parliament, late 
though it is, pay some heed to what happened.  We should at least draw the one 
lesson that if we had a different system of conducting inquests so that in a 
special case of public interest—a death or a series of deaths—there should be a 
procedure to ensure that the public, not only the families and their friends and 
relatives, should be satisfied that justice has been done.193 
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Twenty-three years after the New Cross fire, a second inquest was held.  While the 
coroner concluded that the fire was probably deliberately started, he could not be sure and 
was compelled to repeat an open verdict.194 
 
4.9.3 What it means to know 'how' someone died – Jamieson )nto the ͳͻͻͲs the coronersǯ courts continued to narrow the scope of inquests to the 
extent that at times they investigated little more than the medical causes of deaths.  
Thomas et al observe that: )nvariably the main controversial issue in an inquest is Ǯhowǯ a deceased came 
by his or her death. […] Yet the development of inquest law, until recently, has 
seen a highly reduced concept of causation.  There was a concerted move away 
from a public inquiry into the circumstances of a death towards a more limited inquiry into the immediate Ǯmeansǯ by which a person came by his death.195 
There are two issues relating to the scope of inquests that were considered in R v HM 
Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe Coroner Ex p. Jamieson.196  First, there is the 
scope of the actual inquiry.    At the time, this was governed by CR 1984, r 36: 
(1) The proceedings and evidence at an inquest shall be directed solely to 
ascertaining the following matters, namely – (a) who the deceased was; (b) 
how, when and where the deceased came by his death; (c) the particulars for 
the time being required by the Registration Acts to be registered concerning the 
death.197 
Second, there is what issues should be addressed in the inquestǯs verdict.  This was 
governed by s 11 of the Coroners Act 1988 (CA 1988), and Rules 36(2) and Rule 42 of the 
CR 1984.  The relevant parts of Sub-section 11 (5) of the 1988 Act state: 
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 ȋͷȌ An inquisition shall […] ȋbȌ set out, so far as such particulars have been 
proved (i) who the deceased was; and (ii) how, when and where the deceased 
came by his death.198 
Rule 36(2) states: 
Neither the coroner nor the jury shall express any opinion on any other 
matters.199 
And Rule 42 states: 
No verdict shall be framed in such a way as to appear to determine any question 
of (a) criminal liability on the part of a named person, or (b) civil liability.200 
Michael Jamieson died at Full Sutton Prison on 25 January 1991. The inquest juryǯs 
verdict was that Michael had killed himself by hanging.  His brother, Roy, sought judicial review of the coronerǯs direction that the jury should not return a verdict that included a reference to ǲlack of careǳ.  Much of Lord Binghamǯs lead judgment concerned the meaning of ǲlack of careǳ and when it might be appropriate as a free-standing verdict, or an ancillary 
observation that could be attached to other verdicts.201  Crucially, Bingham tied the issue to 
what should be included within the scope of the inquest. 
While the scope of the verdict may have been curtailed by rules 36(2) and 42, the only 
fetter on what was investigated, was that it be confined to who the deceased was and when, 
where and how he came by his death.202  This would not prevent the coroner and jury per 
se from inquiring into evidence that might, if true, indicate criminal or civil liability, and 
Bingham acknowledged this.203  Nevertheless, despite the issue being the appropriateness 
of certain verdicts rather than lines of inquiry, Bingham arguably conflated the issue, 
asserting that the restrictions on findings of criminal or civil liability—or any sort of 
blame—required the question of how a person died (in the context of both the inquiry and 
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the verdict) to be given a narrow interpretation: i.e. Ǯby what meansǯ and not Ǯin what broad 
circumstancesǯ.204 
[T]he task is not to ascertain how the deceased died, which might raise general 
and far-reaching issues, but ǲhow…the deceased came by his death,ǳ a more 
limited question directed to the means by which the deceased came by his 
death.205 
Bingham also repeated a commonly held belief amongst judges, coroners and the 
representatives of state institutions, that families see inquests as a ǲstepping-stoneǳ to civil 
actions for damages.206  This is a rather simplistic and questionable interpretation of the 
motivations of bereaved families.  But even if families do have an eye on potential civil 
proceedings, the concern this engenders amongst the judiciary arguably derives from an 
inflation of its practical (and even moral) significance. 
Thomas et al argue that this attitude significantly informed judicial decisions 
concerning inquests in the 1980s and 90s.207  They also point out there was no 
corresponding uneasiness about state actors and state institutions using inquests to try to 
legitimise their role regarding a death.208  If verdicts of neglect, lack of care or unlawful 
killing risked crossing a line by apportioning blame, verdicts of lawful killing, suicide, 
natural causes, or open verdicts, were often seen as—and held out as—exonerating state 
actors and state institutions, and also appearing to determine issues of liability. 
The accusation is also loaded with negative moral connotations.  But why, as well as 
seeking a reliable and tested narrative in an inquest, should a family not also seek official 
recognition through an award of damages, where a loved one died as a result of a legal 
wrong?  This is particularly understandable when state institutions may be dismissive of 
critical inquest verdicts.209  The preoccupation with familiesǯ motives in inquests also 
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obscures community and wider public interests in public accountability for such deaths 
when these interests can be bypassed in civil proceedings by out-of-court settlements. 
Jamieson was before the Court of Appeal when McCann was being considered by the 
ECmHR.210  However, there was no mention of Article 2 ECHR either in submissions or Lord Binghamǯs judgment.  While this was years before the HRA 1998, the courts can take into 
account treaty obligations when statute or common law is unclear on an issue—as was 
arguably the case here.211 
 
4.10 Conclusions 
Historically, the types of deaths with which this thesis is concerned have fallen within a 
wider category of deaths that have required public investigation by an independent 
tribunal (the inquest) since the twelfth century.  Originally, the purpose of these 
investigations was to protect the revenue interests of the Crown.212 
Writing about criminal justice systems in Europe, Foucault argues that towards the eighteenth century ǲa new theory of law and crime, a new moral or political justification of the right to punishǳ was beginning to evolve.213  This included a view that ǲthe power to 
judge should no longer depend on the innumerable, discontinuous, sometimes 
contradictory privileges of sovereignty, but on the continuously distributed effects of 
public power.ǳ214  The significance of Foucaultǯs historical interpretation, here, is not the ǲpunishment strategyǳ he goes on to describe, but on whose behalf it was exercised: 
societyǯs.  The inquest saw a corresponding shift from a forum concerned with asserting 
                                                                                                                                                             ǲ) am afraid that suicides are often unpredictable and the internal inquiries into Jamesǯs death do not in 
fact suggest that there were any failings on the part of the staff at Ashford [Remand Centre], or any significant matters on which action was required.  The verdict ǲlack of careǳ seems to have stemmed mainly from a 
number of misunderstandings at the inquest, in particular about the instructions given to prison staff about those who may be suicidal.ǳ Scraton and Chadwick ȋn ͵Ȍ ͻͲ–91. 
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and protecting the rights and privileges of the Crown, to a forum that served a recognised 
need for justice that resided in the people.  Regarding inquests into prison deaths, Burney 
argues, for example, that ǲthe Crown yielded to ǲthe publicǳ as the guarantor of order and the injured party whenever that order was breached.ǳ215  The inquest evolved into 
something which performed a public function, in the interests of all society: if wrongdoing caused the death, it was in societyǯs interest that justice be done; if dangerous living or 
working conditions were responsible for a death, it was in communitiesǯ interests that 
those dangers be understood and remedied. 
The history of the inquestǯs purpose then, can be characterised as evolving from being 
concerned with the Crown revenue implications of a death, to being concerned with both 
the criminal justice implications of a death, and what Sim et al characterise—with 
reference to Foucault—as the bio-political implications of a death.216  In particular, it was 
observed that inquests began to take on a particular significance when investigating deaths 
at the hands of state actors or institutions, which corresponded to demands for public 
accountability.217  The most notorious nineteenth century example was the Lees inquest, 
which Burney describes as having been regarded by many as ǲa chance to expose 
government repression to public opinion in a clear forum.218 
Despite the renaissance of the nineteenth century inquest in the popular consciousness 
as a potential source of justice, by the twentieth century it was again subject to attack on 
multiple fronts.  Its relative social value was doubted, and it was increasingly associated 
with considerable social burdens—both financial and deontological: including the 
perceived unfair impact they could have on reputations, public confidence in societyǯs 
institutions, and the perceived threat they posed to fair criminal and civil proceedings.  
Despite the continued confidence shown in the inquest by the Brodrick Report, the forum 
was undoubtedly in decline towards the end of the twentieth century as popular 
confidence was eroded by inquests like those into the death of Blair Peach and the New 
Cross fire. 
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5.1 The scope and openness of modern inquests 
There are three elements to the procedural manifestation of openness following deaths 
at the hands of the state.  First, there is the issue of when an investigation will be held.  The 
conducting of an investigation is a prerequisite for opening up the circumstances of a death 
to scrutiny.  Second, there is the scope of the investigation.  Again, on the most basic of 
levels, what is not investigated—because it falls outside an investigationǯs scope—is not 
opened up to scrutiny.  Third, there is the manner and degree to which investigations and 
their conclusions are ǲopenǳ.  This chapter reviews the practice in inquests and inquiries 
into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state, by examining these three elements and 
the purposes that have been attributed to them.   
 
5.1.1 The inquest as the forum for fulfilling Article 2 
The HRA 1998 has had a considerable impact on the modern inquest. As observed in 
Chapter 1, most of its provisions came into force on 2 October 2000. The Act seeks to give 
domestic effect to Article rights, whilst maintaining the sovereignty of Parliament.   Section 
3 requires courts, so far as possible, to give effect to primary and subordinate legislation in 
a way that is compatible with Convention rights.1  In doing so, it requires courts to take into 
account ECtHR and ECmHR jurisprudence.2  Where it is impossible for courts to do this, s 4 
provides that the higher courts may make a Ǯdeclaration of incompatibilityǯ.3  This triggers 
procedures which allow the government, if it is so minded, to fast-track legislation in order 
to remedy the conflict.4  Under s 6 public authorities must also act in accordance with 
Convention rights unless primary legislation makes it impossible for them to do so.  Public authorities include coroners and coronersǯ courts. 
Initially it was unclear exactly what the HRA 1998 would mean in practical terms for 
inquests.   Section 6 HRA 1998 did not necessarily specifically require coroners to ensure 
the UK fulfilled Article ʹǯs procedural requirements.  So, for example, in R (Wright) v 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Divisional Court found that an inquest had 
failed to fulfil the procedural obligation, but did not conclude this meant the inquest was 
unlawful.5  Rather, it simply meant that the state had not met the obligation and, therefore, 
had to set up another investigation, the precise form of which ǲshould be left to [its] discretion.ǳ6 
The issue came before the Court of Appeal in the (at the time conjoined) cases of R 
(Middleton) v HM Coroner for West Somersetshire and R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.7  In Middleton, the Court quoted submissions made by the coroner that it was wrong to equate the coronerǯs responsibilities with those of the state.8  Whether or 
not an inquest complied with Article 2 depended on the circumstances, and the obligation 
might equally be fulfilled by a combination of procedures, including some over which the 
coroner had no control.9  Despite finding this argument had force, the Court held that the 
inquest was, in practice, the way the state usually fulfilled the procedural obligation and, as such, ǲit is for the Coroner to construe the Rules in the manner required by s 6(2)(b) HRA ͳͻͻͺ.ǳ10 
 
5.1.2 The purposes and scope of Article 2 compliant inquests 
For some time now, inquests must be held where a coroner has reason to suspect that: 
the deceased died a violent or unnatural death; the cause of death is unknown; or the 
deceased died whilst in prison custody.11  This last category was recently broadened to include any death ǲin custody or otherwise in state detention.12   Deaths that occur during 
or as a result of arrest or restraint by the police will normally qualify as deaths in 
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detention, or violent or unnatural deaths.  But a requirement under Article 2 ECHR that 
investigations be held into all deaths at the hands of the police has been confirmed as the 
responsibility of coroners by Keenan and Middleton.13  This investigative obligation 
represents the core of the first pillar of the practice of open justice in these circumstances. 
It will be seen below that the scope of modern inquests is influenced by their purposes, 
so it is appropriate to consider first the rationales that are attributed to opening up the 
circumstances of use-of-force deaths to scrutiny. 
 
5.1.2.1 Amin – The purpose of an Article 2 compliant investigation 
Amin was the first of a group of important post-HRA 1998 cases concerning Article 2 to 
reach the House of Lords.14   Zahid Mubarak, a 19-year-old prisoner at Feltham Young 
Offenders Institute, was murdered by his racist and mentally disturbed cell-mate, Robert 
Stewart.  Stewart admitted to the killing, and the only issue at his criminal trial was 
whether he was guilty of murder or manslaughter.15 Zahidǯs uncle originally brought the 
case to force the Home Secretary to either hold a public inquiry, or require the coroner to resume the adjourned inquest into Zahidǯs death.16  The Court of Appeal ruled that the 
police investigation and an internal prison investigation were, in combination, sufficient for the purposes of fulfilling Article ʹ.  Zahidǯs family appealed, but dropped the issue of 
whether the coroner should resume the inquest, instead concentrating on trying to compel 
the government to set up a public inquiry. 
The lead judgment in the case was given by Lord Bingham.  He acknowledged that the coronerǯs refusal to resume the inquest into Zahidǯs death was not an issue before the court, but stated that it was ǲvery unfortunate that there was no inquest, since a properly conducted inquest can discharge the state's investigative obligation.ǳ (e then went on to 
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interpret what the investigative obligation entailed, pausing in particular to consider its 
purposes: Where a death has occurred in custody [the stateǯs duty to investigate] is not a minor or unimportant duty.  )n this country […] effect has been given to that 
duty for centuries, by requiring such deaths to be publicly investigated before 
an independent judicial tribunal with an opportunity for relatives of the 
deceased to participate.  The purposes of such an investigation are clear: to 
ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and 
discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of 
deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and 
procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least 
have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the 
lives of others.17 
While inquests are not mentioned here by name, Bingham is clearly talking about them 
when referring to the centuries old requirement that ǲsuch deaths […] be publicly 
investigated before an independent judicial tribunal with an opportunity for relatives of the deceased to participate.ǳ18  The implication is that these purposes have always formed the 
rationales behind inquests into deaths at the hands of the state.  As seen in the previous 
chapter, the history of inquests is not quite so simple.  While similar purposes have 
sometimes been popularly attributed to these types of inquest, this has not always been 
consistent over the centuries.  Previous cases had considered and interpreted inquestsǯ 
aims (to discover who, how, when and where), but prior to Amin, there was little if any real 
consideration of their qualitative purposes.19 
As discussed in Chapter 1, open justice in the contexts of civil and criminal justice 
systems is typically described as a procedural principle which acts as a safety check on the 
right to a fair trial.  A fair trial helps to achieve the purposes of criminal and civil justice 
systems: the conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent; or a fair and accurate 
                                                 
17 Amin (ch 1, n 11) 31 (emphasis added). 
18 ibid. 
19 Other than the negative requirement that they not attribute criminal or civil liability. Bingham, for 
example, makes no mention of their qualitative purposes in Jamieson (ch 4, n 196). 
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determination of the legal status of the parties in a civil trial and, where appropriate, their 
compensation.  Opening up circumstances to public scrutiny is not generally considered 
part of the purposes of criminal and civil justice.20  However, with the first two of the 
purposes listed by Bingham above, openness is effectively being described as the purpose 
of the investigation itself.  And while openness is instrumental to ǲallaying unjustified 
suspicions of wrongdoingǳ, it is unlikely, in the absence of an open investigation, that those 
who suspect wrongdoing will be satisfied by mere assertions that there was none.  The 
same may be said of reassuring relatives that lessons have been learnt if they see no 
evidence of an effective learning process being undertaken.  Only with regard to the 
penultimate purpose listed by Bingham does openness serve an instrumental end similar in 
nature to the main rationales for openness in criminal and civil proceedings: those in 
authority are more likely to act in good faith—and rectify dangerous practices—if they feel 
the pressure of public scrutiny. 
 
5.1.2.2 Middleton – The scope of an Article 2 compliant inquest21 
Colin Middleton took his own life in prison.  His family argued that he should have been 
on suicide watch as the authorities knew he was a suicide risk.  At the inquest, the coroner ruled that ǲthe issue of ǲneglectǳ should not be left to the jury,ǳ22 but, if they wished, they 
could provide him with a note indicating any matters they thought relevant to his decision 
on whether to make recommendations to the prison under CR 1984, r 43.23  The jury found 
that Colin had killed himself while the balance of his mind was disturbed.  They also handed the coroner a note ǲwhich communicated the juryǯs opinion that the Prison Service had failed in its duty of care for the deceased.ǳ24   The family requested that the coroner 
append this to the inquisition. The coroner refused.  Colinǯs mother challenged this and his 
direction to the jury. 
                                                 
20 See the discussion on Binyam Mohamed at 9.3.1. 
21 Middleton (n 10). 
22 ibid, 42. 
23 ibid, 43. 
24 ibid. 
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The Lords (who included Lord Bingham) acknowledged that it was ǲremarkableǳ that 
Article 2 had not been referred to in Jamieson.25  They then held that with ECtHR 
jurisprudence not specifying the required form that investigations should take, the crucial 
test was that ǲthe prescribed procedure must work in practice and must fulfil the purpose 
for which the investigation is establishedǳ.26  This was a watershed moment in the way the 
courts approached Article 2 inquests.  As seen previously, prior to Amin and Middleton, the 
courts interpreted the relevant statutes and rules with little consideration of inquestsǯ 
positive purposes. 
The judgment then reflected on the aims and purposes ascribed to the procedural 
obligation in Jordan,27 including: determining who was responsible for the death; whether 
any force used was justified; and, if appropriate, punishing those responsible.  These ends 
potentially conflicted with CR 1984, r 41, as would a verdict that appeared to indicate 
negligence had led to or contributed to a prisonerǯs death.  (owever, the Lords ruled that: )t seems safe to infer that the stateǯs procedural obligation to investigate is 
unlikely to be met if it is plausibly alleged that agents of the state have used 
lethal force without justification, […] and if the fact-finding body cannot express 
its conclusion on whether unjustifiable force has been used or not, so as to 
prompt reconsideration of [a] decision not to prosecute.  [In Article 2 compliant 
inquests] it seems that an explicit statement […] of the juryǯs conclusion on the 
central issue is required.28 
While referring (like Bingham had in Amin) to the equivalence of existing domestic 
requirements and the Article 2 obligation,29 the Court concluded that the regime for 
holding inquests, as interpreted by Jamieson, did not meet the requirements of the 
Convention.30  It concluded that: 
                                                 
25 ibid, 28. 
26 ibid, 8. 
27 See 2.8 and 5.1.2 above. 
28 Middleton (n 10) 16. 
29 ǲThe requirement to summon a jury [in inquests into deaths in prison] recognises the substantive and 
procedural obligations of the state which are now derived from Article 2 as well as from domestic law.ǳ ȋibid, 23 
(emphasis added)). 
30 ibid, 31. 
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Only one change is in our opinion needed: to interpret ǲhowǳ in section 
11(5)(b)(ii) of the Act and rule 36(1)(b) of the rules in the broader sense previously rejected [in Jamieson], namely as meaning not simply ǲby what meansǳ but ǲby what means and in what circumstances.ǳ31 
The judgment thus significantly extended the scope of Article 2 compliant inquests and 
the conclusions they could reach.  
The judgments in Amin and Middleton had an immediate and significant impact on 
subsequent inquests into deaths at the hands of the state.  The inquest as a forum whose 
broad purposes have arguably long-corresponded to those of Article ʹǯs procedural 
obligation, had suffered from the lack of a constitutional guarantor of those purposes.  Prior 
to the HRA 1998, the inquest did not consistently live up to many of the purposes that had 
been popularly attributed to it since the nineteenth century.  It was observed that a large part of the problem was concern about the inquestǯs impact on due process in criminal and 
civil settings.  This was—and to a certain extent, remains—a genuine concern.  But it was 
also arguably used as a convenient foil for state accountability.  Amin finally provided badly 
needed clarity on the qualitative purposes of these types of inquest.  Most importantly, it 
defined them positively and on their own terms rather than only negatively in relation to 
other court proceedings.  Finally in Middleton, the Lords reached a practical conclusion 
about what the scope of inquests must logically include if they are to fulfil those purposes. 
 
5.1.3 How inquests are open to the public 
There are two issues to consider here: 1) The inquestǯs openness to members of the 
public and the press, in terms of their ability to attend proceedings or, in the case of the 
former, receive information through the reporting of proceedings; and 2) The extent to 
which inquests are open to the active participation of members of the public (including the 
family of the deceased), either personally or through those who might symbolically and/or 
actually represent their interests. 
 
                                                 
31 ibid, 35 (emphasis added). 
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5.1.3.1 Openness to public and press attending and observing proceedings 
With regard to the first question, we saw that CR 1984, r 17 required that: 
Every inquest shall be held in public: 
Provided that the coroner may direct that the public be excluded from an 
inquest or any part of an inquest if he considers that it would be in the interest 
of national security so to do.32 
This is still the case under the new Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 (C(I)R 2013), 
although the new Rules now allow the coroner to exclude the public from pre-inquest 
hearings where this is in the interests of justice.33  This limited ability to exclude the public 
only in the interests of national security is in stark contrast to coronersǯ wide discretions in 
other procedural matters, and the much broader range of exceptions to openness that exist 
in the civil courts. We have also seen that ECt(R jurisprudence requires there to ǲbe a sufficient element 
of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory.ǳ34  Again, the most important thing is for investigations to be sufficiently 
open in order for them to fulfil their purposes.35   
The jury are also an important feature here.  We typically think of juries in terms of 
their active role in proceedings.  However, in inquests that are the focus of this thesis, they 
have an important role in ensuring that (whether or not anyone turns up to watch 
proceedings from the public or press gallery) between 7 and 11 members of the public are 
present throughout the hearing of evidence. 36 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 CR 1984, r 17. 
33 The Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1616 (C(I)R 2013) r 11(5). 
34 Jordan (ch 1, n 10) 109. 
35 These purposes will be returned to below when considering the purpose of openness. 
36 Section 7(2) of CJA 2009. However, it is important to note that natural deaths in prison no longer 
require the inquest to be conducted with a jury. 
 132 
5.1.3.2 The openness of inquests to the active participation of the public 
Of course, as well as the jury being present watching proceedings, they also have an 
active role to play.  They can put questions to witnesses and must come to a 
verdict/conclusion as to how the deceased died.  As observed above, Middleton encouraged 
an increasing trend for coroners to allow juries to reach narrative verdicts, whether as an 
alternative to a short-form verdict or in addition.37  Thomas et al point out that the presence of a jury ǲprovides a powerful symbolic and historical indication that the ordinary peers of the deceased are anxiously inquiring into the facts of his or her death.ǳ38 
The presence of a jury ensures that the inquest is a more democratic and 
accountable process.  One of the purposes of the inquest is to allay public 
anxiety about the death—especially where a death occurs behind closed doors.  
This act of determination will, at least in controversial cases, be best done by 
members of the public rather than a servant of the state.  This goes beyond the 
fact that the jury is free of establishment considerations—the pace and tone of 
the proceedings may be tamed by the presence of the jury.39 
The inquest jury has arguably been significantly tamed over the centuries, especially 
when one considers historical accounts which suggest that their numbers, outspokenness 
and enthusiasm could sometimes mean coroners struggled to control proceedings.40  This 
change is likely due in part to their diminished numbers and the increased formality of 
proceedings, particularly when one considers that in the past, inquests could be held 
outdoors or in public houses.  Nevertheless, in contrast to the conclusions of the Brodrick 
Report, it is argued in Part ͵ that the juryǯs role in inquests—at least where these inquire 
into deaths at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody—remains an important 
one.41 
There are important practical limits on the jury in the performance of its roles.  They 
are prevented from expressing an opinion on matters other than who the deceased was 
                                                 
37 See 5.2.1.4 above. 
38 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 294. 
39 ibid. 
40 See, for example, 4.4 above and The Times report of the death of a prisoner at Millbank Prison in 1923 
(ch 4, n 44). 
41 Brodrick, (ch 4, n 139) para 16.49. 
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and when, where and how they came by their death;42 or framing a verdict that appears to 
determine civil liability or criminal liability of a named person.43  Most importantly, the 
jury is confined to considering those verdicts the coroner decides are legally open to it on 
the evidence.  In theory, this should have no other effect than to un-clutter its deliberations 
by removing verdicts which, if properly instructed, it would anyway be bound not to reach 
due to a lack of evidence.  The coroner has no discretion to exclude a verdict just because 
he or she prefers a different one.44 
There are also practical limits on the juryǯs ability to question witnesses.  First, in 
contrast to interested persons and the coroner, the jury does not have prior access to 
statements or evidence.  Jurors therefore have no opportunity to prepare lines of 
questioning. Unlike interested persons, they also cannot receive individually tailored 
confidential legal advice.45  Coroners will also disallow questions they believe are ǲnot relevant or otherwise not a proper questionǳ.46   This could be a fetter on the role of the 
jury if jurorsǯ views of what is relevant to a death do not correspond with the coronerǯs. 
The exact procedure followed for jury questions will vary according to the preferred 
practice of individual coroners.  Some ask jury members if they have any questions at the end of each witnessǯs evidence, and may use open and encouraging language.  Other coroners may simply refer to the juryǯs right to ask questions in their opening address, and 
not mention it again, leaving it to determined jury members to get the coronerǯs attention 
before a witness is released.  Some coroners allow jury members to put their questions 
directly and orally.   At the Ian Tomlinson and Mark Duggan inquests, the coroners 
instructed jurors to write down their questions, which were passed to the coroner by a 
clerk, and they then put them to witnesses.47 
                                                 
42 CJA 2009, s 5. 
43 ibid s 10(2). 
44 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 314; R (Cash) v HM Coroner for Northamptonshire [2007] 4 All ER 903 (QB), 
25. 
45 The only legal advice they can take is from the coroner. All communications between the coroner and 
the jury must be done in open court. 
46 C(I)R 2013, r 19. This rule is framed in terms of the ability of interested persons to ask questions and is 
applied equally to jury members. 
47 Duggan Inquest, ǮTranscript of the Oral (earing of ͹ September ʹͲͳ͵ǯ, <http://tinyurl.com/joocwyͷ> 
accessed 28 January 2016, pp 14-15. 
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There may be natural inhibitions on jury members asking questions, such as a 
reluctance to interrupt or hold up proceedings.  The inquest is sometimes considered a 
relatively informal procedure when compared to other court proceedings.  It is true that some coronersǯ courts can look more like office conference rooms than courts.  However, most coronersǯ courts will still have the look and feel of a courtroom.  The sombre nature of 
the subject matter being considered will also add to the formality of the occasion.  In deaths 
involving state institutions there will often be many lawyers present, and there can also be 
a significant media presence.  In such an atmosphere, it can take a particularly strong-
willed jury member to draw attention to what he or she feels is a gap in the evidence being 
elicited from a witness. Where the deceasedǯs family is represented, the jurorsǯ role as representatives of the 
public may be eclipsed in terms of influencing the direction of the inquiry and raising 
issues of public concern.  But, there may be times when the deceasedǯs family has little or 
no interest in the inquest, or they feel unable or unwilling to pursue concerns that have not 
been taken up by the coroner.  In such cases the opportunity for members of the jury to put 
questions could be very important. 
This brings us to the ability of the family to play an active part in inquests and the 
extent to which they may play a role in representing the public interest as well as their own 
interests in inquests.  This is looked at more at 5.1.5 and 5.2.1.2 below, and is also 
considered in Chapter 9.  On a general level, however, we have seen that the right of the 
family of the deceased to be present and question witnesses has been a feature of inquests 
for centuries.  Most recently it was confirmed by s 47 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (CJA 
2009) and r 19 C(I)R 2013.48  Under the rule, the coroner must allow an interested person 
to examine a witness in person, or through their legal representative, provided their 
questions are relevant.49  The family of the deceased are members of the public who have 
the status of ǲinterested personǳ in light of their special interest in the subject matter.  They 
                                                 
48 This includes spouses, civil partners, partners, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, 
children of siblings, step-parents, half-brothers and sisters or ǲany other person who the senior coroner thinks has a sufficient interestǳ.  CJA ʹͲͲͻ, s Ͷ͹. 
49 The C(I)R 2013, r 19. 
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will often receive public funding to be legally represented at an inquest.50  In every case 
they should now be given pre-inquest disclosure of witness statements, reports and other 
evidence, from which lines of questioning can be prepared.51 
 
5.ͷ.͹.͹ Who are Ǯthe publicǯ in inquests? We have seen that coronersǯ powers to exclude the public from inquests is only exercisable where it is ǲin the interest of national security to do so.ǳ52  But there is a 
question regarding what is meant by Ǯthe publicǯ.  This came before two Appeal Court 
judges sitting in the High Court, in relation to the inquest into the deaths caused by the July 
2005 London bombings.53  Assistant Deputy Coroner, Hallett LJ, had ruled at a pre-inquest hearing that she was unable to accede to the (ome Secretaryǯs application that certain 
sensitive evidence be heard in the absence of the families of those killed.54  The High Court 
agreed.55 
Maurice Kay LJ summarised the issue in the following way: 
Do [ǲthe publicǳ ȋreferred to in r 17 CR 1984)] they include properly interested 
persons and their legal representatives who are participating in the inquests? 
Or are they limited to members of the public in a wider sense, meaning all those who are not ǲproperly interested personsǳ?  )n the latter case, once the public in 
the wider sense had been excluded, the hearing would continue in camera, but 
                                                 
50 See 5.1.5 below. 
51 See 5.1.4 below. 
52 Of course the coroner also has a common law power to exclude individuals from the courtroom where 
they are being disruptive. Coroners Rules 1927, SI 1927/344, r 17. 
53 R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v AD Coroner for Inner West London [2010] EWHC 3098 
(Admin). 
54 (eather (allett LJ, ǮCoronerǯs )nquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005: Ruling of Dame (eather (allettǯ ȋ͵ November ʹͲͳͲȌ <http://tinyurl.com/hqjͺ͸nz> Accessed ʹͺ January ʹͲͳ͸. 
55 The inquests in question were not into deaths at the hands of the state and so would not necessarily 
involve the full procedural obligation under Article 2 ECHR.  Nor, in the opinion of the Assistant Deputy Coroner, was she required to summon a jury under s ͺȋ͵Ȍ CA ͳͻͺͺ ȋJustice (allett LJ, ǮCoronerǯs )nquest into 
the London Bombings of 7 July 2005: Decision Following Pre-)nquest (earing from ʹ͸ to ͵Ͳ April ʹͲͳͲǯ ȋ͵Ͳ 
April 2010) <http://tinyurl.com/zapfxyg> accessed 28 January 2016, paras 137–165). 
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with all properly interested persons and their legal representatives able to 
attend and participate.56 
Amongst reasons for preferring the latter interpretation, Maurice Kay LJ pointed out 
that r 17 CR 1984 applied as much to inquests with a jury as it did to inquests without a 
jury: 
It cannot have been contemplated that a properly interested person and his 
legal representative would be excluded while a jury sees and hears closed 
material.57 
Significantly, he also referred to the governmentǯs recent failed attempts to introduce 
closed material procedure into inquests: 
Interestingly, in the Counter Terrorism Bill of 2008 there were clauses in Part 6, ǲ)nquests and )nquiriesǳ, the purpose of which was to provide for the reshaping 
of inquests raising national security issues.  Parliament refused to enact the 
provisions.  A similar fate befell clauses in the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009.  
What all this demonstrates is that the construction sought to be placed on rule 
17 by [counsel for the Home Secretary] is, in effect, an attempt to pre-empt 
legislation which is either not yet in force or has been rejected in the recent past 
by Parliament.  If these are steps which Parliament is not yet prepared to take, I 
am fortified in my unwillingness to adopt what would be a forced construction 
of rule 17.58 
The court therefore held that the meaning of the public in r 17 CR 1984, did not include 
interested persons. 
 
5.1.4 Disclosure 
As well as the impact the HRA 1998 had on the purposes and scope of inquests into 
deaths at the hands of the state, it also had implications for pre-inquest disclosure and 
public funding for families.  As seen in the previous chapter, pre-inquest disclosure was a 
                                                 
56 Coroner for Inner West London (n 53) 2. 
57 ibid, 25. 
58 ibid, 30. 
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frequent source of conflict between coroners and relatives of the deceased.59  When it was 
refused, the family of the deceased often had little idea of the nature of competing 
narratives surrounding a death and was greatly hindered in preparing lines of questioning 
for witnesses.  Not only was this frustrating for families, but it also meant the coroner 
carried more of a responsibility to challenge inconsistencies in evidence.  Where a 
witnessǯs evidence merited robust challenge, this could put at risk the apparent objectivity 
of the process if it was carried out by coroners, and this may in turn have inhibited them in 
their approach. 
Advances in this area were a combined result of the 1999 Macpherson Report and 
ECtHR jurisprudence.60 Following Macpherson, the Home Office advised police to disclose 
documentary evidence relating to a death at the hands of the police, to other interested 
persons 28 days prior to the inquest.61 In Jordan, the ECtHR confirmed that in the absence 
of this change in policy, it would not have been persuaded that families were fairly or 
adequately protected in inquest proceedings.62  In R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (2006), the Court of Appeal agreed that Article 2 required coroners to provide 
relatives of the deceased reasonable access to all relevant evidence before an inquest 
began.63  This requirement is now contained in Part 3 C(I)R 2013.64  Rule 13 requires the 
coroner to disclose, or make available for inspection, any documents relevant to the 
inquest, as soon as reasonably practical when requested by any interested person.65  Under 
r 14(b) documents may be redacted, but, as Thomas et al point out, ǲlegal challenges are 
likely to arise if coroners fail to comply with fair process and other public law principles in 
                                                 
59 e.g. the inquest into the death of Blair Peach and the New Cross fire described at 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 above. 
60 ǲThere should be advance disclosure of evidence and documents as of right to parties who have leave from a coroner to appear at an inquest.ǳ ȋSir William Macpherson, Report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Cm 
4262-I, 1999), rec 43). 
61 (ome Office, ǮCircular ʹͲ/ͳͻͻͻ: Deaths in Police Custody: Guidance to the Police on Pre-Inquest Disclosureǯ, para ͹. 
62 Jordan (ch 1, n 10) 134. 
63 R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 143, 46; see also the 2008 case of 
R (Smith) v AD Coroner for Oxfordshire, where Collins J held that post-Middleton there must be a ǲpresumption in favour of as full disclosure as possibleǳ, and that in Article ʹ cases ǲit will be very difficult to justify any refusal to disclose relevant material.ǳ ([2008] EWHC 694 (Admin), 37). 
64 CJA ʹͲͲͻ, s ͷ. This should be read in conjunction with coronersǯ powers under para ͳ of sch ͷ CJA ʹͲͲͻ 
to compel the disclosure of materials relevant to the circumstances of a death. 
65 C(I)R 2013, r 2(1): This includes photographs and video evidence.  
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exercising this discretion.ǳ66  Rule 15 provides that there may be restrictions on disclosure 
where: 
1. there is a statutory or legal prohibition on disclosure; 
2. the consent of any author or copyright owner cannot reasonably be 
obtained; 
3. the request is unreasonable; 
4. the document relates to contemplated or commenced criminal proceedings; 
or 
5. the coroner considers the document irrelevant to the investigation.67 
We saw in Chapter 3 that there is a presumption that IPCC and PPO reports will be 
disclosed to the coroner and to all interested persons.  There is some controversy whether 
police reports are disclosable or whether they fall under Rule 15(a).  Dorries claims that 
police reports and IPCC reports will usually fall under this exception.68  However, IPCC 
reports are now generally disclosed to relatives of the deceased.69  With investigations into 
police deaths invariably being investigated independently by the IPCC, police reports are 
less of an issue than at the time of the Blair Peach inquest.  However, as we have seen, the 
police still investigate all prison deaths.  Thomas et al argue that despite the Chief Coronerǯs guidance,  ǲ[t]here can be no justification for a clear cut rule against the disclosure.ǳ70   Indeed, if there is sensitivity about the disclosure of a police report, it should 
be subject to normal procedures regarding PII.  Finally, the coroner must also inform 
interested persons before admitting written evidence, that they are entitled to a copy of the 
evidence.71 
 
 
                                                 
66 ibid; Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 168-169. 
67 C(I)R 2013. 
68 Dorries, (ch 1, n 18) para 6.76. 
69 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 170. 
70 ibid, 169-170; Peter Thornton HHJ, The Chief Coronerǯs Guide to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
(2013) <http://tinyurl.com/j5dj4g9> accessed 28 January 2016, para 121. 
71 C(I)R 2013. 
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5.1.5 Public funding for familiesǯ legal representation 
Public funding for legal representation at inquests into deaths at the hands of the state 
is an important consideration regarding the openness of proceedings to the participation of 
families of the deceased and the public.   Families represent their own interests at inquests, 
but they also often play a vital role in representing the interests of communities and the 
wider public.  The High Court acknowledged this in R (Main) v Minister for Legal Aid, 
indicating that this latter feature should be taken into account in public funding decisions.  
In particular, Owen J observed that ǲit is only through representation of the family that the 
wider public interest will be representedǳ at the inquest.72 
Normally Legal Help is the only form of public funding available to relatives at inquests.  
Since November 2014 this is only available to those with a disposable income of less than 
£733 a month and savings of less that £8,000.73  This cut-off point for eligibility bears little 
relationship to the ability of someone to afford private legal representation. The financial 
eligibility requirements may be waived by the Director of the Legal Aid Agency  (LAA) in 
special circumstances: in particular having regard to Article 2 ECHR.74  Legal Help pays for 
initial legal advice about inquests, any written submissions to the coroner, and help 
preparing for inquests.  It does not cover representation during inquests.  However, 
provided the financial eligibility test is met (or is waived), exceptional funding may be 
available for legal representation where the deceased died in prison or police custody, or 
otherwise at the hands of the police.75 
The first of two exceptional scenarios where the LAA may authorise funding for 
representation, relate specifically to Article 2 inquests.  The Lord Chancellor's Exceptional 
Funding Guidance (Inquests) describes a two-fold test.76  The LAA must be satisfied that a 
                                                 
72 Main (ch 1, n 15) 49. While the decision in that case to order the public funding of the family was 
overturned in the Court of Appeal, it did not take issue with this point. 
73 Legal Aid Agency, ǮControlled Work: Guide to Determining Financial Eligibility for Controlled Work and Family Mediationǯ ȋApril ʹͲͳͶȌ ͹. 
74 The Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment of Services) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/480, reg 
10. 
75 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPOA 2012), s 10(3). 
76 Legal Aid Agency (n 73) para 7. 
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death involved an arguable breach of Article ʹǯs substantive negative obligation, and that representation is required for the inquest to fulfil Article ʹǯs procedural obligation.77  This 
can be problematic, because an arguable breach of the negative obligation under Article 2 
may only become apparent relatively late in proceedings.  In the Tomlinson case, for 
example, police, media, IPCC and the coroner, all initially assumed the death was a natural 
one.  That the case engaged Article 2 only became apparent when video footage later 
emerged showing that Mr Tomlinson had been struck by a policeman.78 
Once an Article 2 death is identified, the LAA must then consider whether 
representation is necessary to fulfil the procedural obligation.  The Guidance explains the 
requirements set out in Jordan,79 emphasising the requirement that the family of the 
deceased be involved to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests.80  
There is an argument that the family being represented aids the fulfilment of all of the 
Article 2 requirements, and that this should also be taken into account by the LAA.  State 
institutions will always be legally represented at public expense.  Individual state actors 
who may come in for criticism will also invariably be legally represented, sometimes at 
public expense, but otherwise normally through their union/federation.  Opening up truth 
discovery processes to diverse interests is a vital safeguard against insulated narrative 
formation processes.  Without professional advocates representing the family, the inquest 
does not lend itself to addressing outside concerns or appreciating non-state perspectives 
of intersubjective interaction between state actors and the public.81  Thomas et al make the 
crucial point that: […] the family will often be the only party working towards satisfying the crucial 
public interests of assuaging public anxiety, ascertaining the circumstances of 
death, highlighting failures and learning lessons to prevent similar deaths from 
                                                 
77 ibid, para ͹.  The Guidance states ǲit is likely that there will be an arguable breach of the substantive obligation where State actors have killed the individualǳ, or ǲwhere the individual has died in State custody other than from natural causes: for example, killings or suicides in prison.ǳ ȋLegal Aid Agency ȋn ͹͵Ȍ para ͳʹȌ. 
This is in keeping with the burden on the State to explain deaths in custody under Salman (ch 2, n 62) 69. 
78 Paul Lewis, ǮVideo Reveals GʹͲ Police Assault on Man Who Diedǯ The Guardian (7 April 2009) 
<http://tinyurl.com/ktxactm> (accessed 20 November 2014). See also Humberstone (ch 1, n 22) where it was 
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79 Legal Aid Agency (n 73) 18; Jordan (ch 1, n 10). 
80 Legal Aid Agency (n 73) 18. 
81 Sam McIntosh, Fulfilling Their Purpose: Inquests, Article 2 and Next of Kin [2012] PL 407. 
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occurring in the future.  The coroner, who had limited resources, and in certain 
respects may be inclined to be less exacting than bereaved relatives, cannot 
always be expected fully to satisfy these purposes.  A lack of funding for families 
does not only mean that often the inquiry will not be as full as otherwise—
perhaps more importantly, it leads to an inequality of arms […] Further, in 
practice [those representing the authorities] often work against the central 
public interests involved in the inquest, of preventing further death in similar 
circumstances.82 
This is because, whatever the inquestǯs purposes, lawyers for state actors and public 
authorities would not be doing their jobs if they did not do what they could to represent 
the best interests of their clients: whether or not this is in the public interest.  It will take a 
particularly confident unrepresented family member to hold their own whilst facing other 
interested persons, each of whom may be represented by two or three lawyers and who 
will often have the shared aim of securing a state-exculpatory verdict/conclusion. 
The Guidance stresses that in most cases the coroner will be able to conduct an effective 
investigation, and the family play a sufficient role, without the family needing legal 
representation.83  It quotes the case of Khan where the court found that this would be true in the ǲoverwhelming majority of casesǳ.84   This is despite the Court of Appeal in 
Humberstone criticising the phraseology in Khan.85  Three considerations must be taken into account by the LAA: ǲȋiȌ the nature and seriousness of the allegations against the state 
actors; (ii) previous investigations into the death; and (iii) the particular circumstances of the family.ǳ86  Point (i) implies that at times there may be a broader public interest in the 
family being represented that should be taken into account. 
The Guidance effectively interprets Article 2 as applying in all of the scenarios that are 
the subject of this thesis.  However its interpretation of when public funding is required in 
these cases may conflict with case-law on the issue.  The Guidance does not appear to take 
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85 Humberstone (ch 1, n 22); Khan (n 84). 
86 Legal Aid Agency (n 73) 20. 
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into account Humberstone, which emphasised that public funding decisions should 
concentrate on the needs of the family, rather than the coroner.  In fact, both are important, 
and the Ǯeffectivenessǯ of the inquest should take into account the need to engage with 
public concerns which can be very effectively represented by a legally represented family.  
It also fails to take into account the sentiment expressed obiter by Owen J in Main above, or 
evidence that legally-represented families can have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of inquests.87 
As well as under s 10(3) LASPOA 2012, funding can also be awarded where the Director 
of the LAA determines that it is in the wider public interest.88  Interestingly this possibility is raised independently of the more specific Article ʹ exception.  The test is that ǲthe 
provision of advocacy for the individual […] is likely to produce significant benefits for a 
class or person, other than the applicant and members of the applicantǯs familyǳ.89  Given 
that this is about benefiting those other than the applicant, it seems inappropriate that the 
means test still applies: but it does. 
The Guidance states that funding under this heading may be appropriate where 
inquests are likely to uncover dangerous practices, systemic failings or other significant 
risks to life and health.90  The inquest must be likely to bring actual public benefits for a 
significant number of people.91  It is implied that what constitutes a Ǯbenefitǯ will normally 
be some tangible improvement in practice and procedure.  The LAA must consider whether 
there are likely to be improvements to systems as a result of the inquest and the familyǯs 
legal representation in it.  The benefit of basic democratic and public accountability does 
not appear to be sufficient.  And it is unclear where the need to foresee actual 
improvements in practice leaves inquests into prison deaths, where systemic problems 
that are amenable to improvement are arguably revealed relatively often, but a lack of 
funding and political will means that improvements are not always made.92  There is also 
some slightly fuzzy logic in the Guidance requiring LAA caseworkers to peer into the future 
                                                 
87 See also the example of Sean Rigg discussed at 3.3.1 above and Casale (ch 3, n 89). 
88 Legal Aid Agency (n 73) 28. 
89 ibid. Although this may be waived (37–38). 
90 ibid, 29. 
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and predict an inquestǯs results.  They will be attempting to arrive at judgments on Ǯsignificantǯ likelihoods regarding an inquestǯs outcome long before the inquest has even 
started to hear evidence.  Generally, it is those cases where things are not black and white 
or predictable that the coroner would benefit from a professional advocate testing and 
challenging state narratives. 
In the recent case of R (Letts) v Lord Chancellor, the High Court held that the Guidance 
was unlawful for laying down a test for legal aid that required there to be an ǲarguable 
breachǳ of the substantive obligation under Article 2.93  Significantly, Green J pointed out 
that the investigative duty under Article 2 arose automatically in deaths in custody, 
whether or not there was an arguable breach of the substantive duty.94 
 
5.1.6 Public interest immunity 
Before comparing the ability of inquiry chairmen and coroners to exclude individuals 
from the hearings, it is important to point out that ministers can always apply to coroners 
to exclude evidence from inquests under PII.  The same basic rules on PII apply in inquests 
as they do in all courts.95  A minister can issue a PII certificate, stating she believes it is not 
in the public interest to disclose material which would normally be disclosable.96  There 
should be a real risk that public disclosure would harm the national interest.97  Normally, it 
is for a judge to weigh the public interest that evidence be withheld, against the public 
interest in courts having the fullest possible access to relevant material when overseeing 
the administration of justice.98  )n inquests, it is up to the coroner: ǲwho will need to 
balance the public interest in non-disclosure with the requirement of the inquest to discover how a person died.ǳ99  In order to do this, a coroner will normally need to have 
sight of the relevant material and hear arguments on behalf of the minister.100  This will 
take place in the absence of the jury, and will usually be ex parte.  PII is looked at in more 
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detail in Chapter 9 as the practice brings to the fore the unique relationship between 
openness and the inquestǯs purposes, which in turn is significant to the analysis of the link 
between openness and justice in inquests.101  But it can be seen in the case of Azelle 
Rodney, that PII can have a significant impact on the possible scope of inquests. 
 
5.2 Azelle Rodney, secret evidence and the Inquiries Act 2005 
A police firearms officer shot and killed Azelle Rodney on 29 April 2005.  A pre-inquest 
hearing was not held until August 2007, when Deputy Coroner, Andrew Walker, outlined 
the basic circumstances of Azelleǯs death: 
[P]olice officers, with the benefit of intelligence, began a search for some 
individuals as part of a police operation.  As part of that operation a group of 
men, including Azelle Rodney were followed in their car.  At some point it was decided that the vehicle should be stopped and the officers carried out a Ǯhard stopǯ in (ale Lane in Edgware.  During the course of this Ǯhard stopǯ Azelle 
Rodney was shot by police officers and died at the scene.  A post-mortem 
examination confirmed that Mr Rodney died from gunshot wounds to head, 
neck and back.102 
At that hearing, Walker ruled that he was unable to fulfil his statutory duty to conduct an inquest into Azelleǯs death, and was compelled to suspend the inquest indefinitely.103 
The problem he faced was a classic conflict of laws.  We have seen previously that 
where someone has died an unnatural or violent death, the coroner has a statutory duty to 
hold an inquest.104  What is more, in cases such as Azelleǯs, inquests must be held with a 
jury.105  We have also seen that inquests must investigate who the deceased was, and when, 
where and how she came by her death.106  Next-of-kin must be designated as interested 
                                                 
101 See 9.2.1.6 below. Regarding PII in civil cases, see also the consideration of R (Binyam Mohamed) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2010] EWCA Civ 65, at 9.3.1 below. 
102 Walker (ch 3, n 114) para 1. 
103 ibid. 
104 CJA 2009, s 1 
105 ibid, s ͹.  As the death had ǲresulted from an injury caused by a police officer in the purported execution of his dutyǳ.  Coroners Act ͳͺͺ͹, s ͺ. 
106 CJA 2009, s 5 
 145 
persons, and have a right to question witnesses.107  Finally, inquests must be held in public, 
except where it is in the interest of national security to exclude the public from all or part of 
it.108 
As well as these domestic law requirements, we have seen that the coroner had to 
presume the inquest was to fulfil the procedural obligation under Article 2.  He would, 
therefore, have to investigate by what means, and in what circumstances Azelle had come 
by his death.109  He would also have to ensure that: the inquest was effective (i.e. capable of 
determining who was responsible for the death and ǲwhether the force used was justifiedǳ); there was sufficient public scrutiny to secure accountability; and Azelleǯs next-
of-kin were ǲinvolved to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her own interests.ǳ110 
All of this is uncontroversial.  However, the problem, according to the deputy coroner, 
was that he was prevented from fulfilling these requirements because—ǲhe had been persuadedǳ—neither the police, nor IPCC could lawfully make available to him or a jury 
certain evidence which was core to the circumstances of Azelleǯs death.111  In the absence of 
this evidence, the inquest would be unable to fulfil the requirement that it be an effective 
and open investigation. 
In his ruling, the deputy coroner was careful to avoid revealing the nature or source of 
this sensitive evidence.  However, it is widely believed that it must have included ǲintercept evidenceǳ i.e. intelligence obtained using powers under the RIPA 2000, through the 
interception of emails or telephone calls to or from targeted individuals.112  The press has 
frequently referred to this likelihood, and the case has been mentioned in parliamentary 
debates on intercept evidence on more than one occasion.113  It also explains why the 
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deputy coroner accepted, without revealing why, that the police and the IPCC could not 
lawfully make the evidence available to him or a jury. 
Under s 17 RIPA 2000, the existence or content of intercept evidence cannot be referred 
to in court proceedings.  Under s 19 RIPA 2000, it is also a criminal offence for certain 
individuals, including the police and anyone holding office under the Crown, to disclose the 
existence or content of material obtained through warranted interceptions.  Sections 17 
and 19 RIPA 2000 are obviously concerned with keeping secret all aspects of telephone and 
email interception, and the intelligence that might be garnered from them.  But the inquest 
would not be effective as a fact-finding exercise, if it were prevented from considering core 
evidence as to why heavily-armed police targeted Azelle, with a Ǯhard stopǯ on a busy public 
street. 
Two potential solutions to this impasse were considered by the government.  First, it 
could simply amend RIPA 2000 to make intercept evidence admissible at inquests.  
Alternatively, it could also introduce legislation that would empower ministers to require 
certain inquests: to dispense with juries; to be held in camera and in the absence of anyone 
without security clearance—including the next-of-kin and their chosen legal 
representatives.  While both of these options would solve the basic conflict between RIPA 
2000 and the CA 1988, it is difficult to see how the latter option would square with Article ʹǯs requirement that an investigation be effective and public, and that the deceasedǯs family 
be involved in a meaningful way. 
For a long time the government did nothing.  Eventually it indicated it would change the 
law to allow coroners and juries to have access to sensitive evidence in a narrow range of 
circumstances.  This appeared to many commentators to be eminently sensible.114  The Guardian Newspaper quoted Susan Alexander, Azelleǯs mother: 
                                                                                                                                                             
<http://tinyurl.com/gtmgfns> accessed 28 January 2016; and HC Deb 23 March 2009, vol 490, col 72; HC Deb 
21 October 2009, vol 713, col 722. 
114 The public is aware of police capability and power (with appropriate authorisation) to listen in on 
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Now that the government agrees that this evidence shouldn't be withheld from 
bereaved families like ours, I hope all concerned can act quickly so the evidence 
is disclosed with minimum delay. Azelle has not had justice and without justice 
there can be no accountability.115 
In the end, however, the government took a very different approach when it introduced 
the Counter-Terrorism Bill into Parliament in 2007.  In the Bill, (as first introduced) clauses 
64-65 would have given the Home Secretary broad powers to issue certificates requiring 
inquests to be held in private and without a jury whenever it was deemed to be in the 
public interest.116  Clause 65 would have allowed the appointment, by the Home Secretary, of a ǲspecial coronerǳ, from an approved list, to conduct the inquest.117  Clause 67 would 
have allowed (and also restricted) the disclosure of sensitive evidence to the specially-appointed coroner and a ǲperson appointed as counsel to the inquestǳ ȋagain from a 
government-approved list).118 
Some observers quickly appreciated the significance of the proposed legislation.119  The charitable organisation )NQUEST expressed ǲextreme concernǳ that the provisions had 
been introduced without consultation, and noted that the proposals gave ǲunprecedented 
powers to the Secretary of State to intervene in death in custody inquests where issues of state intelligence are involved.ǳ120  The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR) also expressed barely concealed anger at the lack of consultation, and noted: […]the prospect that under these provisions inquests into the death of Jean 
Charles de Menezes, or British servicemen killed by US forces in Iraq, could be 
held by a Coroner appointed by the Secretary of State, sitting without a jury.121 
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It argued that: 
On first inspection we find this an astonishing provision with the most serious implications for the UKǯs ability to comply with the positive obligation in Article 
2 ECHR to provide an adequate and effective investigation where an individual 
has been killed as a result of the use of force, particularly where the death is the 
result of the use of force by state actors.122 Daniel Machover, Susan Alexanderǯs solicitor, observed: 
These proposals mean that Ministers and those responsible for intelligence 
gathering will never be held properly to account for the validity of their tactics. 
It is a fiasco, bearing no resemblance to a fair system of justice. Presented with 
the problem of what to do with sensitive material that is relevant to the 
circumstances of how and why a person was killed by a state agent, the 
government proposes to remove the vital democratic accountable layer of a jury 
and hide away from the bereaved family crucial evidence about the death.123 
When the government was defeated on the provisions in the Lords, they were dropped 
from the Bill.  In 2009, it tried again, with similar provisions in the Coroners and Justice 
Bill.124  Once again, significant opposition meant that the provisions were dropped.  
However, it became apparent to the government that an alternative route might be found. 
Ten years previously, the Access to Justice Act 1999 inserted a provision into the CA 
1988, allowing the Lord Chancellor to direct a coroner to adjourn an inquest where a public inquiry was being, or was about to be held, which would itself ǲadequatelyǳ investigate a 
death.125  The provision was ostensibly to save families the emotional burden (and the 
public the expense) of inquests duplicating proceedings where inquiries had already 
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investigated major disasters.126 Inquiries do not have juries, and the IA 2005 includes 
broad provisions allowing evidence to be heard in private—including in the absence of ǲcore participantsǳ ȋthe equivalent of ǲinterested personsǳ in inquests).  Meanwhile, s 74(1) 
of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008, quietly inserted into RIPA 2000 a provision which in ǲexceptional circumstancesǳ allowed: 
a disclosure [of the existence and/or content of intercept evidence] to the panel 
of an inquiry held under the Inquiries Act 2005 or to a person appointed as 
counsel to such an inquiry where, in the course of the inquiry, the panel has 
ordered the disclosure to be made to the panel alone or to the panel and the 
person appointed as counsel to the inquiry127 
 
5.2.1 Comparing inquiries to inquests 
Before returning to Azelle Rodney, it is helpful to look at how the legislation and rules 
governing inquiries under the IA 2005 differ to those governing inquests.  We have already 
noted two negative differences: an inquiry will not have a jury; and a minister, or an 
inquiry chairman, can require evidence to be considered in closed session—including to 
the exclusion of the family of the deceased.128  This feature is considered last.  It is 
important to bear in mind that while the primary and secondary legislation concerning 
inquiries are very different to those governing inquests, they have to be read in the light of 
Article 2 ECHR and the HRA 1998. 
 
5.2.1.1 The scope of inquiries 
The first big difference is that an inquiryǯs terms of reference are at the discretion of the 
minister who establishes it, although since 2013 they must include the aims set out in s 5 
CJA 2009.129  Article 2 should restrict any practical difference this makes where the inquiry 
is investigating a death at the hands of the state, and a minister will, in theory, have no 
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discretion to narrow the scope of the inquiry to anything less than would be required in an 
inquest.130 
The second difference is one where the IA 2005 arguably takes a more sensible 
approach than the CA ͳͻͺͺ or the CJA ʹͲͲͻ, regarding an inquiryǯs implications for 
criminal or civil liability.  Section 2 IA 2005 simply states: 
1) An inquiry panel is not to rule on, and has no power to determine, any personǯs civil or criminal liability. 
2) But an inquiry panel is not to be inhibited in the discharge of its functions by 
any likelihood of liability being inferred from facts that it determines or 
recommendations that it makes.131 
 
5.2.1.2 Openness of inquiries to the participation of the family of deceased 
The chairman of an inquiry can designate as ǲcore participantsǳ those with ǲa significant interest in an important aspect of the matter to which the inquiry relates.ǳ132  This 
empowers—and Article 2 ECHR will require—the chairman to designate close family 
members of the deceased as core participants.133 
A major concern regarding openness is the restrictions on core participants being able 
to participate meaningfully in questioning witnesses.  In inquests this is subject only to the 
coroner agreeing that questions posed are indeed questions, and that they are relevant.  
However, with inquiries, the questioning of witnesses begins with the presumption that ǲonly counsel to the inquiry […] and the inquiry panel may ask questions of that witness.134  
The chairman can even refuse legal representatives the opportunity of asking their own 
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clients questions when they give evidence.135  Otherwise, if a core participant wishes to ask 
witnesses questions, their legal representative must apply for permission, and set out: 
a)  the issues in respect of which a witness is to be questioned; and 
b) whether the questioning will raise new issues or, if not, why questioning 
should be permitted.136 
There is no specific guidance as to what the chairman should consider when deciding 
whether the presumption against core participants questioning witnesses should be 
rebutted.  Rather there is only the general guidance that: 
(3)  In making any decision as to the procedure or conduct of an inquiry, the 
chairman must act with fairness and with regard also to the need to avoid any 
unnecessary cost […]137 
Again, Article 2 ECHR comes into play here, and, in particular, the requirement that 
next-of-kin be involved in the investigation to the extent necessary to protect their own 
interests.138 
 
5.2.1.3 The openness of inquiries to the public and press observing proceedings 
Unlike in inquests, neither the IA 2005, nor the Inquiry Rules 2006 (IR 2006) create an 
explicit presumption that inquiries will be public.  Section 18 (Public access to inquiry 
proceedings and information) really only requires the chairman to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the parts of the inquiry that are public are accessible, as are associated 
evidence or documents.139  In contrast, s 19 provides both ministers (by restriction notice) 
and the inquiry chairman (by restriction order) a broad power to restrict attendance at an 
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inquiry, or any part of it, and to restrict disclosure or publication of related evidence or 
documents.140  The broad nature of the power, is illustrated by the Actǯs Explanatory Notes: 
Restrictions that could be imposed on attendance under subsection (1)(a) of 
section 19 might range from the exclusion of the press or general public ȋallowing those with an interest in the inquiry to attend […]Ȍ to the exclusion of 
everyone except the panel, the witness and, if appropriate, their legal representatives […]. They might be imposed on all hearings, or only where a 
particular witness was giving evidence or where evidence was heard on a 
specific topic […]  Similarly, a range of different restrictions might be imposed 
on the disclosure or publication of evidence or documents.141 
The power of ministers and chairmen to restrict access is not completely unfettered, 
however.  They can only make restrictions as required by law, or such as they consider ǲconducive to the inquiry fulfilling its terms of reference or to be necessary in the public interest.ǳ142  In determining this, the section gives a non-exhaustive list of issues to be 
considered: 
 (a) the extent to which a restriction on attendance, disclosure or publication 
might inhibit the allaying of public concern; 
 (b) any risk of harm or damage that could be avoided or reduced by any 
such restriction; 
 (c) any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person acquired 
information that he is to give, or has given, to the inquiry; 
 (d) the extent to which not imposing any particular restriction would be 
likely — 
  (i) to cause delay or impair the efficiency or effectiveness of the inquiry, 
or(ii) otherwise to result in additional cost (whether to public funds or 
to witnesses or others). 
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ȋͷȌ  )n subsection ȋͶȌȋbȌ ǲharm or damageǳ includes in particular— 
 (a) death or injury; 
 (b) damage to national security or international relations; 
 (c) damage to the economic interests of the UK or any part of the UK; 
 (d) damage caused by disclosure of commercially sensitive information.143 
 
5.2.1.4 The manner in which inquiries conclude 
The final significant difference between 2005 Act inquiries and inquests into use-of-
force deaths at the hands of the state, is the manner in which they conclude.  Inquests 
conclude with a verdict (now referred to as a conclusion).  The coroner will instruct the 
jury as to which verdicts are open to them on the evidence heard.  The Ǯ)nquisitionǯ (as it 
was known under the ͳͻͺͺ ActȌ or the ǮRecord of an )nquestǯ, may describe how the 
deceased died in a number of ways.  It may give a short-form verdict such as: accident, 
misadventure, lawful killing, unlawful killing, natural causes, open, neglect or suicide etc..  
Those verdicts which in the past indicated that a death was caused by a criminal act ȋsuicide, unlawful killingȌ, require the criminal standard of proof of Ǯbeyond reasonable doubtǯ.  All other verdicts must be reached on the balance of probabilities. 
Short-form verdicts may, however, be insufficient to meet the procedural obligation 
under Article 2.  This requires conclusions to be reached on the major factual issues 
surrounding the circumstances of the death, including whether there were any individual 
failures or wrongdoing by state actors, or systemic failings within a state institution.  
Bingham suggested in Middleton that in addition, or as an alternative, to a short-form 
verdict, narrative verdicts (at the time, relatively rare) should be encouraged.144  A 
narrative verdict may take the form of a brief description of the circumstances of a death, 
or a series of answers to questions posed by the coroner on the main issues.  Where a 
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narrative verdict is appropriate, Bingham observed that the coroner should decide how best to elicit the juryǯs conclusions on the central issues: 
If the coroner invited either a narrative verdict or answers to questions, he may find it helpful to direct the jury with reference to […]: where and when the death 
took place; the cause or causes of such death; the defects in the system which 
contributed to the death; and any other factors which are relevant to the 
circumstances of the death.145 
As well as the verdict, coroners can also make Prevention of Future Death Reports (PFD 
Reports) (previously Rule 43 Reports under the CR 1984: replaced by para 7, Schedule 5 
CJA 2009, and regs 28-29 of the C(I)Regs 2013).   
7 (1)  Where— • a senior coroner has been conducting an investigation under this Part into a 
person's death, • anything revealed by the investigation gives rise to a concern that 
circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur, or will continue to 
exist, in the future, and • in the coroner's opinion, action should be taken to prevent the occurrence or 
continuation of such circumstances, or to eliminate or reduce the risk of 
death created by such circumstances, 
 the coroner must report the matter to a person who the coroner believes 
may have power to take such action.146 
Under the Regulations, the Chief Coroner, rather than the Lord Chancellor,147 decides 
how much of the report, and the response, is published.148 Thomas et al make the 
important point that: 
                                                 
145 ibid, 36. 
146 CJA 2009; See also C(I)Regs 2013, regs 28–29. 
147 As it was under the CR 1984. 
148 Cȋ)ȌRegs ʹͲͳ͵. The Chief Coroner has also produced guidance: Peter Thornton ((J, ǮGuidance No. ͷ: Reports to Prevent Future Deathsǯ ȋͶ September ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ <http://tinyurl.com/jrdyrͻl> accessed 28 January 
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The function of preventing deaths in the future has gained increasing 
importance over recent years.  This is obviously something to be applauded.  It 
gives an inquest, among legal proceedings, a uniquely constructive aspect.  This 
is a function which need not imply criticism, offers solace to families, and, if 
effective, is highly important.149 
With inquiries under the IA 2005, the chairman must produce a report under s 24(1) IA 
2005.  This must contain ǲthe facts determined by the inquiry panelǳ and recommendations 
where required by the terms of reference.150  It may also contain anything else that the 
panel considers relevant including recommendations where these were not required by the 
terms of reference.  The chairman or the minister has ǲa dutyǳ to arrange for the inquiry 
report to be published.151  There is a presumption that the report will be published in full, 
but material can be withheld where necessary under statute, EU law or in the public 
interest. When deciding upon the latter, account must be taken of: 
 (a) the extent to which withholding material might inhibit the allaying of 
public concern; 
 (b) any risk of harm or damage that could be avoided or reduced by 
withholding any material; 
 (c) any conditions as to confidentiality subject to which a person 
acquired information that he has given to the inquiry.152 ǲ(arm or damageǳ includes: 
 (a)  death or injury; 
 (b)  damage to national security or international relations; 
 (c)  damage to the economic interests of the UK or of any part of the UK; 
                                                                                                                                                             ʹͲͳ͸; and ǮGuidance No. ͷA: Practical Guidance: Prevention of Future Deaths Reportsǯ ȋʹͳ November ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ 
<http://tinyurl.com/hejt3q9> accessed 28 January 2016. 
149 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 369. 
150 IA 2005, s 24. 
151 ibid, s 25. 
152 ibid, s 25(4)–(6). 
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 (d) damage caused by disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information.153 
 
5.2.2 The Azelle Rodney Inquiry 
On 30 March 2010, the government finally announced a 2005 Act inquiry into Azelleǯs death.  )ts Terms of Reference were: ǲ[t]o ascertain by inquiring how, where and in what 
circumstances Azelle Rodney came by his death on 30 April 2005 and then to make any 
such recommendations as may seem appropriate.ǳ154  Sir Christopher Holland, a retired 
High Court Judge, was appointed as chairman.  The inquiry formally opened on 6 October 
2010. 
At the opening, the issue of the sensitive evidence was again alluded to in the vaguest of 
terms.  Sir Christopher (olland referred to it as ǲthe problemǳ, elucidating only to say that it ǲbears upon the potential for public hearing of this matter.ǳ155  The substantive hearing of 
evidence began another two years later on 3 September 2012.  This additional delay was 
partly because of further investigations being carried out by the inquiry team, and partly 
due to negotiations regarding the redaction or gisting of evidence to make the inquiry as 
open as possible.  At the 4 November hearing, Ashley Underwood, counsel for the inquiry, 
predicted that it may not be necessary for any evidence to be heard in closed session. 
When the inquiry proper finally got underway, the most contentious issue was the 
extent to which counsel for the core participants—and Azelleǯs family in particular—
should be permitted to question witnesses.  The chairman acknowledged the restrictive 
nature of r 10 IR 2006 in his Directions of the 30 April 2012: 
This markedly restrictive provision is no doubt aimed at curtailing prolixity and 
thus the length and cost of inquiries.  For my part if the barrister appearing for a 
core participant wishes to cross-examine a witness he or she will have to make 
an application to me.  If permission is granted, it will not serve to permit 
                                                 
153 ibid. 
154 Commons Hansard, Ministerial Statements, The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr 
Kenneth Clarke), 10 June 2010, col 32WS. 
155 Azelle Rodney )nquiry, ǮTranscript of Formal Opening – ͸ October ʹͲͳͲǯ, ʹ–3 
<http://tinyurl.com/n68td4j> accessed 23 November 2014. 
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revisiting matters already covered by Counsel to the Inquiry—there must be 
compliance with Rule 10(5).  Leave aside prolixity, I am not a jury—once a point 
is made then I can be taken as heeding it.  That said, I do anticipate giving 
permission.156 
The problem is that cross-examination is not just about raising points with witnesses 
just to flag them up for the arbiter of fact.  It is also about putting points to witnesses and 
seeing how they respond; and assisting the arbiter of fact to judge whether a point is 
supported by evidence.  Does the witness provide a convincing explanation as to why 
something happened or why a certain choice was made?  Do they seem to be giving a more 
honest or reliable account of the facts than any witness giving a contradictory account? As 
counsel for the family pointed out, the chairman would have to judge the reliability of 
individual accounts: ) am sorry, sir, again […] you are sitting not only as a chairman with a judge or 
judicial type hat on, but you're also sitting there in the capacity of a jury in a 
sense, because you're going to have to determine these factual issues, and one of 
the factual issues that you, with your jury type hat on, would have to determine 
is not only the fact that there's a conflict but why officers may well have given 
an account which […] may be […] an untrue account, and that not only informs 
you, sir, in relation to that particular issue, but it may inform you in relation to other parts of their evidence later on, and that's why these questions […] are 
important.157 
 Second, while the chairman may ǲget the pointǳ, it would be unfair not to allow a 
witness who may be implicated by that point to try and answer it and address any evidence 
                                                 
156 Sir Christopher (olland, ǮThe Azelle Rodney )nquiry: Directions Made ͵Ͳ April ʹͲͳʹǯ <http://tinyurl.com/lvzxthz> accessed ʹͷ November ʹͲͳͶ; Azelle Rodney )nquiry ǮTranscript of the Oral 
Hearings of 6 September 2012ǯ  <http://tinyurl.com/mom7jdr> accessed 23 November 2014: ǲ) am rather keen, in this matter, to have a light touch.  That said, there are rules and I can't ignore them altogether; […] ) have to be satisfied there are issues […], and those issues have to be new or at least there has 
to be some good reason for questioning.  That is what the rules indicate. Now, I don't want to stop anybody, but ) would like people just to have that in mind, so that ) don't need to keep policing it. […]  I am just putting 
my marker down, rather less forcefully than ) am expected to do by the Rules.ǳȋͶͳȌ 
157 Azelle Rodney )nquiry, ǮTranscript of the Oral (earings of ͳʹ September ʹͲͳʹǯ, 53–54 
<http://tinyurl.com/na7w2yr> accessed 23 November 2014. 
 158 
that appears to support it.  Finally, it was important to bear in mind that the inquiry was a 
public inquiry: 
MR THOMAS:  But sir, it is not a question of moving on because we are under 
time constraints.  … [T]his is not just an )nquiry where you have to 
understand.  The public have a right to understand what is going on; and that is 
the reason why we have got all these live links, these feeds and everything, 
because this is meant to be a public Inquiry.  And if we are prevented from 
exploring these issues, then it is not a public Inquiry.158 
To an extent, the chairmanǯs hands were tied by the Rules.  He was almost certainly 
more generous in allowing questions than a strict reading of the Rules permitted.  It could 
be argued, and often was by counsel for the family, that the chairman had to allow them to 
question witnesses in order to adequately involve them in the investigation as required by 
Article 2 ECHR.  But the Chairman was often impatient with certain lines of questioning, 
and could appear particularly uncomfortable when accusatory questions were put to police 
witnesses.  Counsel for the family suffered constant interruptions by the chairman on some days, often with the exclamation ǲ)ǯve got the pointǳ.  This got so bad that one exchange ended in counsel for the family exclaiming ǲThis is ridiculous!ǳ and storming out of the 
room.159 
 
5.2.2.1 Restrictions on the openness of the Azelle Rodney Inquiry 
As well as restrictions on questioning witnesses, there were several ways in which the 
openness of the proceedings was explicitly restricted.  First various witnesses were 
granted anonymity.  Some were referred to either by a cypher or by their command 
code.160  Some, including the shooter, were also hidden from public view while giving 
evidence.  ǮThe publicǯ here, did not include Azelleǯs mother or her lawyers, who could see 
the witnesses give evidence.  When they gave evidence, the rest of the public and press 
were moved to an annex where they watched proceedings via video link with the witnesses 
                                                 
158 Azelle Rodney )nquiry, ǮTranscript of the Oral (earings of ͳ͵ September ʹͲͳʹǯ, ͹–8 
<http://tinyurl.com/oqjnwoz> accessed 23 November 2014. 
159 Azelle Rodney Inquiry (n 155) 2–3. 
160 ǲEͳǳ, ǲSͳǳ etc. or ǲBronze Commandǳ and ǲSilver Commandǳ. 
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obscured from view.  Finally, evidence that might identify anonymised witnesses was either 
gisted, omitted completely, or considered in closed session. 
The inquiry was widely praised for ensuring that the overwhelming majority of the evidence was heard in public.  Through lengthy negotiations, the relevant ǲsensitiveǳ 
evidence was redacted and gisted so that the substance of the intelligence could be 
revealed, without intelligence-gathering techniques or technologies also being revealed.  In 
this respect, the inquiry appears to have been extremely successful. The intelligence-
gathering community got to keep their practices secret, and the family and public saw the 
substance of relevant intelligence if not its source. 
There is a potential problem with this, however, beyond the fact that substantive 
evidence may also have been redacted to avoid revealing sources. The nature of the 
intelligence source (whether human or technological) may have important implications for 
the reliability of the intelligence it produces.  Human sources or informants are the most 
obvious example of this.  If you do not know who an informer is, you cannot take steps to 
assess her reliability.  There can be analogous problems with technology.  Voice recognition 
software may, for example, be used to identify one of the parties to a telephone call.  The inquiry might be told ǲintelligence revealed X received a phone call from Yǳ.  (owever, if 
this intelligence comes from technology, core participants will have no idea how reliable it 
is.  The family of the deceased was completely reliant on the inquiryǯs legal team to make 
any appropriate inquiries and reach conclusions on this. 
There were four occasions when the gisting and redaction of evidence was insufficient, 
and the inquiry went into closed session to hear evidence.161  The first arose when counsel 
for the family wished to question a senior firearms officer about a training video in which 
E7 (the shooter) appeared.162  The second and fourth occasions occurred when the same 
                                                 
161 There were a number of occasions when the public were excluded from the inquiry when legal issues 
were discussed—i.e. P)); restriction orders; and the Attorney Generalǯs undertaking.  Similar ex parte 
applications would also have occurred in an inquest. 
162 25 October 2012, 9.45am–10.41am (Azelle Rodney Inquiry, ǮTranscript of the Oral (earings of ʹͷ October ʹͲͳʹǯ, lines ͳ-4 <http://tinyurl.com/z68hpya> accessed 28 January 2016; and Azelle Rodney Inquiry Team, ǮThe Azelle Rodney )nquiry: Summary of Content of Closed Sessionsǯ <http://tinyurl.com/psgkͶjp> 
accessed 23 November 2014). 
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witness was asked to view and comment upon video footage taken by an ǲaerial assetǳ, 
which risked revealing the nature of that Ǯassetǯ.163  The answers provided by the witness were summarised by counsel for the family, with the witnessǯs help, in open court.164  The 
third closed session occurred when counsel for the family wished to question the same 
officer about the professional history of E7.165  To do this in public would have risked revealing E͹ǯs identity.  The reasons for going into closed session were clearly explained 
and follow-up questions took place in open court.  On each occasion the familyǯs lawyers 
were present in the closed sessions.  Finally, there was one occasion when a witness was 
questioned in open court about training and tactics, after which the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) indicated they would apply for a restriction order to prevent the publication 
of the evidence.  The application was not heard until June 2013, and the transcript of the dayǯs proceedings was removed from the website.166 
Otherwise the inquiry followed the procedure of the Ian Tomlinson inquest where 
transcripts of proceedings were uploaded onto the website, along with documentary, 
photographic and video evidence.  Additionally, the inquiry website broadcast a live audio 
stream of the proceedings.  These efforts appeared to be part of a concerted effort at best 
practice, promoting the openness of proceedings with modern technology,167 and 
recognised the wide public interest in the proceedings. 
The final way in which the public scrutiny of proceedings was restricted concerned the core participantsǯ closing submissions.  Core participants were allowed to make written 
                                                                                                                                                             Following the inquiry, E͹ was charged with Azelleǯs murder, and subsequently identified as Anthony 
Long.  Azelle was the third suspect Long had killed in his career.  He was acquitted by a jury on 3 July 2015. 
163 ibid; Transcript of the Oral Hearing, 14.18-14.36, 31 October 2012, page 97, lines 10-12; and 
Transcript of the Oral Hearings of 25 October 2012, lines 1-Ͷ; and Azelle Rodney )nquiry Team, ǮThe Azelle Rodney )nquiry: Summary of Content of Closed Sessionsǯ <http://tinyurl.com/psgk4jp>. 
164 Transcript of the Oral Hearing, 15 October 2012, pp. 1-20 and Transcript of the Oral Hearing, 31 
October 2012, pp. 97-103. 
165 Azelle Rodney Inquiry (n 162) 66, lines 2-4; and Azelle Rodney Inquiry Team (n 162). 
166 A restriction was eventually granted requiring extracts from the National Police Firearms Training 
Curriculum and a Police Firearms Manual be redacted. When last checked on 27 November 2014, the entire transcript of this dayǯs evidence was still missing from the website. 
167 Things were not completely problem free in this regard. Several times, the live web-feed did not 
appear to work and the visual feed to the annex was of bad quality often making it impossible to read 
documents shown on the monitor.  The preference for removing public to an annex to watch on video feed, 
over putting a screen around an anonymous witness is to be lamented. 
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submissions on specific issues the chairman wanted to consider in his final report.168  This 
is not permitted at inquests.  Controversially, the MPS raised evidence in their submissions 
which was not considered during the actual formal hearing of evidence.  They claimed this 
evidence was sensitive, and it is redacted from the copy that was made available on the 
inquiry website.169  The chairman originally directed that he would not consider this 
evidence, but left it open to the MPS to make an application, until which time it would 
remain redacted.170  After indicating they would make an application on 17 December 
2012, there appears to be no further reference to the submissions in any subsequent 
orders or directions.171 
Given the limited amount of evidence heard in closed sessions, it is worth asking whether the investigation into Azelleǯs death could have been performed by an inquest 
with a jury.  Ostensibly, it appears it could have been; but in practice it is unlikely.  A lot of 
evidence appears to have been gisted and redacted.  The problem is that when evidence is 
gisted so as not to reveal the source of intelligence, witnesses will still be asked about that 
evidence.  The chairman may instruct barristers not to question witnesses about the 
source, and this will not normally cause any problems.  However, there may be times when 
a witness wants to clarify things to protect her own position.  The MPS, might agree to 
gisting evidence for use in open court only because if questioning threatens to embarrass a 
witness, they can go into closed session, where a witness can explain herself more fully.  In 
the absence of this possibility witnesses might back themselves into a corner through no 
fault of their own.  This risk was illustrated during the inquiry. 
The family of Azelle were provided with a shortened version of aerial video footage of 
the moments before the shooting.  Counsel asked a surveillance officer if he was aware of 
helicopter surveillance being carried out.  The officer said he was not, at which point 
counsel for the MPS intervened: 
                                                 
168 Azelle Rodney )nquiry Core Participants, ǮWritten Closings with Submissionsǯ ȋundatedȌ 
<http://tinyurl.com/pcvgs3m> accessed 23 November 2014. 
169 ibid, 1. 
170 ibid. 
171 ibid. 
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Mr Thomas is putting a particular question.  He is going to get a negative answer 
to that question, but the officer is not going to be able to answer it in a different 
way. 
The issue was complicated by the fact that it was agreed to make the footage available 
to the family in an ex parte hearing, which they were unaware of.  An order also prohibited 
questions about the technology behind the footage.  This led to the following exchange with 
the Chairman trying to help out: 
SIR CHISTOPHER (OLLAND [Chairman]: [… W]ere you in any communication 
with those who were conducting aerial surveillance? 
MS STUDD [Counsel for the MPS]:  Sir, I'm sorry.  This has been the subject of 
application to you previously. 
MR THOMAS [Counsel for the family]:  What application? […] 
MS STUDD:  I want to be very clear: this officer is going to be extremely cagey 
about the responses that he gives, for the reasons that you are aware of. […] 
MR THOMAS:  What application? 
SIR CHISTOPHER HOLLAND:  I don't know whether he was in communication or 
not.  That's all I'm asking. 
MS STUDD:  Very well. 
SIR CHISTOPHER HOLLAND:  I haven't asked any more and I shall keep a very -- 
were you in communication with anybody conducting aerial surveillance or not? 
A.  Yes I was, sir. 
SIR CHISTOPHER HOLLAND:  You were. 
MR THOMAS:  Right. Sir, I'm extremely troubled.  This is meant to be an open 
public inquiry, Ms Studd has said there's been an application.  What application? 
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SIR CHISTOPHER HOLLAND: I am conducting it. All right? )ǯm just going to rise 
for a minute or two and I would like to have Mr Underwood [Counsel for the 
Inquiry] advise me.172 
Initially, it appears as if the witness contradicted himself.  When Mr Thomas asked him 
about helicopter surveillance, he said he was unaware of any; but when the chairman asked 
him about aerial surveillance he agreed that he was in communication with those operating 
it.  But the witness did not contradict himself if the footage was not from a helicopter but 
from another source; and the exchange revealed the existence of a surveillance technology, 
if not what that technology was, which the MPS did not want made public. The MPS could 
argue that this confusion, and the witnessǯs potential embarrassment, could have been 
avoided had the inquiry gone into closed session. 
The inquiry was full of contradictions.  It represented the first use of the Attorney Generalǯs power to suspend an inquest and set up an inquiry in its place, so that sensitive 
evidence could be heard behind closed doors.  In fact, very little evidence was heard in 
closed session.  It is possible that the sensitive evidence may have been successfully dealt 
with in other ways had there not been the option of going into closed session.  And it is 
impossible to say whether the exclusion of this evidence completely under PII, would have 
had any substantial bearing on the investigation or its outcome. 
Following progress with the effectiveness of inquests since the New Cross fire, Blair 
Peach and Hillsborough, the Azelle Rodney Inquiry set a very worrying precedent.  There 
was no jury, a wide potential to go into closed session, and the family of the deceased was 
significantly disadvantaged by the rules in terms of their ability to effectively question 
witnesses.  While progress has been made in recent years to make inquests less dependent 
on the personalities of coroners (particularly with the advent of the Chief Coroner), the use 
of inquiries risks taking things in the opposite direction.  The Azelle Rodney inquiry 
arguably illustrated how much the character of inquiries can depend upon the personalities 
of the chairman and the inquiry team.  Despite some of the issues highlighted above, it 
                                                 
172 Azelle Rodney )nquiry, ǮTranscript of Oral (earings of ͳͳ September ʹͲͳʹǯ ͳʹ͹-8 
<http://tinyurl.com/ztscm26> accessed 26 January 2016. 
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appears that in this case this was to the considerable advantage of open justice.  But there 
are few guarantees that future inquiries will always be as open. 
Finally, the inquiry report and recommendations were much more effective in publicly 
and meaningfully detailing the various conclusions reached by the chairman than an 
inquest verdict could be.  Even with the potential for narrative verdicts and PFD Reports in 
inquests, this is a real benefit of inquiries as far as openness is concerned. 
The Inquiry Report concluded that Azelle had been unlawfully killed.  The CPS revisited 
its decision not to prosecute E7 and decided that there was now sufficient evidence to 
charge him with murder.  His anonymity was removed and he has been named as Anthony 
Long.  He was acquitted by a jury on 3 July 2015. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have described the practice of openness in England and Wales in the 
aftermath of a death at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody.  The first part 
of this practice consists of the procedural manifestation of openness: when the main types 
of investigations will take place; what the scope of those investigations will be; and the 
manner and extent to which they are open to the public.  The second part of the practice 
consists of the rationales that have been, and are given for opening up the circumstances of 
these deaths to scrutiny.   
This account was preceded by an analysis of the procedural obligation under Article 2 
ECHR in Chapter 2.  As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 5, this obligation has significantly 
influenced modern domestic practice.  It was appropriate to consider ECtHR jurisprudence 
separately, because despite its influence, the domestic requirements and the international 
obligation do not cover exactly the same parameters, pursue exactly the same purposes, or 
have exactly the same priorities.  Of course domestic practice has had to meet the 
requirements laid down by ECtHR jurisprudence, but there is arguably more to domestic 
practice than this. 
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The two aspects of practice described—the procedural manifestation of openness and 
the rationales behind it—form two components of a context-specific conception of open 
justice in the aftermath of deaths at the hands of the police or in police or prison custody. 
Part 2 of the thesis examines the possible non-retributive, non-compensatory justice needs 
that might arise in the aftermath of deaths at the hands of the police or in police or prison 
custody.  Part 3 returns to summarise the main tenets of the practice described in this Part, 
and use this to suggest a basic procedural principle that might form the core of a context-
specific conception of open justice.  Using the theory developed in Part 2, Part 3 suggests a 
normative theory as to the link between openness and justice in these circumstances—the 
fourth and final element of this context-specific conception of open justice. 
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Harm in the Aftermath of Deaths at the Hands of the 
State 
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by taking something akin to a negative morality approach in order 
to arrive at any normative justice ends that should underpin the inquisitorial processes 
that are the focus of the thesis.  It begins with a brief description of the nature of negative 
morality and why it may provide a useful tool in the current context.  It then identifies the 
predictable harms that may arise in the aftermath of deaths at the hands of the state, and 
inadequate institutional responses to such deaths.  The chapter concludes by identifying 
areas of justice theory which appear to be particularly concerned with the justice that 
resides in procedures and action that tend to counter these and analogous types of harm.  
These are then explored in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
6.2 Justice 
6.2.1 Justice in inquests and related processes 
We might presume that because inquests take place in a court, they must be concerned 
with justice.  But is this really the case?  Most people associate criminal courts with 
retributive or punitive justice, and if someone is convicted of a criminal offence they 
normally receive some form of punishment.1  In contrast, our civil courts are generally 
associated with compensatory justice.2  But what sort of justice, if any, are our coronersǯ 
courts concerned with when conducting inquests into use-of-force deaths at the hands of 
the state?  We have seen that their rules of procedure specifically exclude the possibility of 
attributing individual criminal or civil liability.3 )f coronersǯ inquests are concerned with a particular type or types of justice, does this 
mean that so too are processes that pursue similar aims through quasi-judicial or non-
                                                 
1 Of course, criminal justice outcomes are often more complex than this, and restorative justice, 
compensatory justice and efforts at rehabilitation have important roles in criminal justice systems. 
2 Again, it is recognised that this is a significant generalisation.  Claimants may seek punitive/exemplary 
damages (only rarely available in England and Wales – see Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL); and, 
Thompson & Hsu v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 498 (CA)).  Or they may want to, e.g., 
enforce a right, seek an injunction, or obtain declaratory judgment. 
3 Coronersǯ Society of England and Wales ǮMemorandum to Joint Committee on (uman Rightsǯ in Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, Deaths in Custody: Third Report of Session 2004-05, Vol. 2: Oral and Written 
Evidence (The Stationery Office 2004) 137. 
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judicial means?4  The task of reframing a context-specific conception of open justice 
requires an interpretive or normative understanding of the actual or potential justice aims 
that reside within these processes, and the role of openness and participatory rights in 
furthering those aims. 
 
6.2.2 Rectificatory versus primary justice 
It is first necessary to address the general question of what is meant by justice here?  A 
basic distinction is often made between distributive justice and rectificatory justice.  
Following Aristotle, distributive justice is generally regarded as being concerned with the 
just distribution of goods (including intangible goods such as honours) according to Ǯmeritǯ.   )n Platoǯs Republic, for example, Socrates and Polemarchus discuss Simonidesǯ saying that justice is ǲgiving to each what is owed.ǳ5  Different cultures, societies and individuals will 
have different ideas about what constitutes merit and how to reward it.6  In what follows, 
the term Ǯprimary justiceǯ is preferred over Ǯdistributive justiceǯ, because the term 
distributive justice is often associated specifically with the just distribution of economic 
goods, and the meaning intended below is broader than this. 
Rectificatory justice, in contrast, is effectively a sub-concern of primary justice.  It is 
concerned with remedying what are considered wrongs, by asking: What amounts to giving 
to X and Y that which is owed, when X has been the victim of a wrong committed by Y?  The 
way in which most societies based on the rule of law generally attempt to achieve 
rectificatory justice, is by having judicial or quasi-judicial processes that attempt to 
establish whether an alleged wrong in fact occurred, and (if so) to provide an appropriate 
remedy. 
The investigations analysed in this study are not in theory concerned with retributive, 
punitive or compensatory justice.  While taking this at face value, and making it our starting 
                                                 
4 This is really no great leap, as the non-judicial disposal of certain minor crimes—through on the spot 
fines or criminal cautions—is obviously concerned with criminal justice. 
5 Ryan K Balot, Greek Political Thought (John Wiley & Sons 2008) 24. 
6 As well as what values should be attributed to different goods. 
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point, it must first be acknowledged that the practical and psychological realities are more 
complicated than this. 
The preliminary investigations examined in Chapter 3 all have, as part of their explicit 
purposes, the identification of potential wrongdoing that might merit criminal proceedings 
(police and IPCC investigations), and/or disciplinary proceedings (IPCC and PPO 
investigations).  The rules and procedures governing inquests and inquiries attempt to 
disassociate them from criminal and civil justice.  Safeguards can also be put in place on an 
ad hoc basis.7  Examples include the prohibition of verdicts that indicate individual criminal 
or civil liability in inquests and inquiries, or the Attorney General undertaking not to use 
evidence given by witnesses in inquiries against them in any future criminal proceedings.8  
However, inquests and inquiries can (albeit rarely) influence whether criminal proceedings 
are brought against anyone in relation to a death.9  The outcome of an inquest or inquiry 
can also affect a potential claimantǯs decision on whether to bring civil proceedings, and the 
evidence that comes to light during an inquest or inquiry may affect the outcome of civil 
proceedings.  The potential for criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings, may therefore 
significantly inform the motives and conduct of participants in inquests and inquiries.  
Family members may push for an unlawful killing verdict, hoping the CPS might revisit a 
decision not to prosecute.  Witnesses may be cagey or uncooperative for fear of 
incriminating themselves or colleagues in criminal or disciplinary proceedings.  And the 
fact that state actors and institutions are typically very well legally represented at inquests 
is at least partly motivated by the ramifications they can have for any civil proceedings.  
These issues are further complicated by the fact that the motivations of interested persons 
will invariably be mixed, and can change over time.10  Justice is a multifaceted concept that 
can be pursued on different levels with varying priorities.  Families may value the justice 
implications of an inquestǯs relatively wide scope and detail, and the opportunity to 
                                                 
7 Not only to safeguard due process for those accused of criminal or civil wrongs but also to try and 
encourage full and honest accounts from witnesses who may fear criminal or disciplinary action. 
8 See Kevin McGinty ȋAttorney GeneralȌ, ǮAttorney Generalǯs Undertaking as to the Use of Evidence to Witnesses to the Azelle Rodney )nquiryǯ, Ͷ April ʹͲͳͳ <http://bit.ly/ͳl͵tvMA> accessed ͵ June ʹͲͳͶ. 
9 e.g. the prosecution of PC Harwood after the Ian Tomlinson inquest verdict of unlawful killing; and the 
prosecution of Anthony Long for the murder of Azelle Rodney following the Azelle Rodney Inquiry. 
10 e.g. a relative may not originally be interested in wrongdoers being punished, but may change her mind 
if an inquest reveals malicious or racist behaviour. 
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confront and question witnesses personally or through their own lawyers.  But they may 
also want individuals prosecuted and punished for their part in a death. 
While the significance of these overlaps of purpose and motive should not be 
overstated, an attempt to identify any normative, non-punitive/retributive and non-
compensatory justice purposes within inquests and inquiries, needs to acknowledge this 
reality.  Finally, it is also not the purpose of this Part to dictate what families, communities 
and the public should feel as a result of a death, or as a result of any injustice that accompanies the death or the stateǯs response to it.  Similarly, it is not the purpose to 
prescribe what types of justice different interest groups should prioritise. 
 
6.3  Negative morality 
6.3.1 Defining Ǯmoral harmǯ 
Before outlining negative morality, it is necessary to define how the term Ǯmoral harmǯ 
is applied below.  Crucially, it differs significantly to Ronald Dworkinǯs use of the term in A 
Matter of Principle.11   Dworkin posits that all empirically experienced harm is bare harm.  
This includes additional emotional or psychological harm stemming from a subjective 
perception that, for example, a physical injury was unjustly caused.12  Dworkin associates 
moral harm with the objective notion of what he calls ǲthe injustice factorǳ.13  Where one 
can point to an objective injustice (critically sustainable as such in light of a normative 
conception of justice), Ǯmoral harmǯ is a ǲmoral factǳ.14  The victimǯs perception or non-
perception of having suffered an injustice is immaterial to whether there is moral harm—
indeed they may not have suffered any actual harm at all as a result of the wrongful act. Dworkinǯs conception, therefore, detaches moral harm from the subjective experience 
of victims.  It is effectively a transcendental type of harm.  While this thesis is concerned 
with elucidating objectively sustainable normative justice values, it is argued below that 
                                                 
11 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (OUP 1986) 80–84. 
12 Whether or not such a perception is objectively justified. 
13 Dworkin (n 11) 80. 
14 ibid. 
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the subjective experience of injustice is a powerful initial indicator of what those normative 
justice values should be. 
The conception of moral harm used below relates to psychological harm that comes from a subjectǯs perception that she is the victim of an injustice.  It is a real harm that is 
experienced by the victim.  For example: people normally experience a deep sense of 
sorrow and psychological pain at the loss of a loved one.  While this may amount to harm, it 
does not amount to moral harm.  But where someone believes that a loved one has been 
wrongfully killed, they can suffer moral harm—the psychological impact caused by the 
wrongful (or unjust) elements of the circumstances as they are perceived.15  Frank 
Haldemann employs a similar notion for the term Ǯmoral injuryǯ and associates it with 
misrecognition: 
A physical injury, for instance, becomes a moral injury only if it is accompanied 
by forms of disrespect or humiliation that deny recognition.16 
A similar distinction between different types of harm was made by the Court of Appeal 
in Thompson and Hsu v Commission of Police of the Metropolis.17  The appeal concerned 
claims for compensation against the Metropolitan Police for assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.  Of interest is how the court distinguished 
between basic damages and aggravated damages in a way that reflects the above 
distinction between bare harm and moral harm. 
Both types of damages are compensatory.  They must be pleaded and are awarded as 
compensation for actual harm suffered.  In a case involving assault, battery, false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, basic damages are, in theory, not concerned with 
moral harm.  They are concerned with the physical and psychological impact or injury 
respectively resulting from: a threat of physical assault, actual physical assault, physical 
confinement, and the fear, stresses and inconveniences of being prosecuted.  They are not 
                                                 
15 People may experience a sense of injustice where they, for example, blame God or an unjust universe.  Nevertheless, it is felt that this example is a valid one to distinguish between Ǯbare-harmǯ and the harm that 
comes from being wronged by another person. 
16 Frank (aldemann, ǮAnother Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognitionǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ Ͷͳ Cornell )ntǯl 
LJ 675, 685. 
17 Thompson (n 2). 
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concerned with any additional harm deriving from a sense of injustice that the claimant has 
been deliberately and unjustly subjected to these bare harms by the defendant: i.e. the insult 
added to the injury. 
Aggravated damages, however, are concerned with compensating something akin to 
moral harm (as defined above).  Again, it is significant that they must be pleaded, and 
quantum will depend on the circumstances as experienced by the claimant.   They will only be awarded ǲwhere there are aggravating features about the case which would result in the 
plaintiff not receiving sufficient compensation for the injury suffered if the award were restricted to a basic awardǳ.18  Aggravating features can include ǲhumiliating circumstances 
at the time of arrest or any conduct of those responsible for the arrest or the prosecution 
which shows that they had behaved in a high handed, insulting, malicious or oppressive manner […]ǳ19 
 
6.3.2 What is a negative morality approach? 
Jonathan Allen characterises negative morality approaches as being interested in the 
normative significance of negative moral concepts and experiences (e.g. injury, 
humiliation), and drawing connections between these and the elucidation of normative 
moral and political values.20  He describes negative morality as a sensibility rather than a 
doctrine or free standing moral system or political theory,21 and identifies the work of 
Judith Shklar and Avishai Margalit as exemplifying negative morality approaches.22  While taking issue with some aspects of Axel (onnethǯs approach to moral and critical theory, 
Allen nevertheless praises him for the connections he draws between negative human 
experiences and positive ideals.23 
                                                 
18 Thompson (n 2) (emphasis added). 
19 ibid. 
20 Jonathan Allen, ǮThe Place of Negative Morality in Political Theoryǯ ȋʹͲͲͳȌ ʹͻ Pol Theory ͵͵͹, ͵͵ͻ–340. 
21 ibid, 342 and 349. 
22 ibid, 340-341. 
23 Allen (1998) (ch 1, n 25) ͶͶͻ.  (aldemann also draws a straight line between Judith Shklarǯs take on negative morality and the ǲLiberalism of Fearǳ, and (onnethǯs theory of recognition ȋ(aldemann ȋn ͳ͸Ȍ ͸ͺʹ–
3). 
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Allen acknowledges that positive moral theories, and theories of rights, do not 
necessarily ignore social evils and their negative consequences for individuals.  He points 
to Rawls and Voltaire as two examples of thinkers who elucidate positive moral ideals but who are very conscious of ǲthe prevalence and power of social evils.ǳ24  But while Allen 
concedes there is a tradition amongst moral and political theorists of reflecting on negative 
experiences—particularly as a rhetorical device to advocate for change—he argues they 
generally fail to draw integral connections between negative experiences and positive 
principles.25  By insisting on deriving and shaping positive ideals from their real life 
negative antitheses, Allen argues we avoid the trap of a priori ideological justifications for 
action.26 
A negative morality approach or sensibility is, therefore, primarily educative.27  As Allen maintains, ǲsustained normative reflectionǳ on negative experiences ensures that we ǲexamine explicitly the significance of experiences of domination, cruelty, suffering, and so forthǳ, and ǲrelate the sense of the significance of these experiences to the formation of political ideals.ǳ28 
It is true that we should not rely exclusively on victimsǯ claims of injustice to shape 
strategies.  These claims may lack objective validity.  First, an assessment of the facts as 
perceived by a subject may not objectively support a claim of injustice.  Second, where 
perceived or suspected facts are capable of sustaining a claim of injustice, events may not in 
fact have transpired as the subject perceives or suspects them to have transpired.  We also 
need to guard against the fact that the physical or vocal expression of moral harm, when 
compared to physical harm, is more susceptible to manipulation.  But Allen argues: 
Saying that political theorists need to take the perspective of victims into 
account does not amount to a call to accept their perspective at face value but is simply a reminder that victimsǯ claims that they are being subjected to evils 
                                                 
24 Allen (2001) (n 20) 338. 
25 ibid, 340. 
26 ibid, 359. 
27 ibid, 348. 
28 ibid, ͵ͶͲ. Allen argues that an ǲexamination of victimsǯ perceptions provides access to potentially challenging and transforming views of society and morality that we would not otherwise encounterǳ ȋibid, 
353). 
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must be given explicit attention.  This is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for the construction of an adequate normative theory of politics.29 
Judith Shklar makes a similar point: 
The voices of the [putative] victims must always be heard first, not only to find 
out whether officially recognised social expectations have been denied, but also 
to attend to their interpretations of the situation.  Are changes in the order of 
publicly accepted claims called for?30 
This last question is particularly important.  Shklar continues: 
If one regards the sense of injustice as Rousseau did, as innate and naturally 
accurate, then one must, at least initially, credit the voice of the victim […] The 
claim may be unfounded on the available evidence and might be rejected, but 
the putative victim must be heard.31 
An approach that attempts to deconstruct the causes of moral harm that contribute to 
what Honneth (borrowing from Barrington MooreȌ terms the ǲconsciousness of injusticeǳ, 
is a useful exercise.32  It not only ensures that negative experiences inform the character of 
positive ideals, but also that they continue to shape the particularisation and practical 
pursuit of those ideals.  Rather than simply taking it for granted that openness and 
participation are good things, this chapter explores the harms that might arise in their 
absence.  Only then can we make judgments about its most appropriate prioritisation and 
manifestation. 
 
6.4  Potential harms in the aftermath of a death 
This section sets out the potential causes of a subjective sense of injustice in the 
aftermath of a use-of-force death at the hands of the state.  According to Axel Honneth it is 
important to pay attention to the consciousness of injustice (whether or not it is 
                                                 
29 ibid, 348–349. 
30 Judith N Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (YUP 1990) 81. 
31 ibid, p.90. 
32 Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Wiley 2007) 84. 
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articulated) as it will always be at the heart of social conflicts.33  With any conception of 
justice, the normative can never be wholly separated from the psychological.  Indeed, it is 
generally a concern for the subjectively-experienced suffering of individuals and groups 
that inspires political and moral theorists to either shape theories of justice, or validate or 
criticise those of others.  Once a normative conception of justice has been elucidated that is 
one step removed from the intuitions that may have inspired it, the relative weight 
attributed to competing justice claims is never completely detached from subjective 
intuitions or experiences. 
There are limits to the scope of the current project.  A myriad of potential harms and 
injustices may also be experienced by state actors who may have caused, failed to prevent, 
or are otherwise associated with a death.  These potential injustices include all those that 
may befall any Ǯaccusedǯ: they may be wrongly accused; they may be unfairly attacked in 
the media or scapegoated; where they have committed wrongdoing, this may be 
exaggerated in the public narrative; an investigation into the death may be unjustifiably 
protracted; they may suffer other procedural injustices while fighting to give their side of 
the story; they may be in their position because of the incompetence of superiors or 
colleagues, or the reckless actions of others (including, potentially, the deceased).  Or a 
death may be the inevitable result of deeper societal pathologies over which low-ranking 
state actors have little or no control.34 
All of these potential harms and injustices deserve attention—not least because they 
often receive even less than the cursory acknowledgment that they have been given here.  
However, issues of length and scope mean that the current project, while alert to these 
issues, focuses on those moral harms experienced by individuals or groups falling on the 
other side of the state/public divide. 
In what follows, I make a chronological (rather than hierarchical) distinction between 
what I term Ǯfirst-order harmsǯ and Ǯsecond-order harmsǯ.  By first-order harms I wish to 
describe those harms which are rooted in a death itself and, in terms of first-order moral 
                                                 
33 ibid. 
34 e.g. a practice of imprisoning the vulnerable in overcrowded and understaffed prisons. 
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harms, the sense of injustice which can arise out of any suspicion that it was wrongfully 
caused.35  By second-order harms, I wish to describe those harms which may be associated 
with the way in which the state and others respond to a death. 
It is impossible to describe the precise cognitive ingredients of a sense of injustice that 
arises out of particular circumstances, and that is not what is attempted here.  One 
potential cause of a sense of injustice will also invariably influence, reinforce and merge 
with others.  The following is merely an outline of what might predictably cause, or 
contribute to a sense of injustice for variously affected non-state actors in the aftermath of 
a use-of-force death at the hands of the state. 
 
6.4.1 First-order harms 
6.4.1.1 Family associated first-order bare harms 
The first-order bare harms that predictably arise out of a death at the hands of the state 
are straightforward.  First, there is the bare harm that has been inflicted on the primary 
victim which is the death itself, as well as any physical or psychological harm that she may 
have suffered immediately prior to her death.  The victim may also experience moral harm 
or a sense of injustice at being subjected to the action or circumstances that, in the end, 
contribute to or cause the death.  Then there are the associated bare harms suffered by 
those close to the deceased.  They may, for example, experience psychological harm from 
the shock of finding out about or witnessing the death itself.  The death may also have 
deprived them of the deceasedǯs love, friendship, companionship, knowledge, guidance, 
emotional, physical and/or economic support.  These losses may cause long-term, and 
potentially significant, psychological harms—particularly if the deceased was what 
psychologists call a Ǯsignificant otherǯ: i.e. an influential figure in the psychological 
development of the person who survives them.36 
 
                                                 
35 While our main concern is second-order harms, it is important to recognise the first-order harms that 
can be associated with a death, as second-order harms often result from a failure by the state to address first-
order harms. 
36 Honneth, (1996) (ch 1, n 23) 96. 
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6.4.1.2 First-order moral harms 
With regard to first-order moral harms, a sense of injustice will typically involve a 
suspicion that a death was wrongfully caused or that insufficient steps were taken to 
prevent it.  First, this may occasion a sense of injustice felt on behalf of the deceased.  It is 
natural to witness someone suffering a perceived injustice and feel a potentially strong 
sense of injustice on the victimǯs behalf.  The degree of moral harm experienced will 
invariably be stronger the closer an individual was to the deceased in life.  Where an 
individual was close to the deceased, this will often combine with a sense of injustice at 
being unjustly deprived of a loved one (a provider of emotional and, potentially, economic 
support etc.).  Those particularly close to the deceased (usually family members) are 
sometimes referred to as Ǯsecondary victimsǯ.37  The special position of these individuals is 
often formally recognised in some way by the civil law.38 
The sense of injustice felt on behalf of the deceased will normally focus on the death 
itself.  However, it may be aggravated by various known or suspected circumstances 
surrounding the death: for example, that the action or inaction that caused or contributed to the death was negatively influenced by the victimǯs ethnicity or other particularly 
condemnable behaviour on the part of state actors.  The sense of injustice may be stronger 
where the deceased is perceived as having been particularly innocent or vulnerable: e.g. a 
child, or someone with learning difficulties or mental health problems. 
Whether an individual was close to the deceased or not, the degree of moral harm 
experienced may depend on how much they normally identify with those state actors 
implicated in a death.  Those not close to the deceased personally may also be affected 
more or less, depending on how closely they identify with the deceased.  The influence of a 
subjectǯs personal traits and characteristics may not be easily predictable.  Someone who 
instinctively trusts the police, and is sympathetic to the difficulties of their work, may be 
more forgiving of wrongful behaviour on their part, or may feel a deeper sense of injustice 
                                                 
37 James M Jaranson and Michael K Popkin, Caring for Victims of Torture (American Psychiatric Pub 1998) 
p.xxxii. 
38 e.g. Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s 1; and Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, s 1. 
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if they believe their and othersǯ trust has been betrayed by such behaviour.39  The different 
ways in which a death is perceived to have been wrongfully caused may also be significant: 
i.e. whether it was deliberate, accidental or the result of broader societal failures. 
The two final potential first-order harms (one bare the other moral), are closely linked.  
A type of bare harm may be felt by individuals or groups who identify with the deceased, 
where the cause of death is such that it negatively affects their sense of security within 
their intersubjective relationships with what they identify as ǲthe stateǳ and/or particular 
categories of state actors.  A death may make them feel that they, as members of the same 
group, are also at risk, or are even being specifically targeted.  A group may identify with 
the deceased on the basis of class, race, lifestyle, sex, politics, citizenship or non-citizenship 
or simply because, like the deceased, they are not part of the coercively empowered 
institution deemed responsible for the death.  The associated moral harm is the sense of 
injustice that accompanies such a perception of being targeted, discriminated against or 
otherwise misrecognised as a group by the state.  Again, the intensity of the personal sense of injustice at oneǯs group being targeted or misrecognised in some way, will likely 
diminish as the size of the group increases and the individual concerned becomes further 
removed from the deceased. 
 
6.4.1.3 Conclusions on first-order harms 
These first-order harms are intuitively familiar.  For example, it is common to 
experience a sense of injustice when hearing in the news about any death that was apparently at someone elseǯs hands.  We may also naturally empathise with the sense of 
injustice suffered by those closer to the deceased even if we have personal doubts about 
the narrative surrounding the death to which they may subscribe. 
We typically think of these first-order harms as demanding rectificatory justice (at least 
when they have in fact been caused by wrongdoing), and therefore falling to be dealt with 
                                                 
39 See, for example, the personal struggle of white settler Aubrey Aggett, the father of Peter Aggett, an 
anti-apartheid activist who died in detention in South Africa in 1982, in Beverley Naidoo, Death of an Idealist ȋCentral Books ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ ʹͻ͹: Naidoo describes the shift in Aubreyǯs attitude towards the State as ǲseismicǳ, 
following the death of his son. 
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by criminal and/or civil justice systems.  The focus of this thesis does not include punitive, 
retributive or compensatory justice forms, but it is important to acknowledge that, putting 
aside the potential for inquests and inquiries to influence future criminal or civil 
proceedings,40 they may themselves give some small measure of quasi-punitive satisfaction 
for any wrongs which contributed to a death.  This may be through the appreciable 
discomfort a perceived wrong-doer may go through when publicly accounting for her 
actions, or the public condemnation of state actors or institutions that a negative inquest 
verdict or inquiry report can bring.41  Regarding truth commissions in transitional 
scenarios, Popkin and Roht-Arriaza acknowledge the reality that: 
While public identification is neither a criminal sanction nor a civil one, it can 
have negative effects on the reputation, career and political prospects of 
individuals.42 
 Nevertheless, even at their strongest, these potential side-effects may be little  
consolation for those who believe that the circumstances of a death demand serious 
criminal sanction. 
 
6.4.2 Second-order harms 
Second-order moral harms relate to those harms caused in the aftermath of a death at the hands of state, rather than by the death itself.  )t may not just be Ǯthe stateǯ or state 
actors who contribute to this type of moral harm.  Other intermediaries, particularly the 
media, can play a significant role in creating such harms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 e.g., the prosecution of PC Simon Harwood over the death of Ian Tomlinson, and the prosecution of 
Anthony Long over the death of Azelle Rodney. 
41 See also, Allenǯs reference to the similar punitive affect of perpetratorsǯ being required to appear before truth commissions ȋJonathan Allen, ǮBalancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the )dea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commissionǯ ȋͳͻͻͻȌ Ͷͻ UTLJ ͵ͳͷ, ͵ʹͺȌ. 
42 Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ǮTruth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin Americaǯ ȋͳͻͻͷȌ ʹͲ L & Soc )nquiry ͹ͻ, ͳͲͷ. 
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6.4.2.1 Injustice surrounding perceived failures of the criminal and/or civil justice systems 
The first potential second-order moral harm that can arise in these circumstances is a 
sense of injustice where the state fails to provide criminal or civil remedies for the first-
order harms described above, and/or is perceived to have provided an inadequate 
explanation as to why no-one has been prosecuted or why a civil action has failed.43  This 
sense of injustice will, again, likely be felt most strongly by those who were personally close 
to the deceased.  But, any community that identifies with the deceased, or even the wider 
public, may feel a sense of injustice where a death was caused by apparent wrongdoing that 
will go unpunished.44 
 
6.4.2.2 Moral harms related to the narrative surrounding a death 
The second category of second-order moral harms relate to the narratives that may 
surround a death, and how they are compiled and communicated.  First, there may be a 
sense of injustice at a perceived lack of a reliable explanation as to how and why someone 
died.  Again, this will usually be most strongly felt by those close to the deceased in life, but 
may also be felt by any community that identifies with the deceased and concerned 
members of the wider general public.  While those close to the deceased may feel a very 
basic emotional need for answers about how and why their loved one died, the demand for 
an explanation may also have a quasi-political element.  It may be motivated by a 
normative intuition about intersubjective relationships between the state and its citizens.  
While the sense of injustice may be articulated, the normative intuition may not be, and 
certainly need not be derived from a knowledge or understanding of formally held legal 
rights. 
The perceived reason for a lack of an explanation may be significant.  In practice, it may 
be due to a refusal by state actors to provide answers within their knowledge; or because 
the state actors tasked with providing an explanation are unable to do so—temporarily or 
permanently—because of their own lack of knowledge.  The release of information may 
                                                 
43 See Jordan (ch 1, n 10), discussed at 2.8.3.3 above. 
44 See 6.4.2.3 below. 
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also be delayed where it is thought inappropriate to release it, for example before the full 
investigation has concluded.45 
The associated sense of injustice may contribute to a wider sense of injustice at the 
manner in which relevant state institutions and actors engage with the family, community 
and wider public following a death.  There may be good faith reasons why a particular state 
body cannot provide immediate answers about how and why someone died.  But there may 
also be a legitimate expectation on the part of the family, community and public that the 
state will explain the reasons for this and give them general information about how matters 
will proceed.46 
A related sense of injustice may derive from the perceived inadequacy of an official 
investigation into death.  Again, the perceived reason for this will be significant in the same 
way as the perceived reasons for the failure to explain a death at all.  It may be interpreted 
as a sign that 1) the state does not consider the issue important enough to warrant proper 
investigation; or 2) the death is being covered up, and with it any associated wrong-doing. 
The manner in which an investigation is deemed inadequate is also significant.   The 
investigator or investigators may be perceived to be biased.  It may be deemed to be 
lacking in scope.  It may be perceived as rushed or sloppy.  There may be an unjustifiable 
delay in the investigation starting or in it reaching its conclusions.  The investigation may 
not be open to scrutiny from the family or the public, or may fail to adequately address the 
issues and questions that most concern interested persons. 
A perceived lack of openness to the scrutiny and/or participation of variously 
interested individuals or groups can be a cause of a sense of injustice whether or not in all 
other material respects the investigation is perceived as adequate and its conclusions 
trustworthy.  Insufficient openness during the conduct of an investigation may lead to 
                                                 
45 Shiv Malik, and Sandra Laville, ǮMark Duggan Death: )PCC Says (ands Are Tied over Release of 
Evidenceǯ The Guardian (29 March 2012) <http://tinyurl.com/l3w9k5x> accessed 1 June 2014. The problem 
with this—as exemplified in the aftermath of the death of Jean Charles de Menezes is that information may be 
manipulated through unofficial leaks to the media ȋAlan Cowell, ǮLondon )nquiry Refutes Police in Their Killing of a Suspectǯ The New York Times (17 August 2005) <http://tinyurl.com/jmuzahh> accessed 12 
January 2016). 
46 For an example of an expression of the sense of injustice that might be caused where such engagement 
was held to be inadequate (once again purely illustrative), see 6.4.2.3 below. 
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distrust in its conclusions; but these two sources of a sense of injustice are different.  
Individuals or groups can be actively or passively engaged in the investigatory process in 
different ways and on different levels (as was observed in Part 1).  What is appropriate will 
depend on the circumstances, including the value placed in the justice ends associated with 
openness or participatory rights, and the degree to which competing public interests might 
be prejudiced by openness. 
Finally, the family of the deceased may feel a sense of injustice if they are denied an 
opportunity to place on public record their experiences of the deceased in life, and the 
personal impact of the death and its aftermath.  This is particularly likely, if there are 
prevailing narratives that are critical of the deceased. 
Where the perceived failures described above occur, they are rarely the extent of the 
potential causes of moral harm in the aftermath of a death.  In the absence of a reliable and 
tested narrative, false or unreliable narratives can fill the vacuum or gain prominence.  
These may have as their sources untested claims by state actors which reach the media 
through official briefings or unofficial leaks.47  )n ǮDemystifying Deaths in Police Custodyǯ, 
Simon Pemberton discusses how these accounts are often ǲfaithfully replicated in the media.ǳ48  And more empirical studies in the United States (US) show that: […] newspaper accounts of deadly force [by police] typically lend primacy and 
authority to official versions of events neatly circumscribed by laws governing 
deadly force. This is not due merely to the relative infrequency and 
inaccessibility of contravening unofficial accounts. When counter-claims appear in Ǯcrime incidentǯ articles, they are generally subjectified or otherwise 
devalued. The reliance upon official sources translates into a majority of news 
accounts that rationalize and normalize police violence by associating it with 
the performance of a legitimate institutional role.49 
                                                 
47 Simon (attenstone, ǮWe Cannot Take Them at Their Wordǯ The Guardian (18 August 2005) 
<http://tinyurl.com/nogwx2w> accessed 28 January 2016. 
48 Simon Pemberton, ǮDemystifying Deaths in Police Custody: Challenging State Talkǯ ȋʹͲͲͺȌ ͳ͹ S & LS 
237, 247. 
49 Paul J (irschfield and Daniella Simon, ǮLegitimating Police Violence: Newspaper Narratives of Deadly Forceǯ ȋʹͲͳͲȌ ͳͶ Theo Crim ͳͷͷ, ͳ͹ͷ; See also Regina G Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and the 
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Some media narratives do, of course, draw from non-state sources such as the families 
of the deceased, public eye-witnesses, family support groups, community groups and, 
occasionally, whistle-blowers, to challenge state versions of events.  But while there may be 
a plurality of public narratives addressing instances of state violence, the most prevalent 
and widely circulated tend to be over-reliant on official and unofficial state sources.50 In the 
US, Hirschfield and Simon have found that ǲnews coverage can, however unintentionally, 
legitimize instances of deadly force […] through the cultivation of shared valuations of objects, phenomena, actions, and actors in everyday life.ǳ51  In particular, they describe an 
apparent bias in news articles that tend to automatically ǲconstruct deadly force victims as physical or social threats and frame police actions as a normal and reasonable response.ǳ52  
These narratives may focus on the circumstances surrounding the death, descriptions of 
the character of the deceased, and/or the character of any group or community to which 
the deceased is perceived to belong.53 
This is not to say that one-sided and misleading narratives do not appear in the media 
when there is a tested official narrative from which the media can draw.  Tested and 
reliable narratives can also be selectively presented to give a distorted impression of the 
evidence and their conclusions.  But in the absence of such narratives, other narratives can 
gain particular prominence and are more likely to be accepted.54  These can cause a very 
real sense of injustice, particularly if it later turns out that state actors knew, or could have 
found out through diligent inquiry, that they were inaccurate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Construction of Police Brutality ȋUniversity of California Press ʹͲͲͲȌ, Chapter ͵ ǮNormalizing Coercion: Competing Claims about Police Use of Forceǯ, ͵͵-62. 
50 Pemberton (n 48); Scraton and Chadwick (ch 4, n 156); Hirschfield and Simon (n 49) 160; Stanley Cohen, Ǯ(uman Rights and Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denialǯ ȋͳͻͻ͵Ȍ ʹ͸ ANZJ Crim ͻ͹; Lawrence ȋn 
49). 
51 Hirschfield and Simon (n 49) 159. 
52 ibid, 160. 
53 Pemberton (n 48) 147–253; Scraton and Chadwick (ch 4, n 156); Cohen (1993) (n 50); Lawrence (n 
49). 
54 See Pemberton (n 48). 
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6.4.2.3 Some illustrative examples of the expression of these types of moral harm 
In summary, then, the failure to fulfil normative expectations regarding how the state 
responds to a death and engages with interested persons may lead to a sense of injustice 
for families and concerned members of the public.  As indicated above and in the section on 
methodology in Chapter 1, it is accepted that a significant amount of caution is necessary 
with the description given above, and the following examples are purely for illustrative 
purposes.  
In the following example, the speaker, Stafford Scott, a community activist, expresses his and othersǯ sense of anger at the police failing to engage with the family and the community in the aftermath of Mark Dugganǯs death at the hands of the police, and the 
belief that, had this happened, the unrest that followed may have been avoided: 
If a senior police officer had come to speak to us, we would have left [Tottenham Police Station, where some protestors gathered …] We were there until ͻpm. 
Police were absolutely culpable. Had they been more responsive when we 
arrived at the police station, asking for a senior officer to talk with the family, 
we would have left the vicinity before the unrest started.   
It is unforgivable police refused dialogue. We know the history here – how can 
Tottenham have a guy killed by police on Thursday, and resist requests for 
dialogue from the community 48 hours later?55 
Recent inquiries and inquests into historical contentious deaths have given rare public 
platforms to some victims of second-order moral harms.  Following publication of the (illsborough )ndependent Panelǯs report in September ʹͲͳʹ, David Cameron recognised 
the second-order moral harms suffered by the families of those who died in the disaster, in 
an address to Parliament: 
Mr Speaker, with the weight of the new evidence in this report, it is right for me 
today as Prime Minister to make a proper apology to the families of the 96 for 
all they have suffered over the past 23 years.  Indeed, the new evidence that we 
                                                 
55 Sandra Laville, Paul Lewis, Vikram Dodd and Caroline Davis, ǮDoubts Emerge over Duggan Shooting as London Burnsǯ The Guardian (8 August 2011) <http://tinyurl.com/m7au36c> (accessed 1 June 2014). 
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are presented with today makes clear that these families have suffered a double 
injustice. The injustice of the appalling events – the failure of the state to protect 
their loved ones and the indefensible wait to get to the truth. And the injustice of 
the denigration of the deceased – that they were somehow at fault for their own 
deaths.56 While describing a ǲdouble injusticeǳ, Mr Cameron alludes to three causes of this 
injustice.  First, he describes the cause of the first-order harms suffered at Hillsborough: the Ǯfailure to protectǯ.  He then refers to two sources of second-order moral harms: the false 
narratives that were widely circulated after the disaster; and the unacceptable wait families 
had to endure to find out the real truth about how and why their loved ones died.57 
Becky Shah, who lost her mother, Inger, in the disaster, said after the publication of the 
report: 
I have mixed feelings. I am really relieved that Liverpool fans, survivors and the 
dead have been exonerated, and the City of Liverpool too, which I feel is 
important and I am not from here. But I was a young woman of 17 who lost her 
only parent at Hillsborough and the fact it has taken more than half of my life to 
get to this point is absolutely outrageous in a democratic society.58 
A common theme in the comments of interested persons following long-delayed public 
investigations into contentious deaths, is a sense of vindication—often following years of 
official denials and the perpetuation of unreliable official and unofficial narratives 
surrounding deaths. 
When the conclusions of the original internal police investigation into the death of Blair Peach were published in ʹͲͳͲ ȋ͵ͳ years after Blair Peachǯs deathȌ, his partner, Celia Stubbs wrote an article for the Guardian headlined ǮFor Blair Peach, a little justiceǯ: 
I always knew the police killed my partner Blair Peach.  Now all can see the 
scale of the lies told. […] We have been vindicated.  The report states what we 
                                                 
56 HC Deb 12 September 2012, cols 285-286. 
57 The re-opened inquests are ongoing at the time of writing. 
58 Owen Gibson and David Conn, Ǯ(illsborough: The Truth about the Causes of the Disasterǯ The Guardian 
(12 September 2012) <http://tinyurl.com/nqglhkt> accessed 1 June 2014 (emphasis added). 
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always believed—the fatal blow was struck by a police officer […] But, equally 
disturbing, in reading the report the deliberate untruths told by officers and 
their success in obstructing the police inquiry have been laid bare.  The deceit 
and lies these officers told is a major factor as to why no policeman was prosecuted for Blairǯs death. […] Blair, we have fought for justice for you for 31 
years, and I hope that we have, even if only partly, got it.59 
The reactions of relatives to the Saville Report into Bloody Sunday also illustrates the 
sense of vindication and a level of justice that can derive from reliable public narratives.  
Tony Doherty, whose father was killed by British paratroopers said: 
The great lie has been laid bare. The truth has been brought home at last. 
It can now be proclaimed to the world that the dead and the wounded of Bloody 
Sunday, civil rights marchers, one and all, were innocent, one and all, gunned 
down on their own streets by soldiers who had been given to believe that they 
could kill with perfect impunity.60 
Kate Nash, whose 19-year-old brother William died, said: 
My brother William. We know he was innocent, we've always known. Now the 
world knows[ …] Thirty-eight years ago, a story went around the world, 
concocted by General Mike Jackson. 
He said there was gunmen and bombers on our streets, and they were shot and 
killed. Today, that lie has been uncovered.61 
John Kelly, whose 17-year-old brother Michael was killed, said: 
Everything else fades into insignificance compared to the fact that those gunned 
down on Bloody Sunday were ordinary, decent Derry people. That was the 
verdict we wanted. That is what matters.  We have overcome.62 
                                                 
59 Celia Stubbs, ǮFor Blair Peach, a Little Justiceǯ The Guardian (London, 1 May 2010) 
<http://tinyurl.com/pqynyht> accessed 1 June 2014. 
60 ǮReaction to Bloody Sunday Reportǯ BBC (15 June 2010) <http://tinyurl.com/qfn96bx> accessed 1 June 
2014 (emphasis added). 
61 ibid (emphasis added). 
62 ibid (emphasis added). 
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Referring to the original investigation into the massacre by Lord Widgery, which was widely seen as a whitewash, John ȋJackieȌ Duddyǯs brother, Gerry, said: 
Widgery destroyed our loved ones' good name.  Today we cleared them. I am delighted to say, 'Jackie was innocentǯ.63 
While the conclusions of the Saville Report were broadly welcomed, the inquiry 
continues to be dogged by criticism about its length and cost.  But the scale of the Saville 
Inquiry, is to a certain extent a measure of the second-order moral harms that, prior to the 
inquiry, had been heaped onto the families and members of the community, by mistruths, 
obfuscation, and unreliable investigations surrounding the events of Bloody Sunday.  
Barrister Ashley Underwood QC alluded to this point before the Commons Select 
Committee on the IA 2005: 
[T]here were so many factors [that influenced the length and cost of The Saville 
Inquiry].  The first was that it is the antidote to Widgery.  You have heard 
arguments about whether a bad inquiry is better than no inquiry […]  A counter 
blast to that is Widgery was regarded as a whitewash and in order to stem what 
flowed from the perception, rightly or wrongly, that it was a whitewash, you 
have to have a dramatically long, highly detailed, very expensive inquiry.  As 
Lord Morris said, one of the reasons for multiplicity of representation may have 
been the bitterness and divisiveness that attended that.64 
Adrienne Makenda Kambana responded to the unlawful killing verdict in the inquest 
into the death of her husband, Jimmy Mubenga who died whilst being forcibly deported: 
Kambana said the inquest verdict was a huge relief for her and her family. "I feel 
like Jimmy can rest in peace now – everything was behind closed doors before, 
but now it has come out," she said.65 
                                                 
63 ibid (emphasis added). 
64 Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005 (ch 5, n 138). 
65 Matthew Taylor and Lewis, Paul, ǮGͶS Faces Damages Claim over Killing of Deporteeǯ The Guardian 
(London, 10 July 2013). 
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And following an inquest juryǯs verdict that the unlawful use of force by staff at 
Hassockfield Secure Training Centre had contributed to 14-year-old, Adam Rickwood 
taking his own life, his mother, Carol Pounder, said: ) have waited over six years for truth and justice […] Nothing can bring Adam 
back. All I have ever wanted is to find out the truth about what happened to my 
son and for those responsible for unlawful assaults to be held to account.66 
 
6.4.3 Justice discourses which appear to address analogous harms 
The second-order moral harms described above, appear to have an affinity with the 
types of injustice that are the concern of discourses on procedural justice and theories of 
recognition.  Narratives surrounding use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state, and the 
manner in which they are created, cause harm when they are one-sided and deny 
interested parties a voice, or trivialise or downplay their concerns about the circumstances 
of a death.  In a judicial (or administrative decision-making) context, not taking seriously 
those with an interest in the subject matter under consideration, or denying them an 
appropriate opportunity to shape an outcome, is typically associated with failures in 
procedural justice.  And both the denial of a reliable narrative to those with a legitimate 
interest, and the denial of voice in the production of that narrative, also appear to fit into 
categories of misrecognition that are described in recognition theories. 
  
                                                 
66 Martin Wainwright, ǮUnlawful Restraint ǲContributed to Death of Boy in Custodyǳǯ The Guardian (27 
January 2011) <http://tinyurl.com/oydry5q> accessed 27 June 2015. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Justice as 
Recognition 
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7.1 Introduction 
It is necessary to consider whether the subjective senses of injustice that make up the 
moral harms described above are at least of a type that are capable of being objectively 
sustainable as injustices.  Chapter 6 concluded by observing that there appears to be an 
affinity between the harms that may result from inadequate institutional responses to use-
of-force deaths at the hands of the state, and those harms that preoccupy procedural justice 
theorists.  The first part of this chapter discusses the nature of procedural justice and its 
relationship to conceptions of legitimacy.  The second part briefly outlines recognition 
theory.  It is suggested that recognition theory may provide a normative framework that 
can sustain claims of injustice where there is a failure to meet normative expectations for 
open and effective investigations into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state.  The 
discussion of procedural justice, legitimacy and recognition theory therefore provides the theoretical grounds for Part ͵ǯs discussion on the link between openness and justice in 
these circumstances. 
 
7.2 Procedural justice 
In discussing the relevance of procedural justice theories to the current project, we are 
faced with the problem that these theories are generally shaped by very different contexts 
to those with which we are concerned.  In particular, discussion about the intrinsic justice 
value of certain procedures are influenced by the considerable practical consequences that 
the formal outcomes of civil and criminal justice proceedings (e.g. prison sentences, awards 
of compensation, injunctions etc.), or administrative decision-making processes (e.g. the 
granting or refusal of licences or planning permission, the award of legal aid etc.) can have 
for individuals.  Inquests and inquiries are very different in this regard.  The information 
uncovered, and the qualitative conclusions drawn, can have indirect practical 
consequences for those who participate in them.1  But these are not formally the concern of 
the processes themselves. 
                                                 
1 ǲ)ndirectǳ because the processes themselves do not determine what those consequences are (unlike 
civil and criminal justice processes).  A minor exception to this is the power of Coroners to produce so-called 
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Most of the literature on procedural justice can therefore only take us so far when 
considering the intrinsic versus instrumental justice value of procedures in processes not 
formally concerned with rectificatory justice or administrative decision-making.  This, 
combined with the limited scope of the thesis, means it is neither possible nor appropriate 
to provide an exhaustive analysis of the debate as it is framed in these very different 
contexts.  However, by describing some of the main features of the discussion, it is possible 
to make certain useful observations. 
 
7.2.1  The relationship between procedures and outcomes 
Writing about procedural rules, Dworkin observes that, ǲnothing is more productive of deep and philosophical puzzlesǳ than the question of what they should be.2  A simple distinction is made by Wojciech Saurski between substantive justice as ǲthe justice of outcomeǳ and procedural justice as ǲthe justice of procedure.ǳ3  Lawrence Solum gives a 
more nuanced definition of procedural justice, describing it as being ǲconcerned with the 
means by which social groups (including governments, private institutions, and families) 
institutionalise the application of requirements of corrective and distributive justice to particular cases.ǳ4 
Rawls distinguishes between three main conceptions of procedural justice.  The first is Ǯperfect procedural justiceǯ.5  This involves defining what a just outcome is, and then 
designing a process that is focused only on achieving that type of outcome.  Some would 
describe a just outcome to civil justice processes as being an accurate determination of the 
legal status of the parties.6  In a system of perfect procedural justice, then, every procedure 
would be directed towards correctly establishing the facts, and then correctly applying the 
law to those facts.  Within such a system, procedures are merely instrumental to helping 
                                                                                                                                                             
Schedule 5 Reports (previously known as Rule 43 Reports), which require the organisation with 
responsibility for the circumstances concerned to provide a response within 56 days. 
2 Dworkin (1986) (ch 6, n 11) 72. 
3 Wojciech Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory (Springer 1985) 49. 
4 Lawrence B Solum, ǮProcedural Justiceǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ ͹ͺ S Cal L Rev ͳͺͳ, ʹ͵ͺ. 
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Rev Ed, HUP 1999) 74. 
6 e.g. Dworkin (ch 6, n 11) 72–103 Although this so-called ǲoutcomeǳ is really only one step in judicial 
processes whose ultimate outcome is a corrective justice action: e.g. a prison term, or a payment of 
compensation. 
 196 
achieve a just outcome.  But the actual justness or otherwise of an outcome depends purely 
on whether it is in fact correct (according to pre-determined criteria), rather than on the 
way in which it was arrived at. 
The second of Rawlsǯs conceptions of procedural justice is Ǯimperfect procedural 
justiceǯ, as exemplified, according to Rawls, by typical criminal trials.7  Here procedures are ǲbest calculatedǳ to achieve a pre-defined just outcome, but at the same time take into 
account laws and justice aims which are external to that objective.8  Solum, for example, describes a ǲbalancing modelǳ for this type of system.9  The procedures followed are still 
concerned with achieving an accurate outcome based on an accurate application of the law 
to the facts, but the choice of procedures is also influenced by a concern to limit the cost of 
pursuing this primary objective.  These costs may be financial or deontological.  For 
example, Dworkin hypothesises that if having twenty-five rather than twelve jurors was 
slightly more likely to reach an accurate determination in a criminal trial, we may still 
decide it not worth the additional expense.10  As a deontological example: even if we 
suppose that torture can garner information that would be probative in a criminal trial, 
most people would consider this an unjustifiable cost in terms of a suspectǯs basic human 
rights.11 
Finally, Rawls defines Ǯpure procedural justiceǯ as a system that has ǲno independent criterion for the right resultǳ.12  )nstead ǲthere is a correct or fair procedure such that the 
outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided the procedure has been properly followed.ǳ13  Rawls uses the analogy of gambling to illustrate this conception.  If, 
for example, everyone enters into a game of poker voluntarily and on equal terms, a fair 
outcome is whatever the outcome happens to be as long as everyone plays by the rules.14 
                                                 
7 Rawls (1999) (n 5) 74. 
8 )n particular, procedures are ǲconsistent with the other ends of the lawǳȋibid, 75). 
9 Solum (n 4) 252–259. 
10 Dworkin (1986) (ch 6, n 11) 72–73. 
11 While Solumǯs particular ǲbalancing modelǳ envisages procedures that attempt to limit the potential 
moral or social costs associated with the blind pursuit of accurate outcomes, it does not admit the 
opportunity for procedures that embody other (non-outcome-related) positive justice aims. 
12 Rawls (1999) (n 5) 75. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
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These three conceptions raise different types of relationship that procedural rules may 
have with notions of justice.  First, procedures can simply be instrumental in helping to 
achieve pre-defined justice outcomes.  Second, procedures that blindly pursue a single, 
narrowly defined justice aim, may have effects which are, in fact, antithetical to broader 
societal justice aims.  And lastly, and relatedly, some procedures can have intrinsic value, unrelated to a processǯs formal outcome. 
 
7.2.2 Intrinsic versus instrumental values of procedures 
The last chapter suggested that moral harm may arise where normative expectations 
are not met in terms of how individuals and groups are treated and engaged with in the 
aftermath of a death at the hands of the state.  There is a question as to whether these 
harms are of a type that are in principle capable of being described as injustices.15  A 
similar question occupies many procedural justice theorists regarding whether procedures 
in judicial or administrative decision-making processes can have intrinsic justice value. 
Most agree that procedures can have value that goes beyond their role in pursuing, for 
example, an accurate outcome to a legal dispute.  T.R.S. Allan observes that even D.J. 
Galligan—for whom an instrumentalist approach to procedural justice is ǲrobustly practical and in tune with common senseǳ16—acknowledges that ǲany complete and convincing analysisǳ of procedural justice recognises ǲthe important part played by non-
outcome values—independent of the accuracy or soundness of the substantive decision or verdict.ǳ17  But Allan goes further than this, arguing that ǲthe whole design or character of a 
hearing may well reflect non-instrumental values of no less importance than those which underlie our concern for accuracy and reliability.ǳ18  But what is the normative basis for 
claims such as this? 
While Galligan and Dworkin agree that procedures can have intrinsic value, they 
express uneasiness at some of the claims of so-called Ǯdignitariansǯ.  Dworkin worries that 
                                                 
15 Or whether they are something else: e.g. discourtesies. 
16 TRS Allan, ǮProcedural Fairness and the Duty of Respectǯ ȋͳͻͻͺȌ ͳͺ OJLS Ͷͻ͹, Ͷͻͺ. 
17 ibid, 498. 
18 ibid, 499. 
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the further we move away from outcome-focused procedures the closer we get to ǲextravagant and […] nihilistic claims about the rights people have to procedures in court.ǳ19  Both Galligan and Dworkin intimate that the claim that procedures should reflect 
the inherent dignity of participants independently of a concern for accurate outcomes, 
lacks adequate normative explanation.20  For Dworkin, this is seen in the failure of Laurence Tribeǯs account to define, for example, ǲwhat moral harm, distinct from the risk of substantive injustice, lies in […] ex parte determinations of guilt that offer no role to the individual condemned.ǳ21  And Allan discusses Galliganǯs concern that ǲthe alleged link 
between respect for persons and fair procedures stands in need of explanation, which dignitarian theorists have hitherto failed to provide.ǳ22  In particular, for Galligan, the instrumentalist approach to procedural justice, ensures that ǲprocedures in the air, procedures good in themselves, and procedures edged with mystery are eliminated.ǳ23 
Alternatively, Tribe suggests that rights to interchange between citizens and officials in 
administrative decision-making processes ǲexpress the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done with one.ǳ24 
For when government acts in a way that singles out identifiable individuals—in 
a way that is likely to be premised on suppositions about specific persons—it 
activates the special concern about being personally talked to about the decision 
rather than simply being dealt with.25 
Mashaw also sees value in such a Kantian analysis, reflecting as it does a requirement 
that each person be respected as an end in herself: 
We do distinguish between losing and being treated unfairly.  And, however 
fuzzy our articulation of the process characteristics that yield a sense of 
unfairness, it is commonplace for us to describe process affronts as somehow 
                                                 
19 Dworkin (1986) (ch 6, n 11) 78. 
20 Denis James Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Clarendon 
Press 1996) 73. 
21 Dworkin (1986) (ch 6, n 11) 103. 
22 Allan (1998) (n 16) 498. 
23 Galligan (n 20) 77. Again, these concerns derive from contexts in which the practical impact of processesǯ outcomes can have a significant effect on the rights of parties. 
24 Laurence H Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1978) 503–504. 
25 ibid. 
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related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being taken seriously as 
persons.26 
Allan points to some of the negative ends pursued by judicial procedures as illustrative 
of a well-recognised need to ensure that people are treated with dignity: 
The dignitarian approach may serve to remind us that non-outcome values 
(such as privacy and confidentiality) should not be overlooked; the rules 
protecting a suspect from being tricked or cajoled into confessing, for example, 
are based on values which are quite independent of any concern with the 
accuracy of outcome.27 
Allan also notes the important positive procedural norm that parties be given reasons for administrative or judicial decisions, as forming ǲan integral part of treating a 
disappointed applicant with the respect which his dignity as a citizen demands.ǳ Giving reasons expresses respect just as a refusal or failure to do so […] 
expresses contempt.  As Lucas explains the point, a requirement to give reasons Ǯrecognises a partyǯs right to be disappointed by an adverse decision, and the 
need to assuage itǯ.28 
Despite the intuitive resonance of these arguments, both Mashaw and Solum hesitate to 
provide a normative grounding for what are often intuitive feelings about the dignitarian 
value of procedures.  Solum admits that the argument that justice depends on participatory rights in judicial processes ǲrests on uncertain and varying foundations.ǳ29  In particular, 
Solum, like Dworkin, is sceptical about dignitarian interpretations of procedural justice: 
[I]t is not clear that the value of dignity provides reasons that are sufficiently 
weighty to counter the other values that bear on procedural justice.  By itself, 
the value of dignity is closely related to the values that are served by proper 
                                                 
26 Jerry L Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (YUP 1985) 162–163. 
27 Allan (1998) (n 16) 498. 
28 ibid, 500. 
29 Solum (n 4) 260. 
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etiquette or good manners.  Indignity or disrespect are not the sort of grave 
injuries that trump other values tout court[…].30 
Mashaw is also hesitant in this respect: 
We all feel that process matters to us irrespective of result.  [But t]his intuition 
may be a delusion.  We may be so accustomed to rationalising demands for 
improvement in our personal prospects, in the purportedly neutral terms of 
process fairness, that we can no longer distinguish between outcome-oriented 
motives and process-oriented arguments.31 
 
7.2.3 Procedural justice and legitimacy 
Solum and Allan both suggest, in different ways, that the concept of legitimacy may be 
helpful in shaping a normative grounding for intrinsically just procedures within judicial 
and administrative decision-making processes.  Allan, like Solum, focuses his attention on 
the intrinsic value of participatory rights.  He side-lines the dubious Millsian claim that 
people are the best protectors of their own interests as an explanation for the value of such 
rights.  Instead he suggests a link between the moral Ǯqualityǯ of an outcome and the 
manner in which the debate that precedes it is conducted.  He thus highlights the concept of 
legitimacy as an outcome-Ǯqualityǯ which deeply concerns us: 
The quality of outcome of a legal or administrative procedure—and, in 
particular, its legitimacy—may be as much a reflection of preceding debate 
about the demands of justice, in the circumstances of the particular case, as of 
argument about the relevant facts.32 
He uses our preoccupation with bias in judicial proceedings as an example of the 
connection between procedural rules and legitimacy: 
Why[…] does the adversarial nature of the trial, with its conception of a contest 
between the parties, render any hint of bias especially odious?  Is it not because 
in such circumstances the legitimacy of the decision is dependent on faithful 
                                                 
30 ibid, 264. 
31 Mashaw (n 26) 162–163. 
32 Allan (1998) (n 16) 498. 
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adherence by all involved to acceptable standards of procedural rectitude, such 
that whatever is decided must be accepted as a just outcome[…]?33 
The accurate application of the substantive law to the facts can also be contextualised as 
just one determining factor when assessing the justness of intersubjective interactions 
within the judicial context.  Such interactions are invariably characterised by significant 
power imbalances amongst actors (between the parties themselves, and between parties 
and arbiters or decision-makers).  These imbalances are such that interactions between 
these actors cannot avoid having primary justice implications (positive or negative) beyond 
the main justice purpose for which a process was created.  This does not mean that 
procedures need not be concerned with achieving accurate outcomes.  Indeed the 
legitimacy of both the decision-making process and the decisions arrived at will be partly, 
or even mainly, dependent on whether procedures manifest a genuine attempt to reach 
accurate outcomes.  After all, a focus on accuracy of outcomes, rather than, for example, the 
social positions of the protagonists, recognises the parties as equal bearers of rights. 
 
7.2.3.1 What is legitimacy? According to Tom Tyler and Jason Sunshine, ǲlegitimacy is a property of an authority or 
institution that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyedǳ.  Tyler observes that studies: […] consistently suggest that the legitimacy of authorities and institutions is 
linked to the fairness of the procedures by which they exercise their authority.  
Hence, the pursuit of public support requires institutions and authorities to 
adhere to lay principles of procedural justice.34 
The research of Tyler, Sunshine and others strongly supports the conclusion that peopleǯs views of the police and the judiciary are determined less by traditionally 
conceived outcome-related criteria (judgment and cost, for example) and more by factors 
                                                 
33 ibid, ͷͲͷ. There is an affinity here with Rawlsǯs conception of pure procedural justice. 
34 Tom R Tyler, ǮPsychological Perspectives on Legitimacyǯ ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍ ͷ͹ A Rev Pysch ͵͹ͷ, ͵ͻʹ ȋemphasis 
added). 
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such as respect, fairness, non-discriminatory dealings and impartiality.35  Whether an 
outcome is considered legitimate, therefore, will depend on whether these qualities are 
perceived to be present in the relevant processes. 
There are therefore practical reasons why the perceived legitimacy of a process and its 
outcome are important.  As Tyler argues, ǲlegitimacy is a valuable attribute for any 
institution if it promotes acceptance of its decisions and the rules it promulgates, and 
stability and institutional effectiveness are virtues that benefit all members of society.ǳ36 
And the effect of legitimacy is that people ǲfeel obligated to defer to the decisions made by 
leaders with legitimacy and the policies and rules they create.ǳ37  He also references Beethamǯs argument that the ǲsubordinate […] relate to the powerful as moral agents as 
well as self-interested actors; they are cooperative and obedient on grounds of legitimacy as well as reasons of prudence and advantage.ǳ38 
Tyler and Sunshine argue that procedural justice—and fairness of dealings 
particularly—encourages groups to accept an institutionǯs authority as deriving from its 
representative function vis-à-vis that groupǯs moral values.39  Where police behaviour 
encourages people to view them as ǲprototypical representatives of the groupǯs moral valuesǳ they are motivated to cooperate with them.40  This in turn encourages institutions 
more generally to be responsive to citizensǯ interests, and can empower them.41 
But these benefits still describe the instrumental value of procedures.  They also rely on 
subjective legitimacy.  This is always vulnerable to manipulation, where it can become a merely ideological mechanism ǲfor creating subjects who behave in conformity with a given social system.ǳ42  This danger can be extrapolated from Max Weberǯs interpretive 
                                                 
35 Jason Sunshine and Tom Tyler, ǮMoral Solidarity, )dentification with the Community, and the 
Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Groupǯs Moral Valuesǯ 
(2003) 66 Soc Psych Q 153, 153. 
36 Tyler (2006) (n 34) 391. 
37 ibid, 393. 
38 ibid, 377, citing David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, (Macmillan 1991) 27. 
39 Sunshine and Tyler (2003a) (n 35).  See also the discussion of Rawls below at 7.2.3.2. 
40 ibid. 
41 Tyler (2006) (n 34) 392. 
42 Honneth (2007) (ch 1, n 24) 324. 
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account of political legitimacy and, in particular, two of what he describes as its three main 
sources: tradition and charisma.43 
There remains a question, then, of what it means to talk of normative legitimacy: a ǲcontent independent obligation of political morality to obey […] lawsǳ.44  Solum argues that ǲ[p]articipation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication processesǳ, 
and the absence of participatory rights at key stages renders judicial procedures ǲfundamentally illegitimate.ǳ45  But he still fails to provide a solid normative foundation for 
this claim.46 
As a starting point, the fact that the concept of legitimacy is so important to us, is itself 
significant.  It testifies to the fact that our acceptance of an outcome is influenced by 
content independent factors, and, in particular, intrinsic values that lie within certain 
procedures.  In other words, the instrumental value of procedures in, for example, 
promoting acceptance of unpopular outcomes, derives from their intrinsic value.  People 
accept outcomes they do not agree with, because they value the procedures engaged in the 
processes that produced those outcomes.  As Tyler and Sunshine point out: 
Since the classic writing of Weber, social scientists have recognised that 
legitimacy is a property that is not simply instrumental, but reflects a social 
value orientation toward authority and institutions i.e. a normative, moral, or 
ethical feeling of responsibility to defer.47 
Normative legitimacy must then reflect or embody some shared understanding of what 
is valuable and just within social processes. 
                                                 
43 But also potentially the third, trust in an authorityǯs legality, where that trust is blindly given ȋMax 
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7.2.3.2 Political legitimacy 
In arriving at a view of normative legitimacy in judicial processes, Allan argues that an 
analogy may be made to political processes where there is a clearer link between the 
intrinsic value of procedures and primary justice aims.48  With the decline of the notion of 
simple consent as a liberal explanation for the authority of democratic government, 
arguably more critically sustainable theories of political legitimacy have taken its place.49  
As before, these focus on the liberal political paradox of the government of supposedly universally free and equal citizens.  As Buchanan puts it ǲ[i]f we are all equal, what can justify some persons ȋthe governmentȌ making, applying, and enforcing rules on us?ǳ And secondly, ǲif liberty is our proper condition, how can the use of coercion, which government essentially involves, be justified?ǳ50  Most answers to these questions are 
concerned with notions of legitimacy. 
For Rawls, the key to a liberal idea of political legitimacy is derived from the fact that ǲ[i]f free and equal persons are to cooperate politically on a basis of mutual respect, we 
must justify our use of our corporate and coercive political power when […] essential matters are at stake, in the light of public reason.ǳ51  The notions of ǲpublic reasonǳ and the need for ǲa public basis of justificationǳ for the exercise of governmental power, underpin Rawlsǯs conception of political legitimacy.52 
One ground for introducing the idea of public reason is this: while political 
power is always coercive—backed by the governmentǯs monopoly of legal 
force—in a democratic regime it is also the power of the public, that is, the 
power of free and equal citizens as a corporate body.  But if each citizen has an 
equal share in political power, then, so far as possible, political power should be 
exercised, at least when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice 
are at stake, in ways that all citizens can publicly endorse in the light of their 
                                                 
48 Allan (1998) (n 16) 498. 
49 Allen Buchanan, ǮPolitical Legitimacy and Democracyǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͳͳʹ Ethics ͸ͺͻ, ͸ͺͻ. 
50 ibid, 698. 
51 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (HUP 2001) 91. 
52 ibid, 186. 
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own reason.  This is the principle of political legitimacy that justice as fairness is 
to satisfy.53 
For Rawls, the concept of public reason forms a crucial part of the broader political 
values derived from his conception of justice as fairness.  Public reason must be based on ǲshared guidelines for inquiry and shared methods of reasoning.ǳ54  It must appeal to all citizensǯ reason which in turn must be free and informed in conditions of freedom of speech 
and thought.55 […A]s a liberal political conception, justice as fairness is not reasonable in the 
first place unless it generates its own support in a suitable way by addressing each citizenǯs reason, as explained within its own framework.  Only so is it an 
account of political legitimacy as opposed to an account of how those who hold 
political power can satisfy themselves in light of their own convictions that they 
are acting properly.  A liberal conception of political legitimacy aims for a public 
basis of justification and appeals to free public reason, and hence to citizens 
viewed as reasonable and rational.56 
 If political morality dictates that government must reflect upon and appeal to all citizensǯ reason, this can only be achieved through intersubjective interaction where the 
statesǯ partners to that interaction ȋand reasoningȌ are fully informed.  )f we refocus justice 
as fairness (as a conception of justice that reflects the autonomy and equal dignity of 
human beings) to the judicial sphere, ǲaddressing citizensǯ reasonǳ should imply a 
particular concern for those citizens who have a special substantive interest in the subject 
matter of proceedings.  For these specially interested persons, decisions need to be publicly 
justified and explained.  Public justification can arguably only truly be achieved if two basic 
features are present in judicial processes.  First, and most obviously, a decision and the 
reasons for it need to be publicly explained—something which is a common feature of 
judicial processes, and which Allan argues exemplifies the fact that a purely instrumentalist 
                                                 
53 ibid, 90–91. 
54 ibid, 92. 
55 ibid, 91. 
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interpretation of procedural justice is inadequate.57  Second, the decision needs to be 
justified in such a way that actually speaks to the reason of those with a special substantive 
interest.  Otherwise, as argued by Rawls above, the justification is a private one—an account of how arbiters ǲsatisfy themselves in light of their own convictions that they are acting properlyǳ.  )f decision-makers are to properly speak to the reason of those with an 
interest in proceedings, they must give them an opportunity to express their own claims, 
suspicions and concerns. 
 
7.2.4 Conclusion 
The scepticism of Dworkin and Galligan about so-called dignitarian approaches to 
procedural justice is understandable considering how much the outcomes of criminal and 
civil justice processes can impact upon the rights of parties.  But, their dignitarian-sceptic 
arguments do not just express a belief that outcome-focused procedures should be 
prioritised over procedures with intrinsic justice value.  They often question whether the 
latter are concerned with justice at all. 
The discussion on legitimacy, and in particular Rawlsǯs take on the basic requirements 
of political legitimacy, suggest that primary justice values are given effect through fair 
procedures which mediate intersubjective interaction.  There is a tendency to treat 
rectificatory justice processes as if they are hermetically sealed from broader 
intersubjective social interactions.  But if we contextualise rectificatory justice processes 
within broader primary justice norms, we see that procedural rules naturally embody both 
rectificatory and primary justice purposes.  This is true even of procedures instrumental to 
archiving accurate outcomes.  An accurate assessment of the law and the facts in judicial 
processes is always important.  If we assume that our substantive laws are just, procedures 
that attempt to ensure that judicial processes arrive at accurate decisions are crucial for 
rectificatory justice.  And as such, they are an integral part of a system of primary justice 
that aims to treat people fairly.   
                                                 
57 Allan (1998) (n 16) 500. 
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The above has focused on the nature of procedures and the potential for them to have 
intrinsic and/or instrumental value.  The analogy between judicial procedures and a liberal 
understanding of the normative function of political processes goes some way towards 
showing that, at least in theory, procedures can embody primary justice values where they 
ensure meaningful intersubjective interaction through openness and participatory rights.  
But as well as there being an important analogy to be drawn here, Rawlsǯs conception of 
political legitimacy also points to the fact that state responses to use-of-force deaths at the 
hands of the state have a bearing on the legitimacy of the stateǯs monopoly on the use of 
force more generally, and the way in which it exercises that use of force socially.  The legitimacy of the stateǯs monopoly on the use of force, and the social exercise of that force 
must be derived from its public justification through public reason.  If this is to happen, the 
public must be properly informed about the realities of its social exercise, particularly 
where the results are fatal. 
 
7.3 Recognition theory 
Recognition theory may provide a framework for strengthening the claim that justice 
requires an open accounting for use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state. 
 
7.3.1  Introduction to recognition theory According to Axel (onneth ǲour notion of justice is […] linked very closely to how, and as what, subjects mutually recognize each other.ǳ58 Recognition theory—of which there are 
several different strands—can be complicated.  But at its heart is the simple premise that ǲanticipations of recognition, and the demands and struggles that may follow when recognition is refused, are an abiding feature of the social world.ǳ59  It is suggested below 
that one can treat all of the potential moral harms that may arise out of a death at the hands 
of the state, and the stateǯs response to a death, as instances of misrecognition. 
                                                 
58 Honneth (2007) (ch 6, n 32) 130. 
59 Smithǯs introduction to Shane OǯNeill and Nicholas Smith, ǮRecognition Theory as Social Research 
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Much of what follows relates specifically to the conception of ethical life which Axel 
Honneth outlines in The Struggle for Recognition.  (onneth draws upon (egelǯs early Jena 
writings, and the empirically-backed child and development psychology of Donald 
Winnicott and George Herbert Mead, to develop his theory that: The connection between the experience of recognition and oneǯs relation-to-self 
stems from the intersubjective structure of personal identity.  The only way in 
which individuals are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to 
themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as being 
with certain positive traits and abilities.  The scope of such traits—and hence 
the extent of oneǯs positive relation-to-self increases with each new form of 
recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as subjects.  In this 
way, the prospect of basic self-confidence is inherent in the experience of love; 
the prospect of self-respect, in the experience of legal recognition; and finally 
the prospect of self-esteem, in the experience of solidarity.60 
While aspects of recognition theory can be traced back to Rousseau, Fichte and 
(particularly) Hegel,61 their rediscovery in political and moral philosophy is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Over the past 25 years, recognition theory has been used increasingly 
in modern political and social discourse to frame theories of rights, authenticity, autonomy, 
difference, identity politics and social struggle.  Bert van den Brink observes that ǲ[t]he 
topic of recognition has come to occupy a central place in contemporary debates in social and political theoryǳ.62  And for Nancy Fraser: ǲThe demand for recognition is fast 
becoming the paradigmatic form of political conflict in the late twentieth century.ǳ63  While 
Honneth disputes some of the theoretical underpinnings relied upon by negative morality 
theorists, there appears to be a certain affinity between aspects of recognition theory and 
the negative morality approaches of Judith Shklar, Avishai Margalit.64  Much of the focus of recognition theory is directed at what Majit Yar describes as the complexity of ǲmanifold 
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social actions, interactions and processes that generate harms for individuals and groups.ǳ65  According to Yar,: 
Such harms span those located in the domain of the inter-personal, the sphere 
of institutionalised action, and also arise from the unintended consequences of 
macro-level processes.  Recent critical social science has devoted significant attention towards developing a Ǯsocial harmsǯ approach to understanding and explaining social problems […] The theory of recognition can ground a theory of 
social harms because it seeks to establish at a fundamental anthropological level 
the Ǯbasic needsǯ that comprise the conditions of human integrity and well-
being.66 (onneth himself points out that recognition theory ǲowes its entire critical impulse to its point of departure in social phenomena of lacking or insufficient recognition.ǳ67  For him, the moral task of recognition theory is ǲto draw attention to practices of humiliation 
or degradation that deprive subjects of a justified form of social recognition and thus of a decisive condition for the formation of their autonomy.ǳ68 
 
7.3.2 The core content of theories of recognition 
Axel Honneth acknowledges that some doubt the critical potential of recognition theory, 
and that there are disputes about the content of recognition as a phenomenon.69  But while 
the periphery of recognition theory may be made up of numerous ǲauxiliary hypothesesǳ, 
Nicholas Smith argues most recognisable theories of recognition have at their heart a core 
of fundamentally consistent defining elements.70  As such, ǲrecognition theoryǳ ǲprovides a 
proven framework for undertaking social research with the broad theoretical ambitions and practical orientation of the Frankfurt School.ǳ71 Smith provides a useful summary of 
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Smith (eds) (n 59) 109, 126. 
66 ibid, 113–114. 
67 Honneth (2007) (ch 1, n 24) 325. 
68 ibid, 324. 
69 ibid, 322–323. 
70 ibid, 1–21. 
71 Introduction to ibid
 210 
the elements making up this conceptual core, which are briefly outlined below.  In Part 3, 
these are used to frame the potential moral harms identified in the previous chapter. 
 
7.3.2.1 The observational element of recognition theory 
Mattiea Iser describes recognition theory as having both a normative and psychological 
dimension: a dual-characteristic which will chime with anyone interested in the nature of 
justice.72  This dualism features heavily in what Smith identifies as the three fundamental 
claims that make up the core of any identifiable conception of recognition theory.73  The 
first of these is observational and relatively straight forward: social conflicts or social struggles ȋǲat least in many casesǳȌ are the result of certain groups in society having their 
normative expectations of recognition violated in such a way as to give rise to feelings of 
disrespect and humiliation.74  According to Smith, this is true both of modern struggles 
against, for example, racial or gender inequality, and what he terms as the ǲepoch-defining historical conflictsǳ of, for example, anti-colonial movements and class struggle.75   Smith 
surmises that these struggles are driven by ǲthe intolerable burden borne by some part of 
the population of the disrespect or contempt shown to them by others, often in a 
generalised form embodied in prevailing laws, customs, and social institutions.ǳ76 
 
7.3.2.2 Intersubjective relationships and the development of relations-to-self 
The second core feature concerns the explanation for this apparently pervasive 
psychological need for recognition.  In its most concise terms, (onnethǯs theory claims that the integrity of oneǯs relations-to-self—qualities such as self-confidence, self-respect and 
self-esteem—are dependent on mutually affirming intersubjective relationships.77 (onnethǯs theory of recognition draws initially from (egelǯs alternative to the (obbesian doctrine of the state of nature, where ǲconflicts over the unilateral seizure of 
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possessions are interpreted not as Ǯstruggles for self-assertionǯ but as Ǯstruggles for recognitionǯ.ǳ78  These struggles, in conditions of hostile competition, ǲrepresent precisely 
the formative process in which individuals learn to see themselves as being fitted out with intersubjectively accepted rights.ǳ79 
Crucial to this opening image is the fact that Hegel derives the reaction-
formation of excluded subjects from a motivational situation whose core is 
formed by the disappointment of positive expectations vis-à-vis the partner to interaction.  Unlike in (obbesǯs depiction, the individual here reacts to the 
seizure of property not with the fear of having his survival subsequently 
threatened, but rather with the feeling of being ignored by his social 
counterpart.  Built into the structure of human interaction there is a normative 
expectation that one will meet with the recognition of others, or at least an 
implicit assumption that one will be given positive consideration in the plans of 
others.80 Charles Taylor also links recognition to the formation and development of individualsǯ 
consciousness-of-self, pointing out that an individualǯs identity ǲcrucially depends on 
dialogical relations with others.ǳ81 Again, recognition or its absence shapes ǲa personǯs 
understanding of who they are, [and] their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being.ǳ82 Noteworthy are the harms Taylor associates with misrecognition: 
Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being […M]isrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect.  )t can inflict a grievous 
wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not 
just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.83 
  For recognition theorists ǲ[t]his dependence on the recognition of others for the 
positive self-relations that enable individuals to lead their own livesǳ explains the 
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traumatic implications of experiences of disrespect and humiliation, as well as the 
motivational force behind social struggles.84  According to (onneth, in ǲpost traditionalǳ 
society, one can discern three levels of recognition which influence the development of 
three types of relations-to-self: self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. 
 
Love and self-confidence 
The first of these concerns the mutual reciprocation of basic physical and metaphysical 
needs, characteristic of relationships of love and affection.85  This type of recognition is 
most crucial during early childhood—where a child is utterly dependant (typically) on his 
mother for his own basic needs.  It continues, however, through familial and non-familial 
relationships (with Ǯsignificant othersǯ)86 involving physical and emotional support, love 
and affection throughout an individualǯs life.  Through intersubjective recognition and the 
fulfilment of these basic needs, an individual develops a basic sense of trust in the world 
and self-confidence: ǲvital to becoming an autonomous and individuated personǳ.87  The 
corresponding forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies with this level of recognition are those which threaten the individualǯs physical integrity, particularly through physical 
abuse or rape.88 
David Owen criticises Honneth on this point, arguing that by limiting the category of 
misrecognition that can impact upon this level of relations-to-self to attacks on an individualǯs physical integrity, (onneth excludes other types of misrecognition that 
similarly affect oneǯs trust in the world and self-confidence.89  This is a valid point.  (onneth must be correct when he states that, ǲsituations in which a person is forcibly 
deprived of any opportunity to freely dispose over his or her body represent the most 
fundamental sort of personal degradation.ǳ90  (owever, the feeling of ǲbeing defencelessly 
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at the mercy of another subjectǳ is not an experience unique to ǲphysical injury, as exemplified by torture and rape.ǳ91  If oneǯs child, partner or parent is wrongfully killed or 
allowed to die whilst in the supposed care of another, the psychological impact may not 
reach the severity of that caused by extreme physical abuse, but it is not difficult to imagine 
feeling that oneǯs reality is at the mercy of others.  It is also credible that if co-members of a 
group to which the deceased belonged believe she was misrecognised (e.g. targeted or 
discriminated against) for being a member of that group, they may also suffer a similar 
category (although perhaps not severity) of harm.  The cause of the death may be 
interpreted as manifesting an ongoing threat to group membersǯ security—again, 
impacting on their confidence and trust in the world and their intersubjective interactions 
with state actors within it. 
 
Rights and self-respect 
The second level of recognition identified by Honneth corresponds to the Kantian 
concern that all individuals be recognised as ends in themselves, as equal citizens and 
bearers of universal rights.  Through this type of recognition individuals are confirmed as morally responsible agents ǲcapable of acting autonomously based on reasonǳ.92   According to Yar ǲǮrightsǯ mediate a demand for dignity and moral equality as an individual person amongst others.ǳ93  And for (onnethǯs neo-Hegelian programme, recognition on this 
basis provides the conditions that favour development of self-respect.  Conversely, denial 
of this type of recognition will generally take the form of denial of rights.94  Honneth argues 
that there is a crucial link between self-respect and oneǯs status as an equal member of society: typically reflected in oneǯs status as a bearer of equal legal rights.   
With regard to the moral harms identified in the previous chapter, we may associate 
this second tier of recognition with all those harms arising out of the failure to meet any 
normative expectations on the part of family, community or wider general public, that they 
have a right to a reliable investigation into a death, and to know how and why someone has 
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died.  The lack of an investigation, or an investigation which is unduly limited in terms of its 
scope, effectiveness, or openness to scrutiny, are all suggestive of a form of misrecognition 
that denigrates the legitimate interests (and socio-political agency) of family, community 
and wider general public. 
The object of respect (including self-respectȌ is an agentǯs capacity to raise and defend claims discursively or, more generally, an agentǯs status as responsible [an agentǯs Zurechnungsfähigkeit].  But this capacity can only become the basis for Ǯself-respectǯ if it can be exercised. […] Hence the importance of rights in 
connection with self-respect lies in the fact that rights ensure the real 
opportunity to exercise the universal capacities constitutive of personhood.  […T]he fullest form of self-respecting autonomous agency [can] only be realised when one is recognised as possessing the capacities of Ǯlegal personsǯ, that is, of 
morally responsible agents.95 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the failure to provide a reliable narrative 
surrounding a death may be motivated by a desire to cover-up and avoid responsibility for 
the truth.  But equally, the closing down of investigatory processes to public scrutiny may 
also be motivated by a paternalistic attitude that seeks to confine responsibility for 
responding to a death to those who hold power. 
Owen points out that at the heart of this tier of recognition is the self-respect that derives from ǲour reciprocal recognition of ourselves and others as morally responsible agents capable of raising and defending socially accepted claimsǳ and that this ǲis instituted 
in our status as rights-bearers.ǳ96  Providing the public (whether family members, 
community members, or the wider general public) with a tested and reliable narrative of 
what happened to cause a use-of-force death at the hands of the state is, in these terms, a 
positive act of recognition.  It confirms the members of these groups as bearers of rights.  
By publishing a reliable truth about the circumstances of a death, the state also devolves a 
degree of control over any action that might be taken as a consequence of that truth—
through the agency that comes with knowledge.  With knowledge, the variously interested 
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public can make their own informed demands and, potentially, take their own positive 
action.  Agency may be exercised through democratic processes (e.g. voting, campaigning, 
demonstrating, otherwise putting pressure on policy makers to take specific types of 
action, or participating in formal political processes in order to influence policy).  
Alternatively, it may be exercised through direct action (e.g. setting up police monitoring 
groups,97 support groups,98 educating and advising people of their rights, bringing civil 
actions, or challenging government policy or action by judicial review). 
But the right to a reliable and public investigation and narrative surrounding a death is 
not just related to devolving agency to those who have an interest in the circumstances of a 
death.  As far as the family of the deceased is concerned, it also typically reflects a 
recognition of the cathartic value that they may draw from being involved in the 
investigatory process and being provided with a reliable truth as to how a loved one died.  
Recognising the familyǯs needs in this regard is an act that confirms their special status as 
intersubjective partners who have suffered a particular loss.  Failing to do so properly can 
cause bitterness and hurt.99 
 
Solidarity and self-esteem (onnethǯs third level concerns recognition of the positive qualities of individuals and 
groups. […T]o acquire an undistorted relations-to-self, human subjects always need—
over and above the experience of affectionate care and legal recognition—a 
form of social esteem that allows them to relate positively to their concrete 
traits and abilities.100 
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This type of recognition fulfils individualsǯ need to be recognised as valued members of 
a community, with the potential to make a positive contribution, through their personal 
qualities, to that community or society.  According to Honneth, this type of recognition is a basic condition for the development of an individualǯs self-esteem:101 that is ǲa sense of oneǯs value as a person […].ǳ102 The denial of this type of recognition may take the form of 
insult and denigration of ways of life.103  Frank Haldemann explains: 
Unlike self-respect, which is a matter of viewing oneself as bearer of equal 
rights, self-esteem involves resources for thinking about oneǯs way of life as 
something that is meaningful and significant […T]his sense of being socially 
worthwhile can be seriously damaged if a socio-cultural environment is openly hostile to considering oneǯs lifestyle as a valuable contribution to the common 
good.  […]  For (onneth, ǲsolidarityǳ is the form of recognition that is committed 
to protecting individuals against such threats of disrespect.  Solidarity, he 
claims, provides the basis for a cultural climate in which every member of 
society can build a sense of self-esteem by contributing to some shared concern, 
interest or value.104 
On the previous level of recognition, respect for the equal dignity and autonomy of 
individuals brings with it a duty to treat people with equal respect in judicial, bureaucratic 
and democratic processes (e.g. particularly by not placing the rights and interests of state 
actors above others).  But this tier of recognition implies a positive valuing of the 
contributions that families, communities and representatives of the wider general public 
may bring to processes, as well as the wider democratic functioning of the state. 
In the aftermath of use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state, the causes of the moral harms that correspond to (onnethǯs third tier of recognition, may be the same as those 
described in relation to the second: the denial of the opportunity to be engaged in 
investigatory processes and the denial of a reliable explanation as to how someone died.  
But as well as potentially misrecognising the rights and needs of the individuals concerned, 
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104 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 686. 
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these failures also misrecognise the value interested persons can bring to the investigatory 
processes, as well as the wider contribution that a properly informed citizenry can make to 
democratic processes. 
 
7.3.2.3 The moral claims of recognition theories 
Finally we arrive at what Smith identifies as the third core component of recognition 
theories: that it is a moral claim. 
The general purpose of moral norms, for the recognition theorist, is to 
provide protection from the harms of disrespect and humiliation to 
which human beings are constitutively vulnerable […]. This means that 
modern morality has its basis in its claim to provide the social 
infrastructure—in terms of recognition relationships—that enables all 
individuals, no matter what their particular identity or place in society, to 
lead their own lives well.  The meaning of morality is thus bound up with 
its social, institutional expression.105 As Yar points out, theories of recognition perform ǲthe moral-evaluative work of 
assessing different social arrangements, actions, and institutionalised processes according 
to whether they succeed or fail in satisfying those needs whose realisation is essential for human flourishing.ǳ106  In terms of institutional processes engaged in the aftermath of past 
wrongdoing, Haldemann describes the moral imperative of recognition theory as being: […] a matter of appropriately responding to, acting in the light of, what we know 
or perceive of victims of past wrongs.  It involves extending to victims the 
concern and respect due to them in virtue of what they are—wounded others, in 
our society—and of what they have suffered.  If, as commonly thought, justice is 
a matter of giving what is due, then this kind of recognition can quite 
unproblematically be understood as an elaboration of this maxim, for it 
                                                 
105 )ntroduction to OǯNeill and Smith ȋn ͷͻȌ ͸. 
106 Yar (n 65) 116. 
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responds to the injustice of being denied rights and the consideration and the 
concern that is appropriate for a person to enjoy.107 
 
7.4 Conclusion to Part 2 
Procedural justice debates within the context of criminal and civil justice systems, and 
administrative decision-making procedures, show that beliefs that procedures can and 
should reflect broad primary justice values, rather than just narrow rectificatory justice 
aims, are highly contested.  We saw that Dworkin concedes that procedural rules, such as 
participatory rights, may hold some intrinsic value.  However, if the denial of such rights 
does not prejudice the accuracy of a processǯs substantive outcome, Dworkin doubts that 
this can in itself amount to a substantive injustice. 
Dworkin and Galliganǯs arguments are motivated by well-founded concerns.  The 
outcomes to criminal and civil proceedings can have far-reaching implications for the rights 
of the parties.   In criminal justice systems, wrongful convictions lead to innocent people 
being punished.  In civil justice systems, wrong decisions may, for example, lead to a 
claimant losing out on life-changing compensation, or a defendant being wrongfully 
deprived of property.  The procedures that make up these processes take into account 
these realities, and are inevitably focused on ensuring that, as far as possible, inaccurate 
and unjust outcomes (narrowly defined) are avoided. 
Processes not concerned with rectificatory justice, or normal administrative decision-
making, are very different in this respect.  The outcomes of inquests and inquiries do not 
include enforceable practical consequences for individuals.  At the outset, therefore, there 
may be less of a concern about diverting the focus of procedures away from the accuracy of 
formal outcomes (conclusions/verdicts), and towards procedures that are valued by 
participants for other reasons.  But, even if this is the case, the question still remains, as it 
did in criminal and civil justice processes: are the intrinsic values which interested persons 
might attribute to certain procedures, and from which they may derive benefit, capable of 
being considered normative justice values, to which they should have access as of right? 
                                                 
107 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 679. 
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Rawlsǯs conception of political legitimacy has both direct and analogous relevance to 
this question.  For Rawls, political legitimacy derives from ǲpublic reasonǳ being at the 
centre of justifications for the use of corporate and coercive political power.  Civil and 
criminal courts are part of the state infrastructure that manifests this ǲcorporate and coercive political powerǳ when they determine someoneǯs guilt, innocence or their civil 
liability.  Other processes are also arguably exercising this power when they give official 
sanction to particular narratives about the circumstances surrounding, for example, use-of-
force deaths at the hands of the state—even if they have no formal power to dictate the 
practical consequences of that narrative.  By analogy, therefore, provided the conditions of 
public justification are met, these institutions manifest the power of free and equal citizens 
as a corporate body.108  If a normative theory of justice as fairness requires the political body to generate support by addressing citizensǯ reason, the legitimacy of judicial 
outcomes should arguably also depend on whether they address the reason of those 
specifically affected by them.  To this extent, Allan observes that the legitimacy of a legal procedureǯs outcome ǳmay be as much a reflection of preceding debate about the demands of justice […] as of argument about the relevant facts.ǳ109 
It was argued that public justification through public reason should require a decision, 
and the reasons for it, to be publicly explained and justified in a way that actually speaks to 
the reason of those with a special substantive interest.  To do this, decision-makers must 
give those with a special interest an opportunity to express their own claims, suspicions 
and concerns.  If they fail to do so they risk merely exercising private power over 
subalterns. 
The analogy with political legitimacy is a useful one, but it only takes us so far.  In Part 3 
it is argued that recognition theory may provide a tool for analysing the nature of the 
subjectively experienced second-order moral harms identified in the previous chapter, and 
to interpret them as resulting from failures by the state to meet normative expectations for 
recognition.  It is argued that justice as recognition demands that these interests be 
recognised, and recognition theory suggests that where they are not, the resulting harms—
                                                 
108 Rawls (2001) (n 51) 90–91. 
109 Allan (1998) (n 16) 498. 
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concentrated in the case of the family of the deceased, diluted but multiplied in the case of 
members of a community, or the wider general public—have significant personal and social 
implications.
 221 
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8.1 Introduction – The significance of Ǯtransitional justiceǯ debates to the thesis 
There is an obvious analogy that can be drawn between inquests and inquiries into use-
of-force deaths at the hands of the state, and truth commissions in states undergoing 
transitions.  This final part of the thesis begins the synthesis of the practice in Part 1 with 
the theory in Part 2 by looking at Ǯtransitional justiceǯ and truth commissions.  The 
intention is to draw from discussions that already combine theories of justice with an 
analysis of the normative value of (non-retributive justice-related) truth discovery 
processes and open narrative formation processes concerning, amongst other things, 
deaths at the hands of the state. 
As argued previously, the literature on open justice and inquests lacks any real 
considered analysis of the link between openness and justice implicit in the term Ǯopen 
justiceǯ.1  Traditional conceptions of open justice are derived from adversarial procedures 
with parties whose legal rights are directly affected by the outcome of proceedings, and 
where principles of procedural fairness tend to be associated with the need to ensure just 
outcomes.2  As we saw in Part 1, inquests themselves previously formed an important part 
of criminal justice processes, but have gradually been detached from the criminal justice 
process. 
Unlike inquests and inquiries, truth commissions have been the subject of relatively 
intense scrutiny concerning their justice credentials.  Like inquests and inquiries, they often 
seek to create a reliable and official narrative, or truth, about—amongst other things—the 
circumstances of deaths at the hands of a state or its agents.  They are often open to the 
active participation of the relatives of those who may have died at the hands of the state. 
And, like inquests and inquiries, they are not generally concerned with retributive justice 
or compensatory justice aims—at least directly.3  But unlike inquests and inquiries, truth 
commissions are often effectively partial or complete alternatives to criminal and civil 
proceedings in states undergoing transitions.  This means claims that they fulfil alternative 
justice forms is understandably subject to more urgent scrutiny than has been the case 
                                                 
1 See 1.1 above. 
2 See 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 above. 
3 If these are contemplated, they are usually of secondary importance and of limited potential. 
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with inquests and inquiries, which do not replace potential criminal and civil justice 
processes.  The lack of opportunities for criminal or civil justice in many transitional 
scenarios means that writers are naturally concerned with whether truth commissions can 
fill the resulting Ǯjustice gapǯ.  This is all the more urgent given the scale of wrongdoing 
which transitioning societies can face.  The result is an interesting contemplation of 
normative criteria that should inform priorities in situations including the aftermath of 
deaths at the hands of the state and in particular, the justice value of truth discovery 
processes not directly linked to retributive or compensatory justice processes.  Discussion 
about the moral foundations of truth commissions therefore provides insight into the 
potential normative bases for claims that justice requires that: deaths at the hands of the 
police, or in police or prison custody, be opened up to public scrutiny; and that there is a 
reliable, official and public narrative about the circumstances of the death. 
 
8.2 What is Ǯtransitional justiceǯ? 
8.2.1 The different potential concerns of transitional justice 
The circumstances in which the term Ǯtransitional justiceǯ is applied are becoming 
increasingly diverse.  Most commonly, it is evoked where a society is undergoing a 
transition from one characterised by mass human rights abuses and possibly civil war, to a 
democracy based on respect for human rights and the rule of law.  Most writers on justice 
during transitions focus on the manner in which past abuses and state crimes are dealt 
with by a new regime.  According to Stanley Cohen, for example, the typical question asked by theorists is: ǲ(ow do societies going through democratization confront the human rights 
violations committed by the previous regime?ǳ4  In an article looking at justice as 
recognition and transitional justice, Haldemann introduces the topic in similar terms: 
At any such time of massive transformation, one question takes on renewed 
urgency: how should societies deal with their evil past?  In addressing this 
crucial and highly topical issue, the contemporary debate has focused on ǮTransitional Justice,ǯ a term increasingly employed to describe the process by 
                                                 
4 Stanley Cohen, ǮState Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Pastǯ ȋͳͻͻͷȌ ʹͲ L Soc )nq ͹, ͹. 
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which societies confront legacies of widespread or systematic human rights 
abuses as they move from repression or civil war to a more just, democratic or 
peaceful order.5 
While this reflects the main concern of writing on the subject, there is more to justice 
during transitions than this focus on the past.   Those actually tasked with overseeing a 
transition may be more concerned to ensure that a potentially unstable society does not 
slip back into the violence or abuse that characterised its recent past.  Related to this, 
Nancy Fraser makes a distinction between affirmative remedies (providing redress for past 
wrongs), and transformative remedies (corrective measures that focus on transforming 
certain aspects of a society to ensure the non-recurrence of those wrongs).6 
The one foot in the past/one foot in the future dichotomy is captured by Ní Aoláin, 
when she describes transitional justice as: 
a conceptual mechanism which references the transition in societies previously 
experiencing entrenched conflict to co-existence and possible reconciliation.  
The key to the transitional justice context is reflection on the legal reforms to 
accommodate past human rights violations, as well as the creation and support 
for new institutions which are human rights compliant.7 
By not confining them to human rights, Haldemann gets closer to the potential breadth 
of concerns shaping justice during transitions when he describes transitional justice as: […] some forms of justice on which countries undergoing intense political 
change may rely.  It is justice informed by prior injustice and induced with 
transformative dimensions—justice caught between the past and the future, 
between the backward-looking and the forward-looking.8 
Haldemann recognises that such a definition lacks normative content: 
                                                 
5 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 675–676. 
6 Fraser (1995) (ch 7, n 63) 70. 
7 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ǮTruth Telling, Accountability, and the Right to Life in Northern )relandǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ ͷ 
EHRLR 572, 574. 
8 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 676–677. 
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With this definition, however, it is still not clear what justice in transition might 
mean, or what the hope for justice should lead us to want in periods of radical 
political change.  […]  What should be deemed just and fair as a state undergoes 
a major political transformation?9 
The final question perhaps gets closest to evoking the breadth of what transitional 
justice is concerned with.  In what follows, the term Ǯjustice during transitionsǯ is preferred 
over Ǯtransitional justiceǯ.10  The most persistent polemic amongst writers on justice during 
transitions tends to be the relative priority that should be accorded to retributive justice 
versus non-retributive and non-compensatory justice forms. 
 
8.2.2 Important differences between truth commissions, and inquests and inquiries 
There are important differences to be noted between truth commissions and the types 
of investigation analysed in this thesis.  Most obviously, the focus is not on countries 
undergoing transitions from a period of mass human rights abuse or civil war.  Justice 
during transitions often has to engage with complex interconnected atrocities carried out 
on a massive scale where the very notion of rectificatory justice can seem unfathomable.  
As Hannah Arendt famously described: 
all we know is that we can neither punish nor forgive such offences and that 
they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and the potentialities of 
human power, both of which they radically destroy wherever they appear.11 
Related to this is the scale of institutional reform which may be contemplated by 
transitioning societies which may include a top to bottom reorganisation of a stateǯs 
constitution and institutions.  In these circumstances, addressing deaths at the hands of the 
                                                 
9 ibid, 677. 
10 ) share (aldemannǯs difficulty with the phrase Ǯtransitional justiceǯ as it says nothing of the form of 
justice being contemplated.  It appears to be more like a discipline in law, concerned with: a) assessing the 
most appropriate prioritisation of different justice forms in states undergoing transition; and b) determining 
the best way to achieve those justice forms in practice. 
At the 2012 Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice, keynote speaker, Carla Ferstman (Director of REDRESSȌ also argued that the term ǯtransitional justiceǯ risks denoting justice as ǲan exceptional, temporary eventǳ ȋCarla Ferstman, ǮKey Note Addressǯ at Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice, University of 
Nottingham, 2012). 
11 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 1998) 241. 
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state may be just one aspect of a vast political, legal, economic and cultural project.  These 
competing priorities, and broader societal circumstances, can create their own specific inhibitions on addressing past incidences of wrongdoing.  As (aldemann points out ǲ[i]n 
periods of transition, marked by radical transformations of the surrounding societies, there is always a strong impulse to put the past aside and move on.ǳ12  This inclination may be 
buoyed by any popular euphoria following the fall of a hated regime.  Of course there are 
strong arguments that societies can never really move forward without first coming to 
terms with their pasts.  But there may not necessarily be anything sinister behind the 
desire of many to try. 
The third difference is the fact that there may also actually be just such sinister forces at 
work, pushing for the past to be forgotten.  Still powerful groups may stand in the way of 
attempts to address the past and prosecute wrongdoers.  In the circumstances that are the 
concern of this thesis there may be times when official and unofficial forces conspire 
against accountability for past wrongs committed by state actors—even in the face of 
permanent formal procedures tasked with securing such accountability.13  However, there 
is a categorical distinction to be made based on scale where the circumstances prevailing in 
transitioning states may be such that there is a real risk that reactionary groups threaten 
country-wide destabilisation and violence. 
One of the most important differences between truth commissions and inquests and 
inquiries is that the very creation of a truth commission is usually in itself an 
acknowledgment of significant past wrongdoing.14  Their investigative function is generally 
to look into the nature, extent and detail of that wrongdoing.  The investigations with which 
this thesis is concerned are engaged whether or not there is any suspicion that a death was 
wrongfully caused. 
                                                 
12 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 693. 
13 See for example: Hillsborough Independent Panel, The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel ȋThe Stationery Office ʹͲͳʹȌ Ch. ͳͳ; Stalker ȋch ʹ, n ͺͶȌ; and Cass, ǮFirst Report—Blair Peachǯ ȋch Ͷ, n ͳ͹͵Ȍ 
and Cass, Second Report—Blair Peach (ch 4, n 173). 
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The final difference has already been mentioned above.  Truth commissions are often 
set up as partial or complete alternatives to prosecutions.15  As seen above, inquests and 
inquiries operate independently from, and in addition to, separate criminal and civil justice 
systems.16 
Despite the above, it should be borne in mind that transitional and non-transitional-
type scenarios cannot always be neatly separated.  The political situation in England and 
Wales would, in most peopleǯs eyes, qualify as a stable democracy with a relatively strong 
human rights tradition based on the rule of law.  But Northern Ireland is going through an 
extended period of transition, the implications of which cannot be conveniently confined 
geographically to the North of Ireland.17  Two communities, along with the governments of 
the UK and Eire, are engaged in a slow and carefully-managed transition process.18  This 
has included difficult and painful choices about how past atrocities and wrongdoing are 
dealt with.19  There are also numerous transitional scenarios that do not have all the 
features usually associated with transitioning states, and truth commissions are 
increasingly being set up in the absence of a change of regime.20 
 
8.3 Truth commissions 
Elizabeth Kiss describes truth commissions as being: 
designed to provide societies in transition with a way to deal with their legacies 
of mass violence, abuse, and injustice.  They are authoritative bodies given a 
                                                 
15 Although, Elizabeth Kiss argues that in the context of the South African TRC, ǲthe public and private 
opprobrium experienced by many perpetrators amounted to a powerful form of accountability and even punishmentǳ where ǲpublic hearings and extensive coverage in the media ensured that perpetrators could not hide behind the wall of silence and anonymity.ǳ ȋǮMoral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justiceǯ in Thompson and Rothberg ȋedsȌ, Truth v Justice: The morality 
of Truth Commissions (PUP 2000) 77). 
16 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
17 Victims suffered and perpetrators operated throughout the UK, Ireland and further afield. 
18 See Ní Aoláin (n 7); and Bell and Keenan (ch 2, n 195). 
19 See, for example, the family of Bobby Moffett challenge to Secretary of State to disclose evidence held 
by the International Monitoring Commission to the inquest into his death in Re Owensǯ Application for Judicial 
Review [2015] NIQB 29 (Transcript). 
20 See recent inquiries looking into the treatment of aboriginal populations in Australia and Canada ȋDamien Short, ǮAustralian ǲAboriginalǳ Reconciliation: The Latest Phase in the Colonial Projectǯ ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ ͹ Cit Stud ʹͻͳ; and Rosemary L Nagy, ǮThe Scope and Bounds of Transitional Justice and the Canadian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissionǯ [ʹͲͳʹ] )JTJ ͷʹȌ. 
 230 
mandate to develop an official account of past brutalities, in the hope that doing 
so will help prevent a recurrence of such violations.21 
Different truth commissions can have very different rules of procedure.  For example, 
early commissions set up in Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, Zimbabwe, Uruguay, the 
Philippines and Chile all heard testimony in private.  In contrast, the South African TRC not 
only heard most testimony in public (with much being broadcast live on television), but 
some victims were themselves able to question perpetrators.22 
Truth commissions generally conclude their work with a report.  These state factual and 
moral conclusions and usually recommend future action.  Some may publicly name 
individual perpetrators, while others do not.23  While aspects of proceedings and reports 
may be withheld from the public, the extent to which they are open, and, in particular, the 
manner in which they actively engage victims, may be considered important markers of 
their justice credentials. 
 
8.3.1 The quantitative aims of truth commissions 
Popkin and Roht-Arriaza describe the four ǲmajor and overlapping goalsǳ of truth 
commissions as: […] creating an authoritative record of what happened; providing a platform for 
the victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of redress; recommending 
legislative, structural, or other changes to avoid repetition of past abuses; and 
establishing who was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for 
the perpetrators.24 
                                                 
21 Kiss (n 15) 69. 
22 Modern truth commissions tend to lean closer to the South African model in terms of their openness to 
the public. 
23 e.g., Commission on the Truth for El Salvador named perpetrators; but the Guatemalan Commission for 
Historical Clarification did not (see The Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 'From 
Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador' (UN DPI/1208, 1992); and  Informe de La Comisión Para 
El Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatamala: Memoria Del Silencio (CEH 1999)). 
24 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (ch 6, n 42) 80.  They also list basic requirements for effective truth 
commissions: independence; that they be broad enough to cover the principal harms and the relevant time 
period, detailed enough for concluding narratives to be convincing; and have procedures that are clear and 
beyond challenge (93–96). 
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Elizabeth Kiss describes their aims as: 
[To] generate authoritative historical accounts, issue recommendations for 
institutional change, and direct a national morality play that places victims of 
injustice on centre stage.  They combine investigative, judicial, political, 
educational, therapeutic, and even spiritual functions.  […T]ruth commissioners 
have affirmed the value of Ǯnarrativeǯ as well as of Ǯforensicǯ forms of truth, and 
have come to speak of justice as reconciliation, national healing, and moral 
reconstruction.25 
Truth commissions will, then, generally include all or some of the following overlapping 
quantitative aims: truth discovery; creating an official public record of that truth; engaging 
victims in the narrative formation process; allowing victims to confront perpetrators; 
making perpetrators account for their actions; confronting perpetrators with the human 
and moral consequences of their actions; and making recommendations. 
 
8.3.1.1 Truth discovery – factual judgments As Kiss emphasises, ǲtruth commissions are created, first and foremost, to establish the truth about past injustices.ǳ26  While discussing the Salvadorian, Guatemalan and Chilean 
truth commissions, Popkin and Roht-Arriaza similarly observe that: 
The first goal that all the commissions set for themselves is to compile and 
present a historical record of the scope, means, and victims of the prior human 
rights violations.  Presentation of a full and unbiased record was important both 
to counter the deceptions and justifications of the military and to move fairly 
recent and still-potent events into the more distant category of Ǯhistory,ǯ 
establishing a line between past and present.27 
Crucial to this process is answering the question of who factually did what, and who 
suffered as a result.28  But truth commissions can go beyond the basic factual culpability of 
                                                 
25 Kiss (n 15) 70. 
26 ibid, 71. 
27 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (ch 6, n 42) 93. 
28 Kiss (n 15) 71. 
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individual perpetrators, and look into deeper social pathologies that may have been at 
work.  They are often held out as being better-equipped to produce more comprehensive 
and deeper truths than, say, criminal prosecutions, which ǲlack the narrative scope of truth commissionsǳ.29  Andre de Toit points out in particular that with prosecutions, the search for ǲthe truthǳ is ǲconfined to what may be relevant to the criminal guilt or innocence of the perpetrator.ǳ30 
What about the victimǯs truth, or the many other complex and multifaceted 
aspects of the truth relevant to a particular case?  So far as the practice of 
criminal justice is concerned, victims may indeed be presumed to have a basic 
interest in seeing retributive justice done to perpetrators, but otherwise they 
cannot expect any special consideration.31 (e argues that ǲ[c]ompared to the adversarial structure of the criminal justice system 
and its focus on the accused, truth commissions represent an alternative way of linking truth and justice that puts victims first.ǳ32  What is interesting here is not only a move away 
from the presumption that justice can only be served by retributive justice processes, but 
these arguments suggest that truth commissions are actually better equipped to meet 
certain important justice forms when dealing with wrongdoing perpetrated by states 
against their citizens. 
 
8.3.1.2 An officially endorsed account Kiss makes the important point that ǲeven when most of the facts about a crime or 
atrocity are well known, it is vital to a societyǯs prospects for justice that they be publicly 
and officially acknowledged.ǳ33  The reports of truth commissions should aim to give a 
                                                 
29 ibid, 73–74. 
30 André du Toit, ǮThe Moral Foundations of the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgment and Justice as Recognitionǯ in Thompson and Rothberg ȋn ͳͷȌ ͳʹʹ, ͳ͵͸. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid.  There will usually be no public examination of the facts if the prosecuting authority decides no 
crime was committed.  Even successful prosecutions are limited in the scope of the narrative pursued: they 
are perpetrator focused, only concerned with the guilt or innocence of particular defendants, and victims 
usually have little input. 
33 Kiss (n 15) 71 (emphasis added). 
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public and authoritative historical account of what actually happened during the relevant 
period.  As Popkin and Roht-Arriaza argue: […P]erhaps the greatest achievement of the [Salvadorian, Guatemalan and 
Chilean truth] commissions has been the official presentation of an authoritative history, which counters the former regimeǯs account.  Although 
contested by members of the former regime or the armed forces, an 
authoritative description and analysis prepared by respected national figures […] will eventually be widely accepted and form the basis of the historical 
record.34 
For Elizabeth Stanley, truth commissions ǲhave significant value as they present a unique opportunity for transitional states […] to provide authoritative acknowledgment of state crime.ǳ35  She underlines the importance of this ǲas a means to challenge denials of 
repressive regimes and expose the myths on which state crime comes to be distorted.ǳ36  
This process begins with the actual setting up of the truth commission: an act which 
officially acknowledges serious wrongdoing was committed in the past and is symbolic of 
the new regime ǲmaking a decisive break with the official sponsorship of human rights violations that characterised the past.ǳ37  
The importance of establishing the truth publicly and officially in these circumstances is 
such that for some time several international and national forums have expressed it as a 
basic right.38  In parallel with ECHR jurisprudence on Article 2, an obligation was read into 
                                                 
34 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (ch 6, n 42). 
35 Elizabeth Stanley, ǮTruth Commissions and the Recognition of State Crimeǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ Ͷͷ Brit J Criminol 
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36 ibid.  The relative value of truth discovery and official recognition of a truth will depend on the 
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37 Allen (1999) (ch 6, n 41) 319. 
38 e.g. Articles 32 and 33 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, 8 June 1977; the Human Rights 
Committee Country Report on Guatemala (CCPR/C/79/Add.63, 3 April 1996); The report by The Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1999/62, 28 December 1998); Office of the High Commissioner for (uman Rights, Ǯ(uman Rights Resolution ʹͲͲͷ/͸͸: The Right to the Truthǯ ȋʹͲͲͷȌ; (uman 
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the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) by the Inter-American Court for the 
Protection of Human Rights in 1988, requiring states to investigate serious human rights 
violations.  This was independent from, and in addition to, member statesǯ obligation to 
prosecute serious violations of human rights: 
The duty to investigate facts of this type [disappearances] continues as long as 
there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has disappeared.  Even in 
the hypothetical case that those individually responsible for crimes of this type 
cannot be legally punished under certain circumstances, the State is obligated to 
use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims 
and, if they have been killed, the location of their remains.39 
In this context Sévana Garibian describes how in Argentina, 
[a]longside the legal statement of the principles that made it possible to 
interpret and apply the ACHR more effectively, case law […] affirmed the central 
importance of clarifying the facts and seeking the truth.  This position would be 
repeatedly confirmed in cases involving violent death, such as executions or homicides; enforced disappearances in which the victimsǯ remains could not be 
found; and disappearances without presumption of death.40 
In Argentina a ǲderecho a la verdadǳ ȋright to the truthȌ developed, guaranteeing a right 
to judicial investigations into the fate of disappeared during the Guerra Sucia.  According to 
Garibian, this required a ǲmobilisation of all available means that might contribute to the clarification of the fate of disappeared persons.ǳ41  These investigations took the form of ǲJuicios por la verdadǳ ȋtrials for the truthȌ, which Garibian describes as sui generes judicial 
procedures.42  Their purpose ǲwas not […] to judge the guilty, but to conduct an 
                                                                                                                                                             Rights Council, ǮResolution ͻ/ͳͳ: The Right to the Truthǯ ȋA/(RC/ͻ/L.ͳʹ ʹͲͲͻȌ; Denuncia Querellante: 
Hairabadian, Gregorio (Case No. 2.610/2001) (The Hairabadian/Armenian Genocide Case) Decision rendered 
by the Buenos Aires Federal Court, 1 April 2011; Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, 
Interamerican Court of Human Rights, 29 July 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4. 
39 Velásquez Rodríguez (ibid), 181. 
40 Sévane Garibian, ǮGhosts Also Die: Resisting Disappearance through the ǲRight to the Truthǳ and Juicios Por La Verdad in Argentinaǯ ȋʹͲͳͶȌ ͳʹ J)CJ ͷͳͷ, ͷʹͳ. 
41 ibid, 523. 
42 ibid, 517. 
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investigation for the purpose of establishing the truth—not as a necessary preliminary to determining proper punishment, but, rather, as an end in itself.ǳ43 
These juicios por la verdad, appear quite similar in nature to inquests.  They were 
judicial processes and, while overseen by criminal judges, were, in theory, unconnected to 
criminal justice: 
The strictly declarative mission of the criminal law judge at the centre of the 
mechanism of the trial for the truth with no punitive function is indeed a 
(re)cognition of the facts by means of a judicial narrative.  Just as the historian 
does, the judge constructs the Ǯnarrative of true eventsǯ that gave rise to the facts of the case before him […] Unlike the historian, however, his interpretation here aims to produce a qualification […] that transforms a historical fact into a 
legal fact, the judicial truth of which is presumed from then on […].  This activity 
acquires a special dimension with the juicios por la verdad, the sole purpose of 
which is to shed light on, authenticate, and designate what happened, outside 
the binary dialectic of guilty/not guilty.44 
 
8.3.1.3 Narrative formation and listening to victims 
The narrative formation processes found in truth commissions can also embody aims 
beyond the discovery of the truth.  Popkin and Roht-Arriaza note, for example, that ǲ[i]t 
may be that from the point of view of redress, the process of compiling the commissionǯs report was as important as the final product.ǳ45  They emphasise the value of giving victims 
a voice as being of both intrinsic and instrumental value.  It lends the narrative the quality of a ǲdecentralised production of historyǳ, but also recognises and gives effect to the special 
interests and needs of victims.46  And Kiss argues that providing a platform for victims is 
crucial not ǲmerely as a way of obtaining information, but also from the standpoint of justice.ǳ47 
                                                 
43 ibid, 522. 
44 ibid, 532. 
45 Popkin and Roht-Arriaza (ch 6, n 42) 114. 
46 ibid. 
47 Kiss (n 15) 73. 
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Inquests produce a concluding narrative in the form of a verdict, and inquiries produce 
a concluding narrative in the form of a report.48  But every piece of evidence heard during 
an inquest or inquiry is a potential revelation—an outcome of the process in its own right.  
Even the questions asked by an interested person (or their legal representative) is an outcome of sorts, as it places on record that personǯs views or suspicions.  )n the Azelle 
Rodney Inquiry core participants had the opportunity to give closing submissions.49  This, 
for example, allowed the family to explicitly place on public record their view that: Azelleǯs 
killing ǲbears a great resemblance, we say, to an execution and no resemblance to a lawful, 
competent policing operationǳ; and that following the shooting ǲthere was a botched 
attempt to plant evidence on the backseat of the Golf after Azelle had been shot dead.ǳ50 
The concluding narratives (verdicts/reports) have a particular quality that 
distinguishes them from the evidential narratives that precede them.  They may repeat and 
place particular weight on parts of that preceding narrative.  And, most importantly, they 
draw certain conclusions based on the evidence.  But the preceding narrative and the 
concluding narrative, are both arguably part of one broader narrative structure.  The Home 
Office Research Study, Experiencing Inquests, for example, observed in relation to one of its 
case-studies ǲthat the Ǯnarrativeǯ of Gavinǯs life mattered more than the verdictǳ, ǲThe formal verdict […] mattered less than the storyǳ.51 
 
8.3.1.4 Reaching moral judgments 
The reports of truth commissions also contain qualitative moral judgments regarding 
the events investigated.  For example, the human subjects of truth commissions are not just 
described objectively as individuals who either carried out or were subjected to certain 
forms of action.  They are identified as victims/survivors of serious wrongdoing on the one 
hand, and perpetrators who carried out serious wrongdoing on the other.  As the South 
                                                 
48 See 5.2.1.4 above. 
49 This is not possible in inquests. 
50 Azelle Rodney )nquiry, ǮTranscript of Oral (earings on ͳ͹ December ʹͲͳʹǯ, ͳͳͷ-116 
<http://tinyurl.com/j4yj46x> accessed 28 January 2016. 
51 Davis et al (ch, 7, n 99) 58. 
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African TRC Commissioner, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela points out, the commissions must  say to victims ǲyou are right, you were damaged, and it was wrong.ǳ52 
 
8.3.1.5 Making recommendations 
Finally truth commissions will usually make recommendations.  These can be for both 
transformative and affirmative action.  For example, they may recommend that victims are 
compensated, or that named individuals are prosecuted;53 or they may recommend 
institutional reforms.54 
 
8.3.2 The qualitative goals of truth commissions 
Truth commissions examine documents and hear evidence from witnesses about the 
nature and detail of past abuses.  Victims often get the opportunity to describe their 
experiences and the impact that abuses have had on them.  They may also get the 
opportunity to question alleged perpetrators.  As indicated above, the setting up of a truth 
commission itself functions as recognition that past wrongdoing was committed on a 
significant scale.  Their reports particularise the nature and extent of the wrongdoing, and 
set out factual and moral conclusions in an authoritative historical record. 
The following considers some of the writing on the normative value of these processes. 
 
8.3.2.1 Are truth commissions just political compromises? 
Elizabeth Kiss argues that transitioning societies must return to basic questions about ǲwhat justice requires in relation to survivors, perpetrators, and entire nations scarred by a brutal past.ǳ55  But truth commissions can struggle to generate support if perceived as ǲmerely political compromises, institutions spawned by an unprincipled negotiation of a 
                                                 
52 Quoted by Kiss at (n 15) 73. 
53 See Comisión de la Verdad para )mpedir la )mpunidad, ǮSin Verdad No (ay Justiciaǯ ȋComisión de la 
Verdad 2010), Título V Medidas para la investigación y judicialización. 
54 See Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, (n 23) in particular, Capítulo 5, Part V Medidas Para 
Fortalecer el Proceso Democrático, at pp. 72-80. 
55 Kiss (n 15) 70. 
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transfer of power [in which j]ustice becomes the casualty of a political calculation.ǳ56   Any 
attempt to analyse the normative foundations that underpin the aims of truth commissions 
must address this suspicion. 
Jonathan Allen suggests that even if we take a sceptical view, ǲthe fact that an institution 
is the product of a political negotiation in which the parties were intent on self-interested 
goals, narrowly conceived, does not demonstrate that the institution does not also and in spite of the participantsǯ goals, express morally defensible values.ǳ57  Du Toit also argues 
that while the mechanisms used to pursue justice in these contexts may not be the same as those used in ǲconsolidated liberal democraciesǳ, this is an insufficient basis for concluding 
they are only political compromises that create a justice deficit.58   As he points out, the 
question of whether truth commissions express and reflect moral aims and values should be tested ǲwith reference to appropriate moral principles and criteriaǳ,59 rather than 
merely on the basis of their political origins. 
Some of these criticisms focus on the fact that victims are forced to play by the stateǯs 
rules and that acts of recognition through, for example, truth commissions, may be 
tokenistic and designed merely to appease populations and consolidate the position of 
those now in power.  This is arguably particularly the case where truth commissions are set 
up in the absence of a change of regime or at least significant institutional reforms.  In the 
context of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Petoukhov discusses Glen Coulthardǯs and othersǯ argument that: 
[T]he coloniser often grants concessions, such as recognition of cultural 
identities, to the oppressed groups as surface remedies for injustice, while 
leaving colonial structures undisturbed. […] 
[Coulthard] argues that without struggle, recognition is imposed on Ǯsubjectsǯ 
who are passive in accepting it from the dominant society.  As a result these Ǯsubjectsǯ do not challenge the power of entities, such as the state.  In 
                                                 
56 Allen (1999) (ch 6, n 41) 315. 
57 ibid, 322. 
58 du Toit (n 30) 137–8. 
59 ibid, 123. 
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Coulthardǯs view, drawing on the work of Franz Fanon, it is necessary for the Ǯsubjectsǯ to win recognition on their own terms.60 
The concern expressed here should arguably be a constant concern for those who seek 
justice for wrongs perpetrated by the state.  The context of Coulthardǯs criticism is 
significant: the Canadian TRC was not preceded by a change of regime.  While his concerns 
may be valid in many respects, they do not tell the whole story.   Rather they risk 
approaching truth commissions as if they exist in a bubble, ignoring the fact that they often 
arise out of, and continue as part of, long-standing struggles for recognition by subaltern 
groups.  Those involved in negotiating the political compromises that aid transitions are 
often themselves survivors of serious wrongdoing and may have fought at great personal 
cost for the changes they are overseeing. 
Like truth commissions, inquests can also be a forum for the struggle for wider 
recognition.  Families can significantly influence the progress of inquests, often in the face 
of considerable resistance by state institutions.  But truth commissions (and inquests) 
should not be viewed as a one-off opportunity for recognition that will heal all of the scars 
of past misrecognition.  Recognition through inclusive narrative formation processes that 
give victims a voice, and acknowledge the truth publicly, is vital, but alone it is unlikely to 
be enough.  According to Elizabeth Stanley, for example, the authenticity of truth commissionsǯ efforts ǲto upwardly revalue the disrespected identities of those who were victimised by a previous regimeǳ, should be partly measured by their recommendations.  These ǲhighlight what victims need to gain justiceǳ, thus ǲpriming transitional states for deeper change.ǳ  But still this deeper change must actually be carried forward. 
A particular process may be appropriate for a particular level of recognition, in a 
particular sphere.  Other reforms—structural reorganisations of the state and institutional 
and individual concessions—may also be necessary for truly meaningful and ongoing 
recognition.  Radical changes may be catalysed by truth commissions and their formal and 
informal outcomes in unpredictable ways.  They may inspire further struggle for 
affirmative and transformative action on the part of the state to address past and persistent 
                                                 
60 Konstantin Petoukhov ǮLocating a Theoretical Framework for the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Charles Taylor or Nancy Fraserǯ ȋʹͲͳʹȌ ͵ )ntl )ndig Pol J ͳ, 3. 
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misrecognition.  Similarly, the inquest will often be seen by the family (and any community 
that has an interest in a death) as part of a wider struggle for justice on different levels.  
This struggle may continue after the inquest, with demands for a prosecution, or changes in 
the law or in procedure, including in investigatory processes themselves.61  After a state-
exculpatory inquest verdict, a family and/or community may campaign for a re-calibration 
of what is considered morally acceptable in the way the state and its agents interact with 
individuals and communities—a common feature in the aftermath of inquests into the 
deaths of vulnerable adults or children in custody.62  In short, recognition and the struggle 
for recognition does not begin, and is unlikely to end with a truth commissionǯs report or 
an inquestǯs verdict. 
 
8.3.2.2 Restorative justice and ubuntu 
In pursuing an alternative form of justice, the South African TRC justified its approach 
by relying on the traditional Xhosa concept of Ǯubuntuǯ and by linking this to restorative 
justice.  Haldemann translates ubuntu as literally meaning ǲ) am because you areǳ, from the Xhosa saying that ǲa person is a person through persons.ǳ63  This is evocative of Charles Taylorǯs and Axel (onnethǯs theories about the place of intersubjective recognition in the 
development of self.64  Referencing Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Haldemann describes 
ubuntu as referring ǲto a philosophy of humanism, placing a premium on harmony, friendliness and community.ǳ65  Archbishop Tutu played an important role in promoting 
the concept and connecting it to notions of restorative justice.  In particular, he convinced 
many South Africans that the structure and purpose of the TRC did not sacrifice justice, but 
was grounded in moral principle.  He explained: 
                                                 
61 Such as police being allowed to confer with each other when writing their statements about the 
circumstances of a death. 
62 e.g., the efforts to amend the Secure Training Centre Rules, following inquests into the deaths of Alan Rickwood and Gareth Myatt.  See JC(R, ǮEleventh Reportǯ ȋSession ʹͲͲ͹-8, House of Commons and House of Lords, February ʹͲͲͺȌ, Chapter ʹ ǮPhysical Control in Careǯ. 
63 Frank (aldemann, ǮAnother Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognitionǯ, Selected Works of 
Frank Haldemann (Selected Works 2008) 4 <http://tinyurl.com/zfkuodt> accessed 7 September 2013. 
64 See 7.3.2.2 above. 
65 Haldemann (n 63) 4. 
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We contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was 
characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence.  Here the central concern is 
not retribution or punishment, but, in the spirit of Ubuntu, the healing of 
breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. 
This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, 
who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he 
or she has injured by his or her offence.66 
Haldemann gives his definition of restorative justice as ǲan interpersonal, community-
oriented way for solving conflicts, seeking to restore the dignity of both victims and offender by reintegrating them into respectful and healthy communities.ǳ67  In this way restorative justice ǲcomports closely with a notion of reconciliation and social harmony.ǳ68  
Unfortunately Ǯrestorative justiceǯ tends to be evoked in this context as a catch-all term to 
describe all non-retributive or non-compensatory justice aims.  However, the relationship 
between restorative goals and retributive, punitive and compensatory justice is arguably 
more subtle than this.69 
Kiss cautiously supports so-called restorative justice approaches to justice during 
transitions—albeit with certain important caveats.70  As a concept, however, restorative 
justice can be hard to pin down.  Kiss, for example, asks: 
[I]s restorative justice truly a distinctive type or dimension of justice, one that is 
different from, and in some cases, more important than, retributive justice? If so 
can restorative justice be promoted through a truth commission? Or, as some 
critics charge, is restorative justice both conceptually muddled and politically 
illegitimate?71 
                                                 
66 Quoted in Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 677. 
67 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 677. 
68 ibid. 
69 This more amorphous relationship between punitive/retributive and non-retributive/non-punitive 
justice forms can be seen in restorative justice practices within the criminal justice system in England and Wales.  See Adam Crawford and Tim Newburn, ǮRecent Developments in Restorative Justice for Young People in England and Wales: Community Participation and Representationǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ Ͷʹ Brit J Criminol Ͷ͹͸; Allison Morris, ǮCritiquing the Critics: A Brief Response to Critics of Restorative Justiceǯ ȋʹͲͲʹȌ Ͷʹ Brit J Criminol ͷͻ͸. 
70 For example, she argues that restorative justice does not, and cannot, ǲrefute the legitimacy of retributive justice.ǳȋKiss ȋn ͳͷȌ ͹ͳȌ 
71 ibid, 70. 
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Restorative justice is perhaps better understood as an approach to rectificatory justice 
where affirmative justice forms are shaped by a broader external transformative justice 
telos.  In states undergoing transitions, the telos is typically the creation of the conditions 
necessary for peace, reconciliation and the restoration of healthy and just intersubjective 
relationships.  The manner and/or degree to which retributive or punitive justice forms are 
pursued may either help or hinder the furtherance of these transformative goals.  Where a 
restorative justice approach is contemplated, punitive justice usually takes a milder form 
than may otherwise have been contemplated, but is not necessarily absent altogether.  
Offenders may still be punished enough to satisfy victims that: a) their suffering is taken 
seriously by the state (solidarity); and bȌ the seriousness of the wrong ȋand societyǯs 
condemnation of it) will be impressed upon the perpetrator.  But there is usually a more 
conscious effort to ensure that any punishment is not so severe that it misrecognises the 
humanity of offenders and risks also making them victims, or that it compromises 
conciliatory efforts and/or efforts to rehabilitate the offender.  Such approaches tend to include other ways of recognising victimsǯ suffering, additional to, or as an alternative to 
punitive/retributive remedies.  Victims may, for example, be placed more firmly at the 
centre of proceedings or mediated exchanges between victims and perpetrators may be 
used to impress upon the latter the personal and human consequences of their actions. 
In states undergoing transitions, we have seen that the retributive/punitive element 
may be removed from justice approaches entirely for political and pragmatic reasons.  This 
heightens the need to find alternative methods for addressing past wrongs and recognising 
affected individuals and communities. 
 
8.3.2.3 Truth as justice 
Aside from the often problematic use of Ǯrestorative justiceǯ as a catch-all term to 
describe any approach that does not include retributive justice, the literature that explores 
the normative value of truth commissions can present other terminological difficulties.  
One is the exclusive association by some authors of Ǯjusticeǯ with retributive or punitive 
justice—to the extent that even the prospect of compensatory justice is sometimes ignored.  
As Allen points out, ǲwhen it is argued or conceded […] that justice has been sacrificed to 
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some other goal, the assumption seems to be that justice must be understood in terms of retribution.ǳ72 
This can create conceptual difficulties when treating with the work of some authors.  
Stanley Cohen, for example, makes some important observations about truth commissions 
and restorative justice processes, including the nature of the relationship between truth 
discovery, accountability and justice.73  But while he defines his terms loosely, he appears 
to exclusively associate accountability and justice with retributive justice.  In so doing, he divides justice during transitions into ǲthe truth phaseǳ, and the ǲaccountabilityǳ or ǲjustice phaseǳ.74 
Despite this, Cohen is obviously aware that truth has intrinsic as well as instrumental 
value: 
For the survivors of the old regime, whether active agents in bringing about its 
collapse or mere historical observers, the primary drive behind truth-telling […] 
lies in the value of truth itself.  After generations of denials, lies, cover-ups, and 
evasions, many people have a powerful, almost obsessive desire to know exactly 
what happened.75 
He notes that ǲPeople do not necessarily want their former torturers to go to jail, but 
they do want to see the truth establishedǳ,76 and, referencing Weschler, that ǲthe demand for truth is often more urgently felt than the demand for justice.ǳ77  The assumption that 
truth and justice are only instrumentally linked leads Cohen (again referencing Weschler) to conclude that truth is ǲa mysterious, powerful, almost magical notion.ǳ78  Below it is 
argued that recognition theory can provide the basis for a relatively straightforward 
                                                 
72 Allen (1999) (ch 6, n 41) 326. 
73 )n particular, he emphasises the significance of truth for the ǲspecial sensitivity of victimsǳ, and the fact 
that its public acknowledgment is as important as its discovery: particularly when victims may have 
previously been branded liars, or faced narratives that attempt to justify what happened to them (Cohen 
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74 ibid, 11. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid, 13. 
77 ibid, 18. 
78 ibid. 
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explanation that demystifies the strength of demands for truth, and its official and public 
acknowledgement.79 ǮRestorative justiceǯ is a convenient label for the benefits associated with truth 
discovery, and processes where victims are given a voice.  But, as argued above, it is wrong 
to view restorative justice as a mutually exclusive alternative to punitive (if not retributive) 
justice.  Relying on restorative justice as an explanation for the normative justice values 
fulfilled by truth commissions arguably only provides a limited and thin understanding of 
the intrinsic value of participatory rights in narrative formation processes, and a reliable 
official and public truth about past wrongdoing.80 
Other writers on justice during transitions recognise the relationship between truth 
and justice can be multifaceted.  Like Cohen, they recognise that truth is instrumental to 
certain justice forms—and not just in the sense that it identifies perpetrators who can then 
be punished, or victims who can then be compensated.  Kiss, for example, suggests that truth also ǲserves justice by overcoming fear and distrust and by breaking the cycles of violence and oppression that characterise profoundly unjust societies.ǳ81  And Allen argues that the value of truth in the South African TRC is both ǲrelated to compensatory justice and 
to the creation of a political culture, in which reflection on justice and, in particular on injustice, figures much more predominantly.ǳ82  For Kiss, by establishing and officially acknowledging ǲas concrete a picture as possibleǳ of the injustice of the past, the South 
African TRC aimed to build a bridge between a ǲdeeply divided past of untold suffering and injusticeǳ, and ǲa future founded on the recognition of human rights.ǳ83  But more than this, 
Kiss argues that truth can itself effectively constitute a form of justice.  Her explanation for 
what Cohen considers so mysterious—the subjective intrinsic value of truth and 
acknowledgement—is very simple: 
                                                 
79 See 8.3.2.4 and 9.5 below. 
80 This appears to be the thrust of (aldemannǯs criticism of restorative justice, which he sees as focusing 
on the instrumental value of processes for achieving peace (see 8.3.2.4 below) . 
81 Kiss (n 15) 71. 
82 Allen (1999) (ch 6, n 41) 332 (emphasis added). 
83 Elizabeth Kiss quoting the South African TRC Final Report, I, chap 5, para 89, in Kiss (n 15). 
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Truth and justice are intrinsically and not just instrumentally connected.  Those 
whose lives were shattered are entitled to have their suffering acknowledged and their dignity affirmed, to know that their ǲpain is real and worthy of attention.ǳ84 
This can be achieved when victims are listened to, their experience deferred to, and 
their truth acknowledged by an official body that represents wider society, such as a truth 
commission.  And while Allen concedes that punitive justice may have been limited by the South African TRC, justice was nevertheless ǲembodied […] in the form of symbolic acknowledgmentǳ.85 
The public and official acknowledgment of the victimsǯ truth is also an act whereby the 
state and its agents place themselves at the level of, and in solidarity with victims: be those 
primary or secondary victims, or all those who were part of a community brutalised and 
threatened by a regime.  Kiss explains: […W]e have an obligation to listen to give [victims] the opportunity to relate 
their own accounts of the violations of which they are the victim.  Justice 
requires that we treat people as ends in themselves.  We affirm the dignity and 
agency of those who have been brutalised by attending to their voices and 
making their stories a part of the historical record.86 
Kiss develops this Kantian basis for the intrinsic value of truth and acknowledgment 
centring on the needs of victims, by invoking Nancy Fraserǯs approach to justice as 
recognition, where ǲthe practices of a victim-centred justice seek to recognise the dignity and voice of those who have suffered.ǳ87 
Justice as recognition entails acknowledging the distinctive identity of the other, 
striving to repair damage done to him or her through violence, stigmatisation, 
and disrespect, and including his or her stories in our collective histories.  The 
practices developed by the [South African] TRC offer important insights into 
what justice as recognition requires.  Thus the theory and practice of truth 
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commissions has led to a nuanced idea of victim-centred justice, and to a new 
repertoire of practices by which to honour the dignity of former victims of 
oppression.88 
 
8.3.2.4 Justice as recognition as a normative basis for justice strategies found in truth 
commissions 
Elizabeth Kiss is not alone in invoking justice as recognition as the normative basis for 
the aims pursued by truth commissions.89  Andre du Toit, for example, argues that the South African TRCǯs ǲconstitutive moral conceptions of Ǯtruth and reconciliationǯ may be explicated […] in terms of truth as acknowledgment and justice as recognitionǳ.90  Allen 
also outlines the non-retributory ǲjustice elementsǳ within the South African TRC as 
including justice as recognition.91  And Konstantin Petoukhov explores ǲthe potential of the 
[Canadian] TRC to remedy the injustice associated with misrecognition.ǳ92  In doing so, he argues that the ǲincorporation of the theory of recognition in the evaluation of Canadaǯs 
TRC allows for a more advanced understanding about what needs to be done in order to restore the cultural identities of survivors.ǳ93 
Frank Haldemann takes a victim-centred approach to justice as recognition.94  His 
starting point is (onnethǯs argument that the measure of the justice of a society is ǲthe 
degree of its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition in which personal identity 
formation, and hence individual self-realisation, can proceed sufficiently well.ǳ95  He 
recognises that recognition theory is, first and foremost, a theory of social (or primary) 
justice, but evokes its rectificatory justice implications for transitional contexts. 
[Recognition c]ertainly requires the just redistribution of resources and rights.  This, however, is not the whole story.  […A] transitional politics of recognition 
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must reach beyond distributive systems of goods in the society to investigate 
the full dimension of injustice and the sense of victimization it arouses.  The 
salient point is that we cannot measure the harm of social and political evils 
simply by considering the tangible deprivation of social goods (liberty, 
opportunity, income, etc.).  Evil doing, such as torture or rape, does not only 
cause the victim physical suffering, but it betokens a profound lack of concern—
a kind of symbolic devaluation that is not reducible to the absence of goods.  From this perspective, ǲit is not only unjust to deprive people of their social 
rights but it is also unjust to make them feel the fury and resentment of being humiliated.ǳ96 
Haldemann focuses on the danger of victims of a previous regime suffering further 
harms during transitions, as a result of further misrecognition:97 harms reminiscent of the 
second-order moral harms described in Chapter ͸ above.  (e argues that ǲin the aftermath of a mass atrocityǳ the potential for victims of the previous regime to be misrecognised98 ǲis 
the crucial issue for transitional justice.ǳ99  As such, the biggest threat to justice in these 
circumstances is any attempt to ignore or forget past atrocities in order to rush a society 
towards a contrived normality.  The vital point for Haldemann is that failing to address the 
past is not just wrong-footed because—as many argue—it impedes a societyǯs ability to 
genuinely move forward.100  Rather, it is intrinsically immoral because it causes victims 
further (second-order moralȌ harm: ǲthe victims of injustice are subjected to the symbolic 
injury of being ignored—of being rendered passive, powerless, voiceless, or simply invisible in matters that deeply affect them as human beings.ǳ101 
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[F]ailing to recognize past wrongs exacerbates the trauma […].  )t couples the 
pain of those experiences with the disbelief of the wider community.  In cases of 
outright denial or partial acknowledgment, the initial wound of insult and humiliation develops into a ǲsecond wound of silenceǳ—a deep sense of hurt stemming from the feeling that ǲpeople condone the wrongs and do not care about the painful results.ǳ102 (aldemannǯs approach can be characterised as a negative morality one, in which recognition focuses on ǲthe reduction of humiliation and moral crueltyǳ.103  It is informed by Margalitǯs exploration of the human capacity for non-physical suffering. 
It seems to me the best way of construing this claim is to advance a negative justification for recognition based on Margalitǯs argument that prevention of 
cruelty, including mental cruelty, is at the very heart of morality.  As Margalit 
holds, and surely correctly, human beings are susceptible to symbolic suffering 
that involves no physical pain, and there is nothing metaphorical about the 
mental pain that certain acts of symbolic meaning can inflict.104 One of the difficulties with (aldemannǯs take on recognition is that he presents it as an 
approach that effectively competes with restorative justice and retributive justice.  In 
particular, he distinguishes his (justice as recognition) concern for the needs of victims, 
from that of restorative justice, by arguing that the latter prioritises victims only in so far as 
it advances the wider project of restoring social harmony to a community.  In contrast, 
justice as recognition requires victims to be placed at the centre of processes for their own 
sake: Recognition […] is essentially individual-centred.  Unlike restorative approaches 
to justice, which emphasize the restoration of communal bonds, recognition focuses primarily on the individualǯs sense of injustice and threatened self-
                                                 
102 ibid, 693, quoting Trudy Govier, ǮWhat )s Acknowledgement and Why )s )t )mportant?ǯ in Prager, Carol 
and Govier (eds), Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts (Wilfred Laurier University Press 2003) 83. 
103 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 692. 
104 ibid, 693–4. 
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respect, drawing a clear line between such matters of justice and other moral 
concerns (including democracy, peace, or reconciliation).105 Despite (aldemannǯs claim at the outset—that recognition ǲmanifests itself at different levelsǳ, and ǲ[c]ertainly requires the just redistribution of resources and rightsǳ—106 the 
exclusion of democracy, peace and reconciliation from the remit of recognition arguably 
misunderstands the scope of recognition theory. 
Other writers take a broader view of the significance of recognition theory in this 
context.  Elizabeth Stanley in particular argues that the individual crimes committed by 
previous regimes need to be understood in their broader social contexts.  This is not to 
invoke an apologist attitude to past crimes, but to better understand the true depth, 
character and pervasiveness of harms committed.  )n this sense, ǲrecognition that acknowledges cultural devaluation alongside a lack of parityǳ is also important.107  Stanley 
explains: ǲiȌ cultural representations are central to how state crimes come to be legitimised and 
how those involved (as perpetrators or victimsȌ come to be viewed and responded toǳ; and ǲiiȌ victims of state crime are also likely to face wider disadvantages within their own societies […] and if these arrangements remain unaddressed, victims will be more likely to 
face continued injustice.ǳ108 
This suggests that recognition theory can provide a moral basis for transformative, 
rather than just affirmative-focused approaches, to justice during transitions. Addressing the South African TRC, Allenǯs account, like (aldemannǯs, often 
understandably focuses on the justice needs of apartheidǯs main victims.  But unlike 
Haldemann, he also creates a broader space for recognition regarding its relevance to 
addressing tertiary harms, such as the wider denial of citizensǯ ǲresponsible agencyǳ by the 
apartheid regime.  Part of the significance of the South African TRC for Allen, was that it 
                                                 
105 ibid, 678. 
106 ibid, 679. 
107 Stanley (n 35) 584. 
108 ibid. 
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symbolically acknowledged the responsibility of ǲapartheidǯs framersǳ and the broader 
injustice of apartheid legislation, rather than just individual acts of abuse or violence.  In 
particular, he refers to the importance of the sectoral hearings, which addressed the 
pervasive nature of injustice under apartheid.109 
Allen also arguably shows a better understanding of the wider symbolic significance of 
victims being adequately recognised during transitions.  Here, by attending to those who 
have suffered harm at the hands of the state, we recognise a broader equality between 
citizens and state actors, thus generally ǲexpressing a public commitment to respect the 
basic rights of all citizens and to make the grievances of citizens known rather than suppressing  them.ǳ110  Allen emphasises that: […] rights can be claimed in order to protect others and that even when we 
claim them for ourselves, we are, in a sense, vindicating them for all.  As Shklar observes, ǲ) have a rightǳ speaks not only for ǲmeǳ but for all who would protest 
and enjoin. […B]y drawing attention to the evil consequences resulting from the distortions 
of the legal framework of apartheid and the officially sanctioned transgressions 
of law, the TRC acknowledges and calls attention to the importance of justice 
and the rule of law.111 
Truth commissions recognising victims/survivors as victims/survivors, is an act of 
solidarity between a newly-styled state apparatus and individuals and communities that 
suffered under the previous regime.  A crucial element of this form of recognition is the public nature of the narrative, where, as Petoukhov observes, ǲthe public sphere serves as a 
site where recognition amongst equals may take place.ǳ112 
                                                 
109 Allen (1999) (ch 6, n 41) 330–1. 
110 ibid, 331. 
111 ibid, 329–1. Similar dynamics are arguably at work in inquests.  The fact that there is an enhanced permanent forum ȋi.e. the ǲMiddletonǳ inquest with a juryȌ investigating all use-of-force deaths at the hands 
of the state recognises the seriousness with which we view such deaths. 
112 Petoukhov is here discussing Charles Taylorǯs conception of recognition ȋPetoukhov ȋn ͸ͲȌȌ. Allen observes that this takes place ǲin a context where lawǯs equal recognition of all responsible agents has been grossly distortedǳ by the previous regime ȋAllen (1999) (ch 6, n 41) 330–331). 
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There are times when Allen, like Haldemann, describes justice as recognition as if it is just one in an arsenal of different, potentially competing ȋin Allenǯs wordsȌ Ǯelementsǯ of 
justice, that include retributive justice, compensatory justice and even restorative 
justice.113  But he also seems to intuit that there is something slightly more amorphous and 
pervasive to justice as recognition, that permeates, and to a certain extent defines, other Ǯelementsǯ of justice.114  In particular, he acknowledges the connection between recognition 
and punitive justice.115 
Allen does this by describing two type of recognition addressed by the TRC.  The first was ǲlegal recognitionǳ, which is the recognition ǲexpressed in legal procedures and in the 
notion of rightsǳ.116  ǲLegal justiceǳ—by which Allen appears to mean criminal 
prosecutions—normally ǲcapturesǳ this type of recognition.  On the other hand, while the 
TRC, did not provide ǲlegal justiceǳ, Allen argues that it nevertheless provided a degree of ǲlegal recognitionǳ that constituted a ǲpartial alternativeǳ to it.  By demonstrating and condemning the ǲconsequences of a lack of public commitment to justice and the rule of lawǳ, the TRC underlined ǲthe importance of such a commitment.ǳ117 
There is an obvious paradox here.  How can we demonstrate a commitment to justice 
when we replace the standard method for achieving rectificatory justice (criminal prosecutionsȌ with a ǲpartial alternativeǳ?  Allen admits that ǳaspects of justice are indeed 
sacrificed in the process,ǳ but insists that it is not ǲsimply discarded.ǳ118  Other justice 
elements were also at work in the TRC, including the second form of recognition described by Allen.  This is neither captured by, nor auxiliary to ǲlegal justiceǳ, but is separate from it.  
It was provided for by the TRC through its focus on victims and their experiences.119 
                                                 
113 Rather it could be argued that punitive, retributive, restorative, compensatory and procedural justice, 
are all different ways of giving due recognition to interested parties. 
114 The terminology in Allenǯs account is not always clear: in particular the relationship between ǲjusticeǳ and ǲlegal justiceǳ, and exactly what for him defines ǲjustice as recognitionǳ as a concept. 
115 See 7.3.2.2 above. 
116 This appears to bear a close relationship to the second of (onnethǯs tripartite theory of recognition, which is concerned with the development of individualsǯ self-respect through equal rights. 
117 Specifically in the form of the hearings held by the Human Rights Violations Committee. Allen (1999) 
(ch 6, n 41) 330. 
118 ibid, 338. 
119 In contrast to many criminal justice systems which focus on the offender. 
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[G]iving victims an opportunity to tell their stories demonstrates that they are 
now admitted to the category of responsible agency from which the predecessor 
regime attempted to exclude them.  It is a form of recognition that 
acknowledged the historical fact of exclusion from legal recognition and seeks 
to reverse the imposition of passive status, by encouraging victims to act in 
public by telling their stories. Allen points out that the ǲcentral significanceǳ given to this type of recognition in the 
TRC does not happen in courts of law.120  Therefore, while truth commissions may fail to 
fulfil certain justice forms as fully as other processes, the implication here is that they can 
fulfil other justice forms which prosecutions cannot. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
While a degree of caution is necessary regarding the strength of any analogy drawn, we 
saw that truth commissions in states undergoing transitions, share certain quantitative 
aims with processes engaged in the aftermath of use-of-force deaths at the hands of the 
state in non-transitional contexts.  They seek to create an official and reliable public truth, 
typically about circumstances that include the coercive use of force by state actors against 
citizens.  They do so generally as an end in itself, rather than as an instrumental step 
towards retributive, punitive or compensatory justice forms.121  And they often seek to 
involve those affected by state action in the formation of such narratives.  However, unlike 
inquests and inquiries, truth commissions have received relatively intense scrutiny in 
terms of the degree to which they fulfil actual justice functions.  Given the overlap in both 
their subject matter (usually coercive interaction between state and citizen), and their 
quantitative aims, these analyses and interpretations of the normative justice ends of truth 
commissions are informative for our purposes. 
Most commonly, the justice function performed by truth commissions is identified by 
writers on the subject with so-called restorative justice.  We saw that under this mantel, the 
                                                 
120 Allen ȋͳͻͻͻȌ ȋch ͸, n ͶͳȌ ͵͵ͳ. )t is presumed that by ǲcourts of lawǳ, Allen means criminal courts. 
121 Although Kiss argues that there is some punitive aspect to publicly condemning perpetrators or 
subjecting them to questioning in a public forum (Kiss (n 15) 77).  
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benefits of social truth discovery processes and giving victims a voice, have been described 
and particularised.  In Part 1, we saw that the depth of explanations for the normative 
purposes of inquests and inquiries tends to be limited to the notion of ǲaccountabilityǳ.  )n 
contrast, interpretations of the normative function of truth commissions go relatively deep, 
particularising their role in addressing many harms that correspond to those identified at 
6.4 above, as well as addressing issues of legitimacy that we raised at 7.2.3 above. 
While a contemplation of the particularised benefits of inclusive truth discovery 
processes and providing victims with a voice are useful, it was argued that their 
identification with restorative justice does not always capture the moral imperatives that 
arise following deaths at the hands of the state.  As such, relying on often quite vague 
notions of restorative justice as a way of understanding the normative function of truth 
commissions can be restrictive.  Some authors have turned to recognition theory, and 
justice as recognition, to provide a thicker understanding of the moral imperatives partially 
fulfilled by victim-centred truth discovery processes.  In particular, the language of 
recognition seems to fit well with the state/citizen intersubjective paradigm that envelopes 
and permeates aspects of transitional scenarios.  And it appears well-suited for 
interpreting and articulating justice strategies that might be fulfilled by inclusive narrative 
formation processes. 
The most effective way of characterising the function of justice as recognition in 
transitional scenarios is not uncontroversial, however.  We saw that Haldemann presents a 
limited idea of justice as recognition that focuses on the needs of individual and particular victims of wrongdoing, but does not speak to ǲother moral concernsǳ such as peace-
building, reconciliation or democracy.122  However, a need to recognise the interests of the 
particular victims of previous regimes is not inconsistent with recognition theory also 
providing a moral imperative for ends associated with democracy and peace-building and 
reconciliation.  Indeed, these ends are arguably crucial aspects of justice as recognition in 
these circumstances. Without functioning democratic institutions, a stateǯs relationship 
with its citizens is characterised by misrecognition in several ways.  Also, if the moral 
                                                 
122 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 678. 
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imperative of recognition theory is ǲto secure conditions of mutual recognition in which 
personal identity formation, and hence individual self-realisation, can proceed sufficiently wellǳ,123 then sustainable and healthy intersubjective relationships based on mutual 
recognition cannot be achieved in the absence of reconciliation and peace.124 
A critical theoretical approach based on recognition theory is therefore preferred over 
one based on restorative justice, and it is through this lens that the processes that are the 
focus of the thesis are considered in the following chapter.  In particular, it is felt that the 
characteristics and normative values of restorative justice described above can be 
expressed and explained as effectively, if not more effectively, in the language of 
recognition theory. 
                                                 
123 ibid, 687. 
124 du Toit (n 30) 123. 
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Chapter 9 
 
A Context-Specific Conception of Open Justice 
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9.1 Introduction 
Throughout the thesis, the focus has been on deaths at the hands of the police, or in 
police or prison custody.  It has been argued that these types of deaths have particular constitutional significance given that ǲwhat is at stake […] is nothing less than popular confidence in the stateǯs monopoly on the use of force.ǳ1  The practice—in terms of the 
procedural manifestation of openness in the aftermath of a death, and the rationales given 
for openness—suggests that open justice in this context is best understood very differently 
from how it has traditionally been understood in criminal and civil justice contexts.  
Openness is obviously considered very important in the aftermath of use-of-force deaths at 
the hands of the state.  All of the investigating bodies that were examined (Police, PPO, 
IPCC, coronersǯ courts and inquiries under the IA 2005) appear to self-consciously 
underline their openness and justify any limits they may place on it.2  In preliminary 
investigations, the commitment to openness, and the justifications for any limitations, can 
be seen in the various policy documents, reports, terms of reference, statutory guidance 
and memoranda of understanding.3  In modern inquests and inquiries any limits placed on 
openness (where permitted by legislation), tend to be justified on a case-by-case basis by 
the coroner or inquiry chairman whilst underlining commitments to keep closure to a 
minimum.4 
                                                 
1 Ramsahai (ch 1, n 21) 325.  See above at 2.15, 4.5.2 and 7.2.3 
2 See Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
3 See Chapter 3. 
4 See Chapter 5 above.  
Sir Christopher (olland opened the Azelle Rodney inquiry acknowledging the existence of a ǲproblemǳ that bore upon ǲthe potential for public hearing of this matterǳ, but underlined that his ǮTerms of Referenceǯ 
specified the inquiry be ǲpublicǳ, and his ǲintention to conduct as much of the inquiry as possible in publicǳ 
(Azelle Rodney Inquiry (ch 5, n 155) 3-4). 
Neither the Litvinenko inquiry nor the 7/7 bombings inquests involved deaths at the hands of the state, 
but they are illustrative of this attitude. In opening the Litvinenko inquiry, Sir Robert Owen admitted some evidence would have to be heard in closed hearings.  (owever, he emphasised that ǲsuch hearings are highly exceptional and rightly so.ǳ  (e was at pains to explain the PII process, and that the evidence concerned was exceptionally sensitive ȋLitvinenko )nquiry, ǮTranscript of Suspension of )nquest and Opening of the )nquiryǯ, 
31 July 2014 <http://tinyurl.com/z96d4gj> accessed 28 January 2016, 15-16). 
And in opening the inquest into the deaths caused by the 7/7 bombings, Lady Justice Hallett stated: 
 ǲThe approach that ) have taken [with disclosure] is that all relevant material received by the inquest 
team should be made available to those interested persons who have requested it.  I have asked my team to interpret what is relevant broadly […] )tǯs in the interests of everyone that these inquests are conducted in as open a manner as possible […]ǳ ȋ)nquest into London Bombings of ͹ July ʹͲͲͷ, Transcript of (earing ͳͳ 
October 2010, Morning session <http://tinyurl.com/h2n755q> accessed 28 January 2016, 5). 
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Conceptions of open justice in the criminal and civil justice contexts are generally made 
up of three elements: a general principle; the rationales behind that principle; and an 
account of how it is manifested in practice, including any exceptions to it.5  Such 
conceptions are based around a basic procedural principle that court proceedings and 
outcomes should be accessible to the public and the press.6  They generally differ only on 
questions of how this principle should be balanced against other interests7 and which 
rationales for the principle are the most important—including whether some of the more 
peripheral potential rationales for openness are, in practice, really motivating factors at 
all.8 
As far as inquests are concerned, there is nothing inherently problematic about such a 
procedural principle of open justice—quite the opposite in fact.  Inquests are court 
proceedings, and the practice in inquests certainly appears to bear the principle out.9  )ndeed, theoretically, coronersǯ courts arguably do so much more consistently than the 
criminal and civil courts.10  As for inquiries under the IA 2005, the principle needs to be 
modified slightly because inquiries are not court proceedings.  But again, the limited 
practice in this area—so far at least—generally seems to bear out the fact that where 
inquiries perform an analogous function to inquests into use-of-force deaths at the hands of 
the state, they broadly conform to the general principle that the proceedings and their 
results be open to public scrutiny.11 
                                                 
5 Neuberger (ch 1, n 1); Jaconelli (ch 1, n 7). 
6 )t was seen that Lord Neuberger described the procedural principle simply as being ǲthat which goes on 
in court and what the courts decide is open to scrutinyǳ ȋch ͳ, n ͳȌ. 
7 See, e.g., JC(R, ǮThe Justice and Security Green Paper: Twenty-Fourth Report of Session 2010-ͳʹǯ ȋ(ouse 
of Commons 2012) HL Paper 286; HC 1777. 
8 See Sharon Rodrick on free speech rationales for open justice (ch 1, n 6); and Jaconelli (ch 1, n 7) 29-69. 
9 A recent exception being the (now quashed) inquest into the death of Poppi Worthington. Cumbria 
County Council v M (Application for Rehearing) (No 5) [2015] EWFC 35. 
10 As seen above, the public can only be excluded from attending inquests on national security grounds 
(C(I)R 2013, r 11). There should be increased consistency with practice (practice in coroners courts in the 
past varied significantly depending on the coroner), since the appointment of a Chief Coroner in September ʹͲͳʹ ȋcurrently ((J Peter Thornton QCȌ.  (e produces ǲGuidanceǳ and ǲLaw Sheetsǳ to help standardise best 
practice across England and Wales (ǮCourts and Tribunals Judiciary | Office of the Chief Coronerǯ 
<http://tinyurl.com/z74ebwv>  accessed 18 November 2015). 
11 Even the inquiry into the death of Alexander Litvinenko has heard a lot of the evidence in public (see 
<https://www.litvinenkoinquiry.org/> accessed on 7 December 2015). 
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The real difficulty with applying traditional conceptions of open justice in this context is 
that—even if we confine our analysis to inquests—there are fundamental conceptual 
differences in the meaning and function of openness in these circumstances when 
compared to the civil and criminal justice contexts.  First, the manner in which inquests are 
open to the active participation of members of the public means that the procedural 
manifestation of the principle does not just differ by a question of degree, but in important 
substantive respects.  But perhaps even more significantly, the primary rationales for 
openness in investigations into deaths at the hands of the police, or in police or prison 
custody, appear very different to those typically given for openness in the criminal and civil 
justice contexts.  These rationales appear to reflect an intuition that there are important 
normative reasons for openness and accountability in these circumstances unrelated to the 
instrumental value of helping secure retributive or compensatory justice.  We saw in the 
last chapter that the same intuition also appears in the literature and practice regarding 
justice during transitions.  This literature has gone some way towards identifying potential 
normative bases for claims that truth discovery processes that look into (amongst other 
things) deaths at the hands of the state, but are not concerned with retributive justice, may 
still fulfil important justice needs.  It was argued that the most convincing of these 
normative explanations focuses on recognition theory and justice as recognition.12 
This chapter outlines the elements of a context-specific conception of open justice 
beginning with a summary of the findings from Part 1, in terms of the general form that 
openness takes in the aftermath of a use-of-force death at the hands of the state, and the 
rationales given for such openness.  This practice reveals a level of consistency regarding 
openness which, it is argued, reflects three potential procedural principles that vary in 
reach and breadth.  It is further argued that one of these can appropriately form the basis 
for a context-specific conception of open justice.  We will have, then, in reverse: a basic 
procedural principle of open justice; a summary of the main rationales given in practice for 
that principle; and a description of how the principle is manifested in practice, including 
any exceptions to the general rule.  These three elements make up an interpretive, context-
                                                 
12 Although it was also argued that some of this literature tends to take an unnecessarily narrow view of 
the implications of recognition theory for transitional justice approaches (see 8.3.2.4 above). 
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specific account of open justice in the aftermath of a death at the hands of the police, or in 
police or prison custody.  However, such an account is still missing an explication of the 
link between openness and justice: a link implicit in the term Ǯopen justiceǯ.  The chapter 
therefore concludes by drawing upon the justice theory discussed in Part 2 of the thesis, to 
argue that there is a very real link between openness and justice in these 
circumstances13—albeit one that is very different in nature to that which underpins open 
justice in the criminal and civil contexts. 
 
9.2 The procedural manifestation of openness 
Part 1 of the thesis gave an overview of the practice of openness in the aftermath of a 
death at the hands of the police or in police or prison custody, including the manner in 
which the circumstances of such deaths are opened up to public scrutiny and the rationales 
that are given for doing this.  Chapter 3 looked at police and PPO investigations into deaths 
in prisons,14 and IPCC investigations into deaths at the hands of the police.15  Chapters 4 
and 5 looked at inquests, and inquiries under the IA 200516 (where these perform a 
function analogous to Article 2 compliant inquests).  In examining the procedural 
manifestation of openness, the thesis set out the practice of openness as manifested 
through these various investigations, rather than just the narrower question of the practice 
of openness within those investigations.  This took in three aspects of openness in the 
aftermath of these types of death.  The first is when investigations will actually be held in 
these circumstances.17  The second is the scope of the investigations.18  As argued above, 
what is not investigated—because there is no investigation, or because something falls 
outside of the scope of the investigation—is not opened up to scrutiny.   The third aspect of 
openness concerns the various procedures within these investigatory processes, which 
either allow or restrict public participation in the scrutiny of both the circumstances under 
                                                 
13 Drawing in particular on recognition theory and Rawlsǯs conception of political legitimacy. 
14 See 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 above. 
15 See 3.3 above. 
16 See 5.2 above. 
17 See 3.2 (police and PPO), 3.3 (IPCC), 5.1 (inquests) and 5.2 (inquiries) above. 
18 See 3.2.1 (police investigations), 3.2.2 (PPO investigations), 3.3.2 (IPCC investigations), 5.1.2.2 
(Middleton inquests) and 5.2.1.3 (Inquiries under the IA 2005). 
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investigation and the investigatory processes themselves.19  The most interesting aspect of 
the procedural manifestation of openness in this context is that in all of the different 
categories of investigation considered there is a participatory component to openness.  
Effectively, therefore, Ǯpublicly investigatedǯ includes a requirement that members of the 
public (invariably the family of the deceased and, in the case of inquests, also the jury), 
have the opportunity to actively participate in the investigatory process to some degree.20 
 
9.2.1 When investigations are held 
9.2.1.1 When preliminary investigations are held 
Part 1 showed that there is a lot more to the opening up of the circumstances of a death 
than just the inquest or inquiry.21  We saw in Chapter 3 that all prison deaths are treated as 
potential homicides by the police and are investigated accordingly.22  If and when the police 
and CPS conclude that the death was not the result of criminal wrongdoing or that there is 
insufficient evidence to prosecute anyone, the police may continue to investigate the death 
on behalf of the coroner.  All prison deaths are also investigated by the PPO, and in most 
cases the relevant primary health care trust will, in co-ordination with the PPO, conduct a Clinical Review of the prisonerǯs healthcare whilst in prison.23  Finally, the prison itself will 
often carry out a relatively limited investigation to determine whether there are any 
immediate and continuing risks to other prisoners and staff.  Normally, coroners rely on 
these preliminary investigations to collect evidence and identify lines of inquiry, but 
coroners may also direct their own officers to gather evidence and take witness statements 
in preparation for the inquest. 
Chapter 3 recounted how where a death has occurred at the hands of the police or in 
police custody, the IPCC will carry out an independent investigation into the death.24  Again, 
a coroner or inquiry chairman may instruct an officer, or a team employed specifically for 
                                                 
19 See 3.2.1.1 (police), 3.2.2.1 (PPO), 3.3.3 (IPCC), 5.2.1 (inquests and inquiries under IA 2005) 
20 In inquests and inquiries, specifically in the eliciting of and testing of evidence. 
21 See Chapter 3 above. 
22 See 3.2.1 above. 
23 See 3.2.2 above. 
24 See 3.3 above. 
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an individual case, to supplement any IPCC investigation with their own inquiries and 
collecting evidence.25 
 
9.2.1.2 When inquests are held 
For centuries in England and Wales, inquests have been required where a coroner has 
reason to suspect that: the deceased died a violent or unnatural death, the cause of death is 
unknown, or the deceased died whilst in prison custody.26  We also saw that in practice, 
inquests have long been held into deaths in police custody.27  Recently, the CJA 2009 
formally extended the statutory requirement that inquests be held into prison deaths, to all 
unnatural deaths ǲin custody or otherwise in state detentionǳ.28 Deaths that occurred 
during or as a result of arrest or restraint by the police generally required inquests due to falling within the definition of ǲa violent or unnatural deathǳ.29  But recently the cases of 
Keenan and Middleton have also confirmed that Article 2 ECHR requires that inquests be 
held into all deaths at the hands of the police.30  More broadly, Article 2 requires an 
effective, independent and public investigation to be held into all deaths at the hands of the 
state.31  We saw that Middleton determined that, in the absence of full criminal proceedings, 
the normal forum for fulfilling this obligation should be the inquest.32  However, as 
observed in Chapter 5, there are (so far) rare cases where an inquiry under the IA 2005 
may been held instead.33 
 
9.2.1.3 When inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 are held 
Under s 1(1) IA 2005, a minister may set up an inquiry where events have caused, or 
are capable of causing public concern, or where there is public concern that particular 
                                                 
25 For example, this happened in the case of Azelle Rodney. 
26 Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 13–18; Sim and Ward (ch 4, n 17); Burney (ch 4, n 18); Scraton and Chadwick 
(1987) (ch 4, n 3) 22–34; Dorries (ch 1, n 18) 1-5. 
27 At least since 1969 (HC Deb (1982) (ch 4, n 187)). 
28 CJA 2009, s 1. 
29 Now CJA 2009, s 1(2). 
30 Keenan (ch 2, n 54); Middleton (ch 5, n 7).  
31 McCann (ch 2, n 10). See 2.2 above. 
32 See 5.1.1 above. Middleton (n 469) 47. 
33 CJA 2009, sch 1.  e.g. the Azelle Rodney inquiry (5.2 above). 
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events may have occurred.34  Under sch 1(3)(1) CJA 2009, a senior coroner must suspend 
an inquest if requested to do so by the Lord Chancellor where: the cause of death is likely to 
be adequately investigated by an inquiry under the IA 2005; a senior judge has been 
appointed under that Act as chairman of the inquiry; and the Lord Chief Justice has 
indicated approval to the Lord Chancellor of that appointment.  The setting-up of inquiries 
in this way is adopted to get around the openness of inquests in cases where the 
government deems some evidence too sensitive to be heard in open court.35  While some 
inquiries under the IA 2005 have been held in order to fulfil purposes analogous to 
inquests, there has, so far, only been one example of an inquiry under the Act being held 
into a death in England and Wales at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody 
due to the perceived sensitivity of core evidence—The Azelle Rodney Inquiry.36 
 
9.2.1.4 The scope of preliminary investigations 
In Chapter 3 we saw that the different types of preliminary investigations vary 
significantly in scope.  Police investigations into deaths in prison are generally restricted to 
establishing whether any criminal charges should be brought.37  We saw that, in theory, 
PPO investigations are relatively broad.38 They are not confined to investigating the role 
public institutions or public servants may have played in causing or contributing to a death, 
but extend to looking into services that may have been provided outside of the public 
sector.39  Their aims include: establishing the circumstances and events surrounding the death ǲespecially regarding the management of the individual by the relevant authority or 
authorities within remit, but including relevant outside factorsǳ;40 examining relevant 
health issues and assessing clinical care;41 and—in a nod to Binghamǯs judgment in Amin— 
assisting the coroner to fulfil the Article ʹ requirement by ǲensuring as far as possible that 
                                                 
34 See 5.2 above. 
35 See 5.2 above. 
36 See Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005 The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny – HL  
143 (The Stationery Office 2014), Appendix 4, Table of Inquiries Established Under the Inquiries Act 2005. 
37 See 3.2.1 above. 
38 See 3.2.2. 
39 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋch ͵, n ͳʹȌ ͵Ͳ. 
40 ibid, para 31. 
41 ibid. 
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the full facts are brought to light and any relevant failing is exposed, any commendable action or practice is identified, and any lessons from the death are learned.ǳ42  The PPO states on its website that investigators will ǲfind out as much as possible about what was 
happening to the person before their death.ǳ43  Finally, the PPO investigation may include 
consideration of other deaths where there appear to be common factors.44 
Regarding deaths at the hands of the police, the IPCC is slightly more circumspect about 
its role in ensuring that the state fulfils the procedural obligation under Article 2.45  It has 
indicated that its investigations will seek to determine how and why a person died and 
whether any individuals are at fault.46  )t states that Article ʹ ǲshapesǳ the way in which it 
investigates deaths, and acknowledges that ǲArticle ʹ investigations should be […] broad in scope […] drawing conclusions beyond misconduct and criminal behaviour such as systemic problems or poor practiceǳ, and ǲhow a death could be prevented in the future.ǳ47  
It was observed that the scope of an IPCC investigation is limited by its remit to only 
investigate the role of the police and any sub-contractors or their employees in causing or 
contributing to a death.48  Depending on the circumstances, therefore, there may be other 
agencies or institutions which may also have been involved in the circumstances of a death 
which fall outside the )PCCǯs investigative remit. 
 
9.2.1.5 The scope of inquests 
The ECtHR has emphasised that the scope of Article 2 compliant investigations should 
be sufficient for an investigation to fulfil its purposes.49  Those purposes are returned to 
below, but in Middleton the House of Lords held that as long as the question of how the 
deceased came by her death was interpreted broadly, the inquestǯs scope would generally 
                                                 
42 ibid. 
43 PPO, Ǯ(ow We )nvestigateǯ ȋch ͵, n ͷͲȌ. 
44 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋch ͵, n ͳʹȌ ͵ʹ. 
45 See 3.3.2 above. 
46 )PCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋch ͵, n ͹͸Ȍ. 
47 ibid, 27–28. 
48 PRA 2002, s 12(7); Anti-social Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 135. 
49 Jordan (ch 1, n 10) 109. 
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be sufficient for the purposes of Article 2.50  This means that the scope of an Article 2 
compliant inquest must be sufficient to determine who the deceased was and when, where and ǲby what means and in what circumstancesǳ they died.51  The CJA 2009, has now made 
this a statutory requirement.52 
 
9.2.1.6 Public interest immunity in inquests 
PII was touched upon briefly in Chapter 5 above.53  It can significantly affect the scope 
of inquests.  Chapter 5 recounted how the Azelle Rodney Inquest had to be abandoned 
because statutory restrictions prevented the inquest investigating core aspects of the circumstances of Azelleǯs death.54 Similarly, the coroner in the Alexander Litvinenko 
Inquest, Sir Robert Owen, was adamant that the scope of the inquest into Litvinenkoǯs 
death would be so reduced by PII as to be ineffective.55  In both cases, inquiries were 
eventually set up to replace the inquests so that sensitive evidence could be considered 
behind closed doors if necessary. 
The issue of PII in inquests is interesting because it illustrates how the distinct relationship between openness and the inquestǯs purposes creates a very practical need to 
modify the approach taken in the civil and criminal courts.  CJA 2009, sch 5(2)(2) states 
that: 
The rules of law under which evidence or documents are permitted or required 
to be withheld on grounds of public interest immunity apply in relation to an 
investigation or inquest under this Part as they apply in relation to civil 
proceedings in a court in England and Wales. 
But while the rules of law regarding PII in the civil courts must be applied in inquests, 
the manner in which they are applied has to be adapted to fit the circumstances. It was 
observed in Chapter 5 that in the civil and criminal justice contexts, the counterpoint to any 
                                                 
50 See 5.1.2.2 above. Middleton (ch 5, n 10). 
51 ibid, 202. 
52 CJA 2009, s 5(2). 
53 See 5.1.6 above. 
54 See 5.2 above. 
55 R (Litvinenko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 194 (Admin). 
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public interest in keeping evidence out of proceedings through PII, is the public interest in 
justice being carried out between the parties.56  The certification process for PII was 
helpfully described in Al Rawi v Security Services: 
Lawyers consider material to see if it passes the threshold test for disclosure 
under CPR Part 31. In so far as it is prima facie disclosable, officials review 
material for potential to cause harm to the public interest. If harm to the public 
interest is identified, the department carries out a balance between harm 
caused by the disclosure on the one hand and injustice in the litigation on the 
other. It also considers whether it is possible to redact or gist the information or 
to make admissions of fact. Officials consider whether and to what extent the 
balance falls against disclosure in order to give advice to the minister as to 
whether to certify. If the minister, having considered the advice, decides that a 
certificate should be given, a PII certificate is prepared which includes a 
disclosable certificate or schedule describing the types of harm that might be 
caused to the public interest and a sensitive schedule as to why it is believed 
that disclosure of documents would cause real damage or harm to the public 
interest.57 
As we saw in Chapter 5, there are no parties in inquests.  They are formally inquisitorial 
processes, engaged to determine who the deceased was and when, where and how she 
died.   The counterpoint to whatever public interest is advanced in favour of non-disclosure 
in inquests is described as ǲthe public interest in the due administration of justiceǳ or ǲthe 
public interest in the open administration of justice.ǳ58  In either case the public interest in 
justice must depend on what form justice is perceived to take in Article 2 compliant 
inquests. 
If the purposes of Article 2 compliant inquests can be described as a form of justice, it is 
of a very different form to that normally pursued in criminal and civil proceedings.59   
                                                 
56 See 5.1.6 above. 
57 Al Rawi v The Security Services [2011] UKSC 34, 148. 
58 Sir Robert Owen, Ǯ)n the Matter of an )nquest Touching the Death of Alexander Litvinenko: Ruling on P)) Applicationǯ ȋͳ͹ May ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ, para ͻ; Thomas et al (ch 1, n 18) 171 (emphasis added). Sir Robert Owen also described the interest simply as ǲthe public interest in disclosureǳ ȋibid, paras 20-
22). 
59 See 5.1.2 above. 
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Logically, therefore, the nature and extent of the public interest in the fulfilment of that 
form of justice may also be different.  This is arguably what counsel to the Litvinenko 
Inquest meant when pointing out that ǲThe content of the public interest in the due administration of justice will vary according to the context […].ǳ60  In the case of inquests, 
counsel argued this interest coincided with Lord Binghamǯs interpretation of the very 
purposes of an Article 2 compliant investigation in Amin, and the coroner agreed.61  But 
while this means that the public interest in non-disclosure must be balanced against the 
public interest in the full facts being brought to light, etc., it does not discern any reliable 
points of reference for deciding the relative priority to be accorded to these aims.62  This 
ambiguity may be in the executiveǯs favour in PII applications, as the courts are loath to 
second guess the governmentǯs assessment of the damage that disclosure might have for 
things like national security or the prevention and detection of crime.63 Nevertheless, by 
associating the purposes described by Bingham with justice, Sir Robert Owen also 
associates openness with justice.  Indeed, as openness is intrinsic to the main purposes of 
Article 2 compliant inquests described by Bingham, on the coronerǯs reasoning, it must also 
be intrinsic to justice in these circumstances.64 
In civil and criminal proceedings, open justice—in terms of what goes on in courts, and 
what the courts decide being open to public scrutiny—is normally not technically the issue 
when the courts consider PII applications.  The real issue is whether one party risks being 
denied justice if evidence is excluded from proceedings under PII.  Therefore, when PII 
applications are rejected, it is normally because non-disclosure will deny a party the 
opportunity of relying on probative evidence to the extent that it jeopardises their chance 
of a fair trial.  It is not because the court believes evidence should be made public via the 
openness of the court proceedings.  Very occasionally, there may be exceptions to this 
                                                 
60 Robin Tam, (ugh Davies and Andrew OǯConnor ȋCounsel to the )nquestȌ, Ǯ)nquest Touching Upon the 
Death of Alexander Litvinenko: Written Submissions on Public )nterest )mmunity by Counsel to the )nquestǯ 
(19 February 2013) <http://tinyurl.com/zsayfev> accessed 28 January 2016, para 3.2. 
61 ibid; Owen (n 58) paras 5–6. 
62 Discerning any points of reference on the basis of successful PII applications is therefore next to 
impossible because one cannot know the content (and therefore the extent of the sensitivity) of the excluded 
evidence. 
63 See Binyam Mohamed (No 2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101), 44 and 147. 
64 See 5.1.2 above and Amin (ch 1, n 11). 
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general rule, however, and the case of R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs will be considered in this respect below.65 
These observations suggest a very close relationship between PII and issues of open 
justice in Article 2 compliant inquests.  PII does not, in theory, risk denying justice for one 
of the parties—again, because there are no ǲpartiesǳ in inquests—but it can risk defeating 
the main object and purpose of inquests by closing the circumstances of a death to scrutiny. 
 
9.2.1.7 The scope of inquiries under the Inquiries Act 200566 
The scope of inquiries under the IA 2005 will depend on their terms of reference, but if 
an inquest is to be suspended, or remain suspended, an inquiry must now investigate who 
the deceased was and when, where and how they died.67  Given that in these circumstances 
the inquiry will be replacing the normal forum for fulfilling the procedural obligation under 
Article 2, this should mean that the question of how the deceased came by their death will 
be interpreted broadly.  Again, this must now anyway be the case if an inquest into the 
death is to remain suspended.68 
 
9.2.1.8 The openness of preliminary investigations 
It has been argued that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to confine the meaning of 
openness in this context to the ability of the public and the press to observe or report on 
proceedings.69  Rather, a description of openness in investigations should include their 
openness to the active participation of members of the public: either personally or through 
those who might symbolically and/or actually represent their interests.70 
                                                 
65 R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC 152 
(Admin); R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2009] 
EWHC 2549 (Admin); Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101).  See 9.3.1 below. 
66 See 5.2.1.1 above. 
67 See 5.2.1.1 above. CJA 2009, sch 1(4). 
68 See 5.2.2 and ibid. 
69 See 1.1 above. 
70 See the argument at 5.1.3.2 and 5.1.5 above; and Main (ch 1, n 15) 49. 
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Police investigations into prison deaths should be carried out with an attitude of 
openness and communication with the family and the community.71  In reality unless 
criminal charges are brought, family liaison and attempts to communicate findings to the 
public will normally be left to the PPO and the coroner (through the inquest).  PPO 
investigations are generally relatively open to liaison with the family.72  Indeed the PPO 
considers one of the primary purposes of its investigations to be to ǲprovide explanations and insight for the bereaved relatives.ǳ73  The PPO emphasises a presumption in favour of 
disclosure, which should be ǲas fully and as early as [the Ombudsmanǯs] terms of reference, and the law allows.ǳ74 PPO reports are published in full on its website—albeit in 
anonymised form.75 
As soon as the IPCC decides to investigate a death, it undertakes to contact the family and offer meetings ǲto explain our role and what we will be doingǳ.76  Unfortunately, there is no mention of this also being an opportunity to listen to the familiesǯ concerns.  As a 
minimum, the IPCC must update the family on the progress of its investigation every four 
weeks.77  Its Statutory Guidance states that ǲCommunication with complainants and interested persons should be based on a presumption of opennessǳ, and that, ǲ[m]aking the 
investigation report available to the complainant and/or interested persons is the most transparent way of showing what the investigation has found.ǳ78 
While policy documents and guidance emphasise the importance of openness and 
active engagement with families, preliminary investigations, including those carried out by 
the IPCC, are often wary of making lines of inquiry public before an investigation has 
concluded.79  This appears to be both due to a reluctance to prejudice potential criminal 
proceedings or the inquest, but also because of uneasiness that mere lines of inquiry may 
                                                 
71 Stoddart ǮACPO Protocolǯ ȋch ͵, n ͵Ȍ ͳ͹.  See 3.2.1 above. 
72 See 3.2.2.1 above. 
73 PPO ǮTerms of Referenceǯ ȋch ͵, n ͳʹȌ ͵ͳ; Also see PPO ǮDisclosure Policyǯ ȋch ͵, n ͶʹȌ. 
74 PPO ǮDisclosure Policyǯ ȋch ͵, n ͶʹȌ para ʹ. 
75 <http://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/> accessed 18 November 2014. 
76 IPCC, ǮReview Reportǯ ȋch ͵, n ͹͸Ȍ ͷͺ. See ͵.͵.ͳ above. 
77 P(CM)R 2012 reg 12. 
78 )PCC, ǮStatutory Guidanceǯ ȋch ͵, n ͹ͻȌ ͳʹ.ͷ. 
79 See 3.3.3.2 above. 
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be seized upon as evidence of wrongdoing.80  Generally IPCC reports are published after the 
inquest and any criminal or disciplinary proceedings.  An IPCC investigation will usually 
significantly inform the inquest, and the information uncovered should reach the public 
through that forum.  Even where investigators are reluctant to disclose information to the 
family or the general public, they should disclose all relevant material to the coroner.81  
And all material relevant to the cause of death should, then, be made available to interested 
persons in pre-inquest disclosure and to the public during the inquest. 
 
9.2.1.9 The openness of inquests82 
There are two issues that arise here: the inquestǯs openness to members of the public 
and the press, in terms of their ability to attend proceedings or receive information through 
the reporting of proceedings; and the extent to which they are open to the active 
participation of members of the public, whether personally (family) or through those who 
might represent their interests (the public via the family and jury). ECt(R jurisprudence requires there to ǲbe a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory.ǳ83  
Again, the emphasis of the Strasbourg Court is that investigations be sufficiently open to 
fulfil their purposes.84   
Inquests, and any pre-inquest hearings, must be held in public unless: 
1. in the case of a pre-inquest hearing, the coroner believes it is in the 
interests of national security or the interests of justice to hold the hearing 
in private; 
                                                 
80 See 3.3.3.2 above. 
81 See 3.3.1.2. 
82 See 5.1.3 above. 
83 Jordan (ch 1, n 10) 109. 
84 See Ramsahai (ch 1, n 21). 
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2. in the case of an inquest hearing or any part of an inquest hearing, the 
coroner believes it is in the interests of national security to exclude the 
public.85 
It was noted that this very limited discretion contrasts starkly with the wide discretions 
coroners have traditionally enjoyed on other questions of procedure.  And, in the limited circumstances where the public can be excluded from inquests, ǲthe publicǳ does not include the jury, or interested persons ȋi.e. the deceasedǯs family, amongst othersȌ.86 
While coronersǯ discretion is very limited here, they do have the power to protect the 
identity of witnesses through special measures, including the use of cyphers and screens.87  
They also have the same powers as civil judges to impose reporting restrictions to prevent 
the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice.  Such reporting restrictions should 
only normally arise in jury inquests in relation to applications made in their absence. 
Not only are the public and the press entitled to attend proceedings, but a 
representative number of the public (in the jury), is effectively compelled to attend 
throughout the inquests with which this thesis is concerned.88  It was observed that, 
whether or not anyone from the press or the public watch proceedings voluntarily, this 
ensures between 7 and 11 members of the public will be present throughout.89 
In terms of the public actively participating in inquests, the jury can put questions to 
witnesses and must come to a verdict/conclusion as to how the deceased died.90  It was 
argued that while inquest juries have been significantly tamed over the centuries, their role 
remains significant.91 
The practical limits on the jury in performing its probative and evaluative roles include 
it being prevented from expressing an opinion on matters the coroner believes are not 
                                                 
85 C(I)R 2013. 
86 See 5.1.3.3 above. Coroner for Inner West London (ch 5, n 53). 
87 C(I)R 2013. 
88 See 5.1.3.1 above. 
89 CJA 2009, s 8. 
90 See 5.1.3.2 above. 
91 ibid. 
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relevant to who the deceased was and when, where and how they came by their death.92  It 
also cannot frame a verdict that appears to determine criminal liability on the part of a 
named person, or civil liability, and it can only give a short-form verdict the coroner 
believes is available on the evidence.93  A coroner will also disallow any questions she 
deems irrelevant.94 )t was argued that where the deceasedǯs family is represented at the inquest, the juryǯs 
role (in representing the public when exercising a right to elicit and test evidence by 
questioning witnesses) may be more symbolic than practical.95  There will likely be few 
lines of questioning not examined by a determined and legally-represented family.  
However, if the deceasedǯs family have little or no interest in the inquest, or are unable or 
unwilling to pursue concerns not shared by the coroner, the opportunity for jury members 
to put questions may be particularly important. 
It was argued that there is another level of public participation in the inquest through 
the representative role that can be played by the deceasedǯs family.96  In most inquests into 
use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state, the deceasedǯs family will benefit from public 
funding in order to be legally represented.97  In contrast to the jury, they also now routinely 
have the benefit of pre-inquest disclosure of witness statements, reports and other 
evidence, from which they can prepare lines of questioning.98  They may also make 
representations to the coroner about which witnesses should be called, and what verdicts 
should be left to the jury.99  While the family will primarily be concerned with representing 
their own interests in inquests, these will often coincide with the interests of any 
community that identifies with the deceased, or the general public, to find out what 
                                                 
92 ibid. Middleton (ch 5, n 10) 36 and 45; CJA 2009, s 5(3). 
93 CJA 2009, s 10(2). 
94 C(I)R 2013, r 19(2). 
95 See 5.1.3.2 above. 
96 ibid. This includes spouses, civil partners, partners, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, 
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97 See 5.1.5 above and Letts (ch 5, n 93). 
98 See 5.1.4 above. Most recently provided for by C(I)R 2013, r 13. 
99 C(I)R 2013, r 27; R v HM Coroner for East Berkshire Ex p Buckley (1993) 157 JP 425 (QB). 
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happened to cause a death, to ensure that there is accountability for wrongdoing and to try 
and ensure that lessons are learned and others do not suffer the same fate as the 
deceased.100 
 
9.2.1.10 The openness of inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005101 
Chapter 5 described some significant differences between the openness of inquests and 
the openness of inquiries under the IA 2005.102  It was seen that inquiries can go into 
closed sessions at the direction of a minister or the inquiry chairman—to the exclusion of 
the press, public and even interested persons, including the family of the deceased.103  And 
with the loss of the jury, inquiries lose both the minimum level of passive public scrutiny 
that it brings, and the active participatory role it can play in questioning witnesses.  But the 
presence of the jury also affects the whole atmosphere in an inquisition.  Where an inquest 
is held with a jury the coroner is constantly reminded of the public interest in the 
proceedings before her.  Even if a jury does not ask witnesses questions, its presence will 
encourage coroners to anticipate its concerns and question witnesses accordingly.  The 
presence of the jury also reminds coroners that the public are one step behind them in not 
having seen pre-inquest disclosure etc..  It forces coroners to ensure that the evidence is 
presented methodically and clearly; which is also in the interests of members of the wider 
public following proceedings.  In this respect it was noted that Leslie Thomas, counsel for Azelleǯs Rodneyǯs family, made the important argument during the inquiry, that while the 
chairman may anticipate or quickly understand points and arguments (helped by his 
experience and prior knowledge of the case), the inquiry was a public one. It was, 
therefore, important that the evidence was presented methodically and clearly for the 
interested public to follow.104 
                                                 
100 As seen in Main, Owen J agreed that in cases of public interest "it is only through representation of the 
family that the wider public interest will be represented."(Main (ch 1, n 15) 49).  See 5.1.5 above and See 
9.5.1.5 below. 
101 See 5.2 above. 
102 See 5.2.1 above. 
103 IA 2005, s 19. See 5.2.1.3 above. 
104 See 5.2.2 above, and Azelle Rodney Inquiry (ch 5, n 158) 7–8. 
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Article 2 will require the chairman of an inquiry to designate the family of the deceased 
as core participants, but their right to question witnesses is significantly restricted by the 
IR 2006.105  It was observed that there is a presumption that only counsel for the inquiry 
and the inquiry panel may question witnesses.106  Where core participants wish to ask 
questions they must apply for permission.107  The Azelle Rodney Inquiry suggests that 
Article 2 will affect the application of these rules.108   But while counsel for Azelleǯs family 
were allowed to question witnesses in a manner that appeared to go beyond the spirit of 
the Rules, they were still arguably restricted more than they would have been had it been 
an inquest.  This led to the inquiry being beset by arguments between the chairman and 
counsel for the family about their right to question witnesses.109 Finally, in the inquiryǯs favour is that it concludes with a report that will set out the chairmanǯs findings of fact and other conclusions much more comprehensively than any 
inquest verdict.110  There is a statutory presumption that the report will be published in full, but the )A ʹͲͲͷ does provide for material to be withheld ǲin the public interestǳ.111 
 
9.2.1.11 A note on Article 2112 
While there is a consensus amongst courts and other institutions that the inquest is the 
designated forum for fulfilling the investigative obligation under Article 2 ECHR, all of the 
investigatory bodies addressed in Part 1 undertake to contribute to the fulfilment of the 
obligation in one form or another.   Article 2 requires the state to initiate an independent, 
effective and public investigation, which involves the family of the deceased to the extent 
necessary to protect their own interests, into the types of death that are the focus of this 
thesis.  We saw that this requirement has had a significant impact on the way inquests are 
now conducted—particularly, in terms of their scope, pre-inquest disclosure to the family, 
                                                 
105 IR 2006, r 10. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid, r 10(4)–(5). 
108 See 5.2.2 above. 
109 See 5.2.2 above. 
110 See 5.2.1.4. 
111 IA 2005, s 25(4). 
112 See Chapter 2 above. 
 274 
and public funding for the family.113  While it is early days in terms of any settled practice 
in inquiries, where these take on the role and purposes of inquests, it is likely that Article 2 
will have an even greater role in how their rules of procedure are interpreted.  This is 
because the use of an inquiry to replace an inquest will usually arise out of a desire to avoid 
the inquestǯs normal requirements of openness and public scrutiny.  Where the procedural 
obligation under Article 2 is engaged, the broad power of inquiries to go into closed session 
must be fettered by the Article 2 requirement that investigations be public and involve the 
family of the deceased to the extent necessary to protect their own interests.114 
 
9.3 The rationales behind open justice 
9.3.1 The rationales behind open justice in civil and criminal courts 
It was noted that the primary rationale for open justice in criminal and civil justice 
systems is generally considered to be that it helps ensure a fair trial.115  Throughout the 
thesis, it has been maintained that one reason for a need to develop a context-specific 
conception of open justice in the case of deaths at the hands of the police, or in police or 
prison custody, is that the rationales behind openness are fundamentally different in 
nature to those in civil and criminal proceedings.  This is not to say that considerations 
such as democratic accountability and having an informed citizenry are irrelevant when it 
comes to open justice in the criminal and civil justice contexts.  The courts are an important 
source of public accountability for the behaviour and actions of individuals or institutions 
that may be the subject of a criminal or civil proceedings. 
It is, however, questionable whether such rationales are anything more than peripheral 
concerns, or even whether they truly play any practical role when openness is balanced 
against competing public interests—such as fairness between the parties, the prevention 
and detection of crime, national security or the maintenance of good relations with other 
states. Rodrick observes that in Australia: 
                                                 
113 See 5.1.2.1, 5.1.2.2, 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 above. 
114 See 2.8.2 above. 
115 See 1.1 above, and, e.g., Leveller Magazine (ch 1, n 2) at 449–450; Scott (ch 1, n 3). 
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Whilst Australian judges have readily embraced the traditional purposes of 
open justice, most have tended to shy away from regarding open justice as an 
aspect of free speech simpliciter. For example, the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal has declared that the purposes of the principle are tied to the operation of the legal system, and Ǯdo not extend to encompass issues of freedom of speech and freedom of the pressǯ.116 
However, in England and Wales, Binyam Mohamed indicates that rationales such as 
ensuring democratic accountability and maintaining an informed citizenry (rationales 
unrelated to fairness between the parties) may be given some weight in the civil courts 
where appropriate.117  The issue before the High Court and, eventually, the Court of Appeal 
in Binyam Mohamed and Binyam Mohamed (No. 2), was whether the High Court should 
restore to an earlier proceedingǯs open judgment seven paragraphs redacted for reasons of 
national security and to protect the intelligence relationship between the UK and the US.118  
The High Court described the nature of the information contained in the paragraphs as: 
a summary of reports by the United States Government to the SyS [the Security 
Service] and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) on the circumstances of [Binyam Mohamedǯs] incommunicado and unlawful detention in Pakistan and of 
the treatment accorded to him by or on behalf of the United States Government […].119 
With the original matter before the Divisional Court having been decided in favour of 
the party being denied full disclosure, the usual primary rationale for openness—to help 
ensure justice is done between the parties—did not apply (at least not in the usual way). 
Thomas LJ observed: 
The issue which arises here is not the balance between the public interest in 
fairness to a litigant by making material available to him to enable a fair trial to 
                                                 
116 Rodrick (ch 1, n 6) at 94–95, referencing: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) ͸ʹ NSWLR ͷͳʹ, ͷʹͷ. Rodrick also notes that ǲSimilar sentiments were expressed in Harman v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 (HL), 303 and The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v The 
Magistratesǯ Court of Victoria [ͳͻͻͻ] ͵ VR ʹ͵ͳ, ʹͶͺ.ǳ ȋibid, 94, fn. 25) 
117 Binyam Mohamed (n 65); Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (HC) (n 65); Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 
101). 
118 Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (HC) (n 65); Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101). 
119 Binyam Mohamed (n 65) 14. 
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take place ȋas has been the position in most cases […]Ȍ. )t is a novel issue which 
requires balancing the public interest in national security and the public 
interest in open justice, the rule of law and democratic accountability.120 
In the end the High Court ruled that the paragraphs should be published and the Court 
of Appeal agreed.121  The important outcome of the case is that democratic accountability 
and maintaining an informed citizenry were held to be real motivating factors behind the 
principle of open justice.122  Both courts underlined that ǲopen justice, the rule of law and 
democratic accountability demonstrate the very considerable public interest in making the redacted paragraphs publicǳ.123 The evidence in question not only suggested that Binyam 
Mohamed was unlawfully detained and tortured at the behest of the US, but it also bore 
upon the question of whether the UK government had misled the public about what it knew 
about his mistreatment, and whether it had been complicit in it.124  However, Lord 
Neuberger MR and Lord Judge were very clear that they would not have ruled in favour of 
publication had the substance of the paragraphs not already been made public as a result of 
judicial proceedings in the US.125  Lord Neuberger MR also stressed that: 
                                                 
120 ibid, 18. 
121 Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (HC) (n 65); Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101). 
122 Binyam Mohamed (n 65) 54. 
123 ibid. 
124 ǲThe court made findings as to what UK Government officials were told about serious and sustained mistreatment ȋconceivably amounting to tortureȌ by a foreign government […)]t seems to me little short of 
absurd to say that the court cannot take into account the public importance of, and the obviously justified 
public interest in, such findings, when deciding whether it is, on balance, in the public interest in publishing those findings.ǳȋȋPer Lord Neuberger MRȌ Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101) 180). 
125 Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101) 48-58 and 192-203.  See Memorandum Opinion by Judge 
Kessler in Farhi Saeed Bin Mohammed v Barack Obama (2009) (Civil Action No 05-1347 (GK)) (US District 
Court for the District of Columbia) 64-70; Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101). At page ͸Ͷ of Judge Kesslerǯs opinion she observes that: ǲ[Binyam Mohamed's] trauma lasted for two long years. During that time, he was physically and 
psychologically tortured. His genitals were mutilated. He was deprived of sleep and food. He was summarily 
transported from one prison to another. Captors held him in stress positions for days at a time. He was forced 
to listen to piercingly loud music and the screams of other prisoners while locked in a pitch-black cell. All the 
while, he was forced to inculpate himself and others in various plots to imperil Americans." 
She continued that: "no question that throughout his ordeal [he] was being held at the behest of the [US]" 
that he "was shuttled from country to country, and interrogated and beaten without having access to counsel" 
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It is of course, elementary that the courts do not function in order to provide the 
media with copy […].  They function to enable justice to be done between the 
parties.126 
Article 10 ECHR (which includes a right to receive opinions, information and ideas) also 
now needs to be taken into account when considering openness in the civil and criminal 
courts.   Until recently, the ECtHR had confined this right to ǲinformation others wish or may be willing to impart.ǳ127  However, the right has been broadened by recent ECtHR and 
domestic jurisprudence.  For example, in Tarsasag a Szabadsagjogokert v Hungary, the 
ECtHR observed it had moved towards ǲa right of access to informationǳ in certain cases.128  
In that case, the Hungarian Constitutional Court had refused a domestic human rights 
organisation access to a complaint made by a Member of Parliament.  The Court held that 
the refusal to grant access to the complaint was an unjustifiable interference with Article 
10: 
[The Court] considers that the present case essentially concerns an 
interference—by virtue of the censorial power of an information monopoly—
with the exercise of the functions of a social watchdog, like the press, rather than a denial of a general right of access to official documents. […] Moreover, the Stateǯs obligations in matters of freedom of the press include the elimination of 
barriers to the exercise of press functions where, in issues of public interest, 
such barriers exist solely because an information monopoly is held by the 
authorities.129 
In A v Independent News and Media Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that where the issue 
was access to court proceedings, the case for Article 10 being engaged would be even 
stronger than in Tarsasag.130  An important consideration was the fact that the applicants 
sought the information for public rather than private purposes.131  In Binyam Mohamed, 
                                                 
126 Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101) 41. 
127 See Leander v Sweden [1987] 9 EHRR 433; Gaskin v UK [1989] ECHR 13. 
128 (2009) ECHR 618, 35. 
129 ibid, 36. 
130 [2009] EWHC 2858 (Fam), 43. 
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Lord Neuberger MR observed that the courts, ǲlike any public body, have a concomitant obligation to make information available.ǳ132 
[w]here the publication at issue concerns the contents of a judgment of the court, it seems to me that article ͳͲ is plainly engaged: the publicǯs right to 
know is a very important feature.133 
There are three important points to note here, therefore.  First, free speech-related 
rationales, including the need for democratic accountability and an informed citizenry, are 
real rationales that may be considered by courts when balancing the publicǯs interest in 
openness against other conflicting interests.  Secondly, even where the material concerned 
is of significant public interest, this rationale is still peripheral to the rationales of ensuring 
fairness between the parties and maintaining public confidence in the judicial system.  The 
primary purpose of the civil and criminal courts is always to ensure justice between the 
parties in individual cases, not to proactively educate the public on issues of public interest 
or concern.  Finally, it should be noted that if open justice were to require a court to publish 
a judgment for no other reason than to inform the public about an issue of public concern, 
unlike in inquests, this would be an additional task to achieving the justice ends for which 
the criminal and civil justice systems essentially exist. 
 
9.3.2 The rationales behind openness in the aftermath of deaths at the hands of the police, 
or in police or prison custody 
With inquests into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state there is a much more 
basic association of openness and public participation with a need for accountability 
regarding the subject-matter under investigation (rather than ensuring the fair and/or 
proficient conduct of the investigation itself).  Openness is inextricably rolled up with the 
primary function of the process itself.  Of course openness in inquests also ensures that the 
coroner whilst conducting an inquest is also on trial,134 and this has long been an important 
                                                 
132 Binyam Mohamed (No.2) (CA) (ch 5, n 101) 180. 
133 ibid. 
134 Paraphrasing Lord Shawǯs quote of Bentham in Scott (ch 1, n 3) 477. 
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concern.135 But in a reversal of the typical prioritisation of the rationales for open justice, 
this rationale appears subsidiary to the justice that lies in ensuring public scrutiny of, and 
public accountability for, the subject-matter under investigation.136 
 
9.3.2.1 The purposes behind Article 2ǯs procedural obligation 
Chapter 4 noted that one problem with discerning the purposes behind inquests prior 
to Amin and Middleton is that the domestic courts tended to take a literal rather than a purposive approach when interpreting an inquestǯs quantitative aims.137  In the absence of 
well-defined purposes in the decades preceding the HRA 1998, there was little to push back 
on the ever-narrowing scope of inquests prompted by a belief that they should not appear 
to determine criminal or civil liability.138  Their quantitative aims—to find out who the 
deceased was and when, where and how she died—rather than their qualitative purposes, 
were generally what concerned the courts.  However when Middleton reached the House of 
Lords, the ECt(Rǯs purposive approach was adopted into domestic practice.139 
We saw in McCann that the ECmHR defined the purpose behind the procedural 
obligation as being to ensure that the ǲcircumstances of a deprivation of life by the agents of a state may receive public and independent scrutiny.ǳ140  It emphasised that it was ǲessential both for the relatives and for public confidence in the administration of justice 
and in the state's adherence to the principles of the rule of law that a killing by the state is subject to some form of open and objective oversight.ǳ141  The Court in McCann confined itself to underlining the practical need for an investigation where ǲa general legal 
prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the state would be ineffective, in practice, if 
                                                 
135 See Ͷ.͸ above: Mr Warburton MP: ǲWhat security was there that the Coronerǯs inquiry would lead to a 
full and fair investigation, if the inquest could be held in secret? In all such cases, the only protection which the people could have was by the free admission of the reporters of the public.ǳȋȋch Ͷ, n ͳͳͳȌ ͻʹ͸Ȍ. 
136 See 5.1.2.1 above. 
137 See 5.1.2 above. Amin (ch 1, n 11); Middleton (ch 5, n 10). 
138 See 4.9.3 above. 
139 See 5.1.2.2 above. Middleton (ch 5, n 10) 8. 
140 McCann (ch 2, n 19) 192–193. 
141 ibid. 
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there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by state authorities.ǳ142 
It was observed that since McCann the ECtHR has also described the purpose behind the investigative obligation as being to ǲsecure[…] the accountability of agents of the state for their use of lethal forceǳ;143 ǲto allay rumours and suspicions of how a death came aboutǳ;144 and ǲin those cases involving State agents or bodies to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility.ǳ145 
We have to be a little wary of the rationales given for the procedural obligation under 
Article 2 and this is one reason why ECHR jurisprudence was discussed separately in 
Chapter 2.  It was observed that it is not really a single obligation at all, but contains 
overlapping duties with overlapping rationales.  There is a duty to open up the 
circumstances of a death to public scrutiny which is clearly an end in itself;146 but it also 
serves the purpose of, where appropriate, leading to accountability through criminal 
and/or civil liability.147  Therefore, when the ECtHR underlines the importance of Article 2 
compliant investigations, and the opening up of the circumstances of deaths to scrutiny, it 
is sometimes difficult to separate the relative intrinsic importance attributed to such a 
process by the ECtHR, from the instrumental role it can play in criminal and civil justice 
processes. 
 
9.3.2.2 The evolving purposes behind domestic inquests148 
In Chapter 4 it was observed that the primary function of early inquests was to protect 
the revenue interests of the Crown.149  In particular, coroners would determine whether 
the property of the deceased, or anyone deemed responsible for a death, should be 
forfeited to the Crown, or whether communities or individuals should be fined, e.g. for 
                                                 
142 McCann (ch 2, n 10) 161. 
143 Kaya (ch 2, n 22) 87. This links to the purposes of an investigation, set out by Bingham in Amin. 
144 Jordan (ch 1, n 10) 128. 
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146 As expressed by the Commission in McCann (ch 2, n 10) 192–193. 
147 See, Oneryildiz (ch 2, n 160) and 2.14 above. 
148 See 4.2, 4.4 and 5.1.2 above. 
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being unable to account for a death or for allowing an accused to flee.150 Financial 
considerations also appear to have been behind the requirement that inquests be held into 
all deaths in prisons.151  However, over the centuries, the motivational sentiment behind a 
need to investigate unexplained, unnatural or violent deaths gradually began to be 
associated with the wider interests of society.  In the nineteenth century we saw inquests 
increasingly being characterised as a source of public accountability for deaths at the hands 
of state actors or institutions.152 
It was argued that, in the mid-twentieth century the inquest seems to have lost its way 
as its scope was gradually reduced and effect was given to the belief that inquests should, 
above all, not appear to pre-empt criminal or civil justice processes.153  But with the HRA 
1998 and Amin and Middleton, the qualitative purposes of inquests into deaths at the hands 
of the state were finally set out in positive and substantial terms.154  With Middleton (CA), 
the inquest was identified as the procedure which should normally fulfil Article ʹǯs 
procedural obligation, and in his lead judgment in Amin, Lord Bingham outlined that the 
purposes of such an obligation were: 
to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable 
and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that 
suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous 
practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their 
relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from 
his death may save the lives of others.155 
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It was argued that as far as the first three of these aims are concerned, openness is 
absolutely intrinsic to bringing the facts to light, exposing culpable and discreditable conduct to public notice, and ensuring ǲthat suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing ȋif unjustifiedȌ is allayed.ǳ156   A degree of openness is also almost certainly going to be needed if the deceasedǯs family are to be satisfied that, where possible, lessons have been learnt 
that may save the lives of others.  The penultimate of Lord Binghamǯs purposes, fulfils a 
role more similar in nature to that normally ascribed to openness in civil and criminal 
justice proceedings: publicity will exert pressure on those responsible to act in good faith.  
But it was also noted that, the participation of the deceasedǯs family also has a track record 
of leading to issues being uncovered that may not otherwise have been.157 
While these rationales do point to some instrumental functions of openness, they focus 
on purposes—public scrutiny and public accountability—for which openness is a 
fundamental and intrinsic requirement.  Of course, for the ECtHR, accountability also plays 
an instrumental role in ensuring that the substantive right to life is protected.  But in 
Jordan, for example, it lists accountability as a purpose additional to this end, again 
suggesting a basic intrinsic value.158 
Other than Article 3, none of the other rights contained in the ECHR require specific 
procedural mechanisms to ensure public scrutiny and accountability where a substantive 
right is merely engaged but not necessarily breached by state action (as opposed to the 
requirement under Article 13 to provide a remedy for those injured by breaches of Article 
rights).  We saw that in Ramsahai, the ECtHR found against the Netherlands in terms of the 
adequacy of a public investigation into a death at the hands of the police, despite being 
satisfied that there had been no breach of the substantive duty.159 
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9.4 A procedural principle of open justice in the aftermath of deaths at the hands of 
the police, or in police or prison custody 
Modern practice suggests three potential procedural principles of open justice at play 
which have varying breadths of focus.  The first of these is that, where there has been a 
death at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody, the state must initiate an 
open, independent and effective investigation into the circumstances of the death.  This 
procedural principle is analogous to the broader procedural obligation under Article 2 
ECHR that applies to a wider category of deaths.  However, as Lord Bingham observed in 
Amin, such a procedural principle has effectively existed independently in England and 
Wales for centuries in the form of the inquest.  These have always, in theory, been: 
independent;160 open to the participation of the family of the deceased; and, during their 
long history, almost always open to the scrutiny of, and (where there is a jury) the 
participation of the public.161  The manifestation of this principle has not always been 
consistent in its detail in England and Wales, but the general principle that such deaths will 
be opened up to independent and public scrutiny, has for the most part long held true.  The 
effect of Article 2 has arguably been simply to make processes that embody the principle 
more effectively geared towards fulfilling revived purposes.162 Unlike Lord Neubergerǯs procedural principle of open justice which specifically 
concerns judicial proceedings, this procedural principle is obviously much wider.163  
However, if we confine our analysis to inquests, there is a second potential procedural 
principle at work that falls neatly within this more traditional procedural principle of open 
justice.  We can state this principle as being ǲthat what goes on in coronersǯ courts and 
what they conclude should be open to public scrutiny.ǳ  This principle has no bearing on 
                                                 
160 This independence (which historically even gave coroners a power of arrest over sheriffs) was at 
times a major source of contention, particularly between coroners and magistrates. 
161 See 4.6 above, the account of Garnett (ch 4, n 102), and nineteenth century debates about whether inquests had to be open to the public.  ǲTheoreticallyǳ because there are examples of inquests being of 
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systems in place. 
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the scope of inquests, and it is as true for Article 2 compliant inquests as it is for non-Article 
2 compliant inquests.  The principle also has nothing to say about preliminary 
investigations and inquiries under the IA 2005.  But given that the distinctive meaning and 
function of openness in inquests seems to be shared with the other main investigatory 
procedures engaged in this context, this would arguably be an arbitrary restriction. 
A third procedural principle that is consistent with practice would simply extend Neubergerǯs principle into the non-judicial sphere when deaths at the hands of the police, 
or in police or prison custody are concerned.  So, for example, given the practice described in Part ͳ, we could simply state a procedural principle that: ǲinvestigations into deaths at 
the hands of the police or in police or prison custody, must be open to public scrutinyǳ.  The 
detailed practical manifestation of the principle obviously differs from one type of 
investigation to another.  But there are arguably sufficient requirements for openness in 
current legislation, guidance, statements of intention, and policy documents, to identify a 
basic procedural principle (albeit one with exceptions) that these investigations will 
generally be open to public scrutiny. 
The practice is sufficiently consistent for any of these principles to be the starting point 
for a context-specific conception of open justice.   The question is which of them is the most 
suitable to adopt as the core of a meaningful, context-specific conception of open justice?  
The primary rationales for openness in inquests, and all of the other types of investigation 
we have looked at, have been defined as bringing the facts about the circumstances of a 
death to light and ensuring public accountability for those circumstances.  This being the 
case, it would be arbitrary to confine a context-specific conception of open justice to Lord Neubergerǯs principle, which only applies to judicial bodies ȋi.e. in this context, inquestsȌ.  )t 
is also the case that the primary rationales for the openness of investigations coincide with 
the primary rationales for holding the investigations in the first place.  Again, even if we 
broaden our procedural principle of open justice to apply to non-judicial investigations, 
this will confine our discussion to how the processes themselves are open, and arbitrarily 
exclude from the analysis the broader but relevant issues of when the investigations will be 
held in the first place and what their scope will be.  Again, Middleton illustrated how an 
inquest can be completely open, but if its scope is insufficiently broad it will fail to fulfil its 
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purposes; purposes which relate to the opening up of the circumstances of a death to public 
scrutiny and public accountability. 
The rest of this chapter therefore proceeds on the basis that the general procedural 
principle at the heart of our context-specific conception of open justice is:  ǲDeaths at the 
hands of the police, or in police or prison custody must be opened up to effective public scrutiny.ǳ  Preliminary investigations, inquests and inquiries are therefore themselves part 
of the procedural manifestation of a basic principle of open justice in this context.164  In this 
way, a context-specific conception of open justice, and the procedural principle at its heart, 
can be expressed in a way that more fully corresponds to how openness and justice are 
linked in these circumstances.  This link is the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
 
9.5 Recognition theory and the link between openness and justice in the aftermath of 
deaths at the hands of the state 
A normative understanding of openness in these circumstances and, in particular, any 
link between openness and non-retributive and non-compensatory justice ends, should 
help guide the level of prioritisation given to openness as against competing interests.165  It 
will also help to better focus the manner in which openness is procedurally manifested in 
the investigative processes concerned, so that these justice ends may be more effectively 
fulfilled in practice.  An analogy may be drawn between the importance of such a project, and Konstantin Petoukhovǯs explanation of the importance of providing a normative 
framework for the aims of truth commissions: 
                                                 
164 Traditional conceptions of open justice are naturally framed in relation to processes (criminal and 
civil justice systems) rather than the circumstances with which those processes are concerned.  This is 
because the prime rationales for openness are subsidiary to the rationales behind the processes themselves.  
In contrast, it has been argued above that the prime (although, not all) rationales behind Article 2 compliant 
investigations coincide with the rationales behind their openness. 
165 e.g., keeping intelligence gathering techniques secret or maintaining good relations with other states.  
See respectively the circumstances surrounding the inquiry into the death of Azelle Rodney (including Walker 
(ch 3, n 114)); and the inquest into the death of Matty (ull from ǲfriendly fireǳ from American pilots ȋGaby (insliff, ǮFamilies Fight Plan for Secret )nquests in Friendly-Fire Deathsǯ ȋ͸ April ʹͲͲͺȌ The Guardian 
<http://tinyurl.com/hqdvtbm> accessed 25 June 2015). 
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A theory of justice may help to strengthen truth commissionsǯ mandates by 
clearly conceptualising their goals and objectives in concrete terms… and 
identifying the potential strategies to attain them166 
In criminal and civil justice contexts the fundamental link between openness and 
justice, and therefore the normative function of openness, is clear.  The prime rationale for 
openness in these contexts is to help ensure a fair trial.  This is instrumental to helping to 
ensure that the purposes of the trials themselves are met.  The ultimate purpose of 
openness, therefore, is to help secure the retributive, punitive, restorative or compensatory 
justice forms pursued by criminal and civil justice processes.  The relative normative value 
of the remedies pursued is not without controversy.  Undergraduate students of law are 
introduced to their vicissitudes and discuss their relative merits in tutorials and seminars 
from a relatively early stage in their legal studies.  But even if we dispute the relative value 
of these justice forms, the function of openness in helping to achieve them is at least clear. 
There has, however, been very little considered analysis of the normative foundations 
for the ends pursued in non-criminal and non-civil justice related investigations into use-
of-force deaths at the hands of the state, other than in the transitional justice context.  
While the normative basis for a need for public accountability in the aftermath of deaths at 
the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody, has never been explained explicitly 
by the courts, there are several expressions of the importance of investigations which hint 
at their relationship to justice.  The ECtHR has underlined the particular importance of 
Article 2 amongst the other Convention rights, noting that it ǲranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention [… and, together with Article 3] enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europeǳ.167  When it 
comes to the procedural obligation, it has been noted that in Ramsahai, the ECHR emphasised that ǲwhat is at stake […] is nothing less than public confidence in the stateǯs monopoly on the use of forceǳ168—the normative significance of which is apparently 
assumed to be self-evident. 
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)t is often taken for granted that the deceasedǯs family and the public have legitimate 
and important interests in learning about the circumstances behind use-of-force deaths at 
the hands of the state.  But it is a mistake to rely on arguments that merely assert the self-
evident importance of public accountability for the fatal use of force by the state, when 
there may be other, very important and competing principles at play: for example, the need 
to protect national security; the need to safeguard methods for preventing and detecting 
crime; and the need for procedural safeguards in matters that may cause reputational harm 
or may impact upon the fairness of criminal proceedings.  Prioritising one principle, or 
moral claim over another requires an understanding of what the normative foundations for 
such claims are. 
It is argued that recognition theory may provide the moral foundation for such a claim, 
and thus the link between openness and justice that is implicit in the term ǲopen justiceǳ. 
 
9.5.1 Applying recognition theory to the aftermath of use-of-force deaths at the hands of 
the state 
The following draws from the discussion of recognition theory and Rawlsǯs conception 
of political legitimacy in Part 2, to identify the sources of legitimate interests that demand 
recognition in institutional responses to deaths, and outline what these might require in 
terms of (onnethǯs second and third levels of recognition.169 
 
9.5.1.1 The source of the rights that accrue after a death 
Chapter 7 described how the second level of (onnethǯs tripartite scheme of recognition 
theory is concerned with the need to recognise individuals as equal bearers of rights.170  Generally speaking, oneǯs vulnerability to misrecognition on this level arises out of the 
potential to be denied a right that others ordinarily enjoy.  In England and Wales, it is the practice, if not also the law, for the cause of a loved oneǯs death to be explained to families 
by a doctor, the police or, in certain circumstances, through an ordinary inquest.  To deny 
                                                 
169 For the different levels of recognition identified by Honneth, see 7.3.2.2 above. 
170 See 7.3.2.2 above. 
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this right in cases where a death occurs at the hands of the state would be to misrecognise 
the generally accepted rights of families.  Such a right to the truth itself recognises a very 
basic metaphysical need to know how and why a loved one died.  Far from there being 
objective reasons for a negative differentiation in cases where loved ones have been lost in 
circumstances involving the use-of-force by state actors, a right to a reliable explanation is 
arguably more pressing in these circumstances because: a) the state must assume some 
responsibility for those its agents subject to the coercive use of force; and b) the details of 
what happened to cause a death will often be exclusively known to state actors.171 The second originating source of a legitimate demand to ǲbe given positive consideration in the plans of othersǳ in these circumstances is more complex.172  If (onnethǯs second level of recognition requires the equal treatment of individuals as bearers of equal rights, why should the deceasedǯs family, any group that identifies with the 
deceased, or the wider public, be afforded additional rights to those that accrue where a 
death occurred in circumstances not involving the use of force by the state?  The answer is 
that here there are objective reasons that justify a positive differentiation to be made in the 
aftermath of these types of death.  These stem from the fact that the deaths occur in 
circumstances that feature very basic inequalities in the rights held by those involved. 
A death that occurs in circumstances involving the coercive use of force by the state 
brings into sharp focus the inevitable inequality that exists in having coercively 
empowered institutions and individuals who exercise the stateǯs monopoly on the lawful 
use of force over others.173  We saw in Chapter 7 that Buchanan asks the questions ǲ[i]f we 
are all equal, what can justify some persons (the government) making, applying, and enforcing rules on us?ǳ; and, ǲif liberty is our proper condition, how can the use of coercion, which government essentially involves, be justified?ǳ174  We saw that for Rawls this 
apparent inequality (which must include and be underpinned by the stateǯs monopoly of 
                                                 
171 See Binghamǯs third principle of the Rule of Law: ǲThe laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation ǲȋTom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books 
2011) ch 5). 
172 Honneth (1996) (ch 1, n 23) 44. 
173 This is not, of course, an absolute monopoly.  Everyone has the power to exercise reasonable force 
against others in certain exceptional circumstances: self-defence being the most obvious example. 
174 Buchanan (ch 7, n 49) 698. See 7.2.3.2 above. 
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the use of force) can in theory be reconciled if certain democratic conditions are met.175  
Where they are, Rawls argues that the coercive powers of the executive can be described as ǲthe power of the public, that is, the power of free and equal citizens as a corporate body.ǳ176  According to Rawls, ǲ[i]f free and equal persons are to cooperate politically on a 
basis of mutual respect, we must justify our use of our corporate and coercive political power when […] essential matters are at stake, in the light of public reason.ǳ177  Again, it 
was argued that essential matters must surely include the exercise of the coercive use of 
force by the state.178  Certainly the ECtHR seems to have appreciated this in Ramsahai.179  
Political legitimacy is achieved, then, when the justification for state power and its exercise 
appeals to all citizensǯ reason, which in turn is free and informed in conditions of freedom 
of speech and thought.180 
Of course, the interests of members of the public in a death are not uniformly spread.  
Some may have enhanced interests and be more vulnerable to harm when those interests 
are misrecognised. 
 
9.5.1.2 The source of the enhanced interests of the deceasedǯs family and those who identify 
with the deceased 
This differentiation derives from fact that the deceasedǯs family and any community 
that identifies with the deceased are particularly vulnerable to the first-order moral harms 
identified in Chapter 6 where deaths may have been caused or contributed to by 
wrongdoing.181  Again, this thesis is concerned with the misrecognition and second-order 
moral harms that can occur where a state fails to adequately respond to a death, rather 
than any misrecognition that may have caused or contributed to the first-order harms 
associated with the death itself.182  But if a stateǯs response to a death fails to recognise the 
first-order harms suffered by those with a connection to the deceased, this itself amounts 
                                                 
175 See 7.2.3.2 above. 
176 Rawls (2001) (ch 7, n 51) 90. 
177 ibid, 91. 
178 See 7.2.3.2 above. 
179 Ramsahai (ch 1, n 21). 
180 Rawls (2001) (ch 7, n 51) 91. 
181 See 6.4.1.2 above. 
182 See 6.4 above. 
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to an act of misrecognition that can cause second-order moral harm.183  It was seen in the 
previous chapter, that similar concerns are expressed by writers on justice during 
transitions.184 
It should be recalled that the types of misrecognition that Honneth identifies as having a 
negative impact on the first level of relations-to-self (self-confidence and trust in the world) 
are those associated with physical abuse and rape.185   However, it was argued in Chapter 6 
that the victims of misrecognition on this tier should not necessarily be confined to those 
who are the primary victims of physical abuse.186  Where a close intersubjective partner is 
misrecognised with fatal results, the surviving partner may suffer a loss of self-confidence 
and trust in the world.  And where the death is at the hands of a state institution or 
someone associated with a body as powerful as the state, it is not difficult to imagine a particularly strong feeling that oneǯs reality is at the mercy of others. 
In the aftermath of a use-of-force death at the hands of the state, the bare harm that 
comes with the loss of a loved one will often combine with moral harm arising from a 
subjective belief or suspicion that the death was caused or contributed to by wrongdoing 
(or misrecognition) on the part of the state or its agents.187  This may derive from a 
personal identification with the deceased as a primary victim of a perceived injustice, as 
well as a sense of personally being the victim of an injustice by being unjustly deprived of a 
loved one.  Aside from those who were personally close to the deceased, this sense of 
injustice may extend to any group or community that identifies with the deceased, where 
they believe or suspect the deceased may have suffered this level of misrecognition 
because she was a member of that group or community.  Here the attendant moral harm 
will again likely derive from an identification with the deceased, but will often also derive from oneǯs identification with a group that one perceives as being unjustly threatened, 
attacked or discriminated against.  These associations are the basis for recognising certain 
individuals or groups as secondary or tertiary victims of wrongdoing: secondary victims 
                                                 
183 See 6.4.2 above. 
184 See 8.3.2.4 above. 
185 Honneth (ch 1, n 23) 132. See 7.3.2.2 above. 
186 Owen (ch 7, n 89) 307. See 7.3.2.2 above. 
187 See 6.4.1.2 above. 
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being ǲthose family members and friends who grieve the injuries or loss of a loved oneǳ; and tertiary victims being ǲindividual members of a specific community affected by structural violence and systemic injusticeǳ.188 
Until the circumstances of a death are uncovered, it will normally not be possible to 
ascertain whether these first-order moral harms have an objective foundation.  However, 
whether or not they do, the vulnerability of the family and any group that identifies with 
the deceased to these harms arguably sustains a need for mechanisms that recognise their 
special interest. 
 
9.5.1.3 What must due recognition involve for the general public? 
It is first appropriate to address the general public interest in the circumstances of 
deaths at the hands of the state that derives from the liberal political paradox of the 
government of supposedly free and equal individuals by coercively empowered institutions 
and actors.189 
When applying Rawlsǯs conception of political legitimacy to the specific context of the 
coercive use of force by state institutions and actors, it could be argued that the special 
interest the public have in the way in which this power is exercised requires that: 
conclusions about the appropriateness of the exercise of the use-of-force need to be Ǯpublicly justifiedǯ; and the scrutiny of use-of-force deaths at the hands of state needs to Ǯaddress citizensǯ reasonǯ.190  It was argued that public justification that addresses citizensǯ 
reason can only truly be achieved if two features are present.191  First, the conclusions of 
investigations and the reasoning behind them need to be publicly explained.  Second, these 
conclusions must actually speak to the reason of those with a substantive interest in the 
                                                 
188 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16), 68Ͳ.  According to (aldemann ǲThis view of victimhood is fairly standard in the transitional justice literature.ǳ citing: Trudy Govier, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgement, 
Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace (Humanity Books, 2006) 30; and the UN Declaration of 
Basic Principles of justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, (G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/40/34/Annex) (Nov 1985). (Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) f/n 21 at p. 680). 
189 The argument here contrasts with (aldemannǯs tendency to exclude democracy from the concern of 
justice as recognition; Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 678. 
190 See 7.2.3.2 above. Rawls (ch 7, n 51) 186. 
191 See 7.2.3.2 above 
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subject matter of the investigation—which in these circumstances extends as far as the 
general public.  Otherwise, even if the reasons are publicised, they remain accounts of how arbiters ǲsatisfy themselves in light of their own convictionsǳ.192 Mowbray, in particular, 
warns against ǲthe dangers of introspective investigationsǳ into deaths at the hands of the 
state.193  As a minimum, those with a legitimate interest in the circumstances of a death, or 
their representatives, should have an opportunity to raise suspicions and concerns, and for 
these to be addressed. 
This account of legitimacy fits with a theory of recognition which requires that in 
intersubjective interaction, citizens are treated as rational and reasonable beings, and 
equal partners in the management, control and scrutiny of state power.  The fact that the 
types of inquest examined in this thesis require a jury, acknowledges the need for 
investigations to speak to the concerns of the general public.  It recognises the fact that 
these investigations touch upon fundamental questions concerning the nature of the 
relationship between state and citizen.  Where the public are not treated as equal partners 
in the management, control and scrutiny of state power, the legitimacy of the stateǯs 
monopoly on the use of force, and its exercise, are brought into question.  Only 
accountability through investigatory processes that address public concerns can ensure 
that the social exercise of the stateǯs monopoly on the use of force is an exercise of ǲpublic power through the corporate bodyǳ194, rather than an exercise of unaccountable, private 
power by a privileged group over subalterns.  This accords with political proceduralism whereby ǲbasic rights represent a kind of guarantee for the continued existence of the interplay of the democratic public sphere and the societyǯs political administration.ǳ195 
Recognition here operates on two levels.  First, it recognises the publicǯs right to 
scrutinise the exercise of the use of force by state institutions or actors where a death has 
occurred.  Second, it recognises the right of the public to the agency that comes with 
knowledge and, in particular, the right to participate as an informed citizenry in wider 
debates about the use of force by the state.  Government and policing by consent, must 
                                                 
192 Rawls (ch 7, n 51) 186. 
193 Mowbray (ch 2, n 90) 442. 
194 Rawls (ch 7, n 51) 90-91. 
195 Honneth (2007) (ch 6, n 32) 219. 
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involve informed consent.  If we are to reflect upon and engage with related questions—
about how, for example, we recruit, train and oversee our police forces; about the 
implications of routinely arming the police with tasers or firearms; about the conditions 
and staffing levels in our prisons; and about the realities of how the criminal justice system 
manages the vulnerable, the mentally ill and those with drug dependencies—we need to be 
properly informed about them.  It was argued in the conclusion to Chapter 7 that justice as 
recognition demands that these interests be recognised, and recognition theory suggests 
that where they are not, the resulting harms—concentrated in the case of the family of the 
deceased, diluted but multiplied in the case of members of a community, or the wider 
general public—have significant personal and social implications. 
 
9.5.1.4 What must due recognition involve for those particularly vulnerable to moral harm? 
In most normal cases where a family member dies, the circumstances of the death are 
not such as to lead to mistrust about the reliability of the explanations provided by the 
institutions concerned.  However, where a death has occurred in circumstances involving 
the coercive use of force by state actors over the deceased, official narratives may be 
suspected of a bias towards narratives that will favour state-exonerating accounts.  The 
particular circumstances of these types of death mean that normal practices where deaths 
are investigated and explained, which are generally accepted as reliable in non-state-use-
of-force scenarios, cannot be relied upon in the absence of special safeguards to produce 
similarly trusted narratives about deaths occurring in state-use-of-force scenarios.  Again 
this suggests an objective reason for a positive differentiation in favour of the rights of 
family members in these types of investigations.  The absence of such a positive 
differentiation denies a legitimate expectation that the special circumstances of the death 
will be taken into account in the manifestation of a general right to a reliable explanation of 
how a loved one died. 
In the last chapter, it was observed that some writers have used recognition theory as a 
normative basis for the justice strategies embodied in truth commissions.196  It was 
                                                 
196 See 8.3.2.4 above. 
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cautioned that an important difference between truth commissions and, for example, 
inquests, is that the very setting up of a truth commission generally constitutes an 
acknowledgment that significant wrongdoing was inflicted (usually by a previous regime) 
on many victims.  Bearing this in mind, we saw that Frank (aldemann argues that ǲ[d]ue 
recognition is something we owe the victims of injustice, and when it is lacking the victims 
have moral reasons for feeling insulted or humiliated.ǳ197  He describes the harm caused 
by—amongst other things—denying secondary victims a reliable, official and public truth 
about a death or disappearance, as ǲnot merely a psychological or factual observationǳ but laying ǲa moral claimǳ.198  An important question arises as to whether this is also true for 
those who suffer harm that comes from a subjective perception or suspicion that they have 
been the victim of an injustice?  If not, (aldemannǯs approach would appear to ignore the 
needs of anyone other than those immediately identifiable as a victim of wrongdoing.  
Judith Shklar argued persuasively that it is the moral duty of a just society to attend to 
subjectively experienced harm wherever it occurs, and that there is a particular moral imperative to do so where claims made by putative victims are against societyǯs official 
agents.199  Given the particular vulnerability of families and communities in the aftermath 
of use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state, it is arguable that they should be treated as 
presumed secondary and tertiary victims until the exact circumstances of a death have 
been established. 
Chapter 6 suggested that the holding of an investigation and the creation of an official 
and public narrative to afford due recognition to the relatives of those who have died at the 
hands of the state, may not be enough.200  It is perfectly possible for an investigation and 
resulting narrative to misrecognise interested persons or groups by ignoring or failing to 
adequately engage with their concerns.201  The most effective way of avoiding this is to 
involve these individuals or groups in the investigatory process, allowing them to raise and 
                                                 
197 (aldemann ȋch ͸, n ͳ͸Ȍ ͸ͻ͵. Although, of course, ǲdue recognitionǳ is something that we owe everyone, on account of it being ǲdueǳ. 
198 ibid. 
199 Shklar (1990) (ch 6, n 30) 90. Even if claims turn out to be unfounded on the available evidence.  See 
above at 6.3.2. 
200 See 6.4.2.2 above. 
201 See 4.9 above, the original Hillsborough Disaster inquests and the Widgery Inquiry into Bloody 
Sunday. 
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pursue their concerns.  But as well as the instrumental good that this does for ensuring that 
the end narrative (verdict/conclusion) addresses the concerns and suspicions of those with 
a special interest in the narrative, it is also an act of recognition that marks the ǲagentǯs status as responsibleǳ.202  Their agency is consolidated through the ǲcapacity to raise and defend claims discursivelyǳ in a matter which affects them.203  In this respect, Anderson 
explains, ǲthe importance of rights in connection with self-respect lies in the fact that rights 
ensure the real opportunity to exercise the universal capacities constitutive of 
personhood.ǳ204 
The exclusion of those with a legitimate interest in the narrative formation process, and 
the failure to provide a reliable account of what happened to cause a death, are usually not 
the only types of misrecognition that can occur in these circumstances.  It was argued in 
Chapter 6 that there is also the real harm that can derive from false, inaccurate and one-
sided narratives that can arise in the absence of a reliable, official and public one.205  These 
narratives can give loaded descriptions of the circumstances that led to the death, or the 
perceived deviancy of the deceased and/or any group or community with which the 
deceased is identified: at times using language that plays on racial and other stereotypes.206 
A number of illustrative examples were observed in Chapter 6, that appeared to express 
the sense of injustice that can be experienced by those who are denied, or suffer a delay in 
reliable, public and official narratives as to how loved ones died, and the sense of justice 
that can come with reliable, official and public narratives.207 
 
9.5.ͷ.5 Recognition on the third tier of Honnethǯs tripartite schema208 Finally, it is appropriate to briefly consider the relevance of (onnethǯs third level of 
recognition. Chapter 7 described how this relates to the recognition of individualsǯ 
                                                 
202 Anderson in Honneth 1996 (ch 1, n 23) p.xic. 
203 ibid. 
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205 See 6.4.2.2 above. 
206 Pemberton (2008) (ch 6, n 48); Scraton and Chadwick (1986) (ch 4, n 156); Cohen (1993) (ch 6, n 50); 
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particular traits and abilities.209  Openness and participatory rights may not only exist in 
order to bestow their value upon those claiming them.  They may also be understood as 
progressive acts that recognise the positive contribution that different participants can 
bring to investigatory processes, and the positive role that a properly informed citizenry 
can play in the public sphere. 
The deceasedǯs family can bring a sense of responsibility and determination to ensure 
that all the facts are brought to light and lessons are learnt.  For example, Adrienne Mubenga commented in the aftermath of her husbandǯs death: ) canǯt stand by and watch this happen to another family. ) have to do that for 
Jimmy.210 
What this level of determination can achieve in practice was recognised by Dr Silvia 
Casale in her review of the IPCC investigation into the death of Sean Rigg: 
The Review considers that the family are fellow travellers in the search for the 
truth; the perspective of the family must be recognised as important.  The Rigg 
family were determined to see that a thorough investigation took place.  Their 
considerable and sustained efforts resulted in the emergence of information 
that might otherwise not have seen the light of day.  The Rigg family are to be commended for their tenacity and commitment in this regard.ǳ211 The attitude of the Rigg family can be compared to Casaleǯs conclusions about the 
attitude of the IPCC investigators: 
The interviewers did not pursue failures on the part of the police with sufficient rigour […].  Most of the interviewers appeared ready to accept the police officersǯ view of events without following up potential lines of questioning.212 
The participation of representatives of the family, community and wider public can be a 
vital safeguard against processes which can otherwise tend towards limited, internalised 
                                                 
209 See 7.3.2.2 above. 
210 Matthew Taylor, ǮJimmy Mubengaǯs Widow: ) Canǯt Watch This (appen to Another Familyǯ The 
Guardian (London, 26 December 2014) <http://tinyurl.com/qburjtj> accessed 27 June 2015. 
211 Casale (ch 3, n 89) 12–13. 
212 ibid, 95. 
 297 
discourses amongst professional classes who may be out of touch with the realities of Ǯordinaryǯ peopleǯs experiences in the social sphere.  In inquests, coroners are either 
lawyers or doctors (occasionally both).  Coronersǯ officers are typically seconded or retired 
police officers.  The state institutions and the individual state actors who were involved in a 
death are always well-represented during proceedings.  Even where an inquest is held with 
a jury, and the family of the deceased take an active part, the Charity INQUEST observed 
that its research into the experiences of families shows that ǲthe common experience in 
[inquests] involving institutions […] is that there is a perception of professional closing of ranks and institutional bias from coroners in favour of professionals.ǳ213 The deceasedǯs family and their legal representatives, as well as representatives of the 
wider public, can bring their particular knowledge and experience to an investigation.  This 
can contribute to the pool of forensic skills that a diversity of participants naturally brings: 
whether when probing (family and jury) or evaluating (jury) evidence.  Any group that 
identifies particularly with the deceased may also bring valuable experience and 
perspectives of the day-to-day realities of intersubjective interaction with state actors, to 
which the deceased may have been exposed. 
Misrecognition of these qualities can be particularly frustrating and painful for those 
concerned.  Here Haldemann describes the harm that misrecognition on both the second and third level of (onnethǯs scheme can cause: 
Humiliation, as Honneth defines it for us, is a matter of being denied a certain 
status in communication with others.  It evokes painful feelings of being 
ignored, of not being taken seriously, of being denied a voice, of being refused 
an ear, of being cut out of the conversation with your fellows.  When a person is 
denied the possibility of ever being recognised as a valuable contributor to 
some shared project, and when that person is treated as though his presence 
counts for nothing, it is natural for him to experience this as a serious lack of 
respect or decency.214 
  
                                                 
213 INQUEST (2002) (ch 3, n 69) 25. 
214 Haldemann (ch 6, n 16) 691–2. 
 298 
  
 299 
 
 
Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion 
  
 300 
Truth and justice are intrinsically, not just instrumentally, linked 
Elizabeth Kiss1 
This thesis has argued that the prime rationales for openness in inquests into use-of-
force deaths at the hands of the state are clearly distinct from those behind traditional 
conceptions of open justice in criminal and civil justice contexts.  As the analysis has shown, 
openness is a fundamental and intrinsic requirement—rather than merely an instrumental 
aid—for the fulfilment of the main purposes behind the investigatory processes engaged 
following deaths at the hands of the police, and in police and prison custody. 
The thesis framed a context-specific conception of open justice based on the principle 
that deaths at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody will be opened up to 
public scrutiny.  Recognition theory was introduced to the analysis as a way of providing a 
normative understanding of the significance of openness and the link between openness 
and justice in these circumstances.  In particular, it provides a moral argument for the 
importance of participatory rights and accountability, where their absence can cause 
significant harms for those with an interest in a death.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, recognition theory suggests that the harms that may predictably arise as a result 
of misrecognition, through inappropriate state responses to a death, may be significant.  As Smith argues, the meaning of morality is bound up with recognitionǯs social and 
institutional expression.  The moral duty of the state, therefore, is to help provide ǲthe 
social infrastructure—in terms of recognition relationships—that enables all individuals […] to live their lives well.ǳ2 
The modern procedural manifestation of openness and the purposes behind it are 
largely sympathetic to what have been argued to be the requirements of justice as 
recognition in these circumstances. 
First, these deaths are normally investigated by either the police and the PPO, or the 
IPCC.  These preliminary investigations are then usually followed by an inquest.  We saw in 
Part 1 that all of the investigating bodies that carry out preliminary investigations commit 
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to at least a degree of openness to the public and to engaging with the family of the 
deceased.  We saw that the degree of such a commitment varies but that generally the 
information and evidence gathered, and the conclusions drawn, should eventually be 
shared with either the coroner or an inquiry chairman/panel.  Any relevant evidence that 
has not already been shared with the family by preliminary investigations, should then be 
shared with them through pre-inquest disclosure.  Relevant evidence that bears upon the 
question of who the deceased was and when, where and by what means and in what 
circumstance they died, should then also become accessible to the public through the 
inquest or inquiry. 
It was observed that the inquest is the primary way in which the state ensures that the 
circumstances of a death are opened up to public scrutiny.  Inquests are open to the public, 
relatively broad in scope, and create an official and public narrative (albeit the formal 
conclusions of which may be very brief) about how the deceased came by their death.  The 
family of the deceased can attend and participate in the inquest.  They can make 
representations to the coroner regarding, for example, lines of inquiry and which witnesses 
should be called.  And they can either personally or through their legal representatives 
question witnesses.  While primarily representing their own interests and concerns, it was 
argued that they will often effectively represent the interests of any group or community 
that identifies with the deceased, as well as any concerns that might be held by the wider 
public. 
In inquests into deaths at the hands of the police, or in police or prison custody, the 
public interest in the inquest will also normally be represented by the presence of a jury—
unless a death in custody was clearly by natural causes.3  These members of the public 
effectively ensure that there is a degree of public scrutiny throughout the hearing of 
evidence.  We also saw that they can put their own questions to witnesses, and that it is 
their task to reach conclusions as to how the deceased came by her death. 
Chapter 5 described how in some cases an inquiry under the IA 2005 will be held 
instead of an inquest.  These are generally less open to the public than inquests, as they do 
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not have juries, and there are significant formal restrictions on the ability of core 
participants to question witnesses.  In addition to these general limits on the openness of 
inquiries, we also saw that they can go into closed sessions, whereby any or all of the 
public, press and the family of the deceased can be excluded from the hearing of evidence.  
Nevertheless, it was argued that the pervasiveness of the procedural obligation under 
Article 2 ECHR, should ensure that the circumstances of use-of-force deaths at the hands of 
the state are always substantially open to public scrutiny, and that investigations 
effectively engage with the family of the deceased.  In Chapter 5 it was argued that this 
appears to have been borne out by the Azelle Rodney Inquiry. 
Despite this generally positive view of modern practice in England and Wales there are 
concerns.  In particular, the distinctive normative understanding that recognition theory 
provides us, in terms of the role of openness in securing non-retributive and non-
compensatory justice forms, has potentially transformative implications for investigations 
in these circumstances.  The application of recognition theory prompts questions about 
whether some of the interests outlined in Chapter 6 are adequately recognised given the 
stakes at play and the harms that can be associated with misrecognition. 
The implications of this analysis for most inquests into use-of-force deaths, may be 
subtle: for example, it may strengthen the argument for a rebalancing of priorities in 
decisions on public funding in favour of families always having their legal representation 
publicly funded in these types of inquest; it may motivate renewed efforts to tackle the 
delays that plague these types of inquests; or it may prompt more consistent best practice 
in terms of making transcripts and evidence available to the public on the internet as was 
done in the Azelle Rodney Inquiry and the Mark Duggan inquest.  The normative 
understanding of the significance of openness in these circumstances may also argue for a 
change in the law so that inquest proceedings in these circumstances can be broadcast 
live.4  But the normative understanding of openness in the context provided above may 
also justify more radical reform.  For example, taking a cue from judicial review 
proceedings, it may be appropriate to allow civil society organisations such as community 
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organisations or organisations like the Howard League, the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission or the Mental Health Foundation, to intervene in certain inquests.  They may 
be able to raise concerns on behalf of particular groups or communities who may identify 
with the deceased.  They will also have particular knowledge of patterns of risk, 
institutional failings and other concerns in their areas, which a coroner, and certainly an 
unrepresented family, may lack.  This may be particularly important where the deceasedǯs 
family are unable or unwilling to participate in an inquest. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the current climate, the implications of this 
analysis may be most significant when the case for openness needs to be justified against 
encroaching interests that push for a deviation from the normal procedures of openness as 
embodied in modern inquests.  In particular, decisions about the use of exceptional 
procedures that close down openness—for example, public interest immunity, and the 
replacement of certain inquests with inquiries—may benefit from a rebalancing of 
priorities that pays better attention to the potential consequences of misrecognition 
through closure in these circumstances. 
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